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A bstract
The objective of this thesis is to explore the notion of extended mind, 
specifically how dynamic social phenomena, such as social interaction, can be 
seen to constitute a cognitive process. To do this it is explained that not only 
do representations form in the minds of individuals through an individuars 
nervous system and body, but that representations can also be seen to form 
in the minds of individuals through participation in social institutions. The 
social institution with which this thesis is concerned is exchange, and a case 
study of Classic Maya ground stone exchange serves as an illustration of how 
the notion of social institutions as source** of cognition can be applied to the 
archaeological record.
The view of cognition adopted in this thesis is based in part on recent 
advances in cognitive scientific research, which proposes tha t cognition arises 
from dynamical systems to which individuals are attuned. These dynamical 
systems are thereby considered cognitive systems. Much cognitive research 
has focused on cognition that arises via the nervous system or motor actions 
of individuals. This thesis proposes that social systems can be seen to form 
dynamical systems to which people are attuned and, as such, social systems 
can also be regarded as cognitive systems or, more accurately, as supra- 
individual cognitive systems. Supra-individual cognitive systems generate 
representations a phenomenon I refer to as internalization tha t mani­
fest themselves in the social environment as well as in the individual brain. 
In turn, once representations become mentally processed by an individual, 
they can be expressed through action affecting the functional organization of
the supra-individual cognitive system; I refer to this phenomenon as exter- 
nalization.
One implication of this thesis is th a t archaeologists can become involved 
in lines of inquiry that generate hypotheses about representations experi­
enced by people in the past. Representations proposed to have been experi­
enced by people in the past can be rigorously described — that is, described 
in a way that can be critically examined by mathematically modeling and 
analyzing supra-individual cognitive systems that can be inferred to have 
existed in the past. In this thesis, the view of cognition I employ and the 
methodology for realizing this view of cognition constitute the first steps 
toward a cognitive archaeology th a t is concerned with the modeling and 
analysis of supra-individual cognitive systems.
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Preface
To contextualize the ideas presented here, it is important to explain how I 
became interested in cognition. Because the idea for this research is closely 
tied to  my experiences in the environment in which I conducted my fieldwork, 
it is relevant to describe my study area and how my research resulted in my 
intcrcwt in the topic of cognition.
I first began work with the Maya Mountains Archaeological Project (MMAP) 
in the Maya Mountains1 of southern Belize in March of 1994 as an under­
graduate. The MMAP was a multi-year National Geographic funded project 
headed by Dr. Peter Dunham of Cleveland State University. The MMAP’s 
purpose was to investigate a little known region characterized in the literature 
as a backwater of little significance in ancient times (Hammond 1975:105). 
The project followed up on exploratory research in the region (Graham 1984; 
Shipley and Graham 1984) that indicated instead that the ancient Maya ex-
*The Maya Mountains make up the only significant topographical relief on the Yu­
catan platform (West 1964:70-73; Wright et al. 1959). The Maya Mountains run along a 
southwest-northeast axis in the interior of Belize. The northeast end of the range is located 
in the present day Cayo District of Belize while the southwest end of the chain extends 
into neighboring Guatemala. Along this axis, the Maya Mountains chain is approximately 
150 kilometers long and about 75 kilometers wide. The highest point, Doyle’s Delight, is 
approximately 1,200 meters above sea level.
ploited the Maya Mountains for rocks, minerals,2 as well as biota.3
Because of the multidisciplinary focus, the project included geologists and 
biologists whose primary purpose was to look for rocks, minerals, and biota 
th a t the ancient Maya would have valued and therefore would have wanted 
to exploit. This crossing of disciplines not only facilitated the project in its 
objec tive, which was to shed light on ancient Maya occupation in the region, 
bu t it also benefited the scientists in their own respective fields. Geologists 
and biologists were allowed to use the infrastructure of the MMAP to carry 
on their own subprojects in a region that is difficult to penetrate.4 As a result 
of the infrastructure that the MMAP provided, several new species of birds, 
snakes, fish, and plants were discovered, including an archaic strain of cacao 
tha t is not found outside the Maya Mountains (Dunham e t al 1992-2000).
As archaeologists on the project, our objective was to explore the region
2Because the Maya Mountains exhibit no value in terms of industrial mineral resources 
(Dixon 1956; Graham 1994) or extensive cultivable land (Wright et aL 1959), the moun­
tains are uninhabited and commercially unexploited today. It is not until we shed our 
contemporary views that we see that the Maya Mountains zone comprises a wide range of 
mineral and biotic resources that provided attractive opportunities for resource exploita­
tion in the past (i.e., in the context of a non-globally oriented market).
•*The Maya Mountains have a high annual rainfall, which approaches five meters. It
also retains cool temperatures, which can get as low as 4°C. For this reason, the Maya 
Mountains of southern Belize support a wide range of flora and fauna that are not common 
in the r a t  of Central America. As one of the two last Pleistocene refuges on Earth (the 
other being the Amazon Basin) (Dunham et al 1998), the Maya Mountains harbor several
biological species that have become extinct elsewhere.
4The Maya Mountains are not imposing in the sense of height; however, they do con­
stitute a formidable area to penetrate. Due to the extremely nigged terrain, the mountain 
range is geographically isolated from the rest of the Maya Lowlands and is, therefore, dif­
ficult to traverse. Hernando Cortes discovered this fact when he lost well over two-thirds 
of his horses crossing the western flanks of the Maya Mountains in 1525 (Sharer 1994:736).
for communities that would have exploited the resources in the Maya Moun­
tains. When sites were discovered, we cleared them of low vegetation and 
mapped them. Small-scale excavations in the region were only started in the 
later years of the project when the reconnaissance phase of the project was 
completed. As a result of the work conducted by the MMAP, we discov­
ered over 18 new sites most of these modest sized communities, but with 
nearly all of the trappings (e.g. settlement features) of important Classic 
Maya polities.
The Maya Mountains constituted a microcosm of Classic Maya civiliza­
tion, in which inter-community (polity) interaction could be analyzed within 
a bounded area. Every community was situated in an alluvial pocket5 cir­
cumscribed by high cliffs in an extremely rugged karstic environment. As a 
result, topography constrained settlement in such a way that the boundaries 
of communities could be delineated, with interconnections represented by wa­
terways and fossil drainages. The implication was that multiple communities 
could be studied as interacting systems. At another level, I saw the inter­
community arrangement as a network or circuit in which the communities 
were the nodes, and the drainages, were the routes of interaction.
In a given three-month season, the MMAP managed three to four arduous 
three-w<x;k expeditions. From our base camp in Big Falls in the Toledo 
District, it took several hours of driving to arrive at the foot of the Maya 
Mountains in pick-up trucks loaded with K’ekchi and Mopan Maya guides, 
scientists, and supplies. It then involved a difficult two-day hike/climb with
5The rivers and streams draining the mountains cut steep courses, and deposition of 
alluvium is limited to relatively small pockets, at least until the rivers reach the coastal 
plain, where more extensive alluvial deposition is possible (Wright et al 1959). Alluvium 
is important for growing crops and it had important consequences for the development of 
ancient settlements in the Maya Mountains.
xiv
heavy packs into the convoluted karstic interior of the Maya Mountains. 
Due to the heat and humidity, and the sheer exertion involved in getting 
through the rugged terrain to the base-of-operations camp, some members of 
the project had to return to Big Falls. In later years, however, the exertion 
involved in getting to the base-of-operations camp was greatly alleviated with 
British military helicopter support.
Initially, when I began my Ph.D. research, what interested me was how 
Maya civilization could have arisen in such harsh environmental conditions. 
Given my background in mathematics, I was interested in using mathematics 
to model interaction among communities to shed light specifically on the eco­
nomic conditions underlying Maya society in the region. Later, my modeling 
revealed to me that what was being modeled resembled what is known as 
a neural network (Rao and Rao 1995). This had far reaching implications, 
because the equations that govern neural dynamics are the same equations 
used to describe how cognition emerges from a network.
As I later discovered, all dynamical systems can be conceived of as having 
rudimentary cognitive capacity from an information processing standpoint, 
and this means that social systems in general, if shown to constitute credible 
dynamic al systems, may be seen to have cognitive capability. One has only to 
verify via modeling and testing that the social systems one is hypothesizing 
<is dynamical systems can be seen to comprise credible dynamical systems. 
The implications of acceding to this point go well beyond the implications 
tha t systems theory held for archaeology from the 1960s to the present, which 
mainly held the system as either an unverifiable hypothesis or as a conceptual 
tool. Since I propose that the hypothesis of a social system as a dynamical 
system can be verified to some extent depending on the social system, it 
should be possible to reconstruct the information that was being processed
xv
by the social system for the ancient people being studied. W hat emerges 
is the realization that some social systems may be conceived of as cognitive 
systems and the modeling of these systems can be used to gain insight into 
the minds attuned to the systems. My objective in this thesis, therefore, is 
to take the first steps toward building a model in which cognition can be seen 
as extending into the social world, thereby making the study of certain social 
institutions, such as exchange systems, a part of the study of cognition.
My case study serves as an illustration of how these first steps can be 
taken toward a comprehensive model of cognition and of how a new con­
ception of cognition resulting from these first steps can be applied. The 
Maya Mountains serve as a laboratory in my study, and the archaeology of 
Maya Mountains communities serves as a means of providing insight into the 
general subjects of cognition and society.
xvi
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: Situating the  
Thesis O bjective
1.1 R esearch Q u estion
Archaeological data are used to model interaction among communities in 
the Maya Mountains to shed light on the regional economy. The process of 
modeling reveals that the interaction among the communities can be seen 
to constitute a dynamical system. Because all dynamical systems inherently 
have rudimentary cognitive capability they process information (i.e. dy­
namical systems have memory in which information can be stored and from 
which information may be recalled) and because the exchange network il­
luminated by the archaeological data reflects social interaction, my objective 
in this thesis is to show how cognition can be seen to extend to the social 
world. The further implication is that studying the genesis of social institu­
tions1 such as exchange systems can be conceived of as a part of the study of
1 institution: A custom, practice, relationship, or behavioral pattern of importance in 
the life of a community or society. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English
1
cognition. (Please refer to Glossary for definitions of key terms used.) My 
archaeological case study serves to illustrate how a view of cognition can be 
formulated that is applicable to archaeological practice. The Maya Moun­
tains serve in my study as a laboratory, and the archaeology of the Maya 
Mountains communities serves as a means for shedding light on the subjects 
of cognition and society.
1.2 D ifferent A pproaches to  th e  S tu d y  o f  C og­
nition
The subject matter of cognition is commonly regarded to be studied by psy­
chologists. However, computer scientists, mathematicians, and engineers, or 
what I refer to as specialists in information processing, also study cogni­
tion. Though psychologists and information processing specialists study the 
same phenomenon, namely cognition, they are often concerned with study­
ing different aspects of cognition and they therefore tend to take different 
approaches to the study of cognition.
Psychologists are primarily concerned with an approach to cognition that 
can be related to the way humans think or behave. Psychologists are often 
counselors and, for this, knowledge of cognition as it relates to the human 
brain is necessary. For some psychologists, the object of analysis is human 
behavior, whereas for others the object of analysis is the neurons that are 
firing and consequently producing representations in the human brain. Often, 
though, psychologists are interested in how humans process information only 
so far as it illuminates why humans behave the way that they do. Data 
regarding an individual’s cognitive capabilities are usually collected by the
Language, Third Edition. Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1992.
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psychologist through observing and interacting with the subject.
Specialists in information processing, on the other hand, deal with the 
mechanics of information processing and, hence, cognition. The study of in­
formation processing originated out of an interest in the human brain (Turing 
1950) but eventually evolved into a distinct field, referred to as neural dy­
namics (Wu 1999). The information processing approach to cognition deals 
with examining the ways in which nodes interact in a network; it analyzes in­
teraction to determine the conditions under which cognition (i.e. information 
processing capability) is produced or effected.
The psychological and information processing approaches differ with re- 
speet to focus. Whereas psychologists study cognition in the context of the 
biochemistry and individual behavior of human beings, specialists in the area 
of information processing view cognition in terms that do not require a hu­
man physiological substrate in order to produce cognition. Cognition instead 
extends conceptually beyond human beings to artificial intelligence as well. 
Specialists in information processing approach the nature of cognition in a 
context that can include, but is not limited to, human beings.
Cognition does not need to be defined archetypically as physiological or 
psychological. Cognition arises in nervous systems, machines, and in essen­
tially any substrate where the functional mechanisms that evoke cognitive 
capability are present (e.g. social institutions, as we shall see in Chapter 7).
In this thesis, I adopt an information processing approach to the study of 
cognition. Although archaeological information can be seen to reflect human 
behavior, neither humans nor their behavior can be observed in ways that 
permit inferences to be drawn according to the terms of a psychological 
approach to cognition. To put it simply, the living human substrate which is 
required of the psychological approach is absent. An information processing
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approach, however, permits cognition to be studied in just such a context as 
archaeology, in which the living human substrate is missing.
Thus, the way information is processed can theoretically be abstracted 
from an archaeological context, and in my case I will propose a mathematical 
means of abstraction.
1.3 T he T h esis O b jective
My objective is to describe how cognition can be seen to emerge from inter­
acting participants or groups of participants comprising a social institution. 
The kind of institution on which I will focus, and which is represented in my 
archaeological data from the Maya Mountains, is inter-community exchange. 
It will be shown that exchange in this circumstance can be conceived of as a 
source of cognition independent of the kind that is generated by the human 
brain. Given the nature of the evidence, we cannot make a provable connec­
tion to the living, operating human brain, but we can observe the effects of 
the interaction of the humans who once lived and at least make theoretically 
supportable connections to the living human brain.
Exchange is both interactive (goods exchange hands) and social (involves 
communities of individuals that sen; themselves as part of a society). The 
cognition tha t potentially emerges from interaction of this kind I shall term 
“supra-individual cognition” . Supra-individual cognition, however, is not 
unaffected by individual cognition (generated by the brain), nor is individ­
ual cognition unaffected by supra-individual cognition. To understand how 
supra-individual cognition can be seen to affect individual cognition and in 
turn how individual cognition can be seen to affect supra-individual cogni­
tion, I offer an explanation of how the conceptual gap between the two forms
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of cognition can be bridged and how in doing this a comprehensive way of 
envisioning human cognition emerges. This new way of envisioning cognition 
reveals important implications with regards to key social theoretical views 
utilized in archaeology and anthropology.
To accomplish this thesis objective, the following steps are followed:
• Cognitive research and the direction in which it is heading is reviewed. 
Much of my thesis is dedicated to looking at cognitive research histor­
ically and how, as time goes on, philosophers and cognitive scientists 
are coming to  recognize the fact that cognition is much more pervasive 
than some had originally thought possible. Research supporting the 
pervasiveness of cognition is discussed.
•  A mathematical model is used to describe a Classic Maya ground stone 
exchange system that once operated in the Maya Mountains of south­
ern Belize, and an economic analysis of the exchange system and its 
model is conducted. My description and analysis of the model and 
the exchange system demonstrate that exchange can be regarded as 
a source of cognition, thus supporting a view of the pervasiveness of 
cognition. If enough information is known about how social, political, 
and economic systems operated, then archaeologists may be able? to 
reconstruct aspects of past human mind frames.
•  A comprehensive means of envisioning cognition is proposed by con­
sidering the evidence for the pervasiveness of cognition. The notion of 
the pervasiveness of cognition leads to a new evaluation of cognition, 
and the first step is taken toward developing a model that can account 
for the pervasiveness of cognition. A model that accounts for the per­
vasiveness of cognition entails a new conception of cognition which can
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be seen to impact several social theoretical issues in archaeology and 
anthropology. I explore the influence of this conception on two social 
theoretical issues: the epidemiological view of cultural traits in cultural 
evolutionary theory, and agency.
1 .3 .1  T h e T h ree P a rts  to  th e  T h esis
The steps that are followed to achieve my thesis objective form three major 
parts, each part containing two to three chapters.
Part I
Part I of the thesis provides the background to the history of the study of cog­
nition. Its purpose is to show the archaeologist how conceptions of cognition 
have changed through time and what the current outlook is on cognition. It 
is im portant to dedicate an entire part to these conceptions because to those 
not familiar with the cognitive literature, the proposal of supra-individual 
cognition might sound fanciful. However, it is important to understand that 
supra-individual cognition is not as fantastic as it might initially sound. In 
fact, the notion that cognition pervades substrates other than the neural sub­
strate (e.g. from inter-community or inter-personal networks) (Block 1978; 
Chalmers 1996) is related to the current established notion that cognition is 
a system incorporating the individual and the environment, called extended 
mind (Mithen 2001) or extemalism  (Clark anti Chalmers 1998; Turvey and 
Carello 1995; Donald 1991). This part is an accumulation of research which I 
will later draw on as I take the first steps toward developing a comprehensive 
way of conceiving of cognition.
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C h a p te r  2 charts the course of cognitive research, with special emphasis 
oil where cognition resides. This chapter is important because it contains 
information that is pertinent to taking the first steps to viewing cognition in 
a more holistic manner. Though Chapter 2 may be redundant for those who 
have studied the history of psychology, it is critical for those unfamiliar with 
cognition and the debates surrounding it. For example, in this chapter, the 
idea that cognition is computation is explored, the implications of this idea 
being th a t cognition is substrate independent and that it can manifest itself 
outside the individual in the environment.
C h a p te r  3 revises the view, expounded at the end of Chapter 2, which 
is tha t cognition is computation. It examines the same fundamental ques­
tions as the first chapter only under a different paradigm called the dynam­
ical, system ; that is, many cognitive scientists today regard cognition to be 
best understood as a dynamical system. A dynamical system is a series of 
functionally related components which acts through time and is commonly 
described mathematically by differential equations. It is argued in Chapter 
3 that cognition is dynamical in nature rather than computational.
Part II
Part II of the thesis deals with the economic approach which I will utilize to 
describe Classic Maya exchange in the Maya Mountains. It also deals with 
the reconstruction and analysis of my case study of Bladen exchange. The 
economics discussed in this part of the thesis will be helpful in contributing 
to our understanding of cognition to be discussed in the third part of the 
thesis.
The archaeological case study that I will be examining constitutes an
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Figure 1: A mano and m etate (photograph in Willey [1978]).
inter-community exchange system within the Bladen Branch of the southern 
Maya Mountains. Under the supervision of Dr. William Meurer, the project 
geologist for the MMAP, I have been able to reconstruct an exchange net­
work of manos and metates. Manos and metates are ground stone grinding 
implements which were utilized to grind seeds and grains into flour, but more 
important, they were used extensively in ritual activities and for developing 
inter-household relations.
The data collected from this research will be used to construct a formal 
economic model of exchange, which will be analyzed mathematically to ob­
tain information regarding the quantity of manos and metates per household 
at each of the Bladen communities. This model is then assessed with respect 
to ethnographic data.
C h a p te r  4 changes direction from cognition to economics. In this chapter 
the focus is on the economic approach that is taken to model inter-community 
exchange in the Bladen region of the Maya Mountains of southern Belize.
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One of my objectives in this chapter is to situate my approach theoretically. 
I characterize my approach as formal with some substantive components (see 
Section 4.1.4).2
C h a p te r  5 is focused on the archaeological case study which investigates 
Classic Maya ground stone exchange on an inter-community scale. The pur­
pose of this chapter is to describe the case study to facilitate understanding of 
the mathematical model I use to describe Bladen exchange in the next chap­
ter. This chapter has two objectives: To reconstruct an inter-community 
ground stone exchange network among three economic centers located in the 
Bladen region of the Maya Mountains, and to investigate export of ground 
stone tools to centers outside of tin; Bladen region. Investigating export in­
volves contrasting two exchange phenomena one exchange phenomenon 
manifests itself among centers in a local context, and another manifests itself 
between regions. The data I use to investigate these phenomena have been 
obtained through sourcing manos and metates at several communities inside 
and outside of the Bladen region.
C h a p te r  6 focuses on demonstrating that my archaeological case study 
of exchange constitutes a credible dynamical system. In my case study, I 
investigate Classic Maya ground stone exchange among three economic cen­
ters, all of which are located in tributary valleys of the Bladen Branch in the 
southern Maya Mountains. Data are drawn from ethnographic, ethnohis- 
toric, geological, and archaeological sources in order to reconstruct Bladen 
exchange, as well as to infer the significance of manos and metates in the 
Bladen region. A mathematical model is then constructed in order to de­
2For an in depth discussion of what constitutes a substantive economic model and what 
constitutes a formal economic model, refer to Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2.
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scribe Bladen exchange. The mathematical model is based on supply and 
demand. This model is then assessed by comparing the output generated by 
the model with ethnographic data.
P a r t  I I I
Part III synthesizes the research that was discussed in Part I regarding the 
nature and pervasiveness of cognition. I then turn to my archaeological case 
study and show that the dynamical system of ground stone exchange among 
the Bladen communities, which my mathematical model describes, further 
supports the pervasive view of cognition (i.e. its substrate independence), the 
conclusion being that there is cognition associated with the Bladen exchange 
system. This means that social institutions such as exchange can in a general 
sense be regarded as sources of cognition. The notion developed is that there 
is an abundance of such sources. However, if there exist multiple sources of 
cognition in this world, then a model must be conceived of which explains 
how it is that each of these sources of cognition affect each other. I propose 
the first steps in realizing such a model and discuss implications for social 
theoretical issues in archaeology.
C h a p te r  7 synthesizes the research discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. Chap­
ter 7 demonstrates that the Bladen exchange system can be conceived of as 
a supra-individual cognitive process. W hat is discovered from the mathe­
matical (i.e. functional) description of the Bladen exchange system as well 
as the nature of the actual exchange system is that it not only describes a 
dynamical system, but it describes a cognitive system. This would be con­
sistent with current cognitive scientific research, which essentially defines a 
cognitive system to be a dynamical system to which an individual is attuned.
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With regards to the Bladen exchange system, attunement to the exchange 
system gives the exchange system its cognitive character.
C h a p te r  8 follows through with Chapter 7’s implications of what it means 
for exchange systems and other social institutions to be cognitive. If there 
exist cognitive systems other than the cognitive systems that occupy human 
nervous systems, then multiple sources of cognition exist. These independent 
sources of cognition, however, must affect each other in some manner, since 
the effects of cognitive systems can be felt on each other. An attem pt is 
made at realizing a model tha t explains how cognitive systems interact while 
retaining their independence. The implications for social theoretical issues 
are also discussed to illustrate the explanatory power of such a model.
1.4 T he S ta tu s o f  th e  M ind in  C ogn itive  A n ­
th rop ology  and A rchaeology and Its  Im ­
p lications for a M od el o f  C ogn ition
In this chapter, I situate my thesis with regard to research that has been 
c arried out in anthropology and archaeology on cognition. In general, cog­
nitive studies in anthropology and archaeology are concerned with attem pts 
to understand what kinds of minds we have or what the mind is like with the 
objective of obtaining a description of the mind. For example, the mind has 
been described using various metaphors from a “cathedral” (Mithen 1996:67) 
to a “structure-seeking device” (D’Andrade 1995:120). My objective on the 
other hand is to understand more fully the processes or underlying mechanics 
of the mind, an understanding to which archaeology can contribute.
Up to now, archaeology has contributed to an understanding of cognition
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largely through expanding our knowledge of the evolutionary record and 
suggesting how evolutionary processes have resulted in the modern mind 
of which the brain plays a central role. My thesis is oriented differently. 
Instead, I attem pt to draw on the notion that the underlying mechanics of 
the mind can also be seen to underlie the social environment (i.e. the social 
institutions pervading a particular society) as well as the brain and that 
our understanding of cognition can be furthered through the study of social 
institutions in the archaeological record.
In the past decade, the evolutionary psychological model of cognition sub­
scribed to by anthropologists such as Dan Sperber and archaeologists such 
as Steven Mithen, which can be senm to be a dominating view in cognitive 
anthropology and archaeology, comes as the result of expanding our knowl­
edge of the evolutionary record. However, the data that have been collected 
by anthropologists and which have served this model can be interpreted in 
another way, which differs from the evolutionary psychological model of cog­
nition. For this reason, and because the nature of the contribution from 
archaeology is at issue, it is important to discuss the contrasting approaches, 
how they stand in relation to each other, and how each of them can be 
seen to be upheld by cognitive anthropological research. Other information 
that supports a model of how the mind works, which this thesis is building 
toward, is drawn from research in the psychological, sociological, philosoph­
ical, mathematical, and engineering sciences, and I review these sources in 
the upcoming chapters.
1.4 .1  C o g n itiv e  C ap ab ilities and  R ep resen ta tio n s
Cognitive anthropologists rely heavily on the notion of cognitive capabili­
ties such as perception, memory, and reasoning — to describe the mind.
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The reason for this is that cognitive capabilities are really what cognitive 
anthropologists are talking about when they refer to mind. Thus, when cog­
nitive anthropologists speak of the kind of mind we have, what they mean 
is more specifically the nature of our cognitive capabilities (e.g. how our 
cognitive capabilities are affected by external stimuli). Cognitive capabilities 
are investigated through representations. Representations can be seen in two 
ways. They can be seen as: I.)Concepts which form in the minds individ­
uals (e.g. ideas, beliefs, prototypes), or as 2.) Ways in which individuals 
utilize their cognitive capabilities — perceive, remember, reason (e.g. cat­
egoric  and schema). As concepts, representations can be seen as instances 
of the ways in which individuals utilize their cognitive capabilities (e.g. a 
prototype is an instance of a schema [D’Andrade 1995:179]). In this case, 
representations often can be elucidated by what human subjects report when 
they respond to a certain stimulus (e.g. a subject’s answer in response to a 
question which can illuminate the concept the subject has in mind). As ways 
in which individuals utilize their cognitive capabilities, representations can 
be considered to be built on concepts (e.g. a schema is made up of concepts 
[Sperber 1996:67-70]). In this case, representations can be elucidated by how 
human subjects respond to certain stimuli, thereby uncovering the structure 
or order behind the subjects’ thinking (Levi-Strauss 1963:33-34, 1978:11-12). 
In short, representations are concepts in the mind, whether they are built up 
from constituent concepts to form ways of thinking or are instances of these 
ways of thinking. Moreover, the kinds of representations on which people 
report tell the cognitive anthropologist much about what the mind is like 
(D’Andrade 1995:182).
On a more fundamental level, representations are two things: 1.) They 
are the products of cognitive processes or systems (van Gelder and Port
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1995:11-12), 2.) And they are signs and thus are not only informational — 
representation is often synonymous with information — but are meaningful 
to the interpreter in question. W ith regard to this latter point, it makes 
sense th a t capacity for meaning is closely associated with the memory stor­
age. Information stored in memory can be seen as being meaningful to the 
interpreter at some level, making this information a representation (Sperber 
1996:74,78,80). As a result, a representation is characterized as being long­
standing. Thus, there is some overlap between 1 and 2, since the storage of a 
representation into memory is the result of cognitive processes or information 
processing to be more specific.
If we look at anthropological work rooted in semiotics, much of which is 
based on Saussure’s (I960) model of the sign, the instantiation of a repre­
sentation begins supra-individually (e.g. Geertz 1973, Sahlins 1976). There 
is a stimulus external to the individual and there is an internal image of the 
stimulus which calls upon an internal signified concept. Thus, in Saussure’s 
model of the sign we see four entities: an external stimulus, an internal sig- 
nifier, an internal signified concept, and an interpreter (i.e. in this case the 
individual). TYaditionally, the sign system is the system involving the last 
three entities, namely the internal signifier, the internally signified concept, 
and the interpreter; but some researchers have conflated the external stim­
ulus with the internal signifier, making the external stimulus the signifier in 
the sign system (e.g. Sperber 1996:61). For others, the representation is the 
signifier, whereas for others still the representation is the signified concept, 
which is the meaning or more specifically the signification of the signifier. In 
another instance, for some researchers, it makes little difference which com­
ponent of the sign is referred to as the representation, because signification is 
instantiation, which is to say that the signifier and the signified are instances
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of each other (i.e. one and the same).
The way I use the term representation should be clear by the context in 
which I use it. I generally take the view that the representation is the signified 
concept (i.e. the meaning of the signifier) and that signifier and signified are 
separate until explained otherwise. For example, I explain later in the chapter 
that signifier and signified can become associated, in effect becoming one, by 
considering signification to be a process — rather than an instantiation — 
in which a signifier is provided with meaning (i.e. a signified concept) and 
meaning is provided with a signifier. For the association between signifier and 
signified to manifest itself, it suffices to show that the signification process 
is capable of memory storage (as I alluded to above), since it is difficult to 
imagine how something in memory could not have meaning for an interpreter. 
When I use the phrase “how representations arise,” I am generally concerned 
with precisely this process in which signifier and signified become one. This 
is to say that in this particular context, I conceive of the representation as 
the entire sign and as a process in which the signifier and signified become 
associated. I rarely use representation to refer to a signifier but when I do, 
I qualify it by calling it a “public representation,” which is consistent with 
Sperber’s (1996:61) usage.
When cognitive anthropologists investigate what the mind is like, they 
do so by treating representations as if they are signs (see point 2 above). 
They are not much concerned with the specifics of how these representations 
arise, since to explain what the mind is like, it suffices to say that repre­
sentations exist a priori and that they are of a certain kind depending on 
the conditions that are determined by the controlled settings of the tests on 
subjects (e.g. having subjects from different cultures report on their percep­
tions, or having subjects recall representations after time lapses rather than
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having them report directly on their perceptions). The approach of assuming 
representations to be signs a priori can point us in the right direction for ex­
ploring explanations of how representations actually arise (i.e. the cognitive 
processes involved in the production of representations [see point 1 above]) 
which is the main concern of this thesis.3
As I mentioned above, the study of the cognitive processes or systems 
that generate representations in the mind — what I will be discussing in the 
chapters to come — is different from the study of the kinds of a priori repre­
sentations we are assumed to have in our minds. Much of cognition concerns 
the processes by which representations are perceived, learned, stored, and re­
called which amounts to how they arise as well as the executive control 
over these processes aimed to achieve certain tasks. Cognitive processes are 
commonly taken to be physiological (e.g. Johnson 1990) and or neurological 
(e.g. Sperber 1996), but the view taken here is that the material substrate in 
which cognitive processes operate need not be embodied. Representations, 
on the other hand, constitute the phenomena which cognition invokes and on 
which the subject being studied by the cognitive anthropologist can report. 
In most research, representations are usually considered to take the form of 
either images or language. The form of imagery or language enables the sub­
ject to report on the representations that are generated as the result of the 
processes involved in cognition. And it is because of the form that represen­
tations take that many aspects of the mind can be illuminated, simply from
*Simply assuming that representations are signs that appear through instantiation 
with no discussion of how the signs actually form is no explanation, and this lack of 
explanation has unfortunately guaranteed the impossibility of ever accessing the original 
signified concepts behind the signifiers. Thus, objectivists for the most part have given up 
the task entirely, leaving it to subjectivists — which is especially apparent in the schism 
between processual cognitive archaeology and interpretive archaeology.
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what the subject verbally describes of his or her experiences. Whereas the 
representations of a subject may not be exactly what the subject reports, 
the representations are close enough and constitute what cognitive anthro­
pologists and psychologists depend on to get some idea of what the subject 
is thinking about (i.e. an emic perspective).
Whereas the study of representations as signs is different from the study 
of the cognitive processes by which representations arise, the two studies 
generally have been regarded as being complementary since the time of Mc- 
Culloch and Pitts (1943) who found that neurons, which can be conceived of 
as material signifiers, have information processing capability a capability 
which can be seen to involve storing and retrieving signified concepts (see 
Section 2.2.1). Since the 1940s, cognitive research has gone a long way in 
demonstrating that there are cognitive processes at work dependent on neu­
ral dynamical systems that generate representations in the mind and which 
the individual in turn experiences and on which the individual can report 
(see Chapter 3). The complementarity of the study of representations as 
signs and the study of the cognitive processes by which representations arise 
is what enables clinical psychologists, for example, to work closely with neu­
roscientists. Although neuroscientists typically study cognition through the 
nervous system, and psychologists, the kinds of representations their subjects 
report on when exposed to certain stimuli, together psychologists and neu­
roscientists can shed important light on cognition and the mind as a whole.
Psychologists and neuroscientists study representations and cognition, 
respectively, under conditions which isolate the individual subject. Like psy­
chologists, cognitive anthropologists also study representations, but they con­
trol for factors such as culture to understand how these factors impact an 
individual’s representations. This makes the cognitive anthropologist the
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analog of the psychologist except that the settings are controlled differently. 
However, just as psychologists — who study the mind — work with neu­
roscientists — who study cognition — it is crucial that the cognitive an­
thropologist have a counterpart who is equipped to deal with the cognition 
which gives rise to representations. In short, the study of cognition and 
the study of representations constitute two ends of a continuum that repre­
sents human thought. Those who study representations on which subjects 
report approach the mind and its representations from one end and those 
who study cognition and how representations arise approach from another 
end. This notion of approaching the study of human thought from two di­
rections holds the promise that some day these studies will meet and have 
the potential to explain human thought holistically. Neither those who study 
representations nor those who study cognition are equipped on their own to 
handle the task of illuminating human thought. In anthropology we have the 
cognitive anthropologists who for the most part study representations; what 
are needed now are anthropologists and archaeologists who study cognition 
via the processes by which the representations in the mind emerge.
1 .4 .2  In n ate V ersus R e la tiv e  C o g n itiv e  C ap ab ilities
There are two schools of thought on the subject of the kind of mind we have: 
evolutionary psychology, which focuses on the structure of the mind, and the 
relativist school. These schools occupy two theoretical extremes; however, 
the general consensus is that the way the mind works lies somewhere between 
the extremes.
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Evolutionary Psychological V iew
Evolutionary psychologists propose that the mind at birth already contains 
certain kinds of information. Indeed, it is generally considered by the evolu­
tionary psychologists that not only are representations innate (e.g. Chomsky 
[1957]), but the cognitive processing of these representations constitute in­
nate, distinct, self-contained modules in the mind (Fodor 1983). How many 
representations and modules already exist when the individual is born and 
what kinds of knowledge these representations and modules reflect are still 
debated, but that representations and modules exist from birth is the hall­
mark of this school of thought.
Evolutionary psychologists envision the mind as a tool with several dif­
ferent functions. Mithen (1996) describes the mind as a Swiss-ariny knife, 
with each utensil serving a specific function. All of these functions were 
slowly acquired from the time our australopithecine ancestors branched off 
from chimpanzees five million years ago. In short, the different functions of 
the human mind evolved as adaptations to environmental features that our 
hominid ancestors experienced. These functions evolved so as to respond to 
dangers as quickly and as efficiently as possible. A general-purpose mind 
would have responded too slowly.
In evolutionary psychology, the mind does not differ significantly among 
individuals at least not individuals of the same species. The species which 
comprised our lineage (i.e. Australopithecus afarensis, Homo habilis, Homo 
erectus) thought in a different manner than we Homo sapiens now do, but 
for the most part, our species sees things in very much the same way. As 
Renfrew (2001:30) has pointed out, more evidence points to the similarities 
of our species’ thought processes than to its dissimilarities.
Evolutionary psychologists have assembled evidence from linguistic as
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well as psychological sources to support their claims (Chomsky 1957; Baars 
1986:208; Fodor 1983). Chomsky (1957) showed that it was unlikely that hu­
mans could acquire language by learning the language in a stimulus-response 
fashion without some innate representations, which he termed a universal 
grammar hardwired from birth. Building upon Chomsky’s work, Fodor 
(1983) claimed that not only do there seem to be innate representations built 
into the mind, but there seem to be embodied faculties or modules dedicated 
to the processing of these representations. These modules are components 
of the mind that would have come into existence with the individual’s birth 
and would have been the product of millions of years of adaptation.
Fodor (1983) sees the mind as having a two-tired architecture in which 
there exists a central conceptual module and a layer of efficiently function­
ing perceptual modules. The conceptual module is a central general-purpose 
module that can access, conceptualize, and process its own information as 
well as information from the perceptual modules (i.e. input devices). Ac­
cording to Fodor there is a perceptual module associated with each of the 
senses and these modules are informationally encapsulated and are equipped 
with their own information processing capabilities; they cannot access each 
other nor can they access (to any significant degree) representations stored 
in the central conceptual processor. W hat this would mean, for example, 
is that what one sees is entirely unaffected by what one hears. Similarly, 
what general knowledge one has of the world one lives in should not affect to 
any significant degree the manner in which one perceives the world. This is a 
profound claim that can be regarded as the antithesis of the Sapir-Whorf Hy­
pothesis, which proposes that our general cultural knowledge determines how 
we perceive things (Sapir 1921; Whorf 1956). Fodor (1983) proposes nearly 
the opposite — that general cultural knowledge, which would be stored in the
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central processor, has very little effect on the manner in which we perceive 
the world.
Cosmides and Tooby (Cosmides and Tooby 1992; Tooby and Cosmides 
1992) emphasize the evolutionary aspect of modularity and in so doing pro­
pose that the general processor itself was divided into modules. They claim 
tha t because the mind is a product of biological evolution, vestiges will remain 
of the processing subsystems that our hominid ancestors needed to survive 
at various times in the past. Fodor’s (1983:101-119) general processor, which 
can be termed a conceptual module since it deals with concepts rather than 
percepts (Sperber 1996:120-121), would have encountered errors as well as 
successes due to the growing number of tasks that early humans would have 
netxled to face?. Therefore, Cosmides and Tooby propose the existence of in­
nate processors designed specifically to solve problems that a hunter-gatherer 
would have faced within the past 70,000 years. Just as Chomsky argues that 
it is impossible for language to be acquired without innate information in the 
form of grammar, so too do Cosmides and Tooby argue that human beings 
need some innate conceptual processing to deal with problems faced in life. 
According to the evolutionary psychologists, early humans needed to have 
self-contained modules with their own information processing functions and 
some a priori representations to be able to deal with unpredictable as well 
as rapidly occurring events in the Pleistocene. The research of Cosmides and 
Tooby resulted in the proposal of multitudes of modules teeming with their 
own representations.
Enter C ulture
Although the term “culture” is a variable one, in general it is used by cog­
nitive anthropologists (e.g. Leach 1976, D’Andrade 1995, Sperber 1996) to
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refer to  representations which we as a social group construct in our minds and 
which affect our intra-individual cognitive processes (D’Andrade 1995:146). 
Although representations are formed in the mind as signified concepts, they 
have material counterparts outside of the individual which instantiate the 
concepts. As I discussed above, some semioticians conflate Saussure’s (1960) 
internal signifier with the external stimulus. It is precisely this conflation 
which, in search for a structuralist explanation of culture, has contributed to 
anthropologists’ and archaeologists’ attraction to Saussure’s theory of signs 
in the first place. Another view of cognitive anthropologists, called the cul­
tural epidemiological view (Sperber 1996), sees culture as structuralists do, 
but with additions (discussed below).
Envisioning culture as a representation or sign has made it possible 
to explain culture in a concise manner. The conceptualization of culture as 
a representation gives form to culture. Culture in the representational view 
can be defined as stimulatory information (normally taken to be outside of 
the body) that structures the mind and in so doing makes the mind that is 
structured part of culture too. While this definition does not explain what 
culture is but rather what it does (i.e. it is a functional definition), anthro­
pologists and archaeologists would generally regard it as an improvement on 
seeing culture only as something shared. The representational view grants 
culture an active role, whereas the traditional definition grants culture a pas­
sive role. In a sense, the representational view escapes having to define what 
culture is by providing it with a job.
Culture, then, like all representations, can be conceived of as: 1.) All 
of the human-made things outside of the mind that structure cognition. An 
example is material culture or the phonetic component of language (e.g. 
the sounds, or more specifically the pronunciation, of words, as well as the
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words on a page). 2.) All of the things inside of the mind that these external 
things have structured. An example is the signified concepts in the mind that 
are being instantiated (e.g. the meanings of certain objects in our material 
culture or the phonemic component of language or how something is heard 
and interpreted).
In practice, very few people write in a way in which culture constitutes a 
whole representation (e.g. Saussure’s sign) even though they may mean to. 
In general, cognitive anthropologists refer to the concepts in people’s minds 
as culture (e.g. D’Andrade 1995). Archaeologists, on the other hand, refer 
to the signifiers as culture, or as material culture, even though much more 
than signifiers is implied by the term representation.
R elativ ist View
The relativist school of thought, also called the Standard Social Science 
Model, sees the mind as a blank slate and everything which constitutes the 
mind is learned after birth directly from the environment (Tooby and Cos­
mides 1992). The environment can be cultural, social, or natural. Even 
though most work in cognitive anthropology concerns the effects of cultural 
environment on the mind, one just as well could consider the mind to be 
shaped by elements in the natural environment.
At birth we are provided with a tool to process this information com­
ing from the outside which we call the brain. The brain can be seen as a 
c omputer running a general purpose program that enables the individual to 
learn, compare, and contrast information, but there is little predisposition 
for learning some kinds of information over other kinds of information, nor 
is there any a priori cognitive representations that an individual is endowed 
with a t birth.
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In the relativist view, the mind works much like a computer in that the 
hardware — in our case the brain and its neural substrate — is the only 
aspect of the mind that we have at birth. The software and the data we 
use in processing (i.e. the representations) come from the environment as 
we develop. We enter various social institutions, such as schools, and we 
learn in a particular manner about particular things. An information base is 
established and it is this information base that constitutes the representations 
we envision and which we use to view the world and interact with other 
individuals.
The logical consequence of such a view of representations is that people 
in different social or natural environments will be presented with different 
representations and hence will conceptualize differently. These concepts are 
the result of the mind being subjected to different associated representa­
tions. This is an environmentally deterministic view of the mind, but one 
can see how it makes sense if one accepts that our bodies contribute little 
beyond manipulating and processing representations which are provided via 
the environment.
The notion that the social environment shapes our processing of repre­
sentations was formalized in the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis (Sapir 1921; Whorf 
1956). Sapir and Whorf were linguists who proposed that features of the en­
vironment, specifically language, construct the world we perceive and know. 
For example, a person born into a culture with a language that did not have 
certain color terms would have a problem in differentiating these colors when 
presented with them. This is a profound idea, for it follows that the symbolic 
systems we humans construct, whether these symbolic systems are languages 
or whether they are the artifacts of our material culture, determine our con­
ceptual reality. To put it another way, in the semiotic debate of what comes
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first, the signifier or the signified, this would suggest — counter-intuitively 
for many — that the signifiers come first and effect the signified concepts. 
Could it be that the external stimuli and their associated signifiers deter­
mine the concepts we experience? And if so — if culture as signifier does 
have such a power over human conceptualizing — how can anthropologists 
ever hope to understand the people they study? Archaeologists following 
the post-processual track accepted this notion of culture as a range of signi­
fiers (e.g. Hodder 1982 and Tilley 1989) and they referred to the study of 
how the material objects form conceptual reality as symbolic or structural 
archaeology.
The relativist position can be taken further than cultural relativism. Be­
cause relativists believe that our interaction with the environment shapes 
how we think, then it is reasonable to conclude that each individual thinks 
uniquely. This notion is not new, but has pervaded philosophical thinking 
from the time of Rene Descartes and Johann Fichte (see Chapter 2). It is 
based on the belief that we see things through our own “mind’s eye,” and 
each person sees things differently, which can mean that there is no objective 
existence beyond our minds — no reality, no truth — except for what we 
can agree is there.
M odifying the R elativist and Evolutionary Psychological V iew s
Both the relativist and evolutionary psychological stances have modified their 
views over the past ten years, and it seems that most researchers have come 
to accept certain views from both schools of thought.
In contemporary research, most cultural relativists generally agree that 
there is an interactive and persistent relationship between the material signi­
fiers we construct and the associated concepts in our minds. That is, signifiers
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construct our concepts, but our concepts can modify, eliminate, or give rise 
to signifiers. Interpreted in this way, the question of what comes first — the 
signifier or the signified -— is no longer a worthwhile enterprise, since the two 
aspects of the sign can be seen to be part of a feedback system for which 
there is no prior or posterior event, but rather a simultaneity of events in 
which signifiers are conjuring up signified concepts and signified concepts are 
causing via action the construction of signifiers. Functioning as a feedback 
loop eliminates any order of happenings since signification and sign construc­
tion are for all intents and purposes occurring simultaneously. This systemic 
paradigm eliminates the need to discover a cause, which in any case could 
lie either with the signifier or the signified. Hodder (1986:12-14,48) and Bar­
rett (1994) are good examples of the tendency to modify the proposal that 
culture determines our cognitive processing.
Research into the innateness of mind that began with the work of 
Chomsky (1957) and culminated in the research of Tooby and Cosmides 
(1992) — is similarly regarded to be extreme. A reaction to this extremism 
has caused some advocates of evolutionary psychology to accept the influ­
ence of cultural context on a child’s development (Karmiloff-Smith 1992). 
Other advocates of evolutionary psychology (e.g. Sperber 1994 and Mithen 
1996) have reacted by simply narrowing down the number of innate mod­
ules proposed by Tooby and Cosmides (1992:113) to only a few. Even Fodor 
(1987:27) commented that one could take the modularity argument too far to 
the extent tha t everything we do and think about is biologically conditioned 
and hence genetically determined. Recently, researchers in the realm of evo­
lutionary psychology have been taking Fodor’s warning into consideration 
and have been toning down hard-wiring arguments to include fewer mod­
ules. For example, Mithen (1996), drawing on the work of Whiten (1991),
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Atran (1990), Karmiloff-Smith (1992), and Sperber (1994), has proposed 
five modules, namely a technical intelligence, linguistic intelligence, social 
intelligence, a natural history intelligence, and a general intelligence module. 
Sperber’s (1994) model of the mind is similar to Mithen’s model with the ex­
ception that Sperber emphasizes a module of meta-representation, a location 
where one can generate higher-order thought processes (i.e. the capability of 
forming complex representations built on simpler representations).
Modifications to the cultural relativist stance and to the biological deter- 
m inist/ evolutionary stance coincide with rigorous attem pts at testing the 
Sapir-Whorf hypothesis by cognitive anthropologists. The strength of the 
Sapir-Whorf hypothesis has been tested on different cognitive capabilities, 
namely perception, memory, and reasoning (D’Andrade 1995:182-207). The 
results of these test show that culture has some influence over cognitive capa­
bilities but not to the extent which relativists argue. The impact that culture 
has on the mind depends on the situation or context in which the subject 
finds himself or herself. As such, it turns out that the mind in some instances 
appears to be operating almost entirely as if it was innate, which is the case 
with perception and episodic memory, as Rosch’s (1972, 1973) and Berlin 
and Kay’s (1969) studies show. In other instances, it is as if the mind was 
culturally determined, as is the case with semantic memory and reasoning. 
Hamilton and Fagot’s (1988) research shows that one’s biology does not nec­
essarily explain (long-term) semantic memory. Nor does biology explain the 
studies on reasoning conducted by Wason (1968), Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, 
and Legrenzi (1972), Cox and Griggs (1982), and Cheng and Holyoak (1985).
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Environm ent and Mind: The S ituation as It Stands
As can be deduced from the cognitive anthropological studies discussed above, 
there is no getting away from the fact that environment is responsible, in 
part, for how we utilize our cognitive capabilities, especially with regards to 
semantic memory and reasoning. The question is: “How does the environ­
ment affect our cognitive capabilities?” . The traditional structuralist view 
held among relativists is that signifiers in the environment invoke particular 
representations in our minds (see pages 23 25). In this view, the mind is 
effectively a receiver for representations that are contained in the environ­
ment. However, in light of the work conducted by other researchers, the 
mind is considered to be innate in certain respects (pages 19 21 and pages 
25 27), which is to say that mind is not only a receiver for representations, 
but it also contains the representations and the cognitive capabilities that 
are responsible for the production and manipulation of the representations.
1 .4 .3  E xp la in in g  H ow  E n vironm en t A ffects C ogn itive  
C apab ilities and H ow  C ultural R ep resen ta tio n s  
A re Form ed
One explanation that can be seen to incorporate both evolutionary psycho­
logical and relativist aspects of the mind, focusing primarily on the effects 
of the cultural environment on basic cognitive capabilities, is called cultural 
epidemiology. Cultural epidemiology can be seen as being based on struc­
turalism, which Sperber (1996) complements with the notion of innate mental 
modules.
Brief descriptions of structuralism and Sperber’s view favoring an innate 
mind are provided below so that the reader can better understand how rela­
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tivism and evolutionary psychology can be intertwined to produce a coherent 
model. The cultural epidemiological model can be compared and contrasted 
with an alternative model I propose later in the thesis concerning how cul­
tural representations or, what I prefer to call, social representations form. 
Sperber’s cultural epidemiological model explains how cultural representa­
tions can manifest themselves as well as remain in the individual’s mind.
Structuralism  as an Explanation o f How R epresentations Arise in 
th e  M ind
Representations are instantiated in the mind of an individual through signi­
fication prompted by an external stimulus in the environment. Referred to 
as structuralism, the notion of representational instantiation has its roots in 
semiotics, in particular in the notion of the primacy of the signifier, where 
representations are considered to be signs which are transmittable through 
communication. For example, a mental representation conceived of by an 
individual can be externalized in the form of a public representation, such 
as the sound of a word. The sound of this word then functions as an ex­
ternal (phonetic) stimulus to an internal (phonemic) signifier of the word, 
which in turn signifies a meaningful (morphemic) concept in the mind of an 
interpreter.
Structuralism by itself, however, is inadequate in explaining how cultural 
representations form because it logically entails an extreme relativist view 
of the mind, which as I discussed in pages 19 -21 and pages 25 27, does 
not entirely describe the human mind. How structuralists propose that the 
environment invokes cultural representations in the mind of the individual is 
discussed in pages 21-27.
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Sperber’s Explanation o f How R epresentations R em ain in th e M ind
When instantiated, the representations which have manifested themselves in 
the human mind are transformed into (long-standing) cultural representa­
tions through embodied cognitive processes. This is accomplished through 
the ability of innate mental modules to attract specific kinds of public rep­
resentations, enabling the public representations to carve out domains for 
themselves.
Modules harbor naive ways of conceptualizing certain aspects of the nat­
ural world and are equipped with their own memory stores and hardwired 
processing capacities. Some proposed modules are: a naive physics module, 
a naive biology module, and a naive psychology module. Each of these mod­
ules evolved as the result of our adaptation to the environment early in the 
prehistory of our species and each module is self-sufficient in accomplishing 
a task. Depending on whether the content of the public representation ar­
ticulates with the content of an established module, a public representation 
can parasitize a module that has taken thousands of years to evolve, thereby 
carving out a domain for itself within the module. As a result, a public repre­
sentation which has carved out a domain for itself can graduate to a cultural 
representation, and the domain occupied by the representation within the 
module is transformed into a cultural domain (Sperber 1996:135).
It should be pointed out that a public representation which first makes 
it into the body from the environment may or may not become a cultural 
representation, but the point is that the mechanisms responsible for trans­
forming a representation in the environment into a cultural representation 
are embodied. Although it has been implied by some research supporting 
an innate mind (e.g. Fodor 1983) that embodied cognitive processes are 
somehow responsible for the formation of cultural representations (Nugent
30
1985), no rigorous explanation was put forward until Sperber’s (1996) formu­
lation. Sperber incorporates aspects of structuralism (above) and evolution­
ary psychology (pages 19-21) into a model that accounts for how cultural 
representations not only arise, but how they are stored.
1 .4 .4  P rob lem s w ith  S tru ctu ra lism  and C ultu ra l E p i­
d em io logy
Both cultural epidemiology and structuralism offer explanations to account 
for how concepts that the relativists would claim to be culturally induced 
arise in the mind. The difference is that cultural epidemiology is seen by 
many to be an improvement over structuralism since it not only depends 
on certain structuralist principles but it incorporates the notion of mental 
modules which many take to be a scientifically grounded notion. However, 
there are problems with both structuralism and the modular hypothesis. For 
structuralism, the problem is the fact that it relies on the notion of signi­
fication as an explanation for how meaning arises. However signification, 
as defined by Saussure (1960), is instantiation and instantiation is not an 
explanation. The reason instantiation is not an explanation is that it can­
not be verified, and this makes signification an untestable hypothesis and an 
untestable hypothesis is as good as no hypothesis. Cultural epidemiology 
faces a problem regarding its explanation of how representations persist, a 
key feature of what constitutes a “cultural” representation. Cultural epi­
demiologists hypothesize that representations become long-standing through 
an inherent attraction of certain kinds of representations to certain innate 
modules. The problem is that there is little evidence to suggest that embod­
ied modules have independent storage capacities to deal with specific kinds 
of representations while excluding other kinds of representations.
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Problem s w ith Structuralism
Structuralism has shortcomings which make it inadequate as an explanation 
of how cultural representations arise, and which also impair the cultural 
epidemiological model. The main problem with structuralism is that what 
makes it work in structuring concepts in the mind cannot be examined in 
detail, and this applies also to many semiotic-based arguments.
Structuralism has failed as an explanation on a number of points from an 
empirical perspective. Structuralism cannot be tested, since it explains the 
mind jis an instantiation of a sign; one component of the sign is a material sig­
nifier in the form of an external stimulus (e.g. an object) or internal signifier 
(e.g. activated neurons) and the other component of the sign is the signified 
concept detained in the recesses of the mind. However, instantiations are not 
adequate explanations since there will never be evidence for how something 
instantiates — it just does. This probably stems from the fact that time 
is completely neglected as a factor. Time, however, is essential whenever 
one is concerned with understanding how something goes from Point A to 
Point B (i.e. from signifier it signified or vice versa). Without incorporating 
time in one’s analysis, one can only say that at one instant something is at 
Point A and then it is at Point B. W hat is needed is a set of intermediary 
points or a set of rules which describe how something moves along a path 
from Point A to Point B, and this means that time must be involved. Sim­
ply conceiving of meaningful (signified) concepts as being instantiations via 
association with a signifier does not constitute an explanation. Instantiation 
is not an explanation that can be tested. It is a metaphor of how a signifier 
can has the capability of generating an associated signified concept in the 
mind. Therefore, it is a kind of explanation in that it sets a viable stage or 
frame for investigation. But more is needed to engage with the details of an
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instantiation process.
Another problem with structuralism is its claim that material culture is a 
sign system. While there has been much discussion that material culture does 
indeed constitute a sign system, there is no general agreement on how such a 
sign system works. As such structuralist approaches to material culture seem 
to have gone through two phases, which can best be described as syntactic 
and interpretive approaches.
The first phase was taken by Hodder (1982) and it amounted to envi­
sioning the archaeological record as a text, in which each artifact grouping 
consisted of a sign, not unlike a word in a text. By considering each arti­
fact grouping with respect to another the hope was that some meaning or 
associative rules regarding different artifact types could be extracted from 
the archaeological record, just as a linguist might approach a text written 
in an ancient language in order to ascertain the syntax of the language. In 
this way, arriving at the meaning of a certain distribution of artifacts was 
reduced to ascertaining the “syntax” of the archaeological record.
There are problems with the syntactic approach. The main one is that 
the archaeological record is not a unified text that is written to reflect mean­
ing (Renfrew 2001:22), especially if we consider all of the unintentional ac­
tions that go into site formation processes which result in the archaeological 
record. But even if we accept that the archaeological record is meaningfully 
constituted, then as linguists know, ascertaining the syntax of a language 
is only part of the process of extracting meaning from texts. This is be­
cause a syntactic analysis essentially amounts to illuminating the grammar 
of the language in which the text, or in our case the archaeological record, 
is written. The problem with the syntactic approach is not only Renfrew’s 
poignant observation that the archaeological record is not a text but that
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syntactic meaning or value is not really the kind of meaning that concerns 
archaeologists. Most archaeologists want to know what the material objects 
meant to the people they are studying or how these material objects were 
used symbolically, not how artifact groupings disconnected from people are 
associated in some abstract language of the archaeological record.
The most problematic aspect of the archaeological record’s uncertain sta­
tus as a text is that the record can only be accepted at face value, with no 
explanation as to how the meaning of material objects being studied arose 
in the first place. As such, the syntactic approach, in which the meaning of 
material objects in the archaeological record is supposed to be divined from 
analogical chains (see Hodder 1982), can be seen as a method blatantly de­
tached from the people who actually gave the objects their meaning (Hodder 
1986:49). In this way, the meaning which can be arrived at by using the 
syntactic approach does not seem to be the kind of meaning that would be 
of any consequence to an archaeologist.
The realization that the syntactic approach is problematic was not the 
end of material culture as a sign system. The kind of meaning that many 
archaeologists appeared to be interested in was the semantic meaning of the 
artifacts in the archaeological record. That is, archaeologists wanted to know 
what the artifacts in the archaeological record signified to the people that 
were being studied. Structural analyses seemed to be reduced to advocating 
the primacy of the material cultural environment over representations in 
people’s minds (e.g. Tilley 1989). The point of these analyses was simply 
to say tha t if material culture does generate associated concepts in people’s 
minds then archaeologists and anthropologists alike should be able to grasp 
the concepts of the people being studied by studying their material culture.
The question which still remained, however, was how were artifacts to
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be studied so as to reveal what their associated signified concepts were. For 
many, this question was avoided; the answer for these archaeologists who 
avoided the question was to claim simply that there are no objective methods 
for understanding how one arrives at concepts in people’s minds from their 
artifacts. The view of these advocates, which represents the phase that came 
after the syntax phase, is currently held by the interpretive archaeologists (e.g 
Thomas 2000) who advocate a subjective view of the archaeological record. 
Their idea is that because the archaeological record is a text and because 
a text is read and interpreted subjectively, the reader of the archaeological 
record can interpret the record. This means that the archaeologist can arrive 
at the semantic meaning of individual objects in the archaeological record 
and that all interpretations c an be considered to be plausible interpretations.
The major problem with the interpretive approach is that like the syntac­
tic: approach, it retains the notion of the archaeological record as a text (even 
though it may focus more on the nature of the signs themselves rather than 
the text as a whole). As text, the material objects remain detached from 
the people who are supposed to be connected to these objects, and this is 
done by separating the material objects from the meaningfully enriched be­
havior that produced or distributed the objects in the archaeological record. 
A solution to this dilemma which I propose below is to consider the behavior 
or actions that produced and/ or distributed the material objects to be the 
sign systems rather than material objects themselves. An example of how 
meaning can arise from behavioral processes is how the meaning of money 
arises in contemporary western society. Money has no intrinsic meaning in 
itself; it is just paper or metal. W hat can be seen to give money meaning is 
the capitalist system — a social system and our behaviors that constitute it 
in which we utilize and circulate the money.
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T he Problem  w ith Cultural Epidem iology and th e N otion  o f M od­
ules
The cultural epidemiological model relies on the premise that because cogni­
tive processes are embodied and because cultural representations constitute 
the output of these cognitive processes, cultural representations themselves 
are embodied. Depending on whether the content of a representation artic­
ulates well with the content of a specific module, the cultural representation 
(or mental representation for that matter) may be externalized in the form of 
a public representation (i.e. discourse), which can then carve out a domain 
for itself within an innate module. This process then begins all over again 
until everyone in the population being considered has this long-standing rep­
resentation. This is the method by which cultural representations come to 
manifest themselves in peoples’ minds and remain in peoples’ minds accord­
ing to Sperber (1996). The main point I want to highlight about cultural 
epidemiology is that even though the cultural representations are at some 
time or another disembodied public representations depending of course 
on whether or not they are being communicated — the cultural epidemiolog­
ical view depends on embodied cognitive processes to generate the cultural 
representations. The mind is taken to be embodied (Sperber 1996:120), which 
is to say that mental modules and the processes involved in making repre­
sentations long-standing (i.e. cultural) are internal. However, the idea that 
c ognition is embodied and that everything we conceptualize in the world has 
to be channeled into the embodied mind at some point or another is prob­
lematic, as I point out below. Luckily, however, the cultural epidemiological 
model is only one interpretation of the cognitive anthropological evidence.
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E vidence  for P e rc e p tu a l/C o n c e p tu a l In fo rm atio n  P ro cessin g  Sper- 
ber's cultural epidemiology theory, while it has many useful insights into how 
an innate mind with its modules can generate culture, has certain shortcom­
ings. We learned from empirical evidence synthesized by D’Andrade (1995), 
which I recapped above, that semantic memory storage and reasoning are dif­
ferent from perception and episodic memory storage in that semantic memory 
storage and reasoning are heavily affected by the cultural concepts we con­
struct whereas perception and episodic memory storage are not. W hat this 
suggests is a very different way of viewing the mind than that advocated by 
tin* evolutionary psychologists and hence the cultural epidemiologists who 
advocate domain-specific conceptual modules.
By domain-specificity, what is meant is that modules are self-contained 
units with their own memory stores and information processing capacities 
dedicated to specific tasks. Modules are autonomous by virtue of their abil­
ity to process information (i.e. store and recall representations) on their own, 
yet surprisingly little research looks at how the conceptual modules process 
information and whether or not there are differences in the ways the con­
ceptual modules being proposed are storing and recalling representations — 
for example, whether the rates of storage and recall are different between 
two modules. If we focus on how information is processed in more detail, 
then the divisions which the empirical evidence supports are not between 
different self-sustaining conceptual modules but rather are more pronounced 
between information processing associated with perceptual tasks and infor­
mation processing associated with conceptual tasks.
To take memory storage as an example, there is significantly more ev­
idence to suggest that there is a difference between how memory works 
in recalling information relating to “ego” (episodic memory) and recalling
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social information (semantic memory) than there is a difference between 
how, for example, memory works in recalling animals using a naive biology 
store and how memory works in recalling cultural information using a meta- 
representation store. According to Tulving (1983), representations stored in 
episodic memory take longer to recall than representations stored in semantic 
memory, and comparing and contrasting rates at which representations are 
stored and recalled can tell us something about how information is processed 
and whether it is accurate to claim tha t the information is being processed by 
autonomous processing units or modules. Using this line of reasoning, repre­
sentations such as “pitbulls can be very dangerous dogs” and “one can catch 
a cold in the rain” according to the modularists should have different mem­
ory stores and very likely different ways of recalling this information. The 
information pertaining to pitbulls should belong to the naive biology mem­
ory store whereas the information regarding catching a cold is very likely 
culturally specific information belonging to the meta-representation memory 
store. Yet, from what can be inferred from studies conducted by Tulving 
(1983), both of these bits of information are more alike than not alike; that 
is, both of these bits of information constitute social information, the content 
of semantic memory.
This seems to agree with at least one point that Fodor (1983) made in 
his modular hypothesis — that there is a distinction between the manner in 
which percepts enter the mind from the environment and are processed, and 
the manner in which concepts are processed. Perception can be conceived of 
as a process which connects the environment to ego, and episodic memory 
can be conceived of as the storage of representations regarding how things 
in the environment are related to ego. In this way, it would seem that 
Fodor’s perceptual modules account for the informational inputs connecting
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ego with his or her environment along with the storage and recall of this 
information. Here, the storage and recall of information can be seen to be 
coextensive with the information processing associated with episodic memory 
and perceptual representation memory. Similarly, Fodor’s central processor, 
which has the job of processing concepts, can be seen to be coextensive 
with the information processing involved with semantic memory. Though 
Fodor seems to agree with Tulving’s (1983) and Nyberg and Tulving’s (1996) 
research on this one point, the problem arises when the episodic and semantic 
information processing centers are partitioned even further as Fodor (1983) 
and the conceptual modularists (i.e. evolutionary psychologists and cultural 
epidemiologists) would have us do.
Lack o f Evidence for E m bod ied  C o n cep tu a l M odules As yet there 
is little evidence to suggest that specific kinds of social representations have 
their own conceptual information processing modules and associated memory 
stores which process them. Since Tulving’s (1983) work, Nyberg and Tulving 
(1996) have identified what they find to be two other long-term memory 
systems, namely procedural and perceptual representation memory systems. 
W hat they have found is that each memory system of the four that they have 
identified is functionally distinctive, rather than task distinctive. That is, the 
memory systems which have been identified “contribute differentially to the 
performance of different tasks” (1996:164), not to the content of different 
tasks. The notion that there is a one-to-one mapping of tasks to memory 
systems which is essentially what the modularists are saying would be
difficult to support (Toth, Reingold, and Jacoby 1994).
If conceptual modules are anything, they may be regarded as sectors of the 
mind with innate representations and innate implicational structures of these
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representations, which differ from one another in the way that they associate 
representations with other representations during memory storage and recall. 
However, this is a far cry from saying that these representations are being 
processed autonomously and only have access to their own stores. Even 
Mithen (1996:209-211) has to admit that modern Homo sapiens maintains 
a cognitively fluid mind in which information flows freely among modules. 
In what sense, then, can one say that the modern Homo sapiens mind is 
modular? Perhaps early in the evolution of hominids modularity played an 
im portant role in information processing, but it does not seem to play that 
same role; now.
Not only does the notion of the embodied module stand in contrast to re­
search on memory (Tulving 1983; Toth, Reingold, and Jacoby 1994; Nyberg 
and Tulving 1996) as I have discussed above, but the modular hypothesis also 
stands in contrast to research on reciprocal casusality, which PET and fMRI 
imagery data support (see van Orden and Paap 1996). Reciprocal causality 
is the notion that every component of the system in this case the brain
contributes to every behavior of the system as a whole. An example of 
a study supporting reciprocal causality is Poeppel (1996), who conducted 
five PET studies in which no particular region in the brain could be consis­
tently identified as the phonetic/phonological processing center of the brain. 
Examinations of impaired versus non-impaired subjects, in which impaired 
subjects were found to have problems with traditionally held task-specific 
regions in the brain, revealed that impaired subjects could compensate by 
using other regions of the brain. These experiments clearly stand in contrast 
with a model of the mind — taken to be coextensive with the brain — con­
sisting of autonomous modules designated for specific tasks, as hypothesized 
by Fodor (Eaton 2000).
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1 .4 .5  M oving  B ey o n d  an E m b od ied  C og n itiv e  E xp la ­
nation
The explanation by which cultural representations become long-standing 
(i.e. stored in memory) through cultural epidemiology is based on one main 
premise. The basic premise explaining how cultural representations arise is 
that representations are content rich and it is because the content of the rep­
resentations is compatible with the functions which embodied modules serve 
that the representation is attracted to a particular module and is permitted to 
be stored in the module’s memory store. As I have shown, however, the view 
that each module has its own memory store isolated from the other modules 
is not demonstrated by the evidence, which instead suggests a shared mem­
ory store episodic memory for perceptual information connecting ego with 
the environment and, of prime concern here, semantic memory for general 
information such as social or cultural representations.
If we are to accept Tulving’s and other’s research on memory, some 
changes must be made to the underlying mechanism by which representa­
tions get stored. In the modular hypothesis, the mechanism for storing the 
representation lies with the content of the representation and how well the 
content fits into an appropriate module. However, if we accept Tulving’s 
and other’s research on memory, then the content of the representation and 
its attractiveness to an embodied module cannot be considered to be the 
mechanism responsible for the representation’s storage and long-standing 
attributes. The notion that representations are content rich need not be 
eliminated, but the involvement of content in enabling the storage of repre­
sentations in a module needs to be reevaluated.
This leads me to propose a different mechanism for the storage of cultural 
representations, or what I prefer to call social representations, to account for
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their long-standing character. This mechanism can be explained indirectly 
through cognitive anthropological research supporting the notion that the 
mind need not be embodied — at least not in its entirety. The first source 
comes from Gibson (1966, 1979) and the second source comes from Rosch 
(1972, 1973, 1978), Berlin and Kay (1969), and Dougherty (1978). Their work 
suggests that many of our representations of things are fully formed before 
they are even sensed. If we take this point together with what I stated earlier 
about the fact that representations are the products of cognition — the sense 
here being that representations constitute the information being processed 
then what this implies is that the cognitive processes from which the 
representations arise must also be occurring outside of the individual.
Ecological Psychology and the R ole of the Environm ent as a Source 
o f C ognition
Ecological psychology is a rapidly growing field (e.g. Turvey and Carello 
1994). A major proponent and developer of ecological psychology is James 
J. Gibson. Gibson (1966, 1979) proposed a theory in which representations 
which appear to us in the mind as images are extracted more or less directly 
from the environment (i.e. what we see is what we get). In this theory, very 
little intermediary processing is done between the raw data in the environ­
ment being perceived and their associated mental sensations (by the brain 
or the body of the individual). As such, the Gibsonian model of the mind 
can be conceived of as an extreme objectivist view of the mind. This idea 
that there are categories or, more generally, representations that exist in the 
environment which do not require much intermediary involvement from the 
body is referred to as the objective mind stance — which can be seen to 
stand in opposition to the embodied mind stance, though it does not stand
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in direct opposition to it since it does permit the individual body a role in 
generating representations in the mind of the individual.
Gibson’s theory, which is primarily based on visual perception, extends 
to the other senses of perception, generally referred to as perceptual systems. 
Gibson sees the environment as a sampling space for the individual. In this 
view, the individual travels through time and space attuning to only the 
invariant information provided by the environment. At the same time, the 
individual can be conceived of as being part of the environment which he or 
she samples. Such a model of how the mind works can neither be situated 
in a mentalist view of the mind nor can it be considered to be a behaviorist 
view of the mind. Mentalism, which is a Cartesian view of the mind and a 
top-down information processing view, claims that perceptions are our own 
creations which are produced intra-bodily. Behaviorism (i.e. the strongest 
kind) which is a bottom-up information processing approach, on the other 
hand, claims that human minds are simply responders to external stimuli in 
the environment. However, ecological psychology, though it is often consid­
ered to be a bottom-up information processing approach, is not as extreme 
as behaviorism since it does not neglect the effects of intra-bodily processing 
on perception (Gibson 1966:264-65). In fact the body serves a role in percep­
tion, the role being attunement to the invariant information in the natural 
or cultural environment. It can be inferred from Gibson that he sees the 
environment as the “cognitive” source where most of the processing occurs, 
and tha t the body as a receiver homes in on the invariance in the environ­
ment. A good example of how he views the environment can be indirectly 
inferred through his description of cultural representations, which he takes to 
be information that has already being processed by the cultural environment 
before it is actually perceived and processed again by the individual (Gibson
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1966:28).
Although there are problems with some of Gibson’s assumptions, an im­
portant component of his approach is that the individual can be seen to 
constitute part of the environment — the individual is locked in a feed-back 
relationship with the environment, and is therefore part of the entire cogni­
tive process which subsumes both participant and environment. To ecological 
psychologists, the mind is coextensive with the environment, such that mind 
and environment (including the individual) can be considered to be one and 
the same. This approach is similar to what the embodied mind advocates, 
inspired by Merleau-Ponty (1962) (e.g. Johnson 1990, Lakoff and Johnson 
1999) are trying to accomplish; however, instead of placing the interface 
between the phenomenological realm and the material realm at the bodily 
extremities, the interface is being placed by the ecological psychologists at 
the furthest limits of human perception. This view clearly holds that the 
mind subsumes both individual and the perceptible (i.e. local) environment.
The view that the mind is coextensive with the environment and the 
perceiver, however misleading, should not be regarded to be an idealist view 
of the mind. Being coextensive with the environment attributes to the mind 
the same properties attributed to the environment and subjects the mind 
to the same rules or laws as those which govern phenomena in the physical 
environment. In fact, one of Gibson’s major contributions is that in creating 
his model of the mind he created an interdisciplinary arena in which the 
laws of physics generally used to explain environmental events are equally 
valid for illuminating the mind. It follows from this that Gibson and his 
followers generally regard the mind to be material just like the environment 
outside of the individual. The embodied mind view does precisely the same 
thing when it places the body in the mind — it makes the mind material by
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coextending it with physiology (Johnson 1990). The major difference is that 
instead of putting the body in the mind, like embodied mind advocates do, 
the ecological psychologists place the environment in the mind.
Gibson’s cognitive model is based mainly on his observation of human 
perception. However, his theory is clear. Gibson proposes that the environ­
ment constitutes the cognitive source, whereas the human perceptual systems 
are simply systems that can attune to the environment. Being attuned to 
the environment allows the individual to become part of the environment. In 
this manner, the mind is the product of an interactive and dynamic system 
between the individual and the individual’s environment.
C ognitive Anthropological Support for the Environm ent as a Source 
o f C ognition
Rosch’s (1972, 1973) work on prototypes is quite well known, and her ex­
planation of how things are more prototypical than other types in the same 
category is important for this discussion since it supports the notion that 
representations are formed in the environment before they reach the senses. 
This notion is related to the Gibsonian view of the mind which I discussed 
above.
Rosch’s (1972, 1973) work on the Dani, a highland people in New Guinea, 
was concerned with color. Her observations showed that even though the 
Dani only had two color categories, the Dani best remembered the focal 
colors which were first proposed by Berlin and Kay (1969). Many would 
regard this as further support for an innate or embodied view, but Rosch’s 
(1972, 1973) interpretation of these studies is different. Rosch’s observations 
of folk taxonomies led her to propose that the focal colors represented ba­
sic level psychological objects just as certain animals and plants represented
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basic level psychological objects in folk taxonomies. In other words, people 
probably do not perceive and recall from memory the componential charac­
teristics of a color or animal and build their way up to the color or animal, 
but seem to perceive and remember certain colors and animals in their en­
tirety as gestalts. Thus, the gestalts of things in the environment form actual 
psychological objects, not the constituent features that may characterize the 
things in the environment. She based this on the premises that: 1.) peo­
ple try to get the most amount of information out of the environment for 
the least amount of cognitive effort, and that 2.) the environment consists 
of structured information and therefore information being sensed by an in­
dividual is nether random nor uniform. That is, there are features which 
naturally co-occur in the environment that our senses lock onto and form 
into psychological objects, which are optimal in terms of the information 
that they contain. These optimal psychological objects are referred to as 
prototypes. Rosch (1972, 1973), synthesizing her work along with Berlin 
and Kay’s (1969), suggested that focal colors and basic level terms in tax­
onomies are prototypes since they are the most informationally useful. They 
encapsulate more attributes than any other categories.
To demonstrate this, Rosch (1978) tested American respondents on sev­
eral taxonomies across three levels by asking the respondents to list all of 
the attributes that came to mind for all of the levels for each taxonomy. The 
taxonomies numbered nine and ranged from trees to furniture. The levels 
consisted of superordinate categories, basic level categories, and subordinate 
categories. FURNITURE, for example, constituted one taxonomy as well as a 
superordinate category. A basic level category of FURNITURE was CHAIR, 
and a subordinate category of CHAIR was LIVING ROOM CHAIR. W hat 
Rosch’s tests demonstrated was that very few attributes were listed for FUR-
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NITURE, significantly more for CHAIR, and not many more attributes were 
listed for LIVING ROOM CHAIR than they were for CHAIR. W hat this 
indicated was that the basic term, CHAIR, was the most cognitively efficient 
representation containing the maximum amount of information for the least 
amount of cognitive effort. Moreover, cognitive effort increases with having 
to recognize finer details about a particular category.
The exception to this pattern of attributes along the taxonomy occurred 
with biological taxonomies. In the case of biological taxonomies, American 
respondents listed just as many attributes for superordinate categories as 
basic level categories. Whereas Rosch (1978) interpreted these results as 
the result of the cultural environment — what we learn by being part of a 
particular society Dougherty (1978), with her cross-cultural tests of the 
knowledge bases of Tzeltal Maya children and American children, interpreted 
Rosch’s (1978) results as a lack of exposure to different plants and animals in 
the natural environment. In both cases, it is important to emphasize that the 
evidence points to structured information in the local environment, regardless 
of whether this environment is considered to be cultural or natural.
Another of Rosch’s (1975) studies suggests that in addition to the con­
cept tha t representations arise in the local environment (i.e. natural and 
cultural environments that subsume the respondents), there also seems to 
be a sort of global environment which generates representations. This global 
environment seems to produce representations that are intrinsic to the ob­
jects themselves and appear to be unrelated to the respondents’ interaction 
with the local environment. In this test, Rosch had American respondents 
(Berkeley undergraduates) provided prototype scores for the species of bird 
they felt was most representative of the category BIRD. The results showed 
that the most prototypical birds were birds from the passerine order. Further
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tests correlating the order of the prototypicality scores with information that 
the respondents may have drawn from their environment revealed that the 
way the scores were ordered was probably not because there were more birds 
in the higher protypicality ranks flying around San Fransisco (i.e. natural 
environment), nor was it the result of there being more mention of the higher 
ranked birds in books and newspapers (i.e. cultural environment). Rather 
the prototypicality scores were highly correlated with the shape and behavior 
of all of the birds the respondents knew about (i.e. global environment). The 
species that were ranked highest were those species belonging to the largest 
orders and families.
The conclusion that can be drawn from these tests is that representa­
tions can be seen to form in the environment. That is, much of what the 
individual does involves seeking out the structure which already exists in the 
environment. This seeking involves embodied information processing as well, 
but if we accept Rosch’s proposition that humans maximize the amount of 
information they can retain with the least amount of cognitive effort, then 
it would seem that the individual more likely than not takes full advantage 
of the preprocessing of the representations which the environment provides 
the individual. It should be noted that the local environment, specifically 
the cultural or social environment, subsumes the individual and this means 
that it can be inferred that individual cognition plays a role in the environ­
ment and the information it processes. The global environment, however, is 
different in that the global environment does not seem to be affected by any 
cognitive effort on the part of the individual.
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T he O bjective of th e  Thesis in R elation to the C ognitive A nthro­
pological Research D iscussed
As can be ascertained from the above discussion, there are processes at work 
within the environment, local and global, that structure the information be­
ing internalized by the individual. This is similar to Alfred GelPs (1998:221- 
258) notion of “extended mind”, but for one main difference, and that is that 
Gell (1998:222-223) primarily conceives of material objects as extensions of 
the mind, whereas I consider the environmental processes involving the ma­
terial items to be manifestations of the mind. The implication that there 
are processes in the environment which structure information for the indi­
vidual is that these processes which can be conceptualized as systems 
are no less cognitive than the neurological processes responsible for cognition 
within the individual. The concern of this thesis strictly surrounds the local 
environment, and specifically the social environment in the form of social 
systems or institutions and their role as cognitive sources.
Archaeology can contribute uniquely to the study of the social environ­
ment and how the processes therein can be seen to constitute supra-individual 
cognitive processes. The reason archaeology can offer a hand in this partic­
ular area is that the archaeological record is by and large a record of social 
processes, and archaeology is the only field that deals with time-depth that is 
necessary in many cases for inferring attunement to information in the social 
environment. Not only can archaeology help to illuminate the interaction 
between the individual and social environment, but it can help to illuminate 
archaeological questions, since by studying the social environment, one can 
arrive at a closer understanding of the individual who is internalizing the 
products of the social environment.
Above I discussed that an embodied modular hypothesis cannot account
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for how representations arise, or how they become long-standing, thereby 
forming cultural representations. The modularists propose that individual 
modules have their own information processing capability. This, however, 
was shown to be inconsistent with what we know about memory through 
Tulving’s (1983) studies and therefore a modular theory could not by itself 
account for how cultural representations become long-standing.
A solution to this dilemma can be found in seeking for cognitive processes
information processing processes — outside of the individual, in the en­
vironment. The research of Gibson, Rosch, Berlin, Kay, and Dougherty 
strengthens research in this direction. They propose that many represen­
tations are already in a form that involves very little processing from the 
individual. What is primarily meant here by processing is memory storage. 
Thus, when I state that very little processing is necessary on the part of 
the individual, this basically means that the representation is already being 
stored in some process occurring in the social and/or natural environment 
subsuming the individual.
How can a social or natural process in the environment function as an 
external or supra-individual memory store and processor for the individual? 
One potential solution is suggested from archaeology, which by its nature is 
forced to privilege or favor environments and the effects of the interactions 
of ancient minds and the environment. My approach in this thesis, rooted 
in archaeology, accepts that the environment has the capacity to generate 
representations in a way that facilitates retention over time (i.e. the long­
standing characteristic) and thus environment is involved in the generation 
of representations that qualify as social and/or cultural. The point that 
should be clear is that representations do not need to be stored in embodied 
modules. They can be stored in external stores, namely the social systems or
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institutions that comprise the social environment. The precise details of how 
a social institutional process in the environment can store representations for 
individual will be discussed later in the thesis. To provide this explanation 
however requires some knowledge of what cognition is, and I begin to explain 
this in the next chapters.
1.5 The R elevance o f  S tu dyin g  Supra-Individual 
C ognition  in A rchaeology
The study of supra-individual cognition concerns archaeology in two ways, 
directly and indirectly.
D irect Relevance o f Supra-individual C ognition for Archaeology
Cognition is directly relevant to archaeologists interested in the evolution of 
c ognition and to those who are tracing the development of cognition from our 
australopithecine ancestors. Archaeologist Steven Mithen (2001:100) has pro­
posed three directions cognitive archaeologists should pursue: mental mod­
ularity, sexual selection, and extended mind. He proposes that all three fall 
within the scope of cognitive archaeology, since archaeology has access to 
data directly relevant to these cognitive topics and it is therefore our respon­
sibility as archaeologists to contribute to these topics with the archaeological 
evidence we have available to us.
Of most concern to me is the topic of extended mind. Extended mind 
or extemalism  is the notion that cognition is not confined to the brain but 
that it is coupled with the environment. Environment can include people, 
computers, a pencil and notepad, in short whatever it is that facilitates 
our cognitive capabilities outside of the neural substrate. The notion of
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externalism has its scientific roots in the psychological research of Gibson 
(1979), but the idea has been around before this in philosophy, as I discuss 
in Chapter 2.
The cognition I discuss in this thesis, namely supra-individual cognition, 
is related to the concept of extended mind and therefore falls within the 
domain of archaeological research. Archaeology can generate the data neces­
sary to contribute to developing a general model of cognition which embraces 
externalism and the related concept of supra-individual cognition. Once the 
data are generated, it is important for the archaeologist to follow through 
with generating theory.
Indirect Relevance o f Supra-individual Cognition for Archaeology
The basic premise is that by using archaeology to address issues, generate 
models, and solve problems in other fields, theoretical contributions can be 
made in other fields, which in turn facilitates archaeology in solving archae­
ological problems. Utilizing archaeology to solve problems in other fields 
constitutes a kind of investment for archaeology, from which archaeology can 
eventually reap the benefits.
Archaeologists should not merely generate data for cognitive scientists 
to interpret, nor should archaeologists merely adopt theories from cognitive 
fields to explain some aspect in the archaeological record. Instead, archaeol­
ogists should be active participants involved in the theory building process. 
To do this necessitates that the archaeologist involve himself or herself in 
research outside of what is generally regarded as archaeology in the conven­
tional sense.
It is crucial for archaeologists to be concerned with answering questions 
outside of archaeology and not solely be concerned with explaining archaeo­
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logical events. If we limit the scope of archaeology to only answering archae­
ological questions, the field of archaeology risks being a “sink” of knowledge, 
in which only tools from other fields are applied, rather than a source of 
knowledge of use to other disciplines.
Other fields will not be the sole beneficiaries of this knowledge, because 
in creating new theory, archaeology will be actively involved in generating 
theory for its own purposes as well. That is, by answering questions in other 
fields such as philosophy, sociology, and cognitive science, archaeology will in 
fact be producing theories that can in turn answer archaeological questions 
down the line. Only then can archaeology emerge as a more self-confident 
field, independently capable of producing theory for itself.
The study of supra-individual cognition, for example, not only gener­
ates ideas that cognitive scientists may work with, but it can also be useful 
to archaeologists in interpreting the archaeological record. Supra-individual 
cognition implies the existence of information that comes to the individual 
already processed by social institutions. Therefore, understanding how social 
institutions work can provide a very useful tool for archaeologists interested 
in knowing what people in the past may have been thinking about. In fact, 
developing a theory of supra-individual cognition would be invaluable for un­
derstanding what past people were thinking since much of the archaeological 
record is a record of social events. Understanding supra-individual cognition, 
therefore, can facilitate the archaeologist in hypothesizing emic perceptions.
Archaeologists should not only be concerned about what theory can do 
for archaeology, but rather what archaeology can do for theory (Elizabeth 
Graham, personal communication 2003). This thesis is an attem pt at get­
ting away from seeing ideas from the perspective of what they can do for 
archaeology and getting closer to seeing archaeology as a generator of new
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ideas.
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Part I
The Nature and Location of
Cognition
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Chapter 2 
The Quest for Cognition
Cognition is an elusive phenomenon, which philosophers have long sought 
to locate. This chapter will deal specifically with the question: “Where is 
cognition located?” . This question is important because, in this thesis, I 
advance a concept of cognition which encompasses both subject (the individ­
ual) and the environment (the physical environment and/or other individuals 
that constitute society) and the reader needs to know that this idea is not 
as unconventional as it may seem when placed in the context of previous 
cognitive work in philosophy, psychology, engineering, and computer science.
This chapter acquaints the reader with concepts and debates that are fa­
miliar to cognitive scientists and philosophers. Only with a familiarization of 
the concepts and debates surrounding cognition can my notion of cognition 
be situated with respect to previous research in the cognitive sciences and 
in philosophy. And only with an understanding of the concepts and debates 
surrounding cognition can the reader see where my ideas on cognition origi­
nate, and see that my views represent a logical step in the direction in which 
the study of cognition is heading.
The material that I present in this chapter is treated chronologically from
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some of the earliest concepts of the mind to the latest ideas on the subject. 
W hat I would like to emphasize from the outset of this short historical ac­
count of cognition is the theme of the chapter, which is the development of 
views regarding the location of cognition. It should, however, become evi­
dent that the question of where cognition is located relies on resolving the 
question of what constitutes cognition. Only when the debate concerning 
what comprises cognition is settled can a home be found for cognition.
2.1 U niversal C ognition
The idea of universal cognition was a rationalist construction, the main pro­
ponent of the paradigm being Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831). 
W hat made the rationalist view of cognition unique was its emphasis that 
cognition was active. This contrasted significantly with the views of the sen­
sationalists and empiricists, who advocated a form of cognition that only 
passively perceived and experienced. Cognition for the rationalists such as 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) was not a vat that simply filled with sensations 
and experiences. Instead, cognition was an entity that was actively engaged 
in processing experiences, the implication being that what we humans per­
ceive to be reality is the product of cognition.
Like Kant, Hegel (1955:806-807) believed that all time and space is sub­
ject to cognition. We perceive reality by actively processing through our 
senses. Therefore, our interpretation of the knowledge we are actually pre­
sented with is our own construction. All knowledge, in other words, is 
“tainted” , since it undergoes cognitive processing before it is finally inter­
preted. It is for this reason, therefore, that Kant believed that a reality 
“outside” our cognitive field and as a consequence, a knowledge of reality,
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are beyond our grasp.1
One of the main arguments for the impossibility of ever comprehend­
ing an untainted knowledge — what Kant refers to as the “thing-in-itself” 
— was the fact that Kant claimed “to know” that the thing-in-itself was 
unreachable (Waxman 1991:220-221). But how would Kant “know” if some­
thing was unreachable if it was beyond anyone’s ability to comprehend to 
begin with? Kant’s reasoning was claimed to be a tautology, and as a result 
Kant received some criticism from philosophers such as Johann Fichte (Hegel 
1955:80; Baillie 1955:38), who stated that what one’s mind cannot know does 
not exist. By making this simple statement, Fichte was able to turn Kant’s 
reasoning on itself, thereby reasoning against the possibility of the existence 
of untainted knowledge.
In contrast to Kant, Hegel (1955:80-81) believed that the thing-in-itself 
could be comprehended. Hegel reasoned that if the thing-in-itself existed 
then it was possible to show that it existed objectively, through reason, not 
through subjectively knowing of the thing-in-itself’s existence. The goal then 
for Hegel was to create the first comprehensive scientific theory of cognition 
that could account for the changes that are effected in the mind, which 
subsequently “tamper with” the thing-in-itself. By understanding the process 
involved in cognition, the distortions that are imposed on the thing-in-itself 
c ould be subtracted, thus bringing the individual closer to the thing-in-itself.
l If this sounds familiar to the archaeologist, it probably is. The material culture move­
ment (Hodder 1982; Shanks and Tilley 1987; Tilley 1989), which has its roots in semiotics, 
is all about “signs” and how they are taken to signify ideas in the mind. We construct 
these signs, whether in the form of language or material objects, which, in turn, construct 
the way we perceive our environment, indeed our world. Like Kant, many semioticians 
also believe that we can never know the world outside of the signs we use to construct the 
world.
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Hegel later adopted the term “the absolute”, which he often equated with 
God (Baillie 1955:21), in place of the thing-in-itself.
Hegel believed it critical to understand how the absolute could come 
to be realized, but in order to do so a path had to be cut through the 
representations of the absolute. The approach, which Hegel would take, was 
to be known as the “dialectic process” .
2 .1 .1  H egel’s D ia lec tic  P ro cess
Hegel’s notion of cognition operates through the dialectic process (Hegel 
1955:122-123), which is a triadic system of reasoning that entails three sub­
processes: speculative thinking, ordinary skepticism, and particular skepti­
cism (Rockmore 1997:17-19). Speculative thinking contrasts with the latter 
two kinds of reasoning in a significant way. Speculative thinking conjures 
up a representation, which is often referred to as a thesis. In reaction to 
the thesis, skepticism arises, which counters speculative thinking with either 
complete or incomplete denial of the thesis proposed.
In the case in which the thesis is denied completely, it is called ordinary 
skepticism. According to Hegel, it is frequently the case that vanity motivates 
one person’s attempt to refute another person’s thesis (Rockmore 1997:19).
In the case where only particular aspects of the thesis are denied, it is 
called particular skepticism. In this case, only certain features of the original 
thesis are accepted whereas other features may be refuted.
In either the ordinary or particular cases, the thesis is countered by a 
skeptical antithesis. Within both the thesis and the antithesis, there exist 
certain untrue aspects about each of them. This is proven by a third repre­
sentation called the synthesis, which eliminates elements of falsity from both 
the thesis and the antithesis. In other words, the synthesis is a hybrid of the­
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sis and antithesis which, because it has subtracted the erroneous elements 
from the thesis and antithesis, is a closer rendering of tru th  than the thesis 
and antithesis ever were.
The dialectic process, however, does not abate as soon as a synthesis 
arises from the thesis and the antithesis. Instead, the synthesis continues, 
but this time, playing the role of thesis, which again is countered by another 
antithesis, creating this time a new synthesis. Each subsequent iteration 
leads cognition closer to the absolute. The absolute, therefore, is the final 
result of this dialectic reiterative process.2
2 .1 .2  D iscussion  o f  th e  R esem b lan ce o f  H e g e l’s D ia lec­
tic  P rocess to  th e  B isec tio n  M eth o d
The resemblance of the dialectic process to a common iterative procedure 
called the bisection method, which is used in mathematics for finding the roots 
of continuous functions (Gregory and Redmond 1994:37-39), is noteworthy. 
3 Based on the Intermediate Value Theorem, the bisection method begins
2This method of finding truth resembles a famous thought experiment, which was pro­
posed by Democritus and by other atomists to elicit the atom. In this thought experiment, 
atomists required one to imagine a material object being halved, and then one of the halves 
l>eing halved ad infinitum. The result of this reiterative dissecting, claimed the atomists,
would l>e an indivisible particle called the atom.
3 A function is a mapping from one set of numbers to another set of numbers, or from a
domain of values (e.g. real or natural numbers) to a range of corresponding values (Haaser
and Sullivan 1991:5). For example, /  : R —► [0,1] is the function, / ,  which maps the set
of all real numbers (i.e. between negative infinity to positive infinity) to the set of real
numbers between 0 and 1. Commonly, functions map from the set of all real numbers to
the set of all real numbers. For example, the function f ( x ) =  2x is such a function, since
it can take any real number for x on the right-hand side of the equation and it outputs
an associated real number for f(x).  Geometrically, this is a line in two dimensions with
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by considering a range of values of x, containing the root. Then one selects a 
point in the range (commonly the midpoint in the range) and substitutes the 
value of the point in for f{x) .  This will result in either a positive or negative 
value for f i x) .  If f ( x )  is positive then one halves the lower division of the 
range (so that the original range is now quartered) by choosing the midpoint 
in the lower division of the original range, and substitutes it in for f (x) .  If 
f ( x )  is negative then one halves the upper division of the range by choosing 
the midpoint of the upper division of the original range. This procedure is 
reiterated, each time dividing the range further, until a value for x, when 
substituted into f (x) ,  gives f ( x )  0. At this point the iterations can halt, 
since the root is revealed.
Here, Hegel’s thesis and antithesis can be conceived of as the least upper 
bound (lowest number in the range) and the greatest lower bound (greatest 
number in the range). It does not matter which is the thesis and which is 
the antithesis, since the thesis and antithesis in the quest for the absolute are 
completely arbitrary representations. In other words, they are just two kinds 
of knowledge, which may or may not be the absolute. Mathematically, the 
absolute can be conceived of as the root that we are searching for, and the 
synthesis as the value between the extremes that one has chosen to substitute 
into the function, f (x) .  The quest for the absolute, then, is the systematic 
selection of numbers that produces subsequent renditions that are continu­
ously getting closer to the absolute. The absolute is encountered when the 
process can go no further or until the thesis or antithesis become identical or 
nearly identical to one another for all practical purposes.4
indefinite length. A root is simply the value of x where the function, / ( x), intersects the
x-axis (i.e. f (x)  =  0).
4I must admit that this technique is not infallible. For instance when the root happens
to be an irrational number, the root may never be completely comprehended numerically.
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The interesting point in all of this is that the Intermediate Value Theorem 
can be adapted into a computational algorithm that can be used to solve 
equations numerically, and it works provided that the range containing the 
root is known. It cuts straight through the different values in the range to 
the actual root. A root can be any value in the range and yet this simple 
algorithm, for all intents and purposes, manages to home in on the root.
2 .1 .3  T he Scale In d ep en d en ce  o f  H eg e l’s C ogn ition
As the resemblance of Hegel’s dialectic process to the bisection method sug­
gests, Hegel’s theory of cognition (i.e. the dialectic process) can be regarded 
as a computational view of cognition, which has been a common way of con­
ceptualizing cognition in the cognitive sciences since the 1950s (e.g. Turing 
1950, Reisberg 1997). By envisioning cognition in this way, it can be argued 
that Hegel saw cognition as being transposable at different scales. This is 
because Hegel saw cognition as a process which could be abstracted from 
its context, and therefore a process which could occur independently in the 
brain of the individual, in society, or even in the world as a whole.
For example, Hegel’s dialectic process entails that with regard to the first 
scale (i.e. the brain), a single individual could come up with an arbitrary 
idea by himself or herself (i.e. a thesis), but then after deliberation find that 
an opposite view is more adequate (i.e. an antithesis). He or she could, then, 
eventually develop the idea even further (i.e. into a synthesis).
By the same token, the dialectic process could occur within society amongst
An irrational number is a number that has an infinite number of decimal places, like the 
natural number, e, and so the iterations can potentially go on forever, never arriving at a 
definitive number. Nonetheless, when rounded to a certain number of decimal places the 
root is realized for all practical purposes.
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several individuals. Within the confines of a society, one individual could 
come up with an idea, while another individual could skeptically refute it, a 
synthesis of the ideas could follow, a t which point the synthesis could become 
the fledgling thesis, and so on.
According to Hegel, no society is completely closed and so entire societies, 
which communicate with each other, can be involved in the dialectic process 
as well as individuals and groups of individuals. In this manner, the dialectic 
process operates on many scales, and if one takes the scaling of cognition 
to its logical conclusion, as Hegel did, then one could eventually conceive 
of a kind of cognition that includes all of humankind and perhaps even the 
universe.
An important point to remember about the dialectic process is that at 
each scale, cognition is cumulative through time and history (Hegel 1956). 
To see how cognition accumulates in this scale independent model, and to 
see how the cognition occurring within the brain of an individual and the 
cognition occurring within society will eventually become one, it is important 
to see that not only does the dialectic process occur at different scales from 
the human brain to the the level of communities and states, but that the 
theses that arise in each of the different scales are fundamentally the same. 
The theses are the same on each scale because they are all creations of the 
lowest scale — the brain.
An example of how a thesis exists in the brain and in society is the thesis 
of “communism”. It is a thesis that goes through independent dialectic 
processes in the human brain, among individuals, and among states. On all 
scales, the thesis of “communism” goes through dialectic processes with its 
antithesis “capitalism”. Whereas the dialectic process can manifest itself on 
an inter-individual scale as an argument, it has manifested itself on the state
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scale in the form of war (e.g. Cold War, Korean War, Vietnam War, etc.).
Though it could be said that the higher scales of society (e.g. the state) 
are dependent on the lower scales (e.g. the brain) for their ideas, it can be 
inferred from Hegel that the dialectic processes on each scale are fundamen­
tally different from each other and can therefore be regarded as independent 
processes. This scale independence prevents what happens in our brains from 
happening automatically on the state level.
If the theses are the same on each scale and if the dialectic process is oc­
curring at each scale, then each scale will arrive at the absolute independently. 
Eventually it will be realized by the individual brain that the absolute has 
been reached at which point “individual’1 cognition and “societal” cognition 
catch up with each other, becoming one.
The idea that cognition operates independently on different scales is not 
incompatible with the view I take in this thesis, which is that cognition
is substrate independent and therefore scale independent. However, it is
important to emphasize that although cognition is scale independent in the 
abstract sense, the scales of cognition are hierarchical and therefore influence 
each other. The reason I hold on to the abstracted notion of cognition is 
that it facilitates the conceptualization of a more general model of cognition 
which I take the first steps in expounding in Chapter 8 .
2 .1 .4  H isto ry ’s R o le  in H e g e l’s C ogn ition
If individuals are deliberating about their own ideas and pedagogically learn­
ing past theses and how these theses were debunked or modified in this 
hypothetical society, then the individual — though he or she may have re- 
conceived an exact duplicate of a thesis that failed — will likely decide against 
proposing the idea since the weaknesses of the thesis have been demonstrated
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historically. As a result, an individual born on this earth will rapidly learn 
what theses have been proposed, and therefore will more likely than not pro­
pose only new ideas built upon the old ideas. In this way, the knowledge 
of an individual at any point in time is, in theory, the knowledge that has 
accumulated in society. Since much of what is stored in the individual’s 
brain is social, then we as individuals are in effect serving the whole, which 
in this case, is society. W hat this means is that over the long term history is 
society’s memory, which is constantly propelling society toward the absolute; 
and so are the individuals that make up society approaching closer to the 
absolute.
A society, therefore, has a memory that transcends any individual bio­
logical memory. Mistakes that are made in the past are recorded into social 
memory and are subsequently — at least in theory never reiterated in 
exactly the same way. Cognition therefore rarely, if ever, circles and finds 
itself in exactly the same place. Cognition is cumulative and teleological, 
and this is evinced from history.
In this sense, history has a very important role in Hegel’s idea of universal 
cognition. In fact, it was pointed out by Engels that history is the proof that 
Hegel’s view of cognition is valid (Marx and Engels 1951:337-338). Hegel 
envisions history as having a purpose, and that purpose is every human’s 
search for freedom (Hegel 1956:12-13). This is not some abstract freedom, 
where everyone follows one’s desires, but rather a freedom of conscience, 
which Hegel adopts from Kant. According to Kant, action is the result of 
desires and reason, but since desires, regardless of whether they are innate or 
social, were not chosen by us, people cannot be truly considered free (Singer 
2001:39). In other words, we are prisoners to our own desires, since we 
have no control over their occurrence and since they often move us to act.
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Therefore, following desires is not the route to freedom and this consequently 
leaves us to our own reason (Singer 2001:39-40).
Action based solely on reason is possible according to Kant if all desires 
are taken out of the equation (Singer 2001:41). W hat we are left with is 
K ant’s “categorical imperative” , which is in and of itself universal morality. 
W hat, then, does acting according to the categorical imperative feel like? 
According to Kant, it should feel like doing one’s duty (Singer 2001:40-42). 
T hat is not to say that one should feel obligated to do one’s duty according 
to some social ethos or innate desire, but the feeling should arise from one’s 
own individual conscience. Regardless of the actions that ensue as the result 
of rational thought, all actions will have at their heart the one common 
denominator, which is the driving force, and that is duty for duty’s sake.
History is the process by which the realization of duty as freedom un­
folds, the goal of history being this realization. Hegel’s view is not quite an 
evolutionary view of history, since evolution is not usually regarded as being 
teleological, yet it is similar to evolution in that Hegel did consider history 
a developmental process. Specifically, Hegel’s history was the developmental 
progression toward a consciousness of freedom (Singer 2001:15).
The development of a consciousness of freedom is integral for the search 
for the absolute, which was discussed above, because being aware of one’s 
freedom clears any superfluous thoughts, such as desires, that might interfere 
with the rational quest for absolute knowledge. Similarly, achieving absolute 
knowledge through a historically manifested dialectic process culminates in 
consciousness of freedom. Thus, the search for the absolute and conscious­
ness of freedom are indelibly linked since they achieve the same result from 
disparate perspectives.
Hegel’s history consists of four main phases, which occurred in four dif­
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ferent parts of the world, namely: the Oriental world, the Greek world, the 
Roman world, and the Germanic world (Hegel 1956). Hegel’s history stops 
with the Germanic world due to the fact that Hegel believed that the goal 
of history was finally attained in the 19th century German state, specifi­
cally with the publication of Phenomenology of Mind. This is because it was 
within the pages of Phenomenology of Mind that people were supposed to 
realize that they were truly free. Hegel wanted to make his thoughts the 
turning point, when individual freedom of conscience was finally realized.
2 .1 .5  D iscussion  o f  th e  H egelian  V iew  o f  C ogn ition
It should be evident from this short summary of Hegel that what Hegel was 
trying to create was a scientific theory of cognition, in which cognition had an 
active role. Cognition was not only a medium through which ideas traveled; 
it had a role to play in creating and questioning ideas. This was accomplished 
through reason and, thus, to a certain extent, cognition for Hegel was reason. 
Hegel was also a firm believer that there existed one moral edict or rationality 
which was universal — the categorical imperative (duty for duty’s sake) — 
and that in the absence of coercion, all paths eventually converged on it.
It can be said that the Phenomenology of Mind is a “how to” book rather 
than a book describing how cognition actually operates. Hegel seems less con­
cerned with how the mind actually functions under normal circumstances 
than he was concerned with looking for a way to arrive at the absolute. One 
valuable point can be extracted from Hegel’s conception of cognition. Be­
cause cognition was reason (for Hegel), and because reason was universal (for 
Hegel and Kant), it followed that cognition was ultimately universal. Con­
sequently, this can be interpreted in several different ways, two of which are: 
that individual minds are linked because they share this universal reason or,
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as Hegel proposed, that individual minds are aspects of universal cognition 
(Singer 2001:89). (On this point Hegel’s interpretation is surprisingly con­
sistent with my interpretation of cognition, which I explain in Chapter 8 , 
though I do not propose a universal cognition but rather a kind of “societal” 
cognition, which I refer to as supra-individual cognition.)
The presumption, however, that cognition is reason and that reason is 
universal is problematic. Anthropology has taught us that not everyone 
abides by the same categorical imperative, which is duty for duty’s sake. 
Not all people are rational in the same way and therefore not all people 
will arrive at the same conclusion. The assumption that there is one final 
form, or truth, at the end of the progression of society, is a presumption and 
nothing more.5 Still, what Kant and Hegel have taught us shows from a 
theoretical perspective, at least, that cognition can be seen to exist outside 
of the individual, at the same time subsuming the individual. It may not be 
the universal omnipresent cognition that Hegel thought was possible, but it 
does suggest that clusters of people thinking along the same lines could form 
an extended cognition.
For Hegel, cognition pervaded societies and even larger organizations of 
individuals. He was a holist in this regard, since he believed that individuals 
played only parts in society and that these parts, in themselves, amounted 
to little given that individual cognition would, in time and driven by history, 
become synchronized with what I would refer to as “societal” cognition.
5The bisection method, used as an analogy to the dialectic process, demonstrates this 
point adequately. If the continuous function that is being analyzed with the bisection 
method has more than one root, then different initial ranges may contain different roots. 
In terms of the dialectic process, multiple roots translates into multiple “absolutes”.
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2.2 C ognition  Is in th e  Brain
The notion that cognition was scale independent remained an important con­
cept for philosophers for many years, but it steadily declined in popularity 
with the advent of scientific psychology (Hergenhahn 1992:207). The reason 
that people became less concerned with scale independent cognition was a 
change in methodology that turned interests toward the individual (Hergen­
hahn 1992:207), but there was no significant refutation of the scale inde­
pendent model. The demand to place the study of cognition on a scientific 
footing arose, but to use scientific techniques, it was necessary to have some­
thing to observe physically, such as material or behavior a substrate was 
required. Because cognition was difficult to observe without a substrate, the 
tendency to study the effects of cognition on the physiology of the individual 
and the behavior of the individual in isolation began to grow.
During the 17th and 18th centuries, observations of human behavior 
would lead to a stream of developments that would later characterize the 
foundations of modern experimental psychology (Hergenhahn 1992:207). The 
very first of these observations were for the most part accidental. For exam­
ple, in the 17th and 18th centuries, clocks were set according to the precise 
locations of specific stars in the night sky. This was often accomplished by 
an observer setting the clock precisely as a specific star crossed the hairline 
of his or her telescope. However, consistent discrepancies between the time 
it would take for two individuals to observe a star-crossing and the time it 
would take to set their clocks were noticed (Hergenhahn 1992:207).
This suggested that reaction times in individual perception varied and 
that these differences could be formally expressed mathematically (e.g., John’s 
clock is always a tenth of a second slower that Bill’s clock). This meant that 
not all individuals process information as speedily as others, and that cog-
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nition or at least aspects of cognition, such as perception, differed to some 
degree among individuals.6 The reaction, then, for burgeoning scientists of 
the mind was to eradicate the notion that cognition was the socially or uni­
versally enveloping phenomenon it was thought to be. This meant that the 
study of the mind could proceed from the individual, not from society or 
some larger social unit of investigation in the way that Hegel believed. It 
also meant that as long as experiments managed to isolate certain aspects 
of cognition, such as perception, from interferences, it was possible to study 
these aspects of the individual mind scientifically.
Developments in physiology and the subsequent emergence of experimen­
tal psychology changed how we conceive of the mind. The idea that the 
secrets of the mind were hidden within the individual was not new, for it was 
a view that was advocated by Descartes (Hergenhahn 1992:209). Descartes 
saw the nervous system as consisting of a complex series of tubules, which 
were routed from a special gland — where ideas (“animal spirits”) were con­
ceived — to a fibrous brain. Ideas flowed through these tubules to the brain, 
enlarging the gaps between the brain fibers. Stronger ideas left larger gaps 
between the brain fibers and hence left deeper impressions on the brain. In 
this way, ideas regarded as spirits could directly impact material (i.e., the 
brain) (Descartes 1985:107 in Seager 1999:6-7).7 It was not until the 19th cen­
s o r  most cases it was nearly the same but in terms of research emphasis, minute
discrepancies took priority over commonalities.
7The notion of there being two different substances in the world, spirits and material,
is known as Cartesian dualism. In later years, the study of cognition settled on a form
of monism , called materialism. However, for some philosophers of consciousness (e.g.
Chalmers 1996), dualism still remains an important doctrine. Another dominant feature
in Descartes’ work, which also happens to be a consequence of dualism, is the mind-body
problem. The mind-body problem is one that addresses how physiological events work to
produce mental events, and how mental events, in turn, work to produce physiological
70
tury, however, that progress into studying nerves (Descartes’ tubules) led to 
developments in distinguishing different kinds of nerves. Charles Bell (1774- 
1842) and Francois Magendie (1783-1855), for example, were the first to be 
able to distinguish motor nerves from sensory nerves (Hergenhahn 1992:209).
Around the same time that physiologists were shedding light on the hu­
man nervous system, advances in psychology were being made. It was at 
this time, for instance, that faculty psychology emerged. Thomas Reid (1710- 
1796) was the first to use the term “faculty” in a meaningful way (Hergenhahn 
1992:170). Before him, others used the term loosely as a way to describe any 
kind of mental ability; but it was Reid who was to consider seriously what 
kinds of faculties humans have. Reid concluded that there were 43 mental 
faculties and that these faculties were innate. Breathing, swallowing, rest­
ing, and feeling were just three of the 43 mental faculties that Reid recorded. 
Whereas innate mental abilities were regarded as faculties, acquired men­
tal abilities were referred to as “habits”. Reid believed that faculties never 
operated alone, only as parts of a single mind.
It was the anatomist Franz Joseph Gall (1758-1828) and his student Jo­
hann Gasper Spurzheim (1776-1832), however, who were integral in equating 
the mind with the brain and with it all of its faculties (Hergenhahn 1992:220- 
221). Three claims, made by Gall and Spurzheim, were to accomplish the 
task of shifting the the study of the mind to the brain. The first claim was 
that the strength of mental faculties varied from individual to individual; 
no two individuals have the same faculties to the same degree. The second 
claim was that these faculties are all housed in specific areas of the brain 
of the individual. And the third claim was that these faculties can be iden­
tified and studied by feeling or looking at the bumps on a person’s head,
effects.
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This third claim was supported by the belief that well developed faculties 
cause protrusions on certain regions of the skull. The study of surface fea­
tures on the head became known as phrenology and it became popular as a 
means of divining characteristics about one’s mental capacities (Hergenhahn 
1992:171-174).
Ironically, it was subsequent faculty research, conducted by phrenologists, 
which was to show that many of the assumptions that were made by phre­
nologists were false. Nevertheless, what Gall and Spurzheim did achieve was 
to situate the mind firmly within the skull of the individual and to present 
the first modular view of the brain, which was to remain popular in neuro­
psychology for many years to come (Hergenhahn 1992:174).
Advances into how the brain functioned were made by psychologists and 
physiologists in subsequent years, but one of the most important break­
throughs was the discovery of the neuron at the end of the 19th century 
by Santiago Ramon y Cajal (Churchland and Sejnowski 1996:40-44). Up 
to this time, anatomists had to tease apart brain tissue carefully in order 
to observe individual cells. Often this resulted in inaccurate depictions of 
individual cells. To isolate individual cells, anatomists began to stain their 
samples, in the hope that the staining would cause the individual brain cells 
to stand out. Unfortunately, these rudimentary staining methods discolored 
entire arrays of cells and did little to illuminate the structure of the individ­
ual cell. Ramon y Cajal (1894), using a silver impregnating staining method 
discovered by Camillo Golgi, became the first to stain only a few random 
cells, or neurons, thereby becoming the first to observe a single neuron with 
all of its distinctive features (Levitan and Kaczmarek 2002:8).
Since this discovery, great advances toward elucidating the operative 
mechanisms of neurons and how they interact with other neurons to pro­
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duce cognition have been made (e.g. McCulloch and P itts 1943). However, 
to understand how neurons function as the fundamental constituents of cog­
nition it is necessary to discuss, in detail, the structure of the neuron and 
the networks that neurons form.
2.2 .1  T h e N eu ron
The neuron comprises two main parts (the following is summarized from Wu 
2001:1-8): the cell body or soma and the axon. The cell body contains the 
nucleus and has several root-like protrusions called dendrites which extend to 
other neurons. The axon is a long fiber-like protrusion, which also extends 
to other neurons. Typically the furthest ends of the dendrites and axon 
can fan out to as many as 10,000 other neurons. The furthest ends of the 
dendrites and axon do not actually make contact with other neurons; instead 
there are gaps called synapses, normally 20 nanometers in breadth, which 
separate the ends of the dendrites and axon from the other neurons. The 
purpose of the dendrites and axon is to link other neurons so that they may 
interact. They interact by sending electrical impulses through the dendrites 
and axon until they reach the synapse, a bulb-like structure at the end of the 
dendrite or axon which contains several presynaptic sites. If the magnitude 
of the electric impulse is strong enough, a presynaptic site releases chemical 
neurotransmitters which cross the synaptic gap, contacting the postsynaptic 
sites on the cell bodies of other neurons. In this way, interaction between 
neurons is achieved by electrical as well as chemical means, and the main 
difference between these two means is in the speed at which they propagate.
The electrical impulses, which are propagated along dendrites and axons 
of neurons, are generated as the result of incoming chemical neurotransmit­
ters exciting the synapses of cells. The excitatory synapses then emit an
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electrical impulse into a negatively charged axon (the neuron’s equilibrium 
potential is about —70m V  in comparison with a positively charged liquid 
exterior). The rising positive charges in the cell cause a loss in the imper­
meability of the membrane. This allows positive ions, such as N a+, to flood 
into the cell, causing the interior of the axon to go positive (-f60m V ). The 
now positive interior causes permeability from the inside out. This action 
initiates an impulse that propagates down the axon, allowing positive ions, 
this time K +, to leak out of the cell until the —70m V  equilibrium within 
the cell is again achieved. The impulse then propagates down the axon to 
the next neuron, and in this way signals are propagated throughout the cell 
body (Wu 2001:2-7).
In the brief discussion of individual neurons above, it was mentioned 
that the electrical impulse, produced as a result of the ionic discrepancies 
between the interior and the exterior of the cell, is the means through which 
neurons interact with each other. What aspect of the signal pulse train 
actually effects responses in neurons is still a m atter of some debate (Milton 
1996:21). For instance, whereas some believe that it is frequency of the pulse 
train, others claim it is the intensity of the pulse train that allows neurons to 
interact with one another. However, this is not an issue for many cognitive 
scientists, because many cognitive tasks can be explained without a precise 
understanding of the actual signals being transmitted among neurons. These 
tasks to which I refer are the information-processing aspects of cognition, 
such as learning, recalling, and recognizing. These tasks are dependent not 
on the bottom-end properties of neural interaction (i.e. the kind of signal 
being transmitted between neurons), but rather on the top-end properties 
of neural interaction (i.e. the interaction of neurons in the neural network 
as a whole). This realization came about as the result of physiological and
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mathematical inter-disciplinary research being conducted in the middle of 
the 20th century. Three discoveries stand out at this point marking the 
beginning of this “cognitive revolution”.
The first was the discovery that neurons have specific roles within the 
neural network they comprise. McCulloch and Pitts (1943) discovered that 
built-in thresholds within neurons, dependent on the electro-chemical envi­
ronment, have to be overcome in order for neurons to fire impulses; if this 
threshold is not overcome, neurons remain inactive. This one property of 
the neuron has far-reaching implications, for it is this on/off mechanism that 
allows information to be processed. This mere property of the neuron in 
itself is insignificant, until we consider entire networks of neurons interacting 
in this on-off fashion. The human central nervous system has a vast number 
of neurons and mutual connections between these neurons. For example, a 
given cell in the human cortex receives input from as many as 104 synapses 
at one time. This high connectivity and complex parallel structure have a 
great impact on the number of various complex tasks a brain can accomplish.
The second discovery was that the brain is malleable to a degree. This 
feature is referred to as plasticity and it is another feature which adds to 
the overall complexity of the human brain. The synaptic strengths between 
neurons vary according to the intensity of usage of the synapses, since more 
active synapses are usually stronger than less active synapses (Hebb 1949). 
This quite elementary observation set the stage for the very first connectionist 
or parallel distributed network view of cognition (McClelland and Rumelhart 
1986).
Hebb’s (1949) work suggested that learning and other cognitive tasks 
have a neuro-physiological basis. The premise is that if ideas can be repre­
sented by neurons, then learning that two ideas are related in some manner
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is equivalent to the neuro-physiological act of strengthening the bonds be­
tween the neurons representing the ideas. W hat this suggested was that the 
properties of neural networks were the main factor in producing cognition, 
not the individual neurons themselves.
A single neuron has one fundamental property: an internal threshold 
(McCulloch and P itts 1943).8 It was inconceivable, therefore, that a single 
neuron had the capacity for complex cognitive tasks. It was more likely that 
neurons arranged in multiplex networks would be able to do complex tasks 
such as learning, storing, and recalling information. In other words, it began 
to appear that emergent cognition was a holistic phenomenon dependent on 
the network rather than the node. A short description of neural networks is 
therefore necessary in order to gain a general understanding of the underlying 
mechanics of cognition.
2 .2 .2  N etw ork  A rch itec tu re
Neural networks can be broken down into two types of architectures, feed­
forward networks and feedback or recurrent networks. Typically, feed-forward 
networks are used in constructing artificial neural networks for engineering 
applications, whereas recurrent networks occur naturally within the nervous 
system. That is, biological neural networks are generally regarded to operate 
like feedback networks, since they have the capability to learn by themselves 
and this capability most accurately represents the autonomous way in which 
neural networks in the brain operate (Haykin 1999:392). Since the concern in 
this section is with cognition and the cognitive capabilities of the neural net­
works of the nervous system, I will focus on recurrent networks. Much of the
8Neurons also have internal decay rates (every neuron decays at a certain rate through 
time but this can be ignored for the time being).
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following discussion on network architecture is taken from Thiran (1997:6-8) 
and Rao and Rao (1995:1-19).
Feedback o r R ec u rre n t n eu ra l a rch ite c tu re s  are networks of neu­
rons that consist of only one layer of neurons, which function both as input 
and output neurons. Information that is input into the network is propagated 
among the neurons in a circular manner since the output and input neurons 
are one in the same and, therefore, form a system. Within this system, the 
input of a neuron is the output of a preceding neuron multiplied by the in­
terconnection strength between the neurons. This process is reiterated until 
the system stabilizes at a particular level of activity. This process of reitera­
tion is a dynamic process; therefore the neural networks that are engaged in 
this reiterative behavior are called dynamical neural networks. Because these 
neural systems frequently form nonlinear systems, different finite numbers of 
final output states (i.e. equilibria) can arise. Feedback neural networks are 
often used for learning, recalling, and recognizing information patterns.
A common mapping algorithm that can be used for a feedback network
is:
where /(•) is a normalized signal function , which is explained in the neural 
dynamics section, 7* is the threshold for the normalized signal function, yj[n], 
n £ R, is an input vector, yi[n +  1] is an output vector, which is then fed 
back into the recurrent network as an input, and Wij are connection weights 
that are associated with a signal being transmitted from the j th  neuron to 
the zth neuron.
Feedback networks are unique because of their dynamical properties which
(2 .1 )
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Figure 2: This network is called a Hopfield network and is an exam ple of feed­
back network architecture. Here, v 2 , 3^ , and U4 all act as input and output
neurons. Notice that the nodal interaction occurs in both directions until stability  
of the dynamical system  Ls obtained. The connections between the neurons can 
be weighted with values other than the binary values of 0  (which implies that 
there is no connection between two neurons) and 1  (which implies that there is a 
connection between two neurons).
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enable feedback networks to learn by themselves (Rao and Rao 1995:5). 
The capability of recurrent networks to learn by themselves is called self­
o rg an iza tio n  or u n su p erv ised  learning. A feedback network needs only 
to be provided with input information (i.e. a stimulus) and it will learn to 
respond in a specific way. The reason that a feedback network can achieve 
such autonomy and learn by itself is that the network itself abides certain 
rules; that is, the nodes of the network interact in a certain fashion which 
can be construed as rules. Provided that these rules are followed, the net­
work can learn on its own without the need of a supervisor. A feedback 
network will learn, thereby forming memory, and will recall information that 
was stored into memory (i.e. respond according to the rules followed by the 
network). In networks that form nonlinear systems, this type of memory is 
called Content-Addressable-Memory (CAM) (Wu 2001:61-62).
2 .2 .3  Sum m arizing N eu ron s and N eu ra l N etw ork s
It was discovered through the study of the brain that the constituents of 
the brain neurons — have an extremely simple function, which is that a 
neuron has an internal threshold that must be overcome in order for a neuron 
to fire. What this means is that cognition is not dependent on some complex 
innate property within the neuron, but rather it is dependent on some holistic 
property that several simple operating components linked together achieve 
by virtue of their holism.
The brain is a unique organ in that it can accomplish a multitude of 
complex tasks. However, the brain is not an enigma with regard to its 
information-processing capacities to store and retrieve patterns. These cog­
nitive capacities, as neuro-physiologists have shown, are best explained as 
holistic properties of networks in which the constituents of the networks,
79
neurons or their equivalents, play only a minor role.
Typically, the neural networks of the nervous system are recurrent net­
works, which have the ability to self-organize or self-learn. These feedback 
networks already have much of the information they need to learn on their 
own built into the network and only need stimulus information to utilize the 
stored information. The unique capability of recurrent networks to store and 
retrieve information on their own cannot be emphasized enough for neural 
networks and, as we shall see in subsequent chapters, for exchange networks 
that are preserved in the archaeological record.
2.3 C ognition  as C om putation
I will now move on to another discovery that occurred at the same time that 
physiologists and anatomists were uncovering the secrets of the neuron and 
the neural network. Unlike the previous two cognitive discoveries, — Mc- 
Culloch and P itts’ (1943) discovery of the simple role that the neuron plays 
and Hebb’s (1949) discovery that neurons can learn and recall information as 
networks — which maintained some connection with the neuro-physiology of 
the brain, this cognitive discovery would come from a purely mathematical 
source.
2.3 .1  P recursors to  th e  C om p u tation a l V iew  o f  C og­
nition: B ehaviorism  and C ogn itive  P sy ch o lo g y
Between about 1930 and 1950, behaviorism was the dominant theory in psy­
chology (Hergenhahn 1992:542). Behaviorism emerged from the functional 
school of thought and it consisted of the assertion that much if not all of 
human cognition can be deduced through the observation of human beings.
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This view contrasted sharply with the mentalist school, which believed that 
the object of study should be the human mind itself. The main way for 
the mentalists to observe the mind directly was through introspection. The 
problem with introspection, claimed the behaviorists, was that it conflated 
observer and subject, and it therefore was not as scientific as observing the 
subject from an objective position. The problem with observing the sub­
ject’s behavior, claimed the mentalists, was that the observer loses track of 
the objective of the study, which should be the human mind. In other words, 
the behaviorists were not studying the mind; they were studying the effects 
of the mind, which were materialized in the form of human behavior.
Nonetheless behaviorism emerged as a powerful contending school of 
thought during the early 20th century (Hergenhahn 1992:335-336). Behav­
ioral psychology, called objective psychology in its infancy, progressed mainly 
through the work of Russian psychologists: Ivan M. Sechenov (1829-1905), 
Ivan Petrovitch Pavlov (1849-1936), and Vladimir M. Bechterev (1857-1927). 
It also developed independently on the other side of the Atlantic with John 
Broadus Watson (1878-1958) and William McDougall (1871-1938) (Hergen­
hahn 1992:336-369).
Watson described the objective of behaviorism as deducing human re­
sponses from stimuli as well as inferring stimuli from observing human re­
sponses (Hergenhahn 1992:346-359). In other words, behaviorists conducted 
repetitive studies on human subjects to discover patterns in human responses. 
If behavioral patterns emerged from these studies, then one could use this 
knowledge in one’s observations of human behavior to infer the stimuli that 
elicited the responses in the first place. In this way, great insight could be 
gained into cognition — or how someone will react — from studying the 
relationship between stimuli and responses in a controlled environment.
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An example, which illustrates this kind of approach, is Pavlov’s well- 
known study of the conditioned and unconditioned stimulus and response 
(Hergenhahn 1992:338-346). In his study, Pavlov discovered that organisms 
innately respond to certain environmental triggers. Food, for example, that 
is presented to organisms triggers certain biological responses such as the 
secretion of gastric juices and saliva. Triggers, such as presenting food to a 
dog, are called unconditional stimuli. Responses to these stimuli are called 
unconditioned responses (in the case of a dog presented with food, the uncon­
ditioned response would be the secretion of saliva). W hat Pavlov discovered 
was that if the unconditioned stimulus is preceded by a conditioned stimu­
lus, such as the ringing of a bell, then the dog anticipating food will secrete 
saliva conditionally. That is, though the food is not yet in the presence of 
the dog, the dog will nonetheless elicit a conditioned response (i.e., the secre­
tion of saliva in response to the bell). To elicit a conditioned response, the 
conditioned stimulus must be temporally associated with the unconditioned 
stimulus several times over before the dog will elicit a conditioned response. 
Presenting the dog with a conditioned stimulus and, shortly after, an uncon­
ditioned stimulus repetitively is called conditioning. W hat Pavlov found was 
that during conditioning, the dog was actually learning through associating 
the conditioned stimulus with the unconditioned stimulus. He called the ner­
vous system activity associated with this learning process excitation, since 
a pattern was being engrained in the dog’s behavior. However, Pavlov also 
found that this behavioral pattern of eliciting a conditioned response can be 
erased if the unconditioned stimulus no longer follows the conditioned stim­
ulus. The nervous system activity associated with this learning process, or 
unlearning process, is called inhibition (Hergenhahn 1992:342).
Behaviorist studies, though they offered a scientific basis for studying
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the physical manifestations of the brain, bypassed what actually occurs in 
the brain. Behaviorism was interested in studying behavioral stimuli and 
responses presented to and elicited from brain; the brain as a separate focus 
played little or no role.
Not content with the miniscule attention paid to elucidating the mecha­
nisms within the brain, the Gestaltists (e.g. Koffka 1963) and the method­
ological behaviorists (e.g. Tolman 1948) countered the behaviorist move­
ment, and as a result initiated the emergence of cognitive psychology. Con­
sequently, the mind-body problem resurfaced with the reemphasis on what 
actually occurs within the mind (Hergenhahn 1992:545).
The mind-body problem is an indelible feature that has appeared through­
out the history of psychology (Hergenhahn 1992:14-15). The reason for the 
problem was the admission of mental events to a physical world. The be­
haviorists claimed that it was only behavior that was of consequence to the 
psychologist, since it is only behavioral manifestations of the brain that can 
be observed. They proposed that there was no need to study something that 
may or may not be occurring within the brain, and this therefore implied 
that there was no reason for hypothesizing the existence of so-called men­
tal events. Behaviorists, hence, managed to resolve the mind-body problem 
quite concisely by denying the existence of mental events and embracing a 
materialist view of the brain via behavior. Behaviorists were monists in this 
regard, since they only accepted the existence of one substance, material, in 
the form of observable behavior.
For cognitive psychologists, the mind-body problem could not be resolved 
as easily as it was resolved for behaviorists. The mind-body problem was also 
more specific than it was for other psychological schools of thought in the 
past. It was not that cognitive psychologists were interested in the connection
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between behavior (body) and cognitive events (mind); they were interested 
in the bridge itself, between the mind and the brain. The mind-body problem 
therefore evolved into what could more accurately be called the mind-brain 
problem. The objective here was to resolve how something material, such as 
the brain or nervous system, could produce something immaterial or mental, 
such as “thinking” or “ideas.”
Initially, cognitive psychology incorporated mentalist approaches and there­
fore could not be regarded as being as one-sided as behaviorism with its 
emphasis on behavioral observation (Hergenhahn 1992:545). Cognitive psy- 
chologists maintained the importance of the physical body or brain, whether 
it was observable human behavior or the firing of neurons in the brain. How­
ever, it was cognitive psychologists’ adherence to the belief that cognitive 
events existed and should be studied in the brain that separated the cogni­
tive psychologists from other psychologists.
It was neural behavior that was clearly responsible for “thought,” but 
the question was: how was the bridge between the brain and the mind con­
structed? Was it a one-way bridge or a two-way bridge? And how did it 
work? These were the kinds of questions that cognitive psychologists would 
make their duty to try to answer (Hergenhahn 1992:545). Those cognitive 
psychologists that were epiphenomenalists claimed that mental events were 
the manifestations of brain activity. Others, which could be called interac- 
tionists, believed that mental events actually affected physiology (e.g. the 
psychosomatic illnesses identified by Freud). In both cases, the material brain 
and the immaterial or idealistic mind exist and interact. Among epiphenom­
enalists, the material determines the ideological; among interactionists, the 
ideological determines the material. Regardless of the position taken by cog­
nitive psychologists, a discovery would take place during the late 1940s that
84
would, for many cognitive psychologists, settle the debate of the mind-body 
problem.
2 .3 .2  U sin g  a M etap h or from  A rtificia l In te lligen ce
In 1950, Alan M. Turing (1912-1954) founded the field of artificial intelli­
gence (AI) with the development of an automatic computing engine (ACE) 
(Turing 1945; Ince 1992:IX-XI). Turing was involved in mechanical computa­
tion previous to the ACE, much of which would be realized in the electrical 
circuitry of the American ENIAC, but it was not until the ACE that his 
original design was recognized. The ACE was a machine that was based on 
how a human thinks and solves problems in steps.
Though Turing was involved in artificial intelligence research as early as 
the mid- 1940s it was a paper that he prepared for “Mind: A Quarterly Review 
of Psychology and Philosophy” , which most profoundly affected the field of 
psychology. In this paper he posed the question: “Do machines think?” and 
he conceived of a way of answering this question by defining objectively what 
“thinking” is (Turing 1950).
Turing proposed that in order to tell whether a machine thinks, the ma­
chine must go through a test. This hypothetical test, called the Taring test, 
involved three players: two people and a machine. One of the people took 
the role of interrogator while the other person and the machine were hidden 
from view of the interrogator, though both were able to communicate freely 
with the interrogator. The task of the interrogator was to determine which 
was the person and which was the machine by asking the machine and the 
person a series of questions. The answers that the machine or person gave to 
the interrogator provided the basis by which the interrogator decided which 
interviewee was the machine and which was the person. Obviously, there
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were certain restrictions as to the kinds of answers that could be given by 
the computer and machine and the person being interviewed. For example, 
one could not answer truthfully to the question: “Are you a human being or 
a machine?” .
Similarly, being able to see or hear the machine or human could facili­
tate in determining the originator of the answer. Therefore, each player was 
supplied with a keyboard with an associated display and it was through this 
means tha t machine and person communicated with the interrogator (i.e. 
something like email). Communicating in this restricted way prevented the 
interrogator from guessing which subject was human by eliminating periph­
eral information — such as voice tone — forced the interrogator to focus on 
the information on which the judgment of intelligence was to be based. If, af­
ter several sessions, the interrogator could not distinguish human intelligence 
from artificial intelligence, then the machine was said to “think” .
Interest in the mechanics of cognition or “intelligence” is a niche in cog­
nitive science that has steadily grown ever since Alan Turing (1950) showed 
that memory and thinking in general could be mathematically generated from 
a material basis. The realization that cognition and mechanics were linked 
set the foundation for artificial intelligence and robotics in engineering and 
for an infor'mation processing view of the human mind in psychology. The 
mathematical mechanics behind information processing were later improved 
upon significantly by Grossberg (1967, 1970a, 1970b) and they continue to 
form the foundational equations for cognition in neural dynamics (Harvey 
1994; Wu 2001). This, however, is subject matter for the next chapter.
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2.3 .3  W eak and S tron g  A rtificia l In te lligen ce
Since the computational approach to cognition first arose with Turing’s work, 
there has been considerable debate about whether the Turing test suffices 
as a test for detecting thought. Some say that a machine that passes the 
Turing test does in fact have the mental attributes of human beings — that 
is, as long as the machine can solve the same problems and reason as well as 
humans can. Advocates of this school of thought are known as proponents 
of strong artificial intelligeMce. They believe that machines can duplicate 
human thought processes. On the other hand, some would say that just 
because a machine passes the Turing test does not imply that the machine 
actually has the same thought processes as a human. Humans can experience, 
dream, hallucinate, and feel. Machines, on the other hand, cannot do these 
things. Advocates of this school of thought are known as proponents of weak 
artificial intelligence. They believe that machines can only imitate human 
thought processes (Hergenhahn 1992:545-551).
However, the argument proceeds, the strong artificial intelligence camp 
is quite specific about what it defines as thinking (i.e. “intelligence” ). Ac­
cording to Turing, thinking is the ability to answer questions in a human-like 
fashion, and in so doing fool a human interrogator in what has been called the 
Turing test. The weak artificial intelligence school, on the other hand, asserts 
that there is something more to thinking than fooling a human interrogator.
If there is something in human thought that a human interrogator cannot 
detect, then does it really m atter what this “something” is? If a computer 
responds in the same way that any human would respond, then we must 
decide what, if anything, makes us think humans are so special.
87
2 .3 .4  D iscussion: S trong A rtificia l In te lligen ce , B eh av­
iorism , and th e  R ise  o f  F unctional E xp lan ation s  
o f C ogn ition
Strong artificial intelligence proponents, as well as behaviorists and cognitive 
psychologists, are commonly regarded as monists, specifically materialists. 
However, a more accurate label for the strong artificial intelligence propo­
nents is that they are functionalists.9 Turing’s hypothetical test is what 
really brought the functional conception of cognition to light.
In the Turing test, the main point is that cognition is determined by 
the function that it serves. That is, because a human and a computer that 
are being interviewed display the same attributes and respond in the same 
human-like way, they are both examples of cognition at work. The difference, 
however, is that one form of cognition is bound up in a human brain and the 
other form of cognition is bound up in the silicon circuitry of a computer.
The main idea behind functionalism is that the end justifies and therefore 
explains the means. In other words, cognition can come about as the result 
of several means, but the most critical attribute which defines cognition is 
its outward appearance — how it appears to people. Interestingly, the rise 
of functional explanations of cognition cannot solely be attributed to Turing, 
though he may have been the first to propose a functional view of cognition 
explicitly. Rather, behaviorism was arguing something similar. That is, 
behaviorism argued that it is the responses of people to certain stimuli which
9There are different kinds of functionalists, which I have divided into two camps, the 
weak functionalists and the strong functionalists. I discuss the distinction between these 
two functionalist schools in Section 3.2.3. Though the functionalism that is discussed in 
this section is weak functionalism, the distinction between it and strong functionalism 
does not need to be clarified at this stage in the thesis.
should be the focus of psychological studies, since it is only human behavior 
which can be observed directly, not the inner-workings of the brain. The main 
difference, therefore, between strong artificial intelligence and behaviorism is 
that whereas behaviorists gave up on the idea of explaining cognition, strong 
artificial intelligence proponents, using the same means of explanation (i.e. 
functionalism), argue that it is possible to explain cognition.
2 .3 .5  D iscussion: O b jection s to  S trong A rtificia l In te l­
ligence
There are, of course, objections to strong artificial intelligence, and I will 
briefly introduce them below (Hergenhahn 1986:548-550). I will also explain 
why I do not accept these objections as valid objections against strong arti­
ficial intelligence or what I will simply refer to as AI.
My views on AI are pertinent to the thesis because I, like the authors 
whose work I will be presenting in the next sections, am clearly of the view 
that cognition is substrate independent and is therefore not only capable 
of being duplicated in different substrates, but is capable of extending be­
yond the human individual, incorporating aspects of the social and natu­
ral environment. The consequences of a substrate independent cognition 
are far-reaching, because the notion of a substrate independent cognition is 
instrumental in reconstructing cognition in the archaeological record, as I 
demonstrate in Chapter 7.
The First Objection Against AI
The first objection against AI is that computers follow rules, whereas humans 
do not necessarily follow rules. The objection stipulates that human thinking
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is often influenced by “non-rule-like” feelings and emotions, which computers 
do not share with humans.
I would argue, however, that the Turing test is not a test to see if machines 
could feel like humans; it is a test to see if machines can think or reason like 
humans. As such, the Turing test accomplishes its task.
It is true that emotions and feelings can be regarded as factors that can 
affect the way different individuals reason, but in this case I would argue 
that feelings and emotions are based on rules. To be more specific, feelings 
and emotions are kinds of information processing (Sloman 2000:192) based 
011 rules which are specific to the individual and which can affect — help or 
hinder the ways the individual thinks.
Feedings and emotions may appear to be non-rule-like, but they can be 
regarded as rule-like nonetheless. The reason we are left with the impression 
that feelings and emotions are non-rule-like is that we interact with humans 
as peers, and not as their programmers. We do not know everyone’s “rules” 
since we are not their programmers, and we therefore should not expect to 
know how everyone will react to a particular situation.
It should also be pointed out that, not all displays of emotion are nec­
essarily unpredictable, and this means that one could potentially program 
a machine to respond emotionally to certain stimuli (e.g. when asked ques­
tions). After all, we humans often respond programmatically. For instance, 
in a chance encounter with someone you know in the street, it is not often, 
when asked how you are doing, that you actually respond with an elaborate 
summary of how you feel. Normally when asked how you are doing, you 
respond with an “alright.” Sometimes one will respond with “good,” some­
times “awful,” but beyond these alternatives, very little else is said. It is a 
program that plays itself over and over again in daily life.
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Whereas it may be true that more research needs to be conducted into 
the nature of emotions and feelings, the opponents to AI cannot refute the 
proposal that emotions and feelings can be conceived of as being rule-based.
The Second O bjection to  AI
The second objection is that AI lacks originality or creativity. Computers 
are programmed by steadfast rules to which they adhere. There is no unpre­
dictability in AI behavior.
The “unpredictability argument” is very human-centric, and subjective, 
since it assumes that humans are unpredictable. But are we that unpre­
dictable? As I mentioned earlier, we all frequently respond in the same ways 
when asked certain questions, such as: “How are you doing?” . Also, behav- 
iorally, we are quite predictable in certain circumstances. For instance, all 
humans will usually run out of a burning building. In both of the above 
examples it can easily be argued that we are programmed socially and in­
stinctively, respectively. This same argument for the predictability of humans 
exists at the microscopic level as well as the macroscopic behavioral level. At 
the neural level, our biological neural networks are mechanistic and therefore 
just as predictable as an artificial reproduction of our neural networks. The 
research we discussed above supports this point.
Nonetheless arguing for the predictibility of humans does not refute the 
claim that machines are not creative. Boden (1998:23), for example, points 
out two kinds of human creativity: P-creativity and H-creativity. An idea 
“... is P-creative if the person in whose mind it arises could not have had 
it before; it does not matter how many times other people have already had 
the same idea” (1998:23). On the other hand, an idea “... is H-creative if it 
is P-creative and no one else, in all human history, has ever had it before”
91
(1998:23).
The claim that computers cannot be P-creative can be refuted by chang­
ing the frame of reference. The claim that computers cannot be P-creative 
is a completely subjective one and it assumes that a human observing an AI 
unit is also the programmer of the AI. Of course, there would be nothing 
creative about a computer you designed yourself. On the other hand, an AI 
that someone else designed could be programmed to be very creative to an 
observer, as creative as one wanted it to be. Thus, what is creative to one 
person is not necessarily creative to another person. The conclusion is that a 
simple algorithm can produce extremely P-creative results, for the computer 
which is running the algorithm and for any observer as long as the observer 
is not also the programmer.
According to the definitions provided by Boden (1998), it might be dif­
ficult to sec; how an AI could be H-creative, but the fact of the matter is 
that we have already seen AI being H-creative. AI is founded on the concept 
that algorithms are the basis of its mental functions, and so if we if it can 
be shown that algorithms can generate H-creative results then it follows that 
AI have the potential to be H-creative.
An example of such H-creativity occurred in the late 1950s when a mete­
orologist by the name of Edward Lorenz stumbled upon an algorithm which 
generated H-creative results (Lorenz 1963) — commonly referred to by math­
ematicians as chaos. From the perspective of Lorenz’s algorithm and all al­
gorithms, Lorenz’s algorithm was being H-creative. Not only was Lorenz’s 
algorithm being H-creative, but it was P-creative as well since there was no 
way that the exact same results could be reproduced by that same algorithm 
with different initial states. A change in the initial state of the algorithm and 
the algorithm would have produced entirely different results. This character­
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istic regarding the initial states is called sensitivity to initial conditions and 
is a feature of all nonlinear systems as well as the algorithms that are used 
to simulate these systems. Of course, not all algorithms have the capability 
to be H-creative, but the potential is certainly there in many algorithms.
To summarize, the two objections against AI that I discussed above are 
weak. However, there are two other strong objections, which I will only 
discuss in passing here, since I provide a more detailed treatment of these 
other two objections in the next chapter (see Section 3.5). These objections 
are that:
1. Computers cannot possibly display human cognitive capacities since 
computers do not interact with the environment.
2. Computers cannot possibly exhibit cognition, since computers are not 
brains; that is, the inner-workings of computers and brains are funda­
mentally different. Therefore, just because phenomena exhibit cogni­
tive characteristics does not mean that they constitute cognition.
I agree with the opponents of AI who state that, at the current level of 
technology computers are incapable of the same cognition that is possible in 
human brains. The reason for this is that brains are not exactly computers, 
as I will discuss in the next chapter. But this is not to say that computers do 
not produce cognition which is in many ways like human cognition, nor does 
this imply that computers will never achieve the same capabilities of human 
brains. I also agree with the view that the physical environment (Gibson 
1966:7-14; Gibson 1979) and the social environment (Gibson 1966:22-27) are 
critical for developing human cognition and that the environment affects 
individual cognition in ways that we are only beginning to understand. In
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this way, unless it is understood what precisely cognition is and how society 
and environment affect individual thought, human cognition is not likely to 
be duplicated by a machine. However, this does not mean that cognition 
abstracted from society cannot be duplicated in machines.
Before these objections are discussed any further, more work needs to be 
reviewed to elucidate what the process is that unleashes cognition. There­
fore, I will consider these objections in Section 3.5 after I have discussed 
more about the nature of cognition. In Section 3.5, I treat these objections 
not as objections to be refuted by AI, but as constructive criticisms of the 
computational view of cognition, which can be used to strengthen the AI 
approach.
2.4 Supporting R esearch for a C om putational 
Substrate Independent C ognition
The following sections present a selection of recent work that has been con­
ducted regarding cognition. The purpose of presenting this work is to show 
that it supports a view of cognition as manifested in different media, and not 
necessarily as connected to the brain of the individual. Substrate indepen­
dence is a natural consequence of a computational conception of cognition 
and the work that will be discussed supports a substrate independent con­
ception of cognition.
A substrate independent cognition suggests that cognition can be con­
ceived of as independent of the human brain (i.e. a calculator or computer), 
and as an extension of the individual brain (i.e. a concept referred to as 
extemalism).
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2.4 .1  H u tch in s and th e  S ocio-C u ltu ra l C om p u tin g  M a­
chine
Hutchins (1995:354) defines culture as a cognitive process in which everyday 
practices and behavior are enacted inside as well as outside the brains of 
people. In this definition, individual cognition is only a subsystem in the 
larger encompassing system of culture.
Hutchins assertion is that cognitive science — because it failed to rec­
ognize culture as cognition — incorrectly placed symbols in the head of the 
individual. This was a mistake, and the consequence was an exaggerated em­
phasis on an internalist view of cognition, in which the influence of culture 
played no role.
Interestingly, Hutchins suggests that the erroneous emphasis on internal- 
ism was made early in the development of artificial intelligence when cognitive 
psychologists attempted to interpret the implications AI had for psychology.
The method by which Alan Turing discovered AI was through observ­
ing his own behavior while solving a mathematical problem. This was not 
through introspection but through actually incorporating his behavioral re­
flexes in solving a problem. Turing conceived of the automatic computing 
engine (ACE) through consciously being aware of how he, himself, solved 
problems via writing down, manipulating, and interpreting symbols — these 
symbols, of course, were on paper and therefore external to the agent doing 
the computing. In other words, Turing envisioned a computational machine 
that was able to “think” using symbols, but these symbols were external 
to the human brain in the form of writing. The manipulation of symbols, 
therefore, does not necessarily take place within the brain of an individual, 
but can be seen to take place outside of the brain.
According to Hutchins, it was cognitive psychologists’ interpretation of
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Turing’s work that erroneously placed these symbols in the brain of the 
individual, but the symbols were never meant to be manipulated entirely 
within the brain to begin with. Prom the outset, Turing was actually cre­
ating a socio-cultural machine that incorporated the symbolic manipulation 
of material culture by the individual. W hat Turing proceeded to do, after 
self-consciously recording the steps he took during symbolic manipulation, 
was to distill the process of symbolic manipulation to the bare essentials. As 
a result, he realized that a computational agent was not necessary to do the 
manipulating. The agent could be taken out of the computational process 
completely, leaving only the steps for manipulating the symbols. The process 
of symbolic manipulation, therefore, could be abstracted from an agent and, 
hence, operate supra-individually.10
Theoretically, Hutchins’ observations are compelling. They suggest that 
cognition is a process of symbolic manipulation that is external as much as 
it is internal. Defined as such, cognition arises from the interaction of the 
individual with the environment. In other words, cognition can manifest 
itself between an individual and some object in the physical environment or 
among any number of individuals in a society or culture. This is because, 
according to Hutchins, many (if not all) symbols and the manipulation of 
these symbols reside outside of the brain. Hutchins’ observations suggest 
that the same models that have been used for years to model brain activity 
are better suited for modeling socio-cultural phenomena.
10In retrospect, Turing’s intelligence test could be conceived of as a socio-cultural system 
of three individuals (i.e. interrogator, computer and human subject) operating in concert, 
where the interaction among interrogator, computer, and human subject functions in 
manipulating symbols among the agents. The agents in this scenario can be abstracted 
from the process leaving only a symbolic field where the agents resided.
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2 .4 .2  K en n ed y  and S ocia l T h in k ing  from  Social In ter­
action
Social psychologist James Kennedy (1998) analyzes various models describing 
the spread of culture to show that social interaction can optimize cognition. 
Cognition is conceived here as “structures and strategies for the manage­
ment of knowledge” (Kennedy 1998:57). These structures and strategies are 
distributed amongst the individuals of a society, and each individual can be 
envisioned as having his or her own method of managing knowledge for ac­
complishing a task at hand. When individuals come together to interact and 
to share ideas, the individuals of the society converge on some optimal way 
of accomplishing a given task. Each person can be thought of as having a 
piece of the puzzle, where a piece of the puzzle is an arbitrary structure or 
strategy and the puzzle is finding the optimal structure(s) or strategy(ies).
A xelrod’s A daptive Culture M odel (ACM ): Thinking as a Social 
Phenom enon
To demonstrate that cognition can be conceived as a social phenomenon,
Kennedy examines and extends Axelrod’s (1997) discrete variable computer
simulation that is used to simulate the spread of culture.11 Axelrod’s model
represents the mental constructs of individuals - which can be taken to
be beliefs, ideas, or methods for accomplishing certain tasks — by five-digit
strings. For example, in an arbitrary simulation, the numeric string 76890
symbolically represents a mental construct in which each digit is a “feature”
11 Axelrod’s (1997) discrete model contrasts with the particle swarm algorithm, a con­
tinuous variable model, which can also be used to show the mutual cognitive benefits 
gained from social interaction (Eberhart and Kennedy 1995; Kennedy and Eberhart 1995; 
Kennedy 1997).
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of the mental construct. As features or aspects of the mental construct 
change, so will the overall nature of the mental construct change in a combi­
natorial manner. Axelrod notes that these mental constructs, represented by 
strings, can also be taken to be social constructs such as community or state 
beliefs, but the emphasis seems to be on the individual in the simulations 
that follow.
Axelrod then creates a grid of these strings in which the grid is meant to 
represent 2-dimensional space and in which the grid coordinates of a given 
string reflect the physical locations of the individuals on an (x,?/)-plane. 
Thus, adjacent strings of a given string or agent on the grid can be considered 
to be the neighbors of the agent.
Resemblance or similarity between individuals is the mechanism of social 
interaction and, hence, the mechanism for changing the construct of either of 
the parties involved in the social exchange. The notion that similarity is the 
characteristic that brings people together has been written about extensively 
by Latane (1981) and Moscovici (1985). Axelrod incorporates these authors’ 
view — that individuals tend to associate with people with whom they have 
things in common — as a stipulation or rule in the program used to simulate 
social interaction.
The general rules for governing social interaction in Axelrod’s program 
can best be summed up in three steps which are:
1. A random neighbor of an agent is chosen.
2. If the mental construct of the neighbor resembles the mental construct 
of the agent in one or more of its features, then either the agent or the 
neighbor adopts one of the features of the other.
3. If the mental construct of the neighbor is different in all of its features
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from the mental construct of the agent, then no change occurs in either 
of the mental constructs.
The result of the simulation using the rules just specified is that clusters 
of certain stable strings emerge. These string clusters reflect distinct social 
groups containing individuals with the same mental constructs.
K ennedy’s Experim ents w ith the ACM
Axelrod’s experiment is interesting in its own right, since it recognizes that 
culture can be conceived of as a cognitive process which operates on a social 
rather than a mental basis. Yet Kennedy takes Axelrod’s experiments even 
further, utilizing Axelrod’s model as a basis for seven different experiments 
which are variations on the simulation just described.
In the first experiment, Kennedy takes out the similarity condition in Ax­
elrod’s program. That is, the only condition stipulated for social interaction 
is that the individuals involved in the social interaction be neighbors. The 
result of the simulation was a uniform population throughout the grid; no 
distinct social groups formed.
In the other experiments, different criteria were introduced. Most of 
these criteria involved optimization conditions. In the second experiment for 
instance, the condition became: “if the sum of the features in the neighbor’s 
construct is larger than the agent’s construct, then interact. Otherwise do 
not interact” . This resulted in all individuals of the population converging 
on the global optimum: 99999.
More interesting criteria were used in the other experiments, and the 
results varied in the number of optima. If more than one optimum arose in the 
simulation, then social groups distinguished themselves, much as they did in 
Axelrod’s original experiment. If only one optimum occurred, then the entire
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population converged on it, resulting in a homogeneous population. These 
variations in the results of the simulations are revealing since they indicate 
that very simple rules can be used to evoke quite complex behavior, consistent 
with what is observed in society. In general, human societies have more 
complex rules for conducting behavior than those that were programmed, 
and so the diversity of human society, in terms of customs and ways of doing 
tasks, is not surprising.
Kennedy concludes his analysis with three key observations, which hold 
for cognition or culture.
1. The first observation is that individuals can learn how to solve problems 
(i.e. find the optimal way or ways of doing things) through interaction 
with other individuals.
2. The second observation is that individuals can be conceived of as com­
prising the parts in the encompassing machine, which is society. Prom 
an outside observer’s standpoint, the ways in which people decide to 
accomplish tasks form a belief system resulting in a mosaic of different 
social groups.
3. The third observation is that culture, conceived of as inter-personal 
interactions guided by rules, can affect and indeed enhance the perfor­
mance of individuals. Through interaction, different methods of doing 
things or, in some cases, the same method of doing things emerges from 
simple local interactions, the effects of which can only be perceived on 
a holistic supra-individual level.
Kennedy states that social thinking (i.e. cognition), for the most part, is 
not perceptible to the actual participants or individuals. That is, social cog­
nition supercedes the individual. I should point out, though, that although
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social cognition supercedes individual cognition, I disagree with Kennedy’s 
statement that the effects of social cognition cannot be perceived by the indi­
vidual. In this thesis, I will show that there are socially induced phenomena 
that can be perceived by individuals and that the ability to recognize social 
cognition or culture in action allows individuals to make changes affected by 
and that affect social cognition. The ability to perceive the effects of social 
cognition is necessary for changing social processes involved in producing 
social cognition. Conversely, social cognition makes changes to us as indi­
viduals, and I discuss these points in considerable depth in Chapters 7 and 
8 .
2 .4 .3  M aris and te  B oek h orst and th e  Supra-individual 
C ognition  o f  R o b o ts
Recent research in artificial intelligence has suggested that what I call supra- 
individual cognition is not limited to biological organisms but exists in ar­
tificial intelligence. This makes the study of supra-individual cognition not 
only an important subject matter for the social sciences and philosophy but 
also for engineering and computer science as well. As a result, these fields 
can all be helpful in shedding light on the phenomenon of supra-individual 
cognition. For example, with regard to engineering, the field of robotics can 
facilitate in placing the study of supra-individual cognition on a rigorous 
scientific footing. The reason for this is that in a laboratory setting, supra- 
individual cognitive experiments can be reproduced and superfluous factors 
that may affect the experiments can be easily accounted for and eliminated 
from the experiments.
Maris and te Boekhorst (1996) have studied the effects of building heaps 
of Styrofoam cubes using autonomous mobile robots called didabots. Heap
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building behavior can be used to shed light on supra-individual cognition 
in many organisms. Because of the simplicity of the programs each of the 
didabots was equipped with in the experiment, the experiment probably 
more closely resembles the behavior witnessed in groups of honey bees and 
ants (Camazine 1983; Deneubourgh, Aron, Goss, and Pasteels 1983) than it 
resembles human groups.
The six-wheeled didabots used in the study were equipped with five in­
frared sensors. Two sensors were placed on both sides of the didabot over 
the wheels, and the fifth sensor was placed in the rear of the vehicle. The 
didabots were programmed with only one rule, which was to avoid obstacles 
that were detected by the infrared sensors. If the sensors detected an obsta­
cle, whether a wall or a Styrofoam cube, the didabot would turn away from 
the obstacle. Clearly, the front of the didabot was used to push the cubes 
into heaps, since the didabot was lacking sensors in the front and therefore 
never avoided a cube on that side.
Several experiments were conducted varying both the number of cubes 
(12 cubes or 25 cubes) and the number of didabots (one, three, four, or five 
didabots). The results showed that large single heaps did not emerge in 
experiments using only one didabot, but single heaps did emerge when more 
didabots were used. The heap-building process decreased however when more 
than four didabots were used, due to mutual avoidance movements.
Interestingly, this research has shown that robots can exploit their simple 
structure by being part of a collective in which nonlinear effects of group 
behavior have the effect of enhancing the heap-building capacities of indi­
viduals. Maris and te Boekhorst propose that the results of their didabot 
experiments are due to nonlinear effects in the collective of robots as a whole. 
That is, what is being observed in the heap-building process is a form of
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supra-individual cognition incorporating all of the didabots, not a process 
which only functions to enhance the individual intelligences of the robots. 
This notion of cognition — which operates on a different level from indi­
vidual cognition, though it utilizes the individual cognitive capacities of the 
didabots — is not incompatible with Kennedy’s (1998) and Hutchins’ (1995) 
work, as well as with the work of others who I will discuss in the forthcoming 
sections.
2 .4 .4  D onald  and th e  E volu tion ary  Im port o f  E xten d ed  
C ognition
Extended cognition subsumes individual and environment, and as such it can 
be seen to constitute a form of cognition which is relatively substrate inde­
pendent, requiring only that a human subject is present. Extended cognition 
plays an important role in cognitive evolutionary research and I will discuss 
this research next.
In “Origins of the Modern Mind”, Donald (1991) traces the evolution of 
cognition from our early australopithecine ancestors to modern Homo sapiens 
sapiens. Donald considers archaeological evidence along with psychological 
and neuro-physiological data from humans and apes.
Using the ape brain as an approximation of the brain of early australop- 
ithecus, Donald is able to trace the neuro-physiological changes which likely 
took place in the human brain, since the time we separated from our common 
ancestor with the ape some five million years ago. This data is supplemented 
by physical anthropological studies on encephalization and other anatomical 
growth tendencies, collected from the skeletal remains of Australopithecus 
afarensis, Homo habilis, Homo erectus, and Homo sapiens. Of more use, it 
seems, is the information gathered from psychological studies conducted on
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ape cognitive abilities. These data seem to be vital for Donald in explaining 
the early changes which took place in the evolution of human cognition. The 
archaeological data are only brought in later to support the emergence of an 
evolutionary stage, which occurs much later in the development of human 
cognition.
Taking all of this information together, Donald proposes that humans 
went through four cognitive stages characterized by four cultures: episodic 
culture, mimetic culture, mythic culture, and theoretic culture. These cogni­
tive stages are then separated by three transition periods: the transition from 
episodic culture to the mimetic culture, the transition from mimetic culture 
to mythic culture, and the transition from mythic culture to theoretic culture. 
I will briefly summarize the highlights of each culture, focusing on theoretic 
culture, in particular, and its reliance on external memory.
Episodic Culture
Episodic culture is a form of mind that is attributed to early australop- 
ithecus. Because apes are presumed to be similar to early australopithecus, 
apes are studied extensively to understand their cognitive capacities in the 
hope of shedding light on australopithecine cognitive capacities. W hat is 
revealed is that apes, particularly chimpanzees, have many of the same cog­
nitive attributes as humans, such as self-representation (i.e. an early form of 
consciousness) and the ability to use symbols to communicate.
Self-representation is the ability to envision oneself and is tested in several 
ways, but the most common test, though it is debatable, is to determine 
whether the subject recognizes himself in a mirror.
Use of symbolic communication, on the other hand, though it is not 
apparent in the wild, can be taught to chimpanzees. Chimpanzees have
104
the ability to communicate with humans using a very simple form of sign 
language, but they have difficulty in inventing new words, and their capacity 
for putting together sentences does not extend beyond a few words. Their 
ability for learning sign language is a virtue of their procedural and episodic 
mental capacities, but their inability to communicate in chains of thought is 
likely due to the absence or near absence of semantic memory.12
M im etic Culture
The mimetic culture, of which the likely beneficiaries were Homo erectus, is 
indirectly inferred since there is no direct evidence for this stage, such as 
that gathered on episodic culture through studying apes. But it appears to 
Donald that mimetic culture is the missing link between australopithecine 
cognitive capacity and human cognitive capacities and is characterized by a 
mind that lies between the episodic mind and the linguistic mind.
According to Donald, the invention of language did not develop abruptly 
and there had to have been an intermediary phase which Donald defines as 
mimetic. The main defense for this pre-linguistic phase is the observation 
of vestiges of this thought in humans who have had all linguistic capacities 
erased. Brother John is a classic example of such an individual who was 
still able to function as a whole individual in many respects but, of course, 
without language.
Human subjects like Brother John depended on mimesis to communicate. 
The fact that individuals like Brother John exist, who are able to commu­
nicate but who lack linguistic capabilities, and yet are completely conscious
12Semantic memory consists of impersonal information such as general concepts which 
are socially agreed upon. This is different than episodic memory which consists of personal 
information such as the knowledge of how someone is related to someone else. Semantic 
and episodic memory will be discussed further in Section 8.1.1.
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of their actions — as they remember events after they have happened — 
indicates that language is not essential for functioning in society.
Mimetic culture presumably developed in two phases, a prosadic phase 
and a phonetic phase. In the prosadic phase, facial and postural gestures 
would have been an important way of communicating with others, and in 
the phonetic phase, auditory inflections (e.g. grunts, and sighs) would have 
been used. The phonetic phase would have led to the next stage in cognitive 
development, mythic culture.
Mimetic culture was likely characterized by conscious or intentional com­
munication with peers, tool-making, and possibly rudimentary exchange.
M ythic Culture
Mythic culture is defined by an expansion of semantic memory, that is, mem­
ory that is useful for putting events together into a cohesive picture. Whereas 
the semantic side of cognition began to develop in the mimetic cultural phase, 
the mimetic mind was still primarily concerned with single events or episodes. 
The more holistic form of thinking which occurred in the mythic phase is pre­
sumed to have developed as the result of the need to describe the world in a 
clearer way (this was achieved by myths).
All objects such as trees, rocks, lakes, were given context in myth. These 
myths were narratives that were explanations of the origins of objects as well 
as associations of these objects with other objects in the world. In order to 
communicate these mythic conceptions of the world, which relied on retaining 
longer chain symbols, a more adequate apparatus for mythic representation 
evolved.
The apparatus that emerged was language, and it was preceded by pho­
netic mimesis. The mythic mind was a social or collective mind and it tied
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people together more cohesively than did the previous cognitive stages. Lan­
guage, in response to the needs of the semantic mind, followed as a natural 
course, especially since at this time the vocal tract had evolved to a point that 
permitted many different vocalizations and expanded the arsenal of symbolic 
cues that could be utilized.
Theoretic Culture
Each mode of cognition that was evolutionarily acquired never disappeared 
completely, for as Donald mentions, vestiges of past modes of cognition can 
be found in modern humans. These vestiges act as back-up systems if the 
most recent modes of cognition (i.e. mythic mind and theoretic mind) are 
impaired. In these instances, Donald of course refers to subjects that either 
have not been taught a language or else have been the victims of some trauma 
to those regions of the brain that are associated with language. The result 
of cognitive development, therefore, is more accurately described as layers 
of cognitive modes rather than a single modern cognitive mode which was 
adaptively selected at the expense of all the previous cognitive modes.
Theoretic culture is a form of mind characterized by analytic thought, 
which emerged in response to having to build on other peoples’ work. Mythic 
culture depended on an oral means for narrating, and this was the impetus for 
the development of biological changes such as semantic memory. In contrast 
to mythic culture, theoretic culture was externally encoded. The need to 
produce theory, whether it was in the form of governmental legislation in early 
complex societies or whether it was proving a mathematical theorem, resulted 
in various external ways of storing symbols (recall Hutchins evaluation of 
Turing in Section 2.4.1).
These external ways of building theory are called external symbolic stor­
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age. The writing down of one’s thoughts, for example, is external storage 
and the invention of writing or a system such as quipu was a response to 
the demands of theorizing in an effective way. This phase of development 
can also be noted in ancient Maya culture. An extremely effective writing 
system was devised and this resulted in advancing other fields, particularly 
mathematics and astronomy. This is not to say that analytical, scientific, 
and logical thought are the only kinds of thought that can be externally en­
coded, for in fact narratives can be written down as well. However, mythic 
culture could rely on oral narration more easily than could theoretic culture, 
which depended and still depends extensively on external storage devices.
Donald calls the records of representations (i.e. ideas) stored in the ex­
ternal devices, exograms and those stored in biological memory, engrams 
(Donald 1991:314-315). The substrate that exograms are stored in preserves 
exograms for a potentially unlimited length of time. Engrams, on the other 
hand, are stored in the nervous system, a substrate that only functions within 
the lifespan of the individual. W hat this means is that engrams disappear 
when the individual expires.13 It could be said that exograms are phylogenetic 
records whereas engrams are ontogenetic records.
There are potentially hundreds if not thousands of external storage de­
vices that modern humans use according to Donald. Some examples of exter­
nal storage devices of which Donald speaks are: pen and paper, paint brush 
and canvas, calculator, and computer. This can be even further extended 
to include ritual (Donald 1991) and exchange (Strathern 1998). However, 
if we do accept that ritual and exchange are external cognitive extensions,
13 Although the engrani disappears with the death of the individual, it should be pointed 
out that the representation that the engram recorded may exist in other engrams in other 
individuals.
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then Donald’s chronology of events for the evolution of cognition must be 
revamped. For example, archaeological evidence for ritual dates to Donald’s 
mimetic and mythic cultural phases and this means that external storage 
was not unique to homo sapiens sapiens, but may have existed as far back 
as homo erectus (Donald 1991:277).
The most important point that Donald’s work has for my thesis is his view 
of cognition in general. His work suggests that external storage is not simply 
an add-on to biological cognition. He instead envisions a form of cognition 
that encompasses both the individual and the form of external storage that 
the individual utilizes.
2.5 Conclusion: Substrate Independent C om ­
putational C ognition
At first it was presumed that the human brain and the neurons that comprise 
it had some innate potential for cognition, but the notion that cognition was 
a functional phenomenon and therefore substrate independent changed all 
that.
Cognition is regarded in this chapter to be computational and therefore 
algorithmic in nature. The origin of this view should be credited to Hegel, 
who saw cognition in this way, but his view was soon overtaken by a view 
that cognition was contained within the brain. Experimental psychologists 
and physiologists were behind the view that cognition resided in the brain, 
but further studies revealed that the brain could not be the only generator 
of cognition.
The idea that neurons could function computationally and could accom­
plish quite complex tasks when joined to form networks was eventually re-
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alized in the work of McCulloch and Pitts (1943) and Hebb (1949). At the 
same time, the artificial intelligence research of Turing (1945, 1950) showed 
that cognition could be regarded as computation, a functional phenomenon, 
and this allows cognition to manifest itself in different substrates. Prom this 
it could be inferred that networks, whether they are in the form of actual 
nerve cells or algorithms, could process information in a sequential manner. 
It was the structure of the interconnected neurons and the way in which neu­
rons symbolically interacted that was the basis for cognition, not some innate 
quality that neurons had that no other substrate could duplicate. The con­
struction of artificial neural networks using silicon instead of “real” neurons 
is evidence of this (Churchland and Sejnowski 1992:416-418).
Physiologists and experimental psychologists sought cognition in the brain 
and the individual, respectively. The result was the discovery of the princi­
ples behind cognition. These principles now suggest that cognition can occur 
outside of the individual not only artificially, but naturally as well (i.e. in 
society). Cognition, therefore, does not reside solely within the head of an 
individual to be studied by psychologists and neuro-physiologists. Nor does 
cognition only reside in its artificial reconstruction by engineers and computer 
scientists. Cognition subsumes both the individual and the many artificial 
devices that the individual can utilize to enhance biological cognition. It 
also resides among groups of individuals and manifests itself in the every­
day actions of human beings to be studied by anthropologists, sociologists, 
economists, and archaeologists.
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Chapter 3 
Cognition as a Dynamical 
System
Thus far, I have described cognition as a form of computation and hence 
capable of existing beyond a human’s nervous system. Can cognition be 
anything else but computation? And if it can, does the re-conceptualization 
destroy the argument for substrate independent cognition?
Recent work has suggested that cognition has a closer resemblance to 
a dynamical system rather than to a computational algorithm (van Gelder 
1995). A dynamical system is a set of functionally interconnected components 
which operate together in real time, whereas computation is a sequence of 
operative procedures that are interconnected, each procedure operating in 
its own distinct time frame.
A crucial distinction between the computational approach and the dy­
namical approach is that in the computational approach the material com­
ponents of the computer responsible for generating cognition are related to 
each other symbolically, whereas the material components of the dynamical 
system responsible for generating cognition are related to each other function­
i l l
ally. The computational view of cognition refers to the idea that cognition is 
algorithmic, consisting of a sequence of procedures that are engaged as soon 
as preceding procedures have completed their tasks. The term computation 
comes from the manner in which computers operate, but this does not mean 
that this is the only way in which information can be processed. These pro­
cedures do not necessarily have to be engaged sequentially in a piecemeal 
fashion. They can be engaged simultaneously as interconnected components 
and as such can process information as a whole system — as a dynamical 
system.
My purpose in this chapter is to revamp the computational model of cog­
nition which was discussed in Chapter 2. In line with current research, I 
argue for a dynamical systems conceptualization of cognition. As it turns 
out, such a view of cognition supports many of the same points that have 
been made with regard to a computational approach to cognition. For ex­
ample, the view that cognition is a dynamical system supports a substrate 
independent form of cognition just as the computational model of cognition 
did. Thus, the main thread which ran through the previous chapter remains 
intact through this chapter.
To commence this chapter, I begin with the work of van Gelder (1995), 
who explains what the difference is between computation and a dynamical 
system and how cognition can be conceptualized as a dynamical system. To 
explain what a dynamical system is, van Gelder draws the reader into the 
field of mechanics.
I, too, feel that mechanics is an adequate way to ground the abstract 
notion of a dynamical system for the reader who is unfamiliar with the con­
cept. I, therefore, encourage the reader to follow me in this summary of van 
Gelder’s explanation of the distinctions between computation and dynamical
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systems.
3.1 Van G elder and C ognition  as a D ynam i­
cal System
Van Gelder (1995) begins his essay on “W hat Might Cognition Be, If Not 
Computation?” by discussing an engineering problem which presented itself 
in the late 1700s. The engineering problem was known as the governing 
problem.
During the beginning of the industrial revolution, steam became the fore­
seeable power source for the upcoming generations. However, there was one 
problem standing in the way, and this was how to translate the oscillatory 
action of the steam piston into the steady rotary action of a flywheel, which 
was essential in almost all machinery, such as the cotton gin or the steam en­
gines of trains and boats. As can be imagined, the rotary action had to be a 
steady rotation that was not directly affected by the jerky movements of the 
steam piston which might be accentuated by sudden changes in the steam 
pressure of the boilers. Sudden lurching on a train or boat could lead to 
obvious passenger discomfiture or injury as well as lead to eventual problems 
with the structural integrity of the train or boat.
3.1 .1  T h e C om p u tation a l G overnor
One way to solve this problem, and the way which would be familiar to 
many engineers today, would be to devise an algorithm that could control the 
rotational velocity of the flywheel. A contemporary solution to the governing 
problem, therefore, might look something like this (van Gelder 1995:348):
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1. Measure the rotational velocity of the flywheel.
2. Compute the result between the desired velocity and the actual velocity 
of the flywheel.
3. If there is zero discrepancy, return to step one; otherwise adjust the 
throttle valve to effect a change in steam pressure that can compensate 
for the discrepancy.
4. Return to step one.
This is a standard computational approach to the governing problem and 
each step would be applied to the steam engine sequentially. That is, it would 
take time for each step to be realized mechanically. For instance, there would 
be a device to measure the discrepancy between desired and actual steam 
pressure, a device to compute the discrepancy between actual and desired 
rotational velocity of the flywheel, and a device that would manipulate the 
throttle valve; and each of these devices would take a definite amount of 
time to complete the associated task. Since a certain amount of time passes 
between the rotational velocity measurement and the change that is effected 
to the throttle, the computational method does not effect control of the steam 
engine instantaneously (i.e. in time with the steam engine).
3.1 .2  T h e C entrifugal G overnor
In the late eighteenth century, the sort of computational technology that was 
just proposed to solve the governing problem was not yet available and so a 
different means was used to smooth out the motion of the flywheel so that 
its rotational velocity was uniform. The problem was solved by a Scottish 
engineer named James Watt.
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W att devised a mechanism called a governor, that consisted of two weighted 
arms attached by hinges to the vertical axis of a horizontally rotating fly­
wheel. The weighted arms, which were attached to the axis, were connected 
to another lever that controlled the throttle valve, which in turn, controlled 
the release of steam from the boiler.
Constructed in this manner, when the arms of the centrifugal governor 
rise, the throttle valve closes off the steam and when the arms return to 
their resting positions, the throttle is opened and more steam is injected into 
the engine. Thus, as a sudden increase in steam from the boiler occurs, the 
weighted arms that are attached to the axis lift up due to the centrifugal 
force caused by the increased rotational velocity (i.e., acceleration). As the 
arms rise, the throttle valve gradually restricts the flow of steam, and as 
the amount of steam continuously drops, the weighted arms gradually drop 
due to the decrease in rotational velocity. As the arms drop, the throttle 
valve is reopened to allow more steam to flow through, hence, increasing the 
rotational velocity to a steady level.
In this way, the centrifugal governor solved the problem of smoothing out 
the rotational velocity of the flywheel in a elegant and concise manner. A 
point that should not be lost in the description of W att’s invention is that 
the centrifugal governor, as it came to be known, worked continuously, not 
periodically like the computational governor did. As a result, the centrifu­
gal governor was deemed perfect in all respects and indeed better than the 
computational governor.
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3.1 .3  C om paring th e  G overnors
When compared, both governors, the modern computational governor and 
the old-fashioned centrifugal governor, are acceptable1 control mechanisms. 
There are, however, very interesting differences between the two governors.
The computational governor includes several devices, each device desig­
nated a specific job. Van Gelder refers to this distribution of the workload 
among several different devices designed for specific tasks, homuncularity. 
In the computational governor, there is a device used to measure the actual 
velocity, a device used to compute the difference between actual and desired 
velocity, and a device that opens or closes the throttle valve relative to the 
difference between the actual and desired velocity. In the computational 
governor, each device produces a representation that means something to 
the next device in the task sequence. In other words, all the devices are 
symbolically connected, since each device communicates with the adjacent 
device through symbolism. For example, the measurement of actual rota­
tional velocity is a symbol which means something to the computing device, 
since the computing device uses the measurement by subtracting it from the 
desired rotational velocity to obtain the discrepancy of the velocities. This 
discrepancy, then, is a symbol for the device that opens or closes the throttle 
valve, and so on. This process is cyclical, each device in the computational 
governor transmitting a representation that has some meaning for the next 
device in use.
The centrifugal governor, in contrast, does not operate through a chain 
of signification. There are no devices that are each designated to do a certain
lrThe acceptability of the computational governor depends, of course, on the rate at 
which the rotational velocity of the flywheel is measured or sampled. Clearly, a small 
sample time is more acceptable than a large sample time.
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part of the workload. Rather the centrifugal governor was built to accomplish 
the task of controlling the flywheel velocity as a whole construction. There 
is no sequence involved in the centrifugal governor, since the arms raise au­
tomatically as the rotational velocity increases, and the arms lower when the 
rotational velocity decreases. The fact that the computational governor is 
symbolically grounded whereas the centrifugal governor is not seems to stem 
from an issue of time.
In fact, the main difference between the two governors seems to be that 
the computational governor assumes a different time frame than the real-time 
frame in which the steam engine operates, whereas the centrifugal governor 
assumes the same time frame within which the steam engine operates. In 
other words, the time frames for the computational governor and the steam 
engine are not synchronous, since the computational governor always lags be­
hind the steam engine; therefore, the computational governor’s time frame is 
not in real time with the steam engine. The computational governor operates 
according to its own time frame (van Gelder 1995:354). In contrast, the time 
frames for the centrifugal governor and the steam engine are synchronous, 
both operating in real time together.
The role that time plays in both governors is important not only because 
an engineer may or may not want a governor in synchronization with the 
steam engine, but it seems that representations or symbols, in general, can 
only be created if there is time for them to be formed. In the case of the 
computational governor, time separates each step in the algorithm so that one 
device has time to represent something to the next device in the sequence. 
Symbols clearly cannot form when no time for development is permitted, 
as is the case with the centrifugal governor. In a way, this analysis agrees 
with the work of Rene Thom (1973), whose work is relevant because it deals
117
specifically with how symbols arise.
It has been proposed by the mathematician and semiotician, Thom (1973), 
that the creation of signs is not a straightforward process. He has proposed 
that objects become symbolic of something by becoming impressions upon a 
receptive or “plastic” medium. The medium upon which this impression is 
imprinted functions as a kind of “memory” for the sign. This sign-building 
process is one which takes time — time to be formed and time to be forgot­
ten. Without time it would be difficult to conceive of how a representation 
could be formed.
To summarize, the main difference between the two governors is that the 
computational governor consists of parts that communicate with one another 
through symbolism and the centrifugal governor does not. The centrifugal 
governor is a system of parts but these parts function together as a dynamical 
system; they do not communicate with each other. This seems to stem from 
different conceptions of temporality. The computational governor operates 
on a time frame independent of the steam engine it is supposed to control, 
whereas the centrifugal governor operates in the same time frame as the 
steam engine it is controlling. Both are valid governors, but are built on two 
different conceptual frameworks.
3.2 C ognition  as a D ynam ical System  Versus 
C om putation
Though it could be argued that the governors discussed have the capacity to 
generate cognition in their own right, (i.e. the governors constitute control 
mechanisms that “know” what to do when to do it), van Gelder is more 
concerned with using the governors as examples of two different kinds of
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conceptual frameworks — one which is computational and the other which 
is dynamical — that can achieve similar tasks. The governor discussion 
therefore serves to illustrate how we can conceive of cognition as a dynamical 
system rather than a form of computation.
Cognition is normally considered to be computational, but it can also be 
regarded as operating on the same premises as the centrifugal governor. By 
“computation” van Gelder means a procedure by which rules are either in­
stantiated or bypassed; this often takes the form of an algorithm or computer 
program, hence, the term computation. However, computation is only one 
way to process information. Dynamical systems can achieve the same results 
on a more naturalistic basis. That is, cognition can be conceived of as a 
dynamical system just like the centrifugal governor. Indeed, current research 
supports the view that cognition constitutes a dynamical system (van Gelder 
and Port 1995:10-11).
Algorithmic processing is archetypal computation and it is, therefore, the 
kind of processing that many psychologists and neuro-physiologists envision 
cognition as being. Hence, the computational mind that has so far been 
discussed has been seen as algorithmic, rather than dynamical. The most 
common form of algorithmic processing involves following a sequence of rules 
or conditions. If a condition is met, processing continues to the next condition 
in the sequence. If the condition is not satisfied then processing resorts to 
a subprogram until the condition is met. This subprogram often consists of 
an iterative procedure, called a loop, which operates until the condition is 
satisfied.
As with the computational governor, the notion of time when applying 
the computational paradigm is depicted as a discrete symbolic sequence. 
Therefore, though the computational paradigm is ideal for approximation,
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it abstracts the phenomenon being modeled from real time. In essence, any 
computational model operates on a time frame independent of real time and 
therefore does not accurately portray the phenomenon being studied.2
Dynamical processing, on the other hand, is a slightly newer idea than 
algorithmic processing in terms of its application to cognition, and it occurs 
in dynamical systems. It was not until the 1960s that dynamical processing 
was used to represent cognitive processes in the work of Stephen Grossberg 
(1967). Dynamical systems do not process information in discrete steps se­
quentially; they instead process information in continuous real-time, in which 
all parts of the system function simultaneously. It places the phenomenon 
being studied in time rather than something in which time is only implicitly 
featured. Many systems in the real world operate in a dynamical manner 
and cognition is no exception. Neurons interact with each other in real-time 
circumstances, and as such are frequently more accurately described by a 
dynamical format (Donald 2001; van Gelder 1995). Extended cognition, in 
general, operates more accurately as a dynamical system as will be discussed 
in subsequent sections.
I will next look at two ways in which dynamical systems can be described.
3.2 .1  D escrib in g  D ynam ica l S ystem s w ith  M aps and  
D ifferentia l E quations
Mathematically, dynamical systems can be modeled using maps or differential 
equations. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that differential equations
2T o  illustrate algorithmic processing in more detail the reader should recall my earlier 
discussion in Section 2.1.2. There I talked of a procedure adapted from the Intermediate 
Value Theorem, which was used to find the roots of functions. That procedure can be 
regarded as a computational algorithm.
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model dynamical systems more accurately than maps do, since real time is 
featured explicitly in differential equations and not in maps.
Maps and differential equations utilize two main symbolic variants to 
describe dynamical systems, parameters and variables. The parameters in 
maps and differential equations describe the dynamical system’s constraints 
and are used to express constants structuring the dynamical system that is 
being studied. The variables in maps and differential equations describe the 
dynamical system’s states and are used to express aspects of the dynamical 
system that change through time.
Exam ple 1: Map
Xn-\-1 ■ o,xn
Here, a is a constant coefficient or a parameter representing the con­
straint on the dynamical system that the map describes. x n is a variable 
describing the state of the dynamical system. x n varies in such a way 
that xn+i is continuously fed back into x n, where it is multiplied by a. 
Thus, this dynamical system generates a trajectory described by the 
sequence {arr0, a2x0, a3x0, ...}, where x0 is called an initial condition 
since it represents the starting state of the dynamical system. Because 
the initial condition is constant it functions in the same way that pa­
rameters do; that is, it constitutes yet another kind of constraint for 
the dynamical system.
Exam ple 2: Differential Equation
dx(t)
I T  = ax(t)
Here, a is a constant coefficient or parameter representing the constraint 
on the dynamical system that the differential equation describes, x  is
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a variable describing the state of the dynamical system, x  varies with 
respect to real time, t, expressed by some unit of time such as seconds 
or years. In this way, the variable x  is said to be time-dependent 
(i.e. situated in real time) and is written as x(t) and read as “r  as a 
function of t”. Though, x{t) varies through time, the variable has to 
have a value at which it starts to vary (e.g. when t =  0) called an 
initial condition and written as rr(0). Because the initial condition is 
constant it functions in the same way that parameters do; that is, it 
constitutes yet another kind of constraint for the dynamical system.
A map, is a function or mapping, which takes a number, conducts one or 
several mathematical operations on it and outputs a corresponding number. 
The number that is outputted, then, is reentered as an input to the function 
and a subsequent number is outputted, which is then substituted into the 
function again. This process is reiterated indefinitely. If the process asymp­
totically converges to a certain number, we say that the procedure stabilizes 
and that it has a lim it For example, the dynamical system described in 
Example 1 will converge to an equilibrium of zero, thus constituting a stable 
system, if a < l .3 Sometimes, however, this process does not converge, but 
diverges instead (e.g. if a > 1). In these circumstances, we say that the 
system is unstable and therefore does not have an associated limit. Maps 
are iterations that are used to model systems moving through time, where 
the current state of the system is a function of the previous state. Maps 
adequately describe the evolution of systems, but time is only implicitly fea­
tured. If all of the points that are outputted from the function are plotted, 
the result is a trajectory or orbit of the dynamical system.
In general, maps are used by mathematicians to facilitate the study of a
3The dynamical system could also converge to an equilibrium of xq if a =  1.
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more accurate way of modeling dynamical systems called differential equa­
tions. Whereas maps express a state as a function of the previous state, 
differential equations express the rate of change of the current state as a 
function of the current state. Therefore, real time is featured explicitly in the 
rate of change term, which maps neglect to feature. As a result, differential 
equations model dynamical systems in a more true-to-life way than maps. 
In a sense, although maps model dynamical systems, the means by which 
they accomplish this is computational in nature, because they are updated 
in a discrete fashion. Since maps update in a discrete fashion rather than 
continuously, differential equations will be considered to be a more accurate 
means of representing dynamical systems throughout the rest of this thesis. 
Differential equations are more accurate than maps for modeling dynamical 
systems, not only in terms of conceptual purity, but in terms of practical 
difference. Modeling the same dynamical system using differential equations 
and maps can yield different results.
Differential equations are analyzed for stability by mathematicians in 
the same way that maps are analyzed for stability. Like the map of the 
dynamical system in Example 1, the dynamical system described by the 
differential equation in Example 2 will converge to an equilibrium of zero, 
thus constituting a stable system. However, unlike the dynamical system 
described by the map, the condition for stability for the dynamical system 
described by the differential equation is a < 0. Sometimes the dynamical 
system does not converge, but diverges instead (e.g. if a > 0). In these 
circumstances, we say that the system is unstable and therefore does not 
have an associated limit.
More complex models of dynamical systems that can be used in archae­
ology are analyzed in Abramiuk (1999).
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3 .2 .2  C onn ection ism  and th e  P ro p erties o f  P arallel D is­
tr ib u ted  N etw orks
The connectionist view of cognition (McClelland and Rumelhart 1986), which 
remains such an important part of psychology in explaining how learning and 
recalling occur, is typically a derivative of a dynamical systems approach (van 
Gelder 1995:374) and is based on Hebbian learning. Hebb (1949) postulated 
that a neuron that repeatedly fires or activates another neuron will have 
increased its capacity to do so and that the bonds between the neurons will 
strengthen as a result.
Connect,ionism, also known as parallel distributed networks (PDN) (Mc­
Clelland and Rumelhart 1986), explains the concept of learning as the strength­
ening of bonds between certain neurons and the relaxing of bonds between 
other neurons. There are two kinds of connectionist approaches: local con­
nectionism and global connectionism (Reisberg 1997:292-299).
Local connectionism  is a connectionist view that allocates an entire 
representation to each neuron. Thus, for example, when one is engaged in 
the process of learning that “dice are black and white,” a neuron representing 
“dice” will strengthen its bonds with the neurons that represent “black” 
and “white.” Concomitantly, the neuron representing “dice” will relax its 
bonds with any neurons that represent other colors. In this way, dice are not 
thought of as blue or red, but only as black and white.
Global connectionism  is a connectionist view that distributes represen­
tation among many neurons. This time, several neurons, when activated, rep­
resent “dice” and two other groups of neurons represent “black” and “white” . 
Thus, when one is engaged in the process of learning that “dice are black 
and white” , the bonds among the neurons representing “dice” , “black” , and 
“white” will be strengthened. Concomitantly, the bonds with neurons repre-
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senting other colors will be relaxed, so that dice are only thought of as black 
and white and no other colors. The global case is currently regarded as being 
a more accurate depiction of learning than the local connectionist approach.
In the local connectionist approach, each neuron is designated a certain 
task, which is to play the role of a representation and strengthen the as­
sociated bonds with other neurons designating other representations. Un­
der the local connectionist umbrella, neurons bond with each other to form 
more complex representations. This method of representation is structural­
ist, since complex representations are constructed in a piecemeal fashion with 
constituent representations.
In the global connectionist approach, on the other hand, the representa­
tion does not form until processing is completed — that is, when all neurons 
have interacted and have reached a steady state. This is because it is only 
after all the appropriate neurons have bonded that a representation, which 
is greater than the sum of its parts, emerges. A unique feature of global con­
nectionism is its capacity to form a complex representation without having 
to resort to intermediary steps, which is a Gestaltist way of viewing cogni­
tion (versus a structuralist way of viewing cognition). That is, the entire 
complex representation is perceived all at once and the details that make up 
the representation are noticed later.
The connectionist approach is generally regarded to be a dynamical way 
of viewing neural interaction and emergent cognition, rather than a compu­
tational way, since the strengthening of bonds between neurons constitutes a 
dynamical system in which all neurons involved in the interaction are working 
together as an organic whole. This process in which neurons work together 
as a system more closely resembles how an organ such as the brain would 
function, making the dynamical system a more adequate means of explaining
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the emergence of human cognition than is possible with an algorithm.
For duplicating cognition, dynamical PDNs have one other interesting 
property which make them preferable over computation. Dynamical PDNs 
are autonomous self-organizing systems and this is how we conceive of cog­
nition. By being autonomous and self-organizing, dynamical PDNs have 
some degree of executive control4 over their systemic functioning and over 
the output they produce. That is, in a sense, any experiences that these 
networks may be presented with are “owned” by them (Donald 2001:155- 
156). These characteristics taken together constitute a rudimentary kind 
of consciousness,5 and the degree to which PDNs self-organize and “own” 
their experiences “determines how much conscious capacity we are willing to 
attribute to them” (Donald 2001:156).
The emerging phenomenon of executive control generated by PDNs re­
sembles consciousness in another important respect. Consciousness, accord­
ing to Donald (2001), is a domain-general phenomenon in that it does not 
appear to have a specific location within the brain. Executive control, like 
consciousness, lacks a control center and is instead a property that is dis­
tributed throughout the network, emerging from the whole network rather 
than from a constituent or node within the network (Reisberg 1997). Specif­
ically, distributed executive control is a property of recurrent networks as I 
have already discussed in Section 2.2.2.
To summarize, connectionism does have elements that makes it, in some
4Executive control is the capability of a system to control aspects of its own functioning
(Donald 2001:155-156) and for this control to be distributed (Reisberg 1997:295-299).
5I prefer to use the term executive control rather than consciousness; however, when
I do use the term consciousness I refer to psychological consciousness rather than to 
phenomenal consciousness as it is used by Chalmers (1996). Section 3.4.2 discusses the 
different interpretations of consciousness in more depth.
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cases, computational, but it is generally accepted to be dynamical (van 
Gelder 1995:369-371). With the recent inclination toward parallel distribu­
tion and global representation (McClelland and Rumelhart 1986), it seems 
that dynamical systems more accurately reflect cognitive capacities than 
computation does.
3 .2 .3  C om p u tation , D yn am ica l S ystem s, and W eak and  
Strong F unctionalism
In light of van Gelder’s discussion regarding the distinction between the com­
putational view of cognition and the dynamical view of cognition, another 
crucial distinction can be made between the computational and dynamical 
approaches. From a philosophical standpoint, both the computational ap­
proach as well as the dynamical approach are functional approaches.6 The 
difference, however, is that the computational approach is a weak variety of 
functionalism (recall I discussed this kind of functionalism in Section 2.3.4), 
whereas the dynamical approach is a strong variety of functionalism .7
Weak Functionalism
Weak functionalism  is more concerned with the end result of a process.
It is more concerned about the outward appearance of the phenomenon be­
6 It is important to note that the way weak functionalism is used in this thesis is consis­
tent with the way psychologists and philosophers of mind define functionalism rather than 
the way anthropologists and archaeologists define functionalism. See Mautner (2000:212-
213) for an explanation of this distinction.
7In Section 3.4.1, I draw on Durkheim (1933:41) and in this context it is worth noting
that Durkheim made a similar distinction between what I refer to as weak and strong
functionalism. Durkheim, however, does not use these terms explicitly, nor does he go
into much depth on the distinction between the two varieties of functionalism.
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ing studied rather than the means by which the phenomenon being studied 
actually emerged. Thus, if an artificial cognitive phenomenon is compared 
to a natural cognitive phenomenon and they are found to be identical, then 
the weak functionalists would assert that they are identical.
The computational approach epitomizes a weak functional viewpoint. 
Weak functionalists believe that if something serves the same purpose as 
something else, then they are for all intents and purposes identical. In the 
computational approach, weak functionalism is reflected in the way that AI 
advocates are more concerned with the appearances of cognition — that is, 
if something produces the same effects that natural cognition does, then it 
is cognition.
Weak functionalism is what most philosophers of mind associate with 
functionalism since the distinction between weak and strong functionalism 
is not often made. For example, a common definition of functionalism for 
philosophers of mind, and which I refer to here as weak functionalism, is:
“the view that what makes a mental state what it is (an experi­
ence of pain, a desire to drink, a belief that p), is the functional 
role it occupies. The view is usually associated with material­
ism about the states that have these functional roles” (Mautner 
2000:212).
What Mautner means by being associated with materialism is that func­
tionalism in the philosophy of mind is used to overcome materialist theories 
of mind which would have it that mental states of the same kind need to be 
bound up with the same physical conditions (Mautner 2000:213). We know, 
of course, that such materialist explanations of cognition are not accurate 
since cognitive capacities can be duplicated in different substrates (e.g. or­
ganic and silicon) (Churchland and Sejnowski 1992:416-418).
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Functionalism for most psychologists also conforms to a weak functional 
view of cognition, because in psychology, functionalism is:
“the view that behavior and mental phenomena can be explained 
as an organism’s strategies for adapting to its biological or social 
environment” (Mautner 2000:213).
In both cases, philosophers of mind and psychologists agree that a cogni­
tive capability or mental state can best be explained by the purpose it serves 
in the grander scheme of things, not by the material process from which 
emerges.
Strong Functionalism
Strong functionalism  is concerned with means as well as the end of a 
process. Strong functionalism is concerned about the means by which a 
phenomenon emerges as well as the aesthetic character of the phenomenon 
being produced at the end of the process. Thus, if an artificial cognitive 
phenomenon is compared to a natural cognitive phenomenon and they are 
found to be identical and if the properties which produce the cognitive phe­
nomena are identical, then the strong functionalists would assert that they 
are identical.
The dynamical approach epitomizes a strong functional viewpoint. In the 
dynamical approach, this notion is reflected in the way that dynamicists are 
more concerned with what the process is by which cognition emerges. Strong 
functionalists therefore would disagree with the notion that if something 
produces the effects of cognition then it is cognition. Strong functionalists 
believe that if something serves the same purpose as something else, then they 
are only functionally identical; they are not truly identical until the properties
129
underlying the phenomena being analyzed are shown to be identical.8
Though most philosophers and psychologists adhere to weak functional 
view of cognition, there are a few philosophers that diverge from this account 
of cognition. Block (1978) and Chalmers (1996) are both functionalists but 
they also note that the material basis for cognition needs to be organized 
in a certain way (see Section 3.4.2). That is, the role that a mental state 
serves is still important, but this does not by itself make that mental state 
cognition. Cognition emerges from certain functional organizations of inter­
connecting material components. Therefore, not only must a mental state 
serve a particular role, but the organization of the material basis from which 
the mental state emerges must be of the sort that is conducive to generating 
cognition in order for that mental state to be regarded as cognition.
Note that this strong functional view relies on a material basis, but it does 
not rely on the type of material the basis is made out of, and therefore cannot 
be regarded as materialism or physicalism. Rather strong functionalism relies 
on the manner in which the material basis is organized. In this way, strong 
functionalism, even though it seems related to materialism, still retains the 
attribute of substrate independence (which is also a characteristic of weak 
functionalism).
The distinction between the functional views in the computational and 
dynamical approaches has important implications for AI. One of the big argu­
ments against AI is that the AI view is only concerned with the appearances 
of cognition, but adopting a dynamical approach changes the debate. Dy-
8The process by which the properties underlying the phenomena being studied are 
shown to be identical is essential for demonstrating that a phenomenon supervenes on 
a particular property. Supervenience is a concept often used in metaphysical inquiry 
(Chalmers 1996:33-38).
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namicists, if regarded as the new generation of AI advocates, no longer need 
to defend their position by arguing that imitation is sufficient for cognition; 
they can now state that they know what cognition is — it is a dynamical 
system. As such, because dynamicists have a firmer grasp of what cognition 
is — a functional phenomenon capable of being described mathematically — 
dynamicists can assert with more confidence than old school AI advocates 
that cognition can indeed be duplicated in different media. This is because 
cognition is a dynamical system and dynamical systems are transposable.
More on how the strong functionalism of the dynamical approach can 
provide firmer support for a substrate independent cognition advocated by 
AI advocates will be discussed in Section 3.5.
3.3 N eural D ynam ics
The research that was conducted by such scientists and mathematicians as 
McCulloch and Pitts (1943) and Grossberg (1967, 1970a, 1970b) contributed 
greatly to the advancement of neural and behavioral studies. As a result of 
their ground-breaking work, the study of neural dynamics was born. By the 
mid 1980s, other scientists (Hopfield 1982, 1984) made significant contribu­
tions to this promising new field. Since then, the study of neural dynamics 
has not only helped us understand how the brain functions and processes in­
formation, but it has provided us with the knowledge to construct artificial 
neural dynamic networks. Therefore, the study of neural dynamics not only 
impacts the field of biology, but it has implications for several disciplines 
including biology, engineering, computer science, and economics.
Neural dynamic networks are feedback or recurrent networks (i.e. they 
have bi-directional flow between the nodes) and are, therefore, capable of self­
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organization. In Section 2.2.2, it was discussed that these kinds of networks 
have memory (CAM) and, hence, the ability to recall information which 
was stored in the past. These dynamic networks are part of a branch of 
learning theory that is called the theory of embedding fields, and the flows 
of the dynamic networks obey systems of nonlinear functional differential 
equations (Grossberg 1970b:28).
The structure and dynamics of a neural network — the way that neurons 
are interconnected through time — gives the neural network the ability to 
learn and remember patterns. In fact, all neural dynamic networks have this 
information processing capability (see Section 7.1). Some neural dynamic 
networks, however, are better than others at such tasks, and elucidating 
what network form is better suited to a particular task entails a detailed 
analysis of the dynamics of the network.
3.3 .1  In trodu cing  N eural D ynam ic M od els
Neural dynamic networks are natural (i.e. biological) cognitive systems, 
which are modeled using differential equations. The reader should recall 
from Section 3.2.1 that differential equations are a means of describing dy­
namical systems and, hence, neural dynamic networks, since neural dynamic 
networks are dynamical systems. The reader should achieve a modest fa­
miliarity with the equations below, — particularly the “Rewritten Additive 
STM Equation” — since these equations provide a template for all cognitive 
systems. They are important to my argument in Chapter 7 where I discuss 
the general characteristics of cognitive systems.
I begin by introducing the model variables used to describe a typical 
biological neural interaction (Harvey 1994; Wu 2001). Let us denote n nodes, 
or more specifically neurons, by V\,v2, ...vn- Then:
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1. The variable, Xi will describe the state, also called the activation of the 
ith  neuron, Biologically, the activation of the neuron is the change 
in potential from the neuron’s equilibrium potential. The variable
is also called the short-term memory (STM) trace.
2. The term, Z i3, which can also be a variable if we take plasticity into 
account, is the coupling strength associated with ^ ’s interaction with 
Vj. Biologically, Z%3 is the average release rate of neurotransmitter over 
the unit axon signal frequency. Z^ - is also called the synaptic coupling 
coefficient or the long-term memory (LTM) trace.
I will now construct models for these variables as they change through 
time.
3 .3 .2  T h e A d d itiv e  ST M  E quation
Suppose that we have a change in the potential (activation) of the neuron 
from its equilibrium state. This change is often caused by internal as well as 
external processes. Involving time, we can easily write these processes as:
dxi \dxA  \dxi
AT =  ~T  +  AT ' t3-1)
^  . .  In tern a l . '  .  E xternal
Another neuron connected to the neuron in question, z^ , may have either 
an excitatory effect or an inhibitory effect on z/j. Other stimuli may also 
contribute to the excitation or inhibition of z/*. We can write these external 
processes as additive processes so that
1
•e*
L 
..... dxi e- OS.
I
+ 8
-
«S
>.
1
dt E xternal dt ex cita to ry dt inh ib itory dt s tim u li
Equation 3.1 can then be expanded to:
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dxj
dt
dxi dxi dxi dxi+ --
dt + dtdt In tern a l dt ex cita to ry inh ib itory
(3.2)
stim u li
Here, we assume that the internal processes of V{ are governed by:
dxi
dt
(3.3)
In tern a l
where Ai(xi) > 0 and describes the rate of decay for vt. This implies that 
the internal processes of vt are exponentially decaying and are, thus, stable 
processes.
Next we assume that synaptic excitation is proportional to the pulse train 
frequency, which implies that:
dxi
dt ^   ^ Ski ^ ki •excita tory
(3.4)
Here, Ski is the average signal frequency, often referred to as the signal 
function, initiated at Vk and evaluated at Vi. The signal function can be 
defined as:
Ski(t) =  bkif[xk(t -  Tki) -  r fc], (3.5)
where is the threshold that Vk must overcome in order to “fire” (emit a 
signal from Vk to vf), Tki is the time delay involved in propagating a signal 
from Vk to Vi, bki is a nonnegative constant, and /(•) is a normalizeA signal 
function, which I will discuss below in Section 3.3.6.
For inhibitory inputs, the coupling strength is constant and so we can 
simply write the inhibitory processes in i/< as:
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dxi
=  Y  (3-6 )
inh ib itory  k = l :k ^ id t
where Cki > 0 and Cki can be defined as a function such that:
C k i( t )  =  C ki f [xk ( t  -  Tki)  -  r fc]. (3.7)
Here, are nonnegative constants.
Together we may write the additive STM equation as follows:
d n n= -Ai(xi(t))xi(t)+ Y 2  bkif[xk(t-Tki)-rk]Zki(t)- Y 2  ckif[xk(t-Tki)-rk]+ii(t), 
k~-l;k i^ k=\-,k i^
(3.8)
where /*(£) represents an external stimulus.
3.3 .3  T h e P assive D elay  LTM  E quation
The passive delay LTM equation can be obtained directly from Hebb’s Law, 
which states that:
+  P « M +, (3.9)
where Bij(Zij) > 0 and
Pij{t) = dijf[xi(t -  Tij) -  I\], (3.10)
is a signal function like Ski(t) was in the additive STM equation.
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Here, dij are nonnegative constants and [xj)+ is a function defined by:
. Xj if Xj > 0
\x3( t ) r  '
0 if Xj < 0
What this all means is that a signal P^ must be sent from Vi to Uj at the 
same time that Vj is activated (ie. Xj > 0) in order for to increase. 
Together, we may write the passive delay LTM equation as:
^  +dijf[xi(t  -  nj ) -  r i][a;J-(*)]+. (3.11)
3 .3 .4  T h e A d d itive  S T M  and P assive D elay  LTM  E qua­
tions
The STM and LTM formulations can be brought together to comprise the 
final system of equations:
d ft
Xr - A i(xi(t))xi{t)+ ^ 2  bkif[xk(t-Tki)-0k]Zki(t)- ^ 2  Ckif{xk{t-Tki)-Qk\+Ii{t),dt
k = l ; k ^ i  k—l ;k ^i
(3.12)
dZ
—2 2  =  —Bij{Zij{t))Zij{t) -I- dijf[xi(t -  Tij) -  (£)]+. (3.13)
3.3 .5  T h e R ew ritten  A d d itiv e  ST M  E quation
The system of equations (3.12 - 3.13) can be rewritten if we assume that 
the LTM traces, Zij(t) converge to constant values. Summing up all of the 
positive and negative feedback terms gives us the important equation:
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- 'jp -  = -AiXi(t)  +  zkif k(xk(t -  r)) +  /,(<), (3.14)
where zki are fixed synaptic couplings, or connection coefficients, which I 
will also refer to as interactional values in the next section. The term r  is 
the time delay in the transmission of a signal from vk to ut . This term may 
sometimes be left out for the sake of simplicity. However, it should be noted 
that time delay can can drastically affect the dynamics of systems and we 
will consider it later.
For those that are familiar with neural dynamics, equation 3.14 with­
out the time-delay is related to the n-dimensional Cohen-Grossberg system9, 
defined by:
1 < i < n, which is subject to the following conditions:
1. Symmetry of the connection matrix, [wjh].
2. Continuity of ai(xi(t)) for Xi(t) > 0 and bi(xi(t)) for Xi(t) > 0.
3. Positivity of ai(xi{t)) if xi(t) > 0.
4. Monotonicity in the sense that fi(xi{t)) is continuously differentiable 
and f ' (xi ( t )) >  0 for Xi(t) > 0 , where (') denotes differentiation.
These conditions must be fulfilled in order to use Grossberg’s Covergence 
Theorem. In other words, in order for a pattern to be recalled successfully, the 
neural dynamic network must be stable. Grossberg’s Covergence Theorem
9Note that the Cohen-Grossberg system is normally written without a time-delay, r.
^  = *(*,(«)) *(*,(*)) -  £ > * /* (* * (« )) (3.15)
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can facilitate the analyst in ascertaining whether or not the dynamical system 
being analyzed is indeed stable.
The relationship between equations 3.15 and 3.14, not considering the 
time-delay, r, is: a*(a*) =  1, bi(xi) = U — A{x, and wki = —z^.
3.3 .6  N orm alized  S ignal F unctions
I mentioned in the previous sections dedicated to neural dynamics that neu­
rons follow relatively simple rules described by functions, /(•), called nor­
malized signal functions. This section will be dedicated to describing some 
common normalized signal functions that are used in neural dynamics.
•  One commonly used normalized signal function is the step function 
defined by:
I 1 if u > 0
f ( u ) = S
 ^ 0 if u < 0
where r^  is the time delay in the transmission of the signal from i/k to 
Vi. Models that use these normalized signal functions are often called 
McCulloch-Pitts models in recognition of the ground-breaking research 
conducted by McCulloch and P itts (1943).
• The second normalized signal function that can be used is the piecewise 
linear function defined by:
1 if u > |
f{u)  =  < /3u if 0 < u < |  ,
0 if u < 0
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where (3 is the neuron gain. Note that the piecewise linear function 
reduces to the step function as (3 — > oo.
•  The third and most commonly used normalized signal function that 
can be utilized is the sigmoid function which can be defined as:
=  l  _|_ g - 4 (iu ’
where u G R and (3 is the neural gain such that (3 = f'ifi) > 0. Again, 
as with the linear piecewise function, the sigmoid function becomes the 
step function if we let (3 — * oo.
To summarize the above sections on neural dynamics, the dynamical sys­
tems behind the production of cognition in the central nervous system have 
been described. Through the study of neural dynamical systems much insight 
has been gained regarding the functional, rather than the material, nature 
of cognition. The study of neural dynamical systems have already provided 
scientists with models that have been used in constructing artificial cognitive 
systems (Churchland and Sejnowski 1992:416-418; Wu 2001:8). As a result, 
these dynamical systems, which have been described, can be used to provide 
a template for building more general cognitive systems which I focus on in 
Chapter 7.
3.4 Supra-Individual C ognition  and E xtended  
C ognition  as D ynam ical System s
In the last chapter, cognition was conceived as computation, but because 
more research in recent years supports the view that cognition is a dynamical
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system, — in which the functional organization of the material basis plays 
a fundamental role — I will focus in this section on work that is closely 
associated with a dynamical conception of cognition.
In the last chapter, I amassed examples that are integral to conceptual­
izing cognition as subsuming both the individual and the environment that 
surrounds the individual, whether physical or social. Therefore, the notion 
that cognition extends beyond the individual and in some cases is detached 
from the individual (e.g. a calculator) should not be new to the reader. The 
difference in this chapter will not only be to emphasize that cognition is a 
dynamical system, but to be explicit about the distinction between supra- 
indimdual and extended cognition. In being explicit about this distinction, 
special attention will be paid to the fact that cognition can be conceived as 
two sorts:
1. Supra-individual cognition manifests itself as a dynamical system ab­
stracted from the individual (i.e. body and nervous system). Supra- 
individual cognition can link up with individual cognition but its source 
is independent from that of individual cognition. Sections 3.4.1 -  3.4.2 
are examples of this kind of cognition.
2. Extended cognition manifests itself as a dynamical system subsuming 
individual and environment. Extended cognition cannot be conceived 
of without including the individual, which is its source. Sections 3.4.3 
-  3.4.4 are examples of this kind of cognition.
3.4 .1  D urkheim  and S o cie ty  as a D yn am ica l S ystem
Although Emile Durkheim’s work (Durkheim 1933) predates the cognitive 
revolution, his view of society parallels the dynamical view held by cognitive
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science. As such, Durkheim’s work can be seen to represent one of the first 
significant attempts to not only realize supra-individualism in social form, 
but to realize a sort of cognition associated with this supra-individualism.
Emile Durkheim was heavily influenced by the French and German in­
tellectual tradition, primarily by Comte (1988) and Schaffle (1889). Comte 
inspired in Durkheim the positivistic notion that the study of society (soci­
ology) is a science and that social phenomena can be studied objectively as 
long as the features that one is studying are explicit and therefore can be 
tested. Schaffle, on the other hand, provided Durkheim with the conceptual 
tools necessary to provide a definition of society.
Durkheim, like Schaffle and Comte, often utilized concepts from biology 
as metaphors for facilitating sociological analysis (e.g. Durkheim 1933:62- 
63) (Giddens 1971:67). Schaffle, and later Durkheim, would compare human 
society to an organism which lives a life distinct from the lives of the cells 
that compose it. The main point is that society is not the sum of the lives 
of a group of individuals but an entity that has properties of its own. In this 
sense, the whole is considered to be greater than the sum of its parts.
Society, unlike its organic analog, is not considered by Schaffle and Durkheim 
to be a series of parts that are united physically. Rather, society comprises 
individuals that are tied together by ideas (Durkheim 1933:96-110) instead of 
a material substrate. Society functions on a level separate from the individ­
ual, but nonetheless greatly influences the individual; in turn, the individual 
impacts society. This however does not mean that the individual is unhappy 
because he is tied to other people. Society is not a prison, and in general the 
individual is quite content to remain in society.
The ideas that bond individuals together and that are shared by all in­
dividuals in the society comprise the collective conscience. The collective
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conscience can be conceived of as a composite of individual minds. Each in­
dividual mind has its own view, but it is all the minds together that make up 
the collective conscience — separate minds working as a group. The manner 
in which this group mind functions is different from the manner in which an 
individual mind functions. This is an important point to emphasize, since 
it suggests that supra-individual and individual knowledge can be conceived 
of as forming separately. The collective conscience constitutes a system of 
beliefs that is shared amongst individuals of a society and which changes 
slowly through time relative to the individual (Durkheim 1933:79-82). Thus, 
generations pass and the collective conscience remains from one generation 
to the next. It therefore has a longer life span than any individual human 
(Durkheim 1933:80) and as such can be conceived of as operating on a dif­
ferent plane or at a different frequency from that of the individual mind.
The notion of collective conscience, because of the ambiguity associated 
with it, is quoted at length in the following passage (Durkheim 1933:79-80):
“The totality of beliefs and sentiments common to average citi­
zens of the same society forms a determinate system which has its 
own life; one may call it the collective or common conscience. No 
doubt, it has not a specific organ as a substratum; it is, by defini­
tion, diffuse in every reach of society. Nevertheless, it has specific 
characteristics which make it a distinct reality. It is, in effect, 
independent of the particular conditions in which individuals are 
placed; they pass on and it remains. It is the same in the North 
and in the South, in great cities and in small, in different profes­
sions. Moreover, it does not change with each generation, but on 
the contrary, it connects successive generations with one another.
It is, thus, an entirely different thing from particular consciences,
142
although it can be realized only through them. It is the psychi­
cal type of society, a type which has its properties, its conditions 
of existence, its mode of development, just as individual types, 
although in a different way.”
Durkheim (1933:80) goes on to state that the collective conscience is an 
ambiguous term since it does not represent all of the social conscience, just 
the psychical aspect of the social conscience. He explains what he means 
later when he calls the collective conscience “sentiments” . These sentiments 
can be considered to be morals that individuals in society share. Our feelings 
on severe crimes, such as murder, might be something that would constitute 
our collective conscience. For example, for many people, depending on the 
circumstances, murder is considered wrong. These same people may feel 
uncomfortable, sad, or angry at the thought of someone committing murder. 
These feelings constitute the collective conscience responding to the notion 
of murder.
Durkheim, emphasizes the fact that the collective conscience is our an­
chor, our center. He presents the abstract notion of collective conscience 
so that it may account for social phenomena, much like Newton introduced 
the abstract concept of gravity to explain why objects fall to the ground. 
Durkheim states that the collective conscience guides us in how we feel and 
eventually act. Durkheim (1933:81) states: “...we must not say that an ac­
tion shocks the common conscience because it is criminal, but rather that it 
is criminal because it shocks the common conscience.” This emphasis directs 
the focus of study on society rather than the amoral acts that are external 
to society, in the same way that gravity directed the focus of causal study 
on universal mechanics rather than on the specific objects that are governed 
by mechanics.
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Durkheim thought that the collective conscience would be more apparent 
in less hierarchical societies. In such a society with little division of labor, 
individuals can more easily relate to one another since they share many 
of the same tasks. Therefore, individuals within less hierarchical societies 
should be affected by what happens to everyone else. A crime against an 
individual in such a society is a crime against society and it reflects itself in 
the kinds of criminal laws that are instituted in society. Durkheim states that 
a less hierarchical society is reliant on a kind of sentiment called mechanical 
solidarity (Durkheim 1933:70-110). Hierachical societies, on the other hand, 
are governed by a sentiment known as organic solidarity and tend to have 
more heterogeneity and a stronger sense of individuality (Durkheim 1933:111- 
132). Criminal laws play an important role in the analysis of these kinds of 
societies since they function as an external index for studying the different 
kinds of solidarity in society (Durkheim 1933:64).10
Discussion: Durkheim ’s Collective Conscience
It should be noted, however, that the notion of collective conscience is prob­
lematic. It is one thing to propose its existence, but another to detect it, even 
with an external index. Durkheim, himself, never completely convinced oth­
ers of the empirical existence of a collective conscience. Subsequent attempts 
at statistically detecting it have been similarly unconvincing. For a more re­
cent attempt at detecting collective conscience, and its subsequent rebuttal, 
see Kraus, Schild, and Hodge (1978) and Guppy (1982), respectively.
Durkheim’s views on conscience can be extended to the concept of cogni­
10The notion of the external index would remain a very important methodological con­
tribution to the social sciences. An external index is a physical trait observed in society 
that is used to reflect a social phenomenon that one is interested in studying.
144
tion, since Durkheim in many ways used the term conscience in a manner not 
dissimilar to how I have used the term cognition. Durkheim would have been 
an advocate of the view that cognition existed outside of the individual and 
his studies were the first attempts to place this supra-individual cognition 
on a rigorous footing. Durkheim was one of the first to use statistics as a 
way of showing that supra-individual cognition was influencing the behavior 
of individuals (Durkheim 1952). He showed that social beliefs correlate with 
the choices that individuals make and as such are subject to being analyzed 
sociologically rather than psychologically.
Though Durkheim proposed two kinds of cognition, individual and supra- 
individual (Durkheim 1933:100,105), it is supra-individual cognition which 
Durkheim posited as the stronger of the two (1933:100) and which he felt had 
the greatest foothold in the centers of the brain controlling behavior (1933:97- 
98). Supra-individual cognition, however, is linked by him to individual 
cognition and, because they occupy the same “organic substrate” , form one 
all-encompassing cognition (1933:106).
This notion that supra-individual and individual cognition are separate 
phenomena yet united in some manner is not as contradictory as it may 
seem. Durkheim is a (strong) functionalist (Durkheim 1933:49), and as such 
Durkheim is able to conceive of two kinds of cognition abstracted from one an­
other yet linked, since both individual and supra-individual cognition occupy 
the same “organic substrate” (1933:106) and independently serve the same 
fundamental purpose, which is to inform the members of a society about 
what is criminal and what is not criminal (1933:81). Therefore, individ­
ual cognition and supra-individual cognition, though different, are united in 
their fundamental purpose and in their development toward this fundamental 
purpose within the same “organic substrate” . Even criminal acts spurred by
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individual cognition can be conceived of as maintaining this social gauge in 
that criminal acts attem pt to weaken the effect of supra-individual cognition 
which, in turn, means that supra-individual cognition must be strengthened 
at all costs by the other members of society.
Durkheim saw supra-individual cognition as he saw society — as a system. 
Being diffused over a society meant that supra-individual cognition changed 
with respect to the characteristics of the society, such as the society’s division 
of labor. Thus, like society, supra-individual cognition was envisioned as an 
organic whole in which all parts of the system worked together concurrently, 
not sequentially. That is, a change in one element brought on associated 
changes to all of the elements of the system, not to just a finite number 
of elements. Because supra-individual cognition changed through time — 
very slowly in some cases — it was dynamic. As such, Durkheim envisioned 
supra-individual cognition as a dynamical system, not as computation.
3.4 .2  C halm ers and th e  P ervasiveness o f  D ynam ica l 
S ystem s W hich  G enerate C ognition
Much light can be shed on the topic of cognition through an evaluation 
of the relationship between cognition and consciousness. This is because 
the conditions necessary for producing consciousness are also necessary for 
generating cognition (Chalmers 1996:25-26).
For Chalmers there is an important distinction between cognition and 
consciousness, which should be made clear from the outset in order to un­
derstand how his work sheds light on supra-individual cognition. I discuss 
the distinction between cognition and consciousness below.
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Chalm ers’ N otion  of Cognition
For Chalmers, cognition is a phenomenon that is easily comprehended be­
cause it is governed by and emerges from material processes. As a result, the 
study of cognition is regarded as a science by cognitive psychologists, neuro­
physiologists, computer scientists, and engineers. That is, cognition can be 
explained using a reductive functional paradigm, which implies that cognition 
can be explained through the systemic means by which it has arisen.
The means by which cognition arises is theorized to be a dynamical 
system ,11 and the dynamical system’s states directly correspond to cogni­
tive states. Within the brain, the dynamical system refers to the neuro- 
physiological system and the cognitive states correspond directly to certain 
thoughts the individual may be having. In principle, the dynamical system is 
the “cause” of cognition and, as such, wherever the dynamical system man­
ifests itself, the corresponding cognitive states of the system should emerge 
(Chalmers 1996:24). Chalmers notion of cognition as a dynamical system is 
based on what we have learned about the mind from the 1940s to the present, 
and is supported by the fact that these dynamical systems, when replicated 
in another environment (say silicon), reveal themselves to be intelligent as 
defined by Turing in 1950.
Chalm ers’ N otion of Consciousness
Chalmers is a dualist and his sympathy for this school of thought presents 
itself immediately. Chalmers is clearly bent on turning consciousness into
11 Although Chalmers (1996:330-331) regards himself as acomputationalist, computation 
does not figure significantly in his discussion of cognition and consciousness. Chalmers’ 
descriptions of such concepts as functional organization suggest that he can be regarded 
as a dynamicLst in the most fundamental aspects on the his theory.
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something phenomenal rather than material, hence returning to the mind- 
body problem once again after it had been left behind with the discovery 
that cognition could essentially be reduced to material states by psycholo­
gists. Scientists of cognition can remain monists, claims Chalmers, but those 
reckless enough to consider the study of consciousness must succumb to du­
alism, because consciousness is forever phenomenal.
Chalmers sees two main links connecting the physical world to conscious­
ness: the link between a physical system and cognitive states, and the link 
between cognitive states and conscious states (Chalmers 1996:25). To be 
more specific, there exists a process that generates cognition (i.e. aware­
ness) from a materially based dynamical system. Another process explains 
how and why conscious states (i.e. consciousness or experience) are accom­
panied by cognitive states.
Cognition has been dealt with in psychology, physiology, and artificial 
intelligence — for instance, we can study the stimuli and responses associated 
with pain, but we find it harder to study the sensations associated with 
experiencing or recognizing pain (i.e. consciousness). Chalmers is specifically 
interested in the relationship between cognitive states and conscious states 
— that is, how and why stimuli of and responses to pain accompany the 
experience of pain (1996:26). How and why cognitive states (i.e. the actual 
neuro-physical states) are associated with consciousness is what is commonly 
referred to as the generation problem or the hard problem of consciousness 
(Seager 1999:216), which Chalmers sets out to illuminate.
To accomplish this, Chalmers proposes that there are two kinds of con­
sciousness: psychological consciousness, which corresponds to the cognitive 
states discussed above, and phenomenal consciousness, which corresponds to 
the conscious states (Chalmers 1996:25-29).
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Psychological consciousness consciousness consists of cognitive states 
and the capability to report on these states. Chalmers finds psychological 
consciousness completely explainable by the reductive functional paradigm 
to which cognitive science subscribes. It is simply that the paradigm that 
cognitive science uses is inadequate for explaining phenomenal consciousness, 
and it is phenomenal consciousness that Chalmers sets out to explain.
Phenom enal consciousness is sensation; it is the feeling-as-if quality 
that simply cannot be reduced to material correlates. Consciousness is a term 
for experience, a qualitative feeling held by the subject. A precise definition 
of consciousness, claims Chalmers, eludes the analyst of consciousness and 
as such it is more fruitful to describe it rather than define it. The reason 
that conscious experience cannot be described in a definitional way is that 
consciousness is intrinsic to the individual. The language we use to define 
consciousness is extrinsic and therefore a definition of consciousness using 
language would reduce consciousness to an extrinsic form. The result of 
course would not be a definition of consciousness but rather a definition of a 
reduced version of consciousness.
Chalm ers’ N otion of How Cognition and Consciousness Are Re­
lated
Chalmers clearly does not isolate cognition from consciousness. In fact, there 
is good reason to believe that they are connected. When we experience the 
color blue, for instance, there is an associated perception of the color blue, 
which is being seen directly. Thus, a corresponding cognitive state is always 
associated with the conscious experience of blue. In this way, conscious 
experiences are accompanied by cognitive states and as such consciousness 
implies that cognition in some form or another is also present. What this
149
means is that we can use what Chalmers stipulates about consciousness to 
shed light on certain aspects of the nature of cognition, since consciousness 
implies cognition.
It does not follow necessarily that conscious experience results from cog­
nitive states, but some if not most of the time it does follow. When one is 
looking attentively at a bird flying from tree to tree, there is a phenomenal 
sensation associated with this attentive cognitive state. In this situation it 
is clearly the case that when a cognitive state appeared so did a correspond­
ing conscious experience emerge. But often we do not receive a conscious 
experience associated with an awareness of the phenomenon. For instance, 
when we recall something, it does not have the same phenomenal impact as 
something that is occurring in the present. Frequently there are sensations 
involved with certain memories, but they usually have weaker phenomenal 
effects than first-hand accounts. In other words for the most part, conscious­
ness is an occurrent phenomenon, whereas cognition need not be occurrent. 
Chalmers, therefore, distinguishes two kinds of cognitive awareness: aware­
ness that is associated with occurrent thought and awareness that is associ­
ated with non-occurrent thought.
What Chalmers then does is to reduce his definition of awareness to oc­
current thoughts (to match with the thoughts associated with consciousness) 
and, in so doing, constructs his principle of structural coherence between 
cognition and consciousness (Chalmers 1996:218-225). The arrows of impli­
cation now flow in both directions between cognition and consciousness since 
they both constitute occurrent phenomena; this is to say that conscious expe­
rience implies cognitive awareness and cognitive awareness implies conscious 
experience under this reduced definition of cognitive awareness. There now 
exists a one-to-one correspondence between awareness and experience, such
150
that where an awareness exists, an experience is entailed, and where there is 
an experience, an awareness is entailed.
The principle of structural coherence between cognition and conscious­
ness simply states that the structure of cognition — when and how cognition 
arises in a dynamical system — can function as a model for the structure of 
consciousness, since there exists a one-to-one correspondence between aware­
ness and experience. Chalmers does not claim to be able to determine the 
magnitude of experience from a corresponding magnitude of awareness from 
this principle, but the principle does guarantee conscious experience given 
cognitive awareness. It is therefore natural to suggest that consciousness is 
reliant on the functional organization of the brain, which produces cognition 
and consequently consciousness. “On this view, the chemical and indeed the 
quantum substrate of the brain is irrelevant to the production of conscious­
ness. W hat counts is the brain’s abstract causal organization, an organization 
that may be realized in many different physical substrates” (1996:247). The 
functional organization of the brain “...is best understood as the abstract 
pattern of causal interaction between various parts of a system, and perhaps 
between these parts and external inputs and outputs. A functional organi­
zation is determined by specifying (1) a number of abstract components, (2) 
for each component, a number of different states, and (3) a system of de­
pendency relations, specifying how the state of each component depends on 
the previous states of all components and on inputs to the system, and how 
outputs from the system depend on previous component states” (1996:247).
Chalmers naturally assumes that functional organization is behind the 
generation of consciousness, since the functional organization is clearly what 
is behind the emergence of cognition. Since Chalmers deals with the subset 
of cognitive states responsible for occurrent thought, then it is clear to him
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that the associated functional organizations responsible for cognition (i.e. all 
cognitive states) are, in turn, initiating consciousness. Chalmers mentions 
a few of the “different physical substrates” in which cognition and hence 
consciousness can be realized — beer cans being just one (1996:249). This 
tapered form of panpsychism is not new as it has been advocated by John 
Tyndall and Thomas Huxley (Seager 1999:216-217). Block (1978) has even 
proposed that if enough people were fitted with a radio transmitters and re­
ceivers that conscious experience similar to that achieved by a human brain 
could be supported. In this manner, human interaction can produce the phe­
nomena of cognition and, hence, memory formation, as well as consciousness 
that we usually attribute to the human brain.
Chalmers’ analysis of consciousness manages to show that phenomenal 
consciousness is non-reductively explainable. (It was cognitive awareness 
that could be reduced to occurrent thought, not consciousness.) As such, 
Chalmers sets the foundation for a scientific theory of phenomenal conscious­
ness, but he does so in a way that also sheds some light on his views of 
cognition. The first and most important thing that can be said of Chalmers’ 
view of cognition (indirectly since his concern is with consciousness) is that 
cognition is dependent on the functional organization of a materially based 
dynamical system and that this system can manifest itself in any medium 
or substrate. In other words, it is the functional organization or systemic 
interaction of the components that causes cognition, not some innate mate­
rial property of the components themselves. Finally, Chalmers sees cognitive 
states as being divided up into occurrent thought and non-occurrent thought, 
and he asserts that occurrent thought is irrevocably tied to consciousness. 
This may be his strategy for explaining consciousness — to divide cognitive 
awareness into occurrent and non-occurrent thought — but it nonetheless
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gives us an idea of how Chalmers conceives of cognition. He sees the subset 
of cognitive states known as occurrent thought as determining consciousness, 
and it is the structural coherence between cognitive states and conscious 
states that he concentrates on throughout the remainder of his book.
3.4 .3  C lark and C halm ers and A ctive  E xternal C ogni­
tion
Clark and Chalmers’ 1998 work makes a significant departure from Chalmers’ 
1996 work, which I have just discussed. Chalmers 1996 emphasized supra- 
individual cognition, whereas Clark and Chalmers 1998 emphasize extended 
cognition.
Clark and Chalmers (1998) explore the issue of the physical limits of cog­
nition. They suggest that cognition is erroneously conceived of as an internal 
neuro-physiological phenomenon, since most people associate “the mind” or 
cognition as being a phenomenon of the brain only, restricted to within the 
skull of the individual. This internalist perspective is not telling the whole 
story, however, since it abstracts cognition from its context, which is the 
surrounding environment and the objects therein that we use to enhance 
cognition. In contrast to the internalist view, which as we have seen has 
its historical reasons for arising (see Section 2.2), the externalist perspective 
does not set boundaries on where cognition ends.
To explain their argument, Clark and Chalmers (1998) propose three 
hypothetical situations.12
1. In the first hypothetical situation, Clark and Chalmers (1998) have the 
reader envision an experiment in which a person is situated in front of a
12In their argument, Clark and Chalmers (1998) draw heavily from Kirsh and Maglio’s 
(1994) observational studies of subjects playing the video game Tetris.
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computer screen that depicts different geometric shapes and associated 
sockets, which the geometric shapes may or may not fit into. The 
subject is then asked which sockets the geometric shapes will fit into. 
The subject must of course conduct all of the mental acrobatics needed 
to accomplish this task within his or her brain.
2. In the second situation, the same experiment is conducted, but this 
time, by pressing a button, the subject is allowed to choose to rotate 
the shapes on the computer screen to see if they fit into the sockets 
being presented to the subject.13
3. In the third scenario, a neural mechanism is implanted within the sub­
ject’s brain that allows the individual’s brain to rotate the shapes in 
the way a computer does. Again it will be assumed that this implant 
decreases the time it takes to determine which shapes fit in the sockets.
Clark and Chalmers suggest that cognition is depicted in all three sce­
narios. Certainly, no internalist would deny that the first scenario does not 
depict cognition. Similarly, an internalist would be hard pressed to explain 
why the third situation could not be considered cognition. Finally, since the 
neural implant duplicates the computer’s actions, the internalist would have 
to admit that the second situation is cognition as well.
All three situations can be regarded as epistemic actions (Kirsh and 
Maglio 1994). That is, they are all actions that help to determine if a shape 
fits into a socket. These actions contrast with pragmatic actions, which only 
rotate a shape to fit a socket for the sake of rotating a shape to fit a socket. 
In the epistemic case, the subject is learning, which is clearly a cognitive
13It will be assumed that this procedure decreases the time it takes to decide which 
shapes fit into the sockets.
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process. In the pragmatic case, the job of fitting the shape into the socket 
need not entail learning, just task completion.
The second hypothetical situation is interesting since it is a case in which 
cognition crosses the boundary of the skull. The notion that cognition 
extends beyond the biological individual is called externalism. Clark and 
Chalmers (1998) do not advocate a passive externalism as does Putnam 
(1975), but instead advocate an active externalism, in which the subject 
and the external device that the subject is using are involved in the cogni­
tive process. That is, it is not only a case in which the individual’s mind 
is being represented in different media around him or her, but it is a case 
in which these media actually supply information that aids the individual in 
processing data. In other words, there is feedback from an external source 
(e.g. calculator, computer, notepad and pen). W hat develops is not a cog­
nitive nexus centered within the individual’s brain and an added-on device 
for aiding information processing, but an entirely different dynamical system 
with no precise center, where human and device are coupled. For example, 
this coupling or interaction has been demonstrated to comprise human visual 
systems in which features in the physical environment have been shown to 
enhance certain visual properties in the human brain (Ullman and Richards 
1984).
Externalism does not stop with features in the environment or with me­
chanical devices such as notebooks and computers; it also includes other 
people. When we interact with people using language (i.e. discourse), we 
learn. Discourse thus constitutes an epistemic action and extends cognition 
to include all people that are involved in the discussion. Language, therefore, 
is critical for “extending” cognition and therefore can be seen to function as 
a factor in evolution, which relates to Donald’s (1991) work. All three au­
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thors, Donald, Clark and Chalmers view the capacity for humans to employ 
external sources in the cognitive process as an adaptive advantage for Homo 
sapiens. For Donald, however, the externalism is focused on external storage, 
whereas Clark and Chalmers subscribe to a continuously ensuing cognitive 
process — a dynamical system that entails interacting subject and environ­
ment. All three authors see the evolution of human cognition as the devel­
opmental process in which humans employ more and more external sources 
in the cognitive process — i.e., cognition becomes more and more extended.
As a result of cognition being extended, it is a natural suggestion, accord­
ing to Clark and Chalmers, that the “self’ too is extended. For example, 
the identity of a person does not consist only of the person, but includes the 
computer he or she may be using as well. The self in this way is extended to 
include the objects we use on a daily basis and the friends that are always 
with us.
This notion of extended self has been described by Mageo (1995). Mageo 
claims that in Samoa, it is very difficult to understand why Samoans do the 
things they do unless some understanding of how Samoans perceive the self is 
acquired. Samoans see the self as including the entire family, and an injustice 
done to one person in the family is a disgrace to the entire family. In essence, 
one individual is represented by all of the family members.
Clark and Chalmers see cognition as potentially limitless and there is 
significant research to support their view (e.g. Port and van Gelder [1995], 
discussed in the next section). Not only should discourse and material objects 
be the focus of externalist cognitive studies, but so too should other actions 
besides discourse be examined as extended cognition. I will focus on actions 
and, in particular, interactions throughout this thesis.
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3.4 .4  Van G elder and P ort and Turvey and C arello on  
th e  A g e n t /  E nvironm ent R ela tion sh ip
Port and van Gelder (1995) provide an extensive review of the dynamical 
systems approach to cognition in their edited book. I will only consider two 
papers from their book.
In van Gelder and Port’s (1995) section, “It’s About Time”, van Gelder 
and Port provide the substantiation for why a dynamical systems view is 
critical to future studies in cognition. Their main line of defense is that dy­
namical systems models are not just a way of representing natural cognitive 
systems systems with cognitive capabilities — natural cognitive systems 
are dynamical systems. They refer to this proposal as the “Dynamical Hy­
pothesis” , and though such a proposal can only be tested through time, one 
central observation supports the view that natural cognitive systems are in 
fact dynamical systems. Their observation is that natural cognitive systems 
are not cyclic and sequential, as the computational view entails; that is, one 
component does not represent something to another component, as discussed 
in van Gelder (1995) and in Section 3.2. Rather, all of the parts of cognitive 
systems are continuously changing in real time. The brain itself is an indica­
tion of this. Mental processing is the result of an organic mass of electrical 
and chemical interactions, all of which are governed by natural dynamic laws 
acting on the neural architecture of the brain through time.
Dynamical systems also describe the whole cognitive process better than 
any other means currently known. From an externalist perspective, cogni­
tion is not encapsulated within the brain of the individual; it subsumes the 
nervous system, body, and environment (van Gelder and Porter 1995:13). 
Cognition is the process of all three of these entities working together simul­
taneously, not sequentially, and it is therefore more accurately described as
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a dynamical system.
A good example of the kind of work that is advocated by the authors is 
empirical work demonstrating that people are attuned to dynamical systems, 
and that this attunement helps people to perceive and process information. 
One such example is the work of Turvey and Carello (1995), who provide 
empirical evidence supporting the view that perception is attunement to the 
features of a dynamical system. Their case study entails demonstrating that 
a dynamical system of a person wielding a hammer is a natural cognitive 
system.
In this work Turvey and Carello study human perception and action to 
see if these phenomena are keyed into the dynamical systems that form exter­
nalist sorts of cognitive systems. In so doing, their research not only provides 
empirical support for externalism (i.e. extended cognition), but their work 
also empirically supports the view that cognition is indeed a dynamical sys­
tem, since the subjects being tested actually perceive the constraints of the 
dynamical system described by the parameters of the dynamical system’s 
model.
Turvey and Carello’s work on perception is two-fold:
1. The first purpose of the authors is to construct a model of the physio­
logical dynamical system, which describes a human acting in his or her 
environment.
2. The second purpose is to determine whether the subject, through his 
or her actions only, is attuned to features of the dynamical system of 
the human-environment action. If the subject is attuned to the model 
of the dynamical system then this suggests that the dynamical system 
is not a figment of the experimenter’s mind, but is actually part of the 
subject’s mind.
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(a) This second purpose is accomplished through first determining 
whether the subject perceives the environment through action cor­
rectly. That is, the subject’s perceptions of the environment — 
the subject is blindfolded and must use actions to perceive the 
environment — are compared with the actual environment to de­
termine if they are correlated.
(b) The second step is to determine if the subject is attuned to any 
of the parameters of the dynamical model and, if so, to determine 
what parameters of the dynamical model the subject is attuned 
to.
Turvey and Carello first begin their study by constructing a dynamical 
model of a human wielding an object around a fixed point in the wrist using 
the Euler’s equations:
where 7i, I2, and 73 are the moments of inertia in the 3-dimensional space 
centered at the fixed point in the wrist; Ah, N2, and are torques around 
the associated axes anchored on the fixed point in the wrist; and uj2, 
and LJ3 are the angular velocities about the associated axes, the derivative of 
which represents the angular accelerations.
at (3.16)
(3.17)
(3.18)
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Turvey and Carello then have their subjects wield objects of various, 
weights, lengths, and shapes, while blindfolded. Through wielding the ob­
jects the subjects are then asked to estimate the lengths of the objects 
wielded.
When these estimates were compared with the actual lengths of the ob­
jects, the subjects’ estimates of the lengths were close enough to the actual 
lengths of the objects to suggest that the objects’ lengths were perceived 
through wielding the objects. This showed to the experimenters that a dy­
namical system, described by the equations above, subsumed both wielder 
and object, and that it was this dynamical system to which the wielder was 
attuned.
The experimenters then went through the process of searching for the fea­
tures of the dynamical system, manifested in the parameters of the dynamical 
model, that the subjects were keyed into. Through regression, Turvey and 
Carello were able to determine which parameters correlated with the percep­
tions of the subjects, hence homing in on the parameters of the dynamical 
system to which the subjects were attuned.
Turvey and Carello’s work provides a concrete example of how extended 
cognition in the form of a dynamical system can be studied and I will draw 
on their research periodically throughout this thesis.
3.5 D efending Strong AI from a D ynam ical 
System s P erspective
Defending (strong) AI is important for my research because AI is the hy­
pothesis that cognition can be duplicated in any substrate. A defense of AI, 
therefore, constitutes a defense for substrate independent cognition which in
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turn is necessary to support the notion of supra-individual cognition, as well 
as extended cognition.
In this section, I take up two more objections against AI, which were 
briefly mentioned in Section 2.3.5, and defend them. I chose to discuss these 
objections at the end of this chapter because the notions of extended and 
supra-individual cognition — which are based on the idea that cognition is of 
a (strong) functional nature — are relevant for defending AI. For example, 
the defense of the first objection (below) requires an understanding of the 
notion of extended cognition (i.e. from the individual into the environment), 
and the second objection (below) requires an understanding of the notion of 
cognition as a dynamical system.
The Third O bjection to  AI
A major objection to AI is that computers cannot possibly exhibit human- 
grade cognition since humans interact with the world around them and com­
puters do not. In other words, much of human cognition comprises things 
that we have learned through interacting with the environment or with other 
people. Computers do not interact with other computers and the environ­
ment in the same way as humans do; therefore, computers will not have the 
same “kind” of cognition that humans have. In other words, culture and 
society have a definite impact on our mental content that computers cannot 
match.
An example supporting this objection is the ability to compare and con­
trast the thinking of Chinese and American individuals (Hergenhahn 1992:549) 
It is argued by opponents of AI that Chinese and Americans think differently 
even though they have the same neural functional organization. Clearly, 
something from outside of the brain is happening to differentiate the thought
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processes of Chinese and Americans. Computers, on the other hand, do not 
form societies and therefore do not exhibit these characteristics.
This objection, however, does not adequately make its case that an indi­
vidual’s “thinking” is not the same for Americans and Chinese. If abstracted 
from the effects of society, individuals do seem to think alike. An individual 
born in China to Chinese parents, but raised in America from an early age 
thinks much the same as any other American individual; the converse is true 
for an individual born in America to American parents, but raised in China 
from an early age. In other words, the common denominator for functioning 
in the world is present in every individual from the time of birth. Only after 
birth does society begin to affect an individual thinking.
Therefore, while I disagree that this objection shows that individuals are 
different from one another despite having the same neural architecture, I 
agree with the fact that society does have an effect on “thinking”. I would 
also add that the reason that we have computers that do not have this added 
interactive dimension is that we do not fully understand how society affects 
humans. Consequently, if we do not understand how society affects humans 
then we cannot possibly be expected to instill social effects into a computer.
We cannot build a computer that can supplement its thought processes 
with the thought processes of other computers or the environment since we 
do not understand how the same phenomenon occurs in humans. However, 
progress is being made. Currently, research is being conducted on just this 
topic with computer simulated experiments (Kennedy 1998) (see Section 
2.4.2) and with robots (Maris and te Boekhorst 1996) (see 2.4.3). Maris 
and te Boekhorst (1996) have found that AI does in fact interact with the 
environment and other AI. This interactive phenomenon has been a topic of 
AI research for over a decade and it gives credence to the notion that there
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is supra-individual cognition working together with individual cognition.
Whereas Kennedy’s (1998) and Maris and te Boekhorst’s (1996) research 
have focused on the social environment, other research is being conducted 
which is focused on the physical environment. Turvey and Carello’s (1995) 
research has concentrated on determining the effects of aspects of the phys­
ical environment on cognition and what they have found is that cognition 
manifests itself as a dynamical system subsuming nervous system, body, and 
environment (see Section 3.4.4). The implication of this is that the human 
body is important for cognition, since it forms an integral component in the 
dynamical system which facilitates perception. Take the body out or change 
its form and the entire dynamical system subsuming nervous system, body, 
and environment would change, thereby changing how things are perceived. 
If preservation of the dynamical system responsible for cognition is important 
in forming human-grade cognition then it would seem that the body would 
similarly need to be artificially reproduced in order for the AI to attain the 
same level of cognition of humans.14
This research supports the view that AI units can and sometimes do 
unpredictable things (especially when incorporating the effects of the en­
vironment on cognition), which was the second objection raised in Section 
2.3.5.
The Fourth Objection to  AI
Another objection against artificial intelligence is quite simply that a com­
puter is not a brain. This objection was raised briefly in Section 2.3.5. The
14I should point out, though, that this does not mean that human cognition is superior 
to cognition that might manifest itself in a dynamical system with a different body type. 
It only means that to duplicate human-grade cognition it would probably be necessary to 
construct for the AI a body of human proportions and capabilities.
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objection against artificial intelligence follows that just because artificial in­
telligence imitates cognitive processes in the brain does not necessarily imply 
that they reflect human-grade cognition.
Proponents of strong AI would defend themselves by stating that if the ba­
sis for human intelligence and artificial intelligence is functionally equivalent, 
then for all intents and purposes they are the same (Hergenhahn 1992:549).
However, opponents to AI would argue that functionality is not enough 
to claim that two things are the same, for if this were true, then many 
phenomena in the natural world could be regarded erroneously as cognitive 
processes. An example of someone who holds this view is Searle (1980).
Searle (1980) demonstrates that a computer is not a brain — that is, 
a brain does not only manipulate symbols according to rules in the way a 
computer does — by proposing a thought experiment. In this thought ex­
periment, called the “Chinese Room” rebuttal, a man who does not know 
Chinese sits in a room where baskets of questions written in Chinese charac­
ters are slipped in and baskets of answers in Chinese characters are slipped 
out. The man in the box, even though he does not understand Chinese, has 
a rule book that tells the man what characters to put together in order to re­
spond to a question. That is, the rule book tells the man how to manipulate 
symbols. The man in the box, following the rules, then writes an answer on 
a piece of paper and slips it out of the room. The problem, however, is that 
the person in the room, who metaphorically represents the computer, does 
not actually understand the characters. He is simply passively following rules 
in the rule book, where the rule book metaphorically represents a computer 
program.
Searle’s (1980) main point is that outputting correct answers to ques­
tions by manipulating symbols according to rules does not mean that the
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computer understands Chinese. This is because to understand Chinese is 
to demonstrate some executive control over symbolic manipulation. Thus, 
demonstrating symbolic manipulation is not a strong enough condition for 
demonstrating that the computer has control over the way symbols are ma­
nipulated; that is, the mere fact that the computer can manipulate symbols 
does not imply understanding and, hence, human-grade cognition.
What Searle has to say about control over symbolic manipulation, or 
what he refers to as consciousness (Searle 1990:29), does impact cognition in 
a fundamental way and we must therefore address this issue. This is because 
Searle’s main point can be taken to be that just because something looks like 
cognition from the outside does not necessarily mean it is cognition. Being 
a weak functionalist is not enough for demonstrating cognition; rather, it is 
also the processes involved in generating cognition which are integral.
I agree with Searle on this point; however, in light of the fact that research 
has been tending to favor conceiving cognition as a dynamical system in 
which executive control (i.e. “the will”) is a property that emerges from 
dynamical systems, and is distributed in systems that form networks (see 
Sections 2.2.2 and 3.2.2), Searle’s objection does not have the same force as 
it did when Searle was arguing against the computational view of cognition. 
This is because Searle was really arguing against computationalists’ reliance 
on weak functionalism as support for computational cognition. Now that 
cognition is generally regarded to be a dynamical system, AI advocates use 
strong functionalism to support a dynamical view of cognition, which renders 
Searle’s objection ineffective. (Refer to Section 3.2.3, where I distinguish 
weak functionalism and strong functionalism.)
To demonstrate that Searle’s argument no longer carries weight against 
AI, let us consider another of Searle’s examples. Searle (1990:31) states that
165
a water molecule cannot be duplicated simply by building a model of a water 
molecule using ping-pong balls any more than cognition can be duplicated 
by a Chinese room (or a man in a Chinese room).
However, one argument as to why water cannot be duplicated using ping- 
pong balls is that three ping-pong balls glued together do not constitute the 
same molecular system as do two atoms of hydrogen and one of oxygen. Wa­
ter is a material phenomenon, not a strong functional phenomenon. Being 
a material phenomenon and therefore dependent on different types of mate­
rial, there will be no molecular forces acting between ping-pong balls as there 
are between the hydrogen and oxygen atoms since ping-pong balls constitute 
a different material type. Model and reality in this case are not the same 
in all respects. Therefore, Searle is correct about water and the ping-pong 
ball model of water being different, but this is because his analogy does not 
consider a functional phenomenon but rather a material phenomenon, which 
cognition is not.
What Searle fails to realize is that cognition, or more specifically the ca­
pacity to process information, is a holistic phenomenon that emerges from a 
system rather than from the individual parts that make up the system (e.g. 
water). Strong functional phenomena, such as cognition, do not require that 
the material constituents (e.g. biological neurons and artificial neurons) be 
the same between two dynamical systems generating cognition, only that the 
dynamical systems themselves that produce cognition are the same. Informa­
tion processing, because it is a functional phenomenon, transcends different 
types of material media. This has been shown in AI studies in which we can 
duplicate information processing of biological neural structures in artificial 
neural structures of completely different physical substrates — one of organic 
tissue, the other of silicon (Churchland and Sejnowski 1992:416-418).
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It was the dynamical system comprising the biological neural network that 
allowed an artificial neural network to be constructed (Churchland and Se­
jnowski 1992:416-418). The biological neural dynamical system was studied 
and mathematically described. Then the understanding of how the biological 
neural dynamical system worked was transferred to an artificial substrate. 
Once this was accomplished, it was possible to duplicate the biological neural 
dynamical system in silicon circuitry. Lazzaro and Mead (1989) and Mead 
(1989) created a synthetic retina and cochlea (part of the auditory cortex) 
based on what was known of the mathematical mechanics behind biological 
cognition. The substrate changed, but the fundamental mathematical prin­
ciples describing cognition remained unchanged. This has been tested many 
times and will therefore be taken to be an irrefutable point throughout the 
remainder of this thesis.
3.5 .1  A n  E valuation  o f  th e  C ogn itive R esearch
The picture that has been painted of cognition is that it is a substrate inde­
pendent phenomenon. With regards to notion of extended cognition discussed 
in Sections 2.4.4, 3.4.3, and 3.4.4, it might appear to the reader that by in­
cluding the individual in the definition of extended cognition that cognition 
is no longer substrate independent. This reasoning, however, would be incor­
rect. Cognition is still substrate independent; it just requires that it subsume 
another information processor that perceives it. In practice this ulterior in­
formation processor that is subsumed by cognition is a human individual, 
but in theory it may be any kind of information processor if we accept the 
arguments that have been made for AI.
Although the authors, whose work was discussed in Sections 2.4.4, 3.4.3, 
and 3.4.4, do not explicitly say so, the “individual” can theoretically con­
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stitute anything that is capable of perception. This is because dynamicists 
like the computationalists are functionalists and being functionalists suggests 
that the authors would not be opposed to the notion that humans, animals, 
and even AI could conceivably function as the “individual” in extended cogni­
tion. The fact that humans are utilized as the subjects of extended cognition 
studies (e.g. Clark and Chalmers 1998; Turvey and Carello 1995) has to do 
more with pragmatic reasons rather than reasons which owe to the unique­
ness of humans. A clear example of an author that is a major proponent of 
the fact that cognition is substrate independent yet utilizes humans in his 
case studies is Chalmers. Chalmers’ (1996) views of cognition are panpsychic 
in the sense that he proposes that cognition can arise potentially anywhere 
in nature. However Chalmers’ case studies predominantly entail the use of 
humans as his frame of reference (e.g. Clark and Chalmers 1998).
This discussion leads me to propose two essential ingredients in cognition: 
information processing and perception. The notion that cognition is informa­
tion processing began in the 1950s with Turing (1950) and it still remains the 
predominant framework to which cognitive scientists, as computationalists 
and dynamicists, adhere. What perception adds to information processing 
is a way for the subject to receive information and hence interact with the 
subject’s environment. It also provides the observer or analyst with a way 
to realize someone else’s or something’s cognitive capabilities.
Beliefs and memories are the products of information processing (van Dijk 
1998) and what perception adds to this is a way for the subject to receive 
the information needed to formulate these beliefs and form these memories. 
Perception is also important for the observer or analyst who studies cognition. 
This is because perception is the proof that an information processor being 
analyzed is connected with the rest of the world and has the potential to
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interact with it, feed off it, and change it. For example, without perception 
there is no evidence that the information processor in question can interact 
with the world like a human might. In short, the notion of perception is 
important, because it not only introduces the information processor to the 
world, but it provides cognitive scientists with a frame of reference with which 
to study cognition.
3.6 Conclusion: T he S tatus o f System s
In the research discussed above cognition is regarded to be a dynamical 
system rather than computation, and this means that models of dynamical 
systems are better than computational models at describing cognition in gen­
eral. This work supports an externalist view of cognition which encompasses 
both individual and environment in a unified or coupled, interactive system. 
It also supports a supra-individual view of cognition.
The term “computational,” as discussed above, means symbolic. It refers 
to the idea that cognition is algorithmic, consisting of a sequence of pro­
cedures that are engaged as soon as preceding procedures complete their 
tasks. The term comes from the manner in which computers operate, in a 
sequential, non-systemic manner.
In this chapter, it has been argued that cognition constitutes a dynamical 
system. The implication of this statement is far-reaching; if cognition consti­
tutes a dynamical system, then dynamical systems models used to describe 
natural cognitive systems are not just tools; cognition is actually embodied 
in the dynamical systems models used to describe the cognitive phenomenon. 
This rather compelling line of thought is interesting for the way that it con­
trasts with the way systems have been treated in the social sciences and
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especially in archaeology.
In recent years, systems have been relegated the status of simple tools 
used for describing behavioral causes and effects in the archaeological record 
(Shanks and Tilley 1992:118; James McGlade, personal communication 2000). 
The reason for the tendency to use systems in this way is simple: we can only 
systemically model what we can see. Hence, systems are primarily used for 
conceptualizing bounded, interacting phenomena such as subsistence prac­
tices, exchange, and other social phenomena that are manifested materially. 
In fact, the model I develop in this thesis is no exception because I sys­
temically model exchange in Chapter 6 . However, this does not mean that 
systemic modeling only illuminates the materially manifested behavior that 
is being studied (e.g. exchange, subsistence). Dynamical systems that are 
modeled can constitute natural cognitive systems — like those described in 
Port and van Gelder (1995) (e.g. Turvey and Carello [1995]) — that the past 
people being modeled were perceiving. This means that the systems which 
archaeologists as outsiders are conceptualizing are not necessarily etic tools 
that are being forced on the ancient peoples being modeled; the systems that 
are being conceptualized may be actual windows into past people’s minds. I 
pursue this line of thought in Chapters 7 and 8 .
Despite the widespread formal use of systems theory in archaeological 
research (Clarke 1978; Renfrew and Cooke 1979; Renfrew, Rowlands, and 
Segraves 1982; Lake 1995, 2001; Abramiuk 1999b), the full potential that 
systems theory has in store for archaeology, particularly for cognitive archae­
ology (Renfrew and Zubrow 1994; Renfrew and Scarre 1998), has not been 
exhausted. Archaeologists using systems may have examined how cognition 
affects subsistence and exchange (e.g. Flannery and Marcus 1976), but not 
how subsistence and trade effect cognition. Research into this latter issue
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would have a great deal of application for archaeologists, and I propose that 
dynamical systems theory plays an important role in such research.
Prom the late 1970s onward, many archaeologists concerned with cogni­
tion turned their backs on systems or relegated them to the status of tools, 
believing systems held no promise for providing insight into the “thoughts” 
of past peoples (Johnson 1999:90). Archaeologists were swayed in the direc­
tion of symbolism as a means of illuminating cognition in the archaeological 
record (Hodder 1982; Shanks and Tilley 1987). A symbolic approach, how­
ever, is a computational way of conceptualizing cognition. The symbolic 
view, which has been the cognitive post-processual way of analyzing mate­
rial culture (Hodder 1982), perceives cognition as analogical chains, which is 
precisely what is involved in computation.
The computational approach still remains a fruitful way of explaining 
many cognitive phenomena, and it provides a useful paradigmatic lens with 
which to view cognition. However, this likely has to do with the fact that 
it is easier to conceptualize a sequence of events rather than a simultaneity 
of events operating as a dynamical system. The problem with any symbolic 
approach to cognition is that it abstracts the phenomenon studied from its 
original context in real time, thereby detaching the phenomenon from the 
process by which it was created. Dynamical systems provide a more concep­
tually pure and accurate depiction of cognition than computation does.
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Part II
The Economic Approach and 
the M odel o f Exchange Along 
the Bladen Branch
172
Chapter 4 
The Basis for an Economic 
Approach to  Classic Maya 
Exchange
In the last chapter, and indeed throughout the first part of the thesis, I fo­
cused on different conceptions of cognition. In this chapter, I will temporarily 
turn away from cognition to concentrate on theoretical issues in economic ar­
chaeology which are pertinent to my investigation of Classic Maya ground 
stone exchange in the Bladen region of the Maya Mountains of southern 
Belize. The reason for investigating a case study of exchange in a thesis ded­
icated to cognition is that the process of exchange can be shown to exhibit 
features which constitute it as supra-individual cognition.
Harkening back to the title of this thesis, it was suggested that an “eco­
nomic approach” to Classic Maya ground stone exchange would be discussed 
and from this would emerge certain “cognitive implications” . I did not broach 
the topic of economics because I believed that providing a background in cog­
nition was essential before I began illustrating how cognition could emerge
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from economic exchange. It is now appropriate that the economic approach 
I take to study Classic Maya exchange be discussed in detail.
In Chapter 6 , I will construct a model of Classic Maya ground stone 
exchange in the Bladen region. However, in order to construct a model of 
exchange it is necessary to discuss the economic premises on which I base 
my model. These premises form the economic approach I utilize to model 
Classic Maya ground stone exchange in the next chapter. The purpose of 
this chapter is to situate the economic approach I utilize in its theoretical 
context.
4.1 Econom ic A nthropology/A rchaeology
Economic theory in anthropology and archaeology has passed through several 
theoretical turning points. In this section, I briefly discuss these theoretical 
perspectives and how they relate to my outlook on economic theory and how 
they can be used for modeling exchange in the Maya Mountains during the 
Late and Terminal Classic period.
Two of the most important economic theories are formalism and substan- 
tivism (Polanyi 1957:243). Formalism is the notion that modern “western” 
economic theories can be used to understand the economic aspects of ancient 
or “non-western” societies. Substantivism is the notion that the premises 
upon which modern western societies are based are not present in ancient 
or “non-western” societies; therefore, modern economic models with their 
assumptions are inapplicable to ancient society or indeed to any non-western 
society.
It is important to remember that, as with many theories in anthropology, 
the theory that is advocated is dependent upon what kind of phenomenon is
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being studied as well as the scale of the investigator’s analysis (i.e. individuals 
versus large groups of people). Another important thing to remember is that 
although formalism and substantivism are theoretical views that are often 
pitted against each other, they can nevertheless be regarded as occupying 
opposite ends of the same economic theoretical continuum. I will discuss this 
continuum next, beginning with the strongest varieties of the substantive and 
formal approaches at the ends of this continuum.
4.1 .1  S ub stantive E conom ics
Substantivism was introduced in the 1950s and 60s by Karl Polanyi (Polanyi 
1957). Polanyi envisioned three kinds of economies, two of which were sub­
stantive and one of which was formal. Formal economy, also known as western 
industrial capitalism, is subject to a completely different analysis and will 
be discussed in its own section. Substantive economies, on the other hand, 
consist of reciprocity, a form of exchange that is prevalent in band and tribal 
society, and redistribution, a form of exchange which is common in chiefdom 
society (Sahlins 1968:93-95). The notion of substantivism is best defined in 
Polanyi’s own words:
“The substantive meaning of economic derives from man’s de­
pendence for his living upon nature and his fellows. It refers to 
the interchange with his natural and social environment, in so far 
as this results in supplying him with the means of material want 
satisfaction” (Polanyi 1957:243).
In this excerpt, Polanyi stresses that economics in the substantive view is 
first and foremost social. “Man” and what he has in his material possession 
is dependent on other people and on his environment. In other words, a
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characteristic of the substantive approach is that the individual plays little 
or no role in the overall economic phenomenon (Hopkins 1957:294-295). An 
individual’s will, wants, and desires are subsidiary to the encompassing social 
and environmental context subsuming the individual. This does not neces­
sarily mean that the substantivist denies the existence of individual will, but 
rather that individual will is not the focus of analysis for the substantivist, 
who instead is more concerned with grander scaled phenomena involving 
communities of individuals.
A second point that Polanyi emphasizes is that there is an “interchange” 
between people and their environment. Polanyi envisions relationships be­
tween people and between people and their environment as being responsible 
for what each member of the society actually has in his or her material posses­
sion. As a result, any profit-making is a byproduct of what people really do, 
which is to contribute to society and maintain the social system .1 The notion 
of a system in Polanyi’s substantive economic approach is therefore essential 
to understanding how particular economies evolve. It can be inferred from 
Polanyi that because the economic situation in which people find themselves 
is directly linked to their social and environmental state, an understanding 
of an individual’s economic state is explicable through the states of the social 
or environmental system being considered. As I discussed in Section 3.4.2 
with regards to the work of Chalmers (1996), this explanation is referred to 
as a reductive functional explanation and is one of the most powerful means
1 Note, the way that system  is used here is not unlike the way dynamical system  is 
defined in the Glossary. As such, the terms “system” and “dynamical system” will be 
used, for all intents and purposes, synonymously in this chapter. What is implicit in the 
way substantivists and indeed in the way macroeconomists use the term “system” is that 
the “system” is generally regarded to be stable, which is not assumed in dynamical systems 
theory.
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of explanation and for this reason is popular in the sciences.2
In the substantivist view, people do things in order to maintain a eco­
nomic system. The system exists as an a priori assumption set out by the 
substantive economic analyst and the analyst proceeds as if the system, or 
more accurately the constraints that give structure to the system, exist as 
tangible factors that are perceptible by the people in the system. This is 
interesting and important because the substantivists endow the system with 
an established existence in a manner analogous to the way that dynami­
cal systems advocates treat cognition (recall the discussion of Turvey and 
Carello [1995] in Section 3.4.4). This is a critical point because the cogni­
tive/dynamical systems school of thought, which van Gelder and Porter and 
Turvey and Carello (1995) advocate, is in a way supporting empirically what 
the substantivists have been assuming — which is that economic systems 
are not just “mind-models” for the analyst (i.e. etic), but may actually be 
“mind-models” for the people that the analyst is studying (i.e. emic).3 In 
other words, some substantive models may in fact describe cognitive systems 
for the people involved in the economic system that the analyst is modeling. 
With more research on cognitive/dynamical systems, the assertion that an­
cient or non-western peoples maintain a “system”, may be supported with 
empirical evidence.
2Substantive economics is usually associated with macroeconomic theory, which con­
trasts with the traditional economic theory laid out in Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, 
first published in 1776. The reason for the contrast is that macroeconomic theory deals 
with systems of large groups of people and their total economic output (Schneider 1974:43), 
such as an entire nation’s Gross Domestic Product (GPD). They do not deal with an 
individual’s motives and incentives, which comprises much of the subject matter for mi­
croeconomists.
3The term “mind-model” is taken from Clarke (1978:45).
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However even with the empirical evidence, substantivism’s reliance on an 
unproven hypothesized system cannot altogether be regarded as an assertion. 
It is substantiated in at least one respect, and that is with regard to the 
system’s states. The system’s states, whether they are in terms of the number 
of goats, people, or the amount of hard currency, are real entities that exist 
for the people being studied by the substantive economist as much as they are 
external indices for the substantive analyst. As such, the people being studied 
probably are aware of the external indices that are used by the analyst. In 
other words, it can be inferred that people in general are attuned to external 
indices reflecting the states in the economic systems that substantivists model 
(Hopkins 1957:294-295), though it is unclear whether or not the people are 
attuned to the constraints that structure the system .4 The states of the 
system, if the reader recalls Section 3.2.1, are the variable features of the 
dynamical system, whereas the constraints of the system are those features 
of the dynamical system that remain constant.
The assumption that people work in order to maintain a system suggests 
that Polanyi also assumed the system to be a stable one in which people 
worked together in order to effect an equilibrium. However, as we have seen in 
Chapter 3, there are unstable systems as well as stable systems and, as such, 
it should not necessarily be assumed that a system is automatically stable. 
This is because the analyst usually does not know beforehand whether the 
system is going to be stable or unstable until after the model of the system 
is constructed and rigorously examined through mathematical analysis.
4Recall that Turvey and Carello’s (1995) work showed that people were attuned to 
the constraints of the dynamical system described by the parameters that structured the 
system.
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4.1 .2  Form al E conom ics
Polanyi contrasts the substantivist approach to the formalist approach in the 
following way:
“The formal meaning of economic derives from the logical char­
acter of the means-end relationship, as apparent in such words 
as ‘economical’ or ‘economizing’. It refers to a definite situation 
of choice, namely, that between the different uses of means in­
duced by an insufficiency of those means. If we call the rules 
governing choice of means the logic of rational action, then we 
may denote this variant of logic, with an improvised term , as 
formal economics.
The two root meanings of ‘economic,’ the substantive and the 
formal, have nothing in common. The latter derives from logic, 
the former from fact. The formal meaning implies a set of rules 
referring to choice between alternative uses of insufficient means.
The substantive meaning implies neither choice nor insufficiency 
of means” (Polanyi 1957:243).
Formalism is mostly concerned with how an individual acquires or pur­
chases an item, how an individual chooses between one item and another 
item. In order to analyze people’s choices in this way, however, the formalist 
must generalize about the nature of the individual. Individuals are said only 
to be concerned with getting the best quality for the least cost and as such 
they are often regarded as completely rational economic beings. In capital­
ist economy, people are regarded as selfish and self-serving. This contrasts 
sharply with view that substantivists take, which is that individuals serve 
the whole.
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To the formalist, the individual is “real” and society is “imaginary”. But 
is the manner in which the individual is constructed “real”? It seems that 
formalists are doing the exact same thing with regards to the individual as the 
substantivists are doing with society. On one hand, the formalist is correct 
to claim to study a “real” thing; an individual can be seen and felt. On the 
other hand, it seems as if the individual being considered is imaginary, since 
the formalist is really studying the “rationality” of the individual rather than 
a “flesh and blood” individual.
Formalism is mostly concerned with the logic of the economic argument, 
rather than with whether or not the precepts substantiating the formalist 
argument are correct (e.g. Knight 1941).5 In other words, the formalist 
does not usually conduct a statistical survey of how people actually choose 
to do things. They are, for the most part, unconcerned with the psychology 
of the individuals or the social behavior of the groups of people that they 
are studying. Rather, they are concerned with the logic of the argument 
that follows from the assumptions made about the rationality of individuals. 
Formalists are concerned with the logic of the argument and the conclusions 
that the assumptions bring, not the assumptions themselves. This would be 
sacrilege for the substantivist who is mostly concerned about the assumptions 
behind the chain of logic. It is for this reason that formalism is regarded as 
a theory building approach whereas substantivism is not.
5Schneider (1974:26) notes that Levi-Strauss’s (1963) approach to anthropology is anal­
ogous to the formalist approach to economics. It is an approach which begins with certain 
premises and builds up logically from the premises. In so doing, the formalist approach 
sometimes encountering unexpected results, which is essentially how theory is formed.
180
Theory Building Through D eduction in Formalism
The notion of theory building is essential to this thesis, since the overall 
enterprise of this thesis is to take the first steps toward “building theory” re­
garding our understanding of human cognition. Building theory is also what 
sets formalism apart from substantivism, a distinction which is integral in 
understanding where my economic approach is situated theoretically. There­
fore, an understanding of what constitutes theory building in economics and 
indeed in other fields (e.g. cognitive sciences) is necessary. To explain what 
is meant by “theory building”, I turn to Schneider’s (1974:22-30) discus­
sion of the debate between Herskovits and Knight, published by Herskovits 
(1952:508-531).
Herskovits (1940) believed that classical economic theory was inapplicable 
almost everywhere outside of modern western society, since it conceives of 
an individual who is economic in all respects. Knight did not deny that 
classical economic theory had this conception of the individual; however, in 
defense of classical economics, Knight stated that the reason that the notion 
of the “economic individual” is used is that formal classical economic theory 
is deductive whereas Herskovits’s anthropological approach is inductive.
Knight explained that the formal deductive approach was based on so- 
called “universal” characteristics of individuals, whereas the inductive ap­
proach (soon to be substantivist approach) was based on ethnographic data. 
Knight claimed that the problem with the substantive approach is that it re­
lies too heavily on getting the assumptive facts straight and not as heavily on 
building theory about humankind. In this sense, Knight’s formal deductive 
approach generalizes about human nature but it makes up for this general­
ization by making significant steps in understanding the universal aspects of 
human economic behavior.
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All that is required of the formalist approach, according to Knight, is 
a common-sense knowledge of the premises since the rest of the approach 
entails formulating a sequence of logical if-then statements, which have the 
purpose of shedding light on some aspect of human nature above and beyond 
the initial assumptions that the formal analyst started off with. This is what 
the formal deductive approach entails and what theory building is all about. 
Substantivism does not have this capacity because it is involved with the 
particularities of the premises and thus does not see the larger picture of 
the universal aspects of human economic behavior. In this sense, the formal 
approach could be regarded as one that generates a coarse-grained (general) 
picture depicting a large scope. In contrast, the substantive approach could 
be regarded as an approach that generates a fine-grained (particularistic) 
picture depicting a very small scope.
Though Herskovits and possibly Knight would disagree, ultimately both 
are valid approaches that depend on the analyst’s objective. If the objective 
of the analysis is to provide depth and theory, then it would surely be in the 
interest of the analyst to utilize the formal approach. If on the other hand the 
analyst is more concerned with detail and making specific observations, then 
it would probably be in the interest of the analyst to adopt a substantivist 
approach. Because the formal approach covers a broader area of study, the 
analyst is usually less discriminatory than a substantivist would be. That 
is, because the substantive approach is particularistic it requires the analyst 
to discriminate one set of data from another in order to probe the particular 
aspects of phenomenon the analyst is studying. In this sense, both formal 
and substantive approaches are important explanatory tools; it is just that 
the formal approach can be regarded as a tool for comparing data, and the 
substantivist approach is a tool for contrasting data.
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In short, Knight concedes Herskovits;s point that more attention should 
be placed on the particularities of the assumptions the formalist begins with, 
but that is as far as he goes. Knight insists that advocating false principles 
is shoddier than advocating false facts, maintaining that economics is a the­
oretical not a descriptive science (Schneider 1974:23). Schneider (1974:23) 
illustrates Knight’s defense with an example. Schneider contends that the 
formal economic approach is analogous to one in which a theoretical physicist 
takes in constructing a general theory of matter. In order to build such a 
theory, a theoretical physicist might need to introduce imaginary substances 
or worlds. Such theorizing, according to Schneider, is a useful exercise, since 
it might illuminate areas of physics that are currently unobservable, yet are 
essential for proposing ways of understanding the manner in which our uni­
verse operates (like hypothesized particles, such as tachyons, in subatomic 
physics).
4 .1 .3  Shades o f Form alism
As I mentioned in the beginning, substantive and formal economic approaches 
occupy opposite ends of a continuum, and there are several researchers (e.g. 
Nash 1961; Malinowski 1984; Firth 1964; Cook 1966; Goodfellow 1939; 
LeClair 1962; Barth 1967; Belshaw 1968; Salisbury 1969) who incorporate as­
pects of both approaches in their views. These researchers, Schneider (1974) 
recognizes, can be regarded as formalists who adhere to certain aspects which 
are substantive in nature. As a result, these formalist views may have more 
differences between them than they have differences with substantive eco­
nomics. These different formalist views comprise the formalist social anthro­
pological view, the materialist economic anthropological view, and the social 
exchange view (Schneider 1974:9-21).
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Formal Social Anthropology
Formal social anthropology, which has been espoused by Nash (1961), Ma­
linowski (1984), and Firth (1964), is stringently adherent to the view that 
the social dominates economics. This formalist school is closest to the sub­
stantivist end of the continuum, and this is especially apparent in the ethno­
graphic writings of Malinowski. According to Malinowski (1984), exchange 
among the Trobrianders, specifically the Kula exchange phenomenon, escapes 
a purely formalist explanation.
The Kula exchange system is system of exchange that encompasses a 
group of several islands and entails the exchange of necklaces for bracelets 
and bracelets for necklaces. The bracelets are traded in one direction while 
the necklaces are traded in another. The resulting phenomenon constitutes 
two movements — bracelets on one hand and necklaces on the other in 
opposite directions. Since the islanders frown upon any Kula participant 
hoarding items, it seemed to Malinowski (1984) tha t no purely formalist 
model emphasizing a self-serving individual — could adequately explain 
Kula exchange. This is because for Malinowski, the Kula participants did 
not appear to be exchanging their goods to make a profit.
It can be argued, however, that some necklaces or bracelets do come with 
stories of important people that had owned the items in the past. Thus, 
owning one of these items that someone important had owned gives the 
temporary owner something to boast about among the temporary owner’s 
peers. But why, then, do the owners give up their trophies after a certain 
length of time?
To an economic anthropologist this could mean one of several things. One 
is that prestige and the stories that an owner gains from the items have an 
expiration date. That is, the owner eventually becomes bored with the Kula
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item and is more than willing to give up his trophy when the time comes. 
The second is that there are many Kula items with interesting stories and 
therefore it is not difficult to give up an item in possession even if it is a 
significant trophy. The third is that selflessness is a virtue that is highly 
respected in Trobriander society and it is this selflessness that could be the 
reward for participating in the Kula exchange system. In this latter scenario, 
being selfless is not so altruistic after all, but rather profit-seeking. The last 
possibility is that the Kula exchange system is a means by which people come 
together to socialize, in which case the act of exchange could be interpreted 
as one which is directed at maintaining social bonds by having stories to tell. 
It is this latter interpretation that Malinowski advocated, and as such he 
remained a staunch advocate of the fact that Kula exchange served a specific 
social function.
Other social anthropologists are considerably more formalist than Mali­
nowski. They propose that exchange and other economic phenomena can be 
subject to more formal scrutiny because self-serving incentives for economic 
behavior can be found in nearly all if not all cultures. It is this key element 
that separates these authors from the substantivists. Their outlook, however, 
is unique in that they do not regard economics as a way of studying human 
behavior at all. Rather, they see economics as a type of behavior. In other 
words, economic behavior is just one kind of social behavior. The social in 
this scenario plays a central role in that it is regarded as determining the 
economic behavior of people. In a way, the formal social anthropological 
view can be considered to be a social deterministic theory (in contrast to the 
economic determinism of Marx). To formal social anthropologists, economic 
behavior and social behavior are distinct phenomena, the former of which 
is subordinate to the latter. If conceived of in a systemic paradigm, society
185
constitutes the system and economics forms a subsystem.
Since society dictates or determines economic behavior, it should stand 
to reason that even modern western society is designed in such a way as to 
enable the fostering of selfish profit-seeking individuals (Schneider 1974:13). 
In fact, that is exactly what a formal social anthropologist would concede. 
Since society determines the economic behavior of individuals, it is logical 
to suppose that capitalism is not a parasite attached to the belly of modern 
western society; rather, capitalism is more like an appendage that has evolved 
naturally as a consequence of the way modern western society is structured. 
Each society therefore breeds its own unique individuals with their own way 
of being “economically minded” .
M aterialist Economic Anthropology
According to Schneider (1974:14-17), the materialist economic anthropolo­
gists (Cook 1966; Goodfellow 1939; LeClair 1962) advocate a view that most 
closely resembles a classical economic view of society. Most of the anthro­
pological advocates of this view have a strong training in economics. They 
believe that classical economic theory can be applied cross-culturally and, 
undoubtedly, cross-temporally. This mode of thought is truer to the formal­
ist attitude on economic behavior than the social anthropological mode of 
thought.
Materialist economic anthropologists assert tha t economic behavior is dis­
tinct from social behavior. Unlike the social anthropologists, the materialists 
propose that an analyst can actually approach different societies from a clas­
sical economic standpoint, as long as certain modifications are made that are 
specific to the society being modeled. The materialists, in other words, are 
not insensitive to the differences between societies; nor are they ignorant of
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the fact that some aspects of societies are difficult to explain through clas­
sical economic theory. These aspects are namely the nonmaterial aspects of 
society — aspects that are difficult to measure.
Although the materialists accede that it is difficult to formally model 
nonmaterial phenomena, this by no means implies that it is impossible to 
formally model nonmaterial phenomena. The formal modeling of nonmate­
rial phenomena, however, entails that certain modifications be made in the 
manner in which classical economic theory is applied in these instances. And 
rather than focus on the modeling of nonmaterial phenomena and the asso­
ciated changes that would accompany such modeling, the materialists prefer 
to focus on the material aspects of society because these aspects can be eas­
ily quantified. Indeed services can be quantified and subjected to economic 
scrutiny as long as there is an observable characteristic associated with the 
entity being modeled.
Though materialists claim that nonmaterial aspects of society can be 
subjected to economic analysis, few materialists, if any, actually succeed at 
modeling these nonmaterial aspects. The materialist methodology is similar 
to the classic sociological methodology that Durkheim (1933:64) espoused 
many decades ago. This consisted of his utilization of an external index to 
show that something is happening within society. According to this method­
ology, proper sociological practice requires that:
1. The analyst focus on a phenomenon in society that the analyst wants 
to explore.
2. The analyst choose a physical or material feature that best reflects the 
social phenomenon.
3. The analyst study the dynamics of the external index under the as-
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sumption that the social phenomenon is manifested in the external 
index.
In this way, a study of the external index functions as a window for 
viewing the inner workings of society. Durkheim (1952), for example, used 
this methodology in Suicide. The phenomenon that Durkheim was interested 
in illuminating was the notion of suicide in society, and one of the external 
indices that Durkheim used to support his theory of suicide is the number 
of cases of deaths by one’s own hand (1952). Similar to this, the materialist 
economic anthropologist studies the social phenomenon that he or she is 
interested in studying through some number of objects.
The main difference between social anthropologists and materialists is the 
difference between how they regard social and economic phenomena, and this 
in turn affects what each school proposes can be illuminated with an eco­
nomic approach. Social anthropologists take the view that social phenomena 
cannot be studied economically because social behavior subsumes economic 
behavior and, as such, an economic approach is ill-equipped to shed light 
on the more general and encompassing society. Materialists, on the other 
hand, do not accept the premises established by social anthropologists. The 
materialists, from the very beginning, deny that economic behavior is sub­
servient to or subsumed by social behavior; that is, the materialists do not 
consider the economic realm to be contained within the social realm. As 
such, the materialists cannot be accused of being reductive; and therefore 
shedding light on social matters via an economic approach, according to the 
materialists, is possible.
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Social Exchange
Social exchange advocates, such as Barth (1967), Belshaw (1968), and Salis­
bury (1969) take the materialist thesis one step further than the materialist 
economic anthropologists do (Schneider 1974:17-18). Whereas the material­
ists propose that material and probably nonmaterial products can be treated 
with a formal economic approach, the social exchange anthropologists are 
adamant that nonmaterial can be treated formally with economic theory 
because economic behavior governs social behavior. In other words, social 
behavior is social exchange. Most if not all social behavior, claim the social 
exchange theorists, is economic at its core regardless of the appearances.
Altruism in economic transactions does not exist, regardless of appear­
ances. This notion is structuralist in that it claims that there exists a core 
of very basic rules operating beneath the veneer of what we take to be one’s 
demeanor. For example, an individual in a given society may appear to be 
completely selfless as he gives his goat to his neighbor. But beneath this act, 
the social exchange theorists propose that there is a profit-motivated incen­
tive to the act. This profit-seeking incentive has only to be identified, which 
in many cases is not easy. In some cases, it seems that individuals cover up 
selfish characteristics in order to make themselves look good personally. In 
other cases, it appears to be a custom and therefore a social characteristic 
to hide one’s selfish side.
According to social exchange theorists, the reason th a t the social anthro­
pologists see economic behavior in the context of social behavior is because 
social behavior is all that is seen in many instances. When the anthropologist 
observes people, the anthropologist is observing the visible aspects of human 
life, such as the customs. In this situation, the social exchange advocates 
would say that the social anthropologists have been misled into believing
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that the social is determining the economic because it is all that is observed. 
According to the social exchange theorists, if one was to look beyond or be­
neath the social, one would irrevocably come to the conclusion that there 
exists in every social act an economic motive. This economic motive, like 
Radcliffe-Brown’s (1957:131) principle of justice, is a universal law of equiva­
lent returns. It simply states that anything that ego gives to alter is returned 
to ego according to some function of what was given. In other words, nothing 
is given without receiving something in return, whatever that “something in 
return” is.
The social anthropologist sees only what is given, whereas the social ex­
change advocate sees both what is given and what is returned. The unde­
niable conclusion for the social exchange theorist is that society is built on 
exchange and therefore on economic motives.
4.1 .4  T he K ind o f E conom ic A pproach Taken H ere
Next, I will describe the economic approach that I will take in modeling 
my case study of Classic Maya exchange and situate it theoretically in the 
context of what was just discussed.
The approach that I will take is economic in all senses of the word “eco­
nomic” . As has been discussed, there are two prevailing economic approaches 
in anthropology and archaeology: substantive and formal. Both views con­
trast significantly, yet they both can be regarded as economic approaches. 
The approach I take in modeling my case study of ground stone exchange 
in the Maya Mountains — specifically the exchange behind the movement 
of manos and metates along the Bladen Branch — is essentially formal; 
however, the approach does have some substantivist characteristics, which I 
discuss below.
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My approach to modeling the exchange of ground stone tools among the 
Maya Mountains communities utilizes two formal economic concepts:
1. The model is mathematical. It uses logical symbols, such as variables 
and parameters to denote states and constraints, and the purpose of the 
model is to determine the frequency of ground stone implements per 
household at each of the sites (i.e. demand). To be precise, the variable 
(fluctuating quantity) in the model will represent the number of ground 
stone implements per household, whereas the parameters (constants) 
in the model will denote the magnitudes of growth and interaction.
2. The model is based on the notion that demand for manos and metates 
indirectly generates a supply for the manos and metates. I use the term 
indirectly since there are of course other considerations such as how the 
use-value of manos and metates compares with the use-values of other 
goods that could be obtained in the marketplace.
There are aspects of the approach that I use, however, that can be con­
sidered to be substantive:
1. The mathematical model tha t I construct is adapted from macroeco­
nomics and, as such, it is flexible and can therefore be tailored to practi­
cally any economy. This is because macroeconomic models incorporate 
statistics from the economies that they model (Schneider 1974:43). In 
other words, macroeconomic models can be fitted to a given economy 
by utilizing information from the specific economy being studied — in 
my case Classic Maya exchange — and adjusting the model to fit the 
specifics of the economy. The economic model therefore is inductive in
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nature.6
2. The model I construct depicts the economic behavior of an entire so­
ciety as a system. However, unlike the substantivists, who envision 
the social or economic system as something needing to be maintained 
(in equilibrium) by the members of that society, I make no a priori 
assumptions as to the system’s stability.
To conclude this discussion, I will simply state that the economic ap­
proach I take in modeling Classic Maya exchange in the Maya Mountains 
is formal with some substantive characteristics. In other words, while my 
method is formal with regards to its mathematical foundation and its notion 
of supply and demand, the model is substantive, since it is tailored to the 
specific case of ground stone exchange in the Maya Mountains.
In addition to my economic approach being closer to the formal end of the 
continuum than the substantive end of the continuum, the entire enterprise of 
this thesis in which I demonstrate the cognitive implications of the approach 
is deductive. The deductive aspect of my thesis becomes clear in Chapters 7 
and 8.
4.2 C lassic M aya Low land E xchange
Classic Maya lowland exchange is generally divided into four cross-cutting 
categories of exchange: exchange of utilitarian goods, exchange of non­
utilitarian goods, regional exchange, and long-distance exchange (Sharer 
1994:452-453).
6My statistics come from the archaeological record as well as from previous research 
into how the ancient Maya exchanged goods.
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In past Maya archaeological research, it was often the case that most 
goods traded in the lowlands, whether utilitarian or non-utilitarian, were re­
garded as having come from the highlands to the west or from the Caribbean 
coast to the east (Rathje 1973). Prom the highlands it was possible to obtain 
hard stone materials for making stone tools such as manos and metates for 
the grinding of seeds and grains into flour, and obsidian for the manufactur­
ing of blades. Prom the coast it was possible to reap the benefits that the sea 
had to offer such as salt and dyes that can be made out of certain mollusks.
In either case, most goods appeared to have come from afar, leading 
Rathje (1973) to propose that the Maya lowlands were a resource deficient 
zone. In this model, select sites in the lowlands would have functioned as the 
recipients of long-distance trade and as redistribution centers; goods that 
were sent to the redistribution centers would have then trickled down to 
satellite sites around the redistribution centers. Such a model would have 
left little reason for the smaller sites around the redistribution centers to 
interact with each other as far as goods were exchanged.
Much work since then has shown this model to be inadequate due to the 
realization that the lowlands is not as geologically, zoologically, or botanically 
homogeneous as previously believed (Graham 1987; Shipley and Graham 
1987; Dunham et al 1992-2000; Abramiuk 2002, 2003). One such geologically 
and biologically diverse region in the lowlands is the Maya Mountains, which 
contain distinct minerals and biota that were important in the manufacturing 
of goods for trade.
The picture now painted is that products exchanged in the Classic pe­
riod could have had their origins in the lowlands as well as the highlands 
and this has direct effects on how we conceive of exchange. No longer are 
the sites surrounding the redistribution center, portrayed in Rathje’s (1973)
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model, dependent on the center for exchange. Sites surrounding the re­
distribution centers were also involved in their own regional exchange that 
supplied individuals with goods and services, which was largely independent 
of the overarching center (McAnany 1991:282-283; Graham 1994; Abramiuk 
2002, 2003).
Such a model would be consistent with the ethnohistoric data from areas 
outside the lowlands, namely the Quiche Maya of highland Guatemala (Car­
mack 1981:153-154) and the Aztecs of central Mexico (Smith 2003:106-112). 
Though there were undoubtedly direct dealings between producers and buy­
ers, much exchange conducted by the Quiche Maya and Aztec was held in 
markets, which were largely independent of state control (Carmack 1981:154; 
Smith 2003:123). Though archaeologically it is difficult to recognize market 
places that would have functioned as the centers of economic life for the an­
cient Maya (Sharer 1994:456), Classic Maya market places for at least some 
trade goods have been identified (Blanton et al 1993:182).
For the Aztecs and the people of the empire, exchange was conducted 
by part-time traders/farmers and by full-time merchants and the state was 
only involved in settling disputes that might arise in market dealings (Smith 
2003:106-112). Like Aztec exchange, Quiche Maya exchange was also con­
ducted by full-time and part-time merchants. Full-time merchants were a 
class of individuals wedged between a stratum of lords who occupied a higher 
position and a stratum of vassals (commoners) who occupied a lower posi­
tion in the social hierarchy, whereas the part-time merchants were commoners 
(Carmack 1981:153-154).
The Quiche exchange system was more regulated than the Aztec exchange 
system. For example, Quiche warriors guarded access into and out of their 
cities (Carmack 1981:196-198) and probably charged tribute for using the
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roads and market places (Carmack 1981:153). Whatever the case may have 
been, it is quite certain that many of the merchants that traded in the markets 
paid tribute to lords in the towns and cities that the merchants traded in. 
In return, the lord would provide the merchant with room and board for the 
length of the merchant’s stay. The merchant was also obliged to pay tribute 
to certain lords in the town or city from which the merchant came. In both 
cases, this tribute acted as a tax of sorts, which benefited the elite in the 
merchant’s home community and in the merchant’s destination community. 
In this way, all levels of society benefited from exchange: the commoners who 
exchanged items in the marketplace with the full-time or part-time merchant, 
and the elite who were paid tribute by the merchant outside of the market 
setting.
Prom the ethnohistoric evidence it is highly suggestive that merchants 
frequently had direct involvement with their buyers, whether it was paying 
tribute to the lord of a community or selling something at the market with a 
commoner. This suggests a kind of freedom or entrepreneurship that could 
be granted to the merchant without the pressure of an overarching political 
obligation. The merchant in both situations was not obliged to take his or 
her goods to a specific market; the incentive appeared to come from the 
merchant himself.
As was mentioned above, being a merchant was not necessarily a full­
time job and with regard to inter-community commerce among communities 
within a few kilometers of each other, it was very likely that commoner house­
holds did much of the manufacturing and selling of their own products (Car­
mack 1981:154). These commoners, or vassals as Carmack (1981:148-150) 
calls them, paid tribute to the lords on whose land they lived. Commoners, 
however, were free to engage in many activities as long as they paid tribute
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to their lords both in terms of subsistence and goods that would have been 
obtained at the local markets. A commoner’s main concern was working the 
fields and any other activities, such as production and exchange of goods, 
had to be done in the commoner’s spare time away from the fields. For the 
Quiche Maya (Carmack 1981:154), the commoner class was undoubtedly re­
sponsible for much of local trade, whereas full-time merchants were involved 
in long-distance ventures.
4.2.1 T h e Formal A pproach to  E xchange
In the most general sense, exchange is the process in which one gives some­
thing and in return for giving, one receives something. For both actors 
involved in the transaction, it is assumed that the motivation behind the 
exchange is to be “better off’ in one form or another for having done the 
transaction. This could mean that one gains a quilt while losing a projectile 
point, or it could mean that one gains the right to open a stall in the market 
place while losing certain goods or services through tribute. It can even be 
argued that gift-giving is the expectation that the giver will be given a gift 
some time in the future in the form of a material object or a service (Mauss 
1990:73-76). At the time that the transaction is being conducted, there is, 
behind the transaction, the notion that one is getting something for giving 
something. Classic Maya exchange, from what has been described above, 
seems to be motivated by this concept.
I would agree with the substantivists that the motivation behind exchange 
is not necessarily conducted for material gain as it is usually taken to be in 
modern western society, but there is at least a non-material or qualitative 
gain from the economic transaction. Such a definition of exchange could 
subsume even the substantive claim that exchange is conducted for the sake
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of maintaining the social system. In this sense, the gain could even be a 
conversation with someone, which was certainly true of the Aztecs (Smith 
2003:111-112).
4.2 .2  T h e Form ing o f B onds Through E xchange for th e  
C lassic M aya
In view of the proposal that exchange is an opportunity to gain some­
thing, the Classic Maya merchant would have exchanged through two means: 
through communication between the buyer and seller and the through the 
intrinsic properties of the good. They are not separate means but two means 
that work together. This is consistent with Renfrew’s (1984:103-105) obser­
vations.
The bond created between seller and buyer greatly facilitates the seller 
and, in many cases, the seller’s community in gaining a reputation for the 
individual or the community, respectively. This reputation, in turn, facili­
tates the production of goods since there will be more demand for the goods. 
During the act of exchange, the buyer recognizes and identifies the seller and, 
through association, the seller’s community (assuming the good comes from 
the seller’s community) as the source of the good that the buyer is buying. 
Such recognition and identification functions as a social-economic bond be­
tween the buyer and the seller if the buyer likes the good that the seller has 
sold to the buyer. As a result, the buyer may maintain the bond between 
himself or herself and the seller and may even pass on a good word about 
the seller to other potential buyers in the buyer’s community. This could, in 
turn, develop into more clientele for the seller or for the seller’s community 
(if what the seller is selling becomes identified with the seller’s community).
Even more important than the buyer-seller bond is the intrinsic properties
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of the good itself as a means through which exchange takes place. In other 
words, the good itself is just as useful for the seller and possibly for the 
seller’s community as a good word from a buyer to his peers.
If the good being produced is identified with some communal characteris­
tic then the demand for that good extends beyond a given seller and includes 
all of the sellers from the same community because the object is associated 
with something inherent in the community. This, of course, would differ from 
a good that involves much personal craftsmanship and can therefore only be 
identified with a particular seller. Below, I have provided two examples of 
these two kinds of goods:
•  An example of a good that is frequently associated with a producer’s 
community — what I refer to as a communal good — is a mano and 
metate since it often has distinctive characteristics that can be at­
tributed to a community. In this case, the color and composition of 
the rock used to manufacture the mano and metate can reflect specific 
regions or communities. For instance, I argue in Section 5.4.3 that the 
manos and metates being exchanged among the Bladen communities 
are communal goods.
• An example of a good that is frequently associated with an individual 
producer — what I refer to as a personal good — is a polychrome 
vessel, since polychrome vessels often have distinctive features that can 
be attributed to a particular producer. That is, a signature or stylistic 
embellishment can be attributed to a specific artisan.
In this sense, every good can be seen to have features that one associates 
with an individual or a community of individuals. Those features of a good 
that can be attributed to a community are features that will cause potential
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buyers to gravitate toward any group of sellers from a particular community, 
whereas those features of a good that can be attributed to an individual 
are features that will cause potential buyers to gravitate toward a particular 
seller. In the case of a communal good, the buyer’s attention is on a particular 
community and in the case of a personal good the attention of the buyer is 
on a particular individual.
I will mostly be concerned with communal goods, particularly since I am 
interested in the exchange of manos and metates. The manos and metates of 
the Bladen are communal since, as I have already mentioned above, they re­
flect properties that can be attributed to all sellers from a certain community 
rather than to a particular seller. Since this kind of exchange manifests itself 
as inter-community exchange rather than inter-personal exchange, something 
must be said about the way that communities interact with each other. This 
will be the subject matter of the next section.
4.3 C lassic M aya Inter-C om m unity Exchange
Much about Classic Maya inter-community exchange can be extrapolated 
from the manner in which communities interacted with each other polit­
ically. Classic Maya communities were part of a political hierarchy, just 
as individuals are part of a social hierarchy in a stratified social structure. 
Much of our knowledge of Classic Maya political hierarchy has developed out 
of studying epigraphic data from Classic Maya polities (Culbert 1991). Poli­
ties are defined as the highest ranked communities in a given society and the 
interaction between polities is referred to as peer polity interaction (Renfrew 
1986).
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4.3.1 P eer P o lity  Interaction
Peer polity interaction (Renfrew and Cherry 1986) can be defined as a process 
by which autonomous polities relate to one another and in so doing develop 
together. As a result of this process, peer polities frequently acquire the 
same structural features, such as the same types of administrative organiza­
tion, religion, and language. Peer polity interaction is a means of explaining 
the emergence of a culture through the interactions of like political entities, 
instead of through external causes such as diffusion or internal causes such 
as administrative changes.
Diffusion falls under the category of explanations which attribute causes 
of social phenomena to exogenous change (Renfrew 1986:5-6). Exogenous 
change is usually used to explain the emergence of a culture at a given site 
through the community’s contacts with foreign political powers. In this view, 
specific social institutions within the community in question are derived from 
a dominant neighboring community or groups of communities. In this way, 
the community being considered is simply a secondary development of the 
external communities which are generating the ideas for their neighbors.
The cause behind the emergence of a culture cannot always be regarded 
as coming from outside the community being considered, because culture 
change can sometimes be attributed to processes occurring within the com­
munity (Renfrew 1986:6). In these cases, the emergence of a culture and 
of social phenomena in general are the result of endogenous changes within 
the community. These changes can be the result of revolutions or innova­
tive charismatic leaders, but in any case the spark of ingenuity which brings 
about the culture change is internal.
As defined by Renfrew (1986:6-7), peer polity interaction contrasts with 
both exogenous and endogenous change explanations in that it explains the
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emergence of a culture as the result of intermediate interactions. Peer polity 
interactions are not the long-distance relations that are frequently associated 
with goods and information entering a site from a primary state. Nor are 
peer polity interactions the results of political dynamics occurring within the 
site. Rather peer polity interaction is a theory that attributes the growth 
of a culture to the free flow of goods and ideas among sites of the same or 
roughly the same political scale.
Peer polities that interact are frequently structurally homologous (Ren­
frew 1986:4-5), since the free flow of information and goods between the 
polities has resulted in the establishment of similar social institutions. This 
means that the polities will often share the same cultural features, whether 
these features are language, settlement patterns, architectural similarities, or 
religion. Regions where peer polity interaction seems to be an important fac­
tor in promoting change, to name two, are the Greek islands during the first 
millennium B.C. (Renfrew 1986:10-15) and the Classic Maya (AD 300-900) 
polities (Freidel 1986; Sabloff 1986).
What makes two polities peers is that they must be autonomous political 
entities that are analogous in scale (Renfrew 1986:4). Such polities frequently 
occur in close proximity, neither dominating the other (Renfrew 1986:1). It is 
important that the polities being considered are close enough to each other 
to interact. This is because the emergence of structural homologies that 
constitute a culture depends on a free flow of information and goods between 
polities, and this flow is frequently dependent on the distance or ease of travel 
between the polities.
Peer polities are rarely in a situation in which one is dominated by the 
other for a significant length of time. The relation formed in such a situation 
would result in a dominant/subordinate relationship, which is clearly not a
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relationship in which both polities interact as peers. Nevertheless, as Renfrew 
(1986:2) discusses, it sometimes occurs that a peer relationship does turn into 
a dominant/subordinate relationship, for this is how empires or nation states 
are formed.
4.3 .2  T yp es o f Peer P o lity  In teractions
Very important in peer polity interaction studies is the nature of the inter­
actions or relationships between polities and how these interactions motivate 
the development of a culture. Renfrew (1986:8-10) describes the kinds of re­
lationships which frequently arise among communities engaged in peer polity 
interaction as: warfare, competitive emulation, symbolic entrainment, trans­
mission of innovation, and increased flow of the exchange of goods.
It is the flow in the exchange of goods as a form of interaction among 
polities that I will be mostly concerned with in this thesis. Another form of 
interaction that will be important is symbolic entrainment, which I argue in 
Sections 5.8 -  5.9 was structuring the manner in which ground stone goods 
flowed among the Bladen communities.
1. One way polities interact is through warfare (Renfrew 1986:8). Warfare 
on a sustained basis functions as a conduit through which cultural infor­
mation can be transmitted or reinforced from polity to polity. Warfare 
can also strengthen administrative institutions that are directly or in­
directly in charge of organizing attacks on neighboring polities, thereby 
stimulating political and cultural complexity.7
2. Competitive emulation entails public displays such as the construction
7Freidel (1986) discusses the importance of warfare in the peer interaction among Clas­
sic Maya polities.
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of monumental architecture and other symbols of status and power 
in order to outdo or impress the other polities in the region (Renfrew 
1986:8). This competitive behavior results in increased political growth 
and structural homologies because competition entails beating the op­
ponent at similar tasks. In this way, if a particular form of architecture 
is raised at one polity, the same architectural form, which might be im­
proved upon, will be constructed at another polity (e.g. Rathje 2002).
3. Symbolic entrainment involves the adoption of a more developed sym­
bolic system in place of a less developed symbolic system (Renfrew 
1986:8-9). In this case, polities of equivalent status but with different 
symbolic systems will move towards utilizing the most efficient symbolic 
system. Thus, a polity with a less developed symbolic system will usu­
ally adopt the more developed symbolic system from the other polity. 
Such a symbolic system might be a certain administrative procedure, 
a government, or a writing system.
4. Transmission of innovation is similar to symbolic entrainment with the 
difference being that the innovation being transmitted is not symbolic 
(Renfrew 1986:9-10). Such an innovation might be technology, for ex­
ample. In this scenario the transmission of an innovation results in 
that invention, whatever it may be, being used at both the polity that 
generated the innovation and the recipient polity.
5. An increased flow in the exchange of goods can cause polities to develop 
better administrations for dealing with the intensified imports and ex­
ports of goods (Renfrew 1986:10). Peer polities involved in exchange 
require facilities for dealing with the influx of traders with their goods. 
In this manner, the infrastructure for coping with transactions leads
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to the growth of economic capital. Increased flow in the exchange of 
goods and its effects on the development of social institutions has been 
observed in Mesoamerica (Blanton et al 1993:208-217).
Why it is exactly that a polity would want to interact with its peer 
(i.e. another polity with similar status as itself) is an interesting question. 
Lin (2001:45) proposes that there would have been a natural tendency for 
polities to interact with like polities — to form homophilous relations with 
each other. This natural tendency to associate with like parties is called 
the principle of homophily or like-me hypothesis (Homans 1950; Lazarsfeld 
and Merton 1954; Laumann 1966; Lin 2001:39) and was investigated as a 
mechanism for generating cultural patterns by Axelrod (1997) and Kennedy 
(1998) (see Section 2.4.2).
Lin (2001:48) explains that the action involved in maintaining one’s status 
as a peer (expressive action) involves less work than the action involved 
in gaining status from one higher in the social organization (instrumental 
action) (Lin 2001:48). In terms of a polity maintaining its political status, 
engaging in homophilous relations with peers would be optimal because it 
would have the lowest cost-benefit ratio of the two options.
4.3 .3  C lassic M aya Peer C om m unity Interaction
For the Classic Maya, social stratification did not just exist at the scale of the 
individual but it existed at the scale of the community. That is, the Classic 
Maya were part of a political hierarchy of sites. Marcus (1973:911) adopted 
the term “cognized model” from Rappaport (1971:33) to refer to the mental 
picture that Maya individuals would have had of their universe. Based on 
this cognized model, Maya individuals living in the Classic period would have 
had a good idea of a community’s power or standing (e.g. they would have
204
known which community was of a different rank and which community was 
a peer). Marcus (1973) points to epigraphic data to support this conception 
of Maya society, which most Classic Maya would have shared.
Marcus’ (1973) Cognized M odel of Classic M aya Politics
According to Marcus, the Maya envisioned four polities, which functioned as 
overlords for the rest of the communities in the Maya world. For long periods 
of time, these paramount centers functioned as peer polities. However, their 
statuses as peer polities were subject to change. Reasons for changes to the 
cognized political hierarchy might be the defeat of one of these polities by an 
underling, a plague, or economic ruin. Two important inscriptions bear out 
how the cognized model could change: the inscriptions on Stela A at Copan 
and the inscriptions on Stela 10 at Seibal.
1. In the inscriptions from Copan, dated to A.D. 731, four emblem glyphs 
designate the principal polities of Copan, Tikal, Calakmul, and Palenque 
as the four bacabs that, according to Classic Maya religion, held up the 
cosmos.
2. At Seibal, Stela 10, dated to A.D. 889, describes Seibal, Tikal, Calak­
mul, and Motul de San Jose as the new bacabs.
In the second inscription, the sites of Copan and Palenque seemed to 
have dropped out of the running as paramount powers in the Maya realm 
and were duly replaced by Seibal and Motul de San Jose. This indicates that 
a polity could fall out of peer status with the its cohorts at anytime due to 
some devastating blow to the polity. Such a blow seemed to have impacted 
Copan and Palenque sometime between A.D. 731 and A.D. 889, marking the
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beginning of the Classic Maya collapse during the Terminal Classic (Martin 
and Grube 2000:18).
From this as well as other epigraphic evidence, Marcus (1976:46) proposed 
that the Classic Maya accepted a hierarchical arrangement based on several 
principles of which I will only mention four:
1. The first principle is that primary centers had their own emblem glyphs 
and could refer to other primary centers in the inscriptions on their 
stelae.
2. The second principle is that secondary centers, which were the de­
pendencies of the primary centers, have their own emblem glyphs and 
frequently refer to their associated primary centers, though the reverse, 
whereby primary centers refer to secondary centers, rarely happens.
3. The third principle states that tertiary centers only refer to their asso­
ciated primary and occasionally their associated secondary centers.
4. The fourth principle states that quarternary centers do not have em­
blem glyphs of their own and do not mention any other centers.
In Marcus’s (1976) view, Maya political hierarchy had its roots in the pri­
mary center or polity. The polity’s subordinate centers did not refer to centers 
connected to a different polity; they only referred to centers dominated by 
the associated regional polity. The exception to this rule was, of course, the 
polities themselves who could mention any center. These principles acted as 
political guidelines for the centers, yet it appears not to have stopped free­
dom of movement up the hierarchy. Seibal, for example worked its way from 
being a tertiary center to a primary center by A.D. 889 (Marcus 1976:74). 
Still, this rigid model permitted little recognition in the hieroglyphic record 
of interaction between communities below the status of primary center.
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Beyond Marcus’ (1973) Cognized M odel of Classic Maya Politics
Today, our perspective on the hierarchical arrangement of Classic Maya com­
munities and on how communities interacted with each other has been fur­
ther illuminated (Martin and Grube 2000:18). For example, evidence now 
suggests that regardless of what status communities had, they nevertheless 
interacted with each other. In other words, the notion of what constitutes 
being a peer is relative. Not only could primary centers have peers, but so 
could secondary and tertiary centers have associated peers. It is still agreed 
that a political hierarchy existed for the Classic Maya, but the notion of 
being peer exists for all communities at all levels in the political hierarchy, 
not just polities. This evidence comes in the form of new epigraphic data 
demonstrating that relationships did exist among peer communities below 
the level of polity.
A good example of how our view of the Classic Maya political hierarchy 
has changed from Marcus’s research is her proposal that Piedras Negras 
and Pomona are secondary centers. According to Marcus’s principles of 
hierarchy, they should not refer to each other in their inscriptions, but in fact 
they do. These centers had two conflicts and an unknown contract between 
them (Martin and Grube 2000:21). Inter-community relations manifested 
themselves everywhere in the hierarchical arrangement of centers and peer 
interaction between centers below the level of polity was no exception. In 
short, peer interaction manifested itself within the different ranks of the 
Classic Maya political hierarchy, and not just within the highest rank.
Homophilous relationships (i.e. relationships among entities of the same 
rank) among communities were by no means the only kinds of relationships 
that pervaded Classic Maya politics, heterophilous relationships (i.e. rela­
tionships among entities of different ranks) did too. In fact, the Classic Maya
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political landscape could be regarded as one in which communities had chang­
ing relationships with their peers. However, in cases in which communities 
on equal scales interacted with each other, the notion of being a peer was 
integral in strengthening relations among the communities and structuring 
the dynamics of inter-community interaction.
4.4  Conclusion: T he Econom ic Approach to  
C lassic M aya Exchange
The economic approach that is to be taken in mathematical modeling of 
Classic Maya exchange in the Maya Mountains has been the main concern of 
this chapter. I have situated my approach in the economic anthropological 
literature and have found it to be mostly formalist with aspects of substan- 
tivism. In addition to the formalist emphasis, the thesis itself is deductive 
in that its aim (in Chapters 7 and 8) is to show how the utilization of a 
substantive model can contribute to making small advances toward a theory 
of cognition.
The substantivist aspects of my model can be inferred from ethnohistoric, 
ethnographic, archaeological and geological data, which I have only touched 
upon in this chapter, but will elaborate on in more detail in the next chapter. 
The formalist aspects of my model are that the model I construct is math­
ematical and is based on the notion that demand for manos and metates 
indirectly generates a supply for the manos and metates. This demand for a 
good is, in turn, influenced by: 1) other goods that can be obtained in the 
marketplace as well as by 2) what kind of good it is that is in demand.
With regard to the first point, why a particular item is chosen over an­
other item is often dependent on what is offered at the market and this,
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of course, is an issue of how the use-value of one good compares with the 
use-value of another good. For example, a good that is surrounded by goods 
that can serve the same purpose as the original good is not nearly as valuable 
as a good that has no other substitutes. With regard to the second point, 
why we choose to buy something from someone rather than someone else is 
often influenced by whether the good is a personal or communal good. A 
personal good can only be bought from a particular artisan, whereas a com­
munal good can be purchased from any number of artisans from a particular 
community. In studying the Bladen exchange system, I concentrate on mod­
eling the exchange of a communal good, namely ground stone (i.e. manos 
and metates). Communal goods are goods that have distinct characteristics 
that can be attributed to a community, as explained above.
In order to construct an accurate model depicting Classic Maya inter­
community exchange dynamics, it has to be taken into consideration that the 
Maya adhered to a political hierarchy in which communities were grouped. 
Some communities naturally fell into the same group or rank and were re­
garded as peers. The notion of being a peer among communities of the same 
rank, especially among those of the highest rank, is believed to be an impor­
tant factor in the rise of many civilizations (Renfrew 1986) including Classic 
Maya civilization.
As Marcus discusses, being a peer constituted a set of “cognized” rules, 
which the Classic Maya would have been attuned to and which would have 
had a direct effect on how communities interacted. Peer communities inter­
acted with each other differently than they did with communities that were 
higher or lower on the hierarchical pyramid. Peer communities interacted in 
such a way that they pulled “each other up up by the bootstraps” (Renfrew 
1986:11). Being equals, a movement of resources between and among peers
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would have represented a more or less equitable transfer which would have 
tended to strengthen relations between peers. This contrasted with non­
peer relationships such as tribute obligations in which transfers of resources 
from one community to another were not equitable and therefore might not 
strengthen relations. When communities interacted with communities out 
of their peer class, the interactive dynamics among the communities also 
changed. In my case study in the Bladen region, I concern myself with ex­
change among peers and how the notion of being peer symbolically structures 
inter-community exchange. This is because the communities in the Bladen 
region, which I will be studying in the next chapter, were peer communities, 
which shared a symbolic system which affected the manner in which exchange 
was conducted.
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Chapter 5
The Bladen Branch Case Study
My case study is a Late-Terminal Classic inter-community exchange network 
which has been defined as the result of fieldwork and laboratory analysis that 
I conducted throughout 2001 and 2002. The inter-community exchange net­
work was reconstructed archaeologically by tracking the movement of ground 
stone grinding implements (manos and metates) among three sites along the 
Bladen Branch in the southern Maya Mountains of Belize. This is the first 
inter-community ground stone exchange network to have been reconstructed 
in the Maya area.
The Purpose of the Bladen Case Study for the Thesis
The Bladen exchange case study serves an important theoretical and method­
ological purpose. The purpose of the Bladen case study, which is presented 
in this chapter, is to use archaeological material to contribute in building 
theory about supra-individual cognition. The notion of theory building was 
discussed in Section 4.1.2.
To be more specific, the purpose of studying ground stone exchange along 
the Bladen Branch is to show that Bladen exchange constituted a dynamical
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system and indeed a cognitive system. The reader should recall that a major 
theme running through Chapter 3 was that cognitive systems are dynamical 
systems. Therefore showing that something is a cognitive system entails 
showing that that it is first and foremost a dynamical system which occurred 
or is occurring in the natural or social environment.
Demonstrating that Bladen exchange constituted a cognitive system will 
allow me to contribute to the theory of cognitive systems and to take steps 
toward a comprehensive theory of cognition which includes social phenomena. 
My conception of cognition maintains that social systems can be conceived 
of as cognitive systems. This means that my conception of cognition can 
potentially be extended to explain aspects that are generally considered to 
be social issues studied by social theorists and scientists.
5.1 The Two Aim s o f the B laden Case Study
The beginning of systematic archaeological research into resource exploita­
tion within the Maya Lowlands was initiated by Graham (1987). Using the 
results from petrographic analyses conducted by Webster Shipley, it was 
shown that several manos collected from the central Lowland sites of Uaxac- 
tun and Seibal came from the Maya Mountains (Shipley and Graham 1987). 
Not only did this research shift some of the attention that was placed on 
the resources of the highlands (Thompson 1963, 1964; Rathje 1972) to the 
resources of the lowlands (Graham 1987, 1994; McKillop 2002), but it sug­
gested that if enough was known about the geology around communities, 
ground stone artifacts throughout the Maya realm could be traced to specific 
source zones which in turn might be linked to individual communities (Gra­
ham 1987). In this manner, through detailed provenance work, exchange
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networks could be reconstructed and, as a result, much could be learned 
about socio-economic relationships between communities. The first aim of 
this study demonstrates how such an inter-community exchange network was 
reconstructed in the Maya area using ground stone as a medium of exchange.
To reconstruct ground stone exchange networks at the level of specificity 
proposed by Graham (1987) — that is, at the level of the community — in­
tensive investigations of the geology surrounding archaeological sites located 
in potential resource “hot spots” needed to be conducted. The “hot spots” 
that were chosen to be investigated were the Mountain Pine Ridge granites, 
the Hummingbird granites, the Cockscomb-Sapote granites, and the Bladen 
volcanics (Graham 1987).
In 1992, the Maya Mountains Archaeological Project (MMAP) was launched 
in the area of the Bladen volcanics. Directed by Peter Dunham and funded 
by the National Geographic Society, the purpose of the MMAP was to locate 
ancient Maya communities that played key roles in exploiting geological and 
biological resources and in exporting products made from these resources 
to communities outside of the Maya Mountains. As a result, extensive ar­
chaeological and geological investigations by the MMAP have been under­
taken throughout the southern Maya Mountains of Belize, primarily along the 
Bladen Branch (Dunham et al 1992-2000). The outcome of these investiga­
tions has yielded eighteen previously unrecorded sites and a vast comparative 
rock collection for the southern Maya Mountains, which is currently housed 
at the Department of Geosciences at the University of Houston (Dunham et 
al 1992-2000). It was at the Department of Geosciences under the supervi­
sion of Dr. William Meurer (also the MMAP geologist) that I conducted the 
petrographic analysis needed to reconstruct the Bladen exchange network for 
this study.
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While the potential for exploiting resources was established for the Maya 
Moimtains communities, export of these resources and or products made 
from these resources still had to be demonstrated through provenance anal­
yses. As a first step in this direction, and as the second aim of this section, I 
show that the communities of the Bladen Branch exploited the resources in 
the region and exported products made from these resources to other low­
land communities throughout the Maya realm. These connections will be 
demonstrated by comparing mano and metate fragments from sites through­
out the Maya lowlands with rocks in the vicinity of four communities along 
the Bladen Branch. Demonstrating exploitation and export are important in 
supporting certain assumptions that are made with regards to reconstructing 
exchange networks.
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Figure 5: The Quebrada de Oro site core (map after Dunham et al [1993]).
5.2 The Bladen Com m unities
The present research focuses on four sites along the Bladen Branch in the 
southeastern Maya Mountains and the different rock resources that the sites 
exploited (Figure 3). The first site that will be investigated in this study 
that is farthest down river but still within the Maya Mountains proper is 
the Quebrada de Oro Ruins located in the Quebrada de Oro; upstream from 
this is the RHF Site located in the Ramos Quebrada, and moving further 
upstream from this site are Ek Xux and Muklebal Tzul, located in the Ek 
Xux and Muklebal valleys, respectively (Figure 5).
Radiocarbon dates from cultural contexts place the sites of Muklebal Tzul 
and Ek Xux mainly in the Late and Terminal Classic Periods (A.D. 600-900), 
with sparse Postclassic activity, and limited Early Classic activity at Ek Xux 
(Kindon 2002:269; Prufer 2002). The Quebrada de Oro Ruins and the RHF 
Site are also dated to the Late and Terminal Classic based on layout and 
architectural features of the sites (Dunham et al 1993). Taken together, the
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evidence suggests that all four sites share a Late-Terminal Classic component, 
indicating that they overlap temporally, and therefore can be regarded as 
contemporaneous communities. Subsistence studies suggest that the Late 
Classic population growth spurt at one of the sites, namely Ek Xux, was 
relatively short-lived, approximately 150-200 years (Abramiuk 1998). This 
estimate assumes that the developmental cycle (Goody 1969; Tourtellot 1988) 
was in effect at Ek Xux, that an agricultural strategy was utilized at Ek Xux 
that involved both intensive methods of cultivation (i.e. raised fields) as 
well as non-intensive methods of cultivation (i.e. slash-and-burn), and that 
Culbert’s (1988) carrying capacity estimates associated with these methods 
of cultivation are appropriate. Ultimately, more excavation will be required 
to ascertain the precise ranges of occupation for the four sites. However, the 
present evidence indicates that all sites were contemporaneously occupied in 
the Late and Terminal Classic.
All four Bladen sites are modest in size with the largest structures being 
around 3.5 meters in height. For the most part, the Bladen sites have well- 
planned site cores with causeways connecting plaza groups. Typical of Classic 
Maya centers, all of the Bladen sites with the exception of the Quebrada de 
Oro Ruins have stelae. Unique to the Quebrada de Oro Ruins, however, is 
the fact that it contains a ball court.
The stelae at the Bladen sites bear no inscriptions. Therefore, with the 
exception of a few ceramic sherds from Muklebal Tzul with glyphs (Prufer 
2002), very little epigraphic information regarding these communities ex­
ists. The presence of certain settlement features at the sites, namely the 
stelae and well-planned site cores traditionally associated with Classic Maya 
polities, suggest that the Bladen communities saw themselves as politically 
autonomous. However, this still does not rule out the possibility that these
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communities were part of a larger regional polity.
Politically, very little is known about the Bladen sites. What is known of 
these sites must be inferred from texts from the nearest significant polities, 
namely Nim Li Punit, Xnaheb, Uxbenka, Lubaantun, and Pusilha, located 
in the southern foothills of the Maya Mountains (Wanyerka 1996, 1999). The 
texts from these sites suggest that there was an Early Classic Tikal presence 
with what appears to be a close relationship with Copan during the Late 
Classic (Phil Wanyerka, personal communication 2003).
Whatever the details of the political hierarchy in the region, the Bladen 
communities seem to have been integral in exploiting rock and mineral re­
sources which were in demand. As a result, the Bladen region would have 
empowered economically any polity that held a political claim to the area. 
The extent of the demand for the resources of the Bladen region is one of the 
points that this chapter will address.
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5.3 Summary o f the G eology o f the Bladen  
Branch Region
The Maya Mountains are the only significant area of topographical relief in 
the Maya lowlands (Dixon 1956). Whereas the Yucatan peninsula is predom­
inantly limestone, the Maya Mountains are considered to be an uplifted fault 
block composed of Late Paleozoic sedimentary and volcanic rocks, which 
make up the Santa Rosa Group (Bateson and Hall 1977; Cole and Andrew- 
Jones 1978). The volcanics, which are known as the Bladen Volcanic Mem­
ber of the Santa Rosa Group, are localized around the Bladen Branch of the 
Monkey River (Druecker 1976, 1978). Also within the Santa Rosa Group 
are several large and small granitic intrusions. The three major areas of 
granitic rocks are the Cockscomb Sapote batholith, the Mountain Pine Ridge 
batholith, and the Hummingbird batholith (Shipley 1978). My focus will 
be on the lithologic variations along the Bladen Branch, particularly those
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lithologies that were used for manufacturing manos and metates.
The southern Maya Mountains are bounded by three east-west running 
faults: the Chiquibul and Sapote faults on the north and the Bladen fault on 
the south. The Bladen Volcanic Member, consisting of volcanic sediments, 
lavas, and tuffs, is exposed along the Bladen fault where the fault is in con­
tact with Cretaceous limestones. The Cretaceous limestones onlapped the 
volcanic rocks from the south during the late Cretaceous and early Tertiary 
periods (Rao and Ramanathan 1990; Ramanathan and Garcia 1991) and 
comprise the karstic terrain south of the main course of the Bladen River. 
Most of this limestone is massive but it is finely bedded near the Bladen’s 
headwaters. The Bladen volcanics, located in the southwestern portion of the 
Maya Mountains, are a volcanic mass 50 kilometers long on the east-west axis 
and 3 to 12 kilometers wide on the north-south axis (Druecker 1976).
Bateson and Hall (1971, 1977:1,3) were the first to find structural evidence 
that supported Sapper (1889) and Ower’s (1928) claims that the Palaeozoic 
sediments were in fact one continuous series (Druecker 1976:3). Bateson and 
Hall (1971, 1977:1,3) also suggested that Dixon’s porphyry occurred during 
the deposition of the Palaeozoic sediments and not later. Bateson and Hall 
recommended that the complex pile of lavas, ash-flow tuffs, breccias, and 
volcanic sediments that compose the porphyry be called the Bladen Volcanic 
Member.
Hall and Bateson (1972) were the first to observe that the lavas that 
peel away from the center of the volcanic mass are interbedded with volcanic 
sediments and pyroclastics. These lavas are rhyolitic in composition, which 
suggests that they are extrusive flows. Petrologically, the lavas are alkali 
rhyolites that are fairly uniform throughout the region, although the texture 
and grain size varies greatly. The rhyolites vary in texture from felsite to
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coarsely porphyritic, with relatively large phenocrysts (Bateson and Hall 
1977:9). According to stratigraphic evidence, the volcanism that produced 
the Bladen Volcanic Member is believed to have taken place at the Permo- 
Carboniferous boundary. The date is confirmed by a radiometric dating of 
300 x 106 b.p. (Bateson and Hall 1971:530).
Although research in the area (Hall and Bateson 1972; Bateson and Hall 
1977:9) suggests that the Bladen Volcanic Member comprises mainly rhyolitic 
lavas and tuffs, Druecker (1976:7) has found that the Bladen volcanics sup­
port a more variable composition. Druecker notes that many of the ash-flow 
tuffs are quartz latites or latites with much of the quartz in silicified matrix 
and veins. The porphyritic lava flows, on the other hand, though they tend 
to be rhyolitic in composition, can also be classified as quartz latites. These 
rocks vary primarily in their feldspar composition.
Druecker (1976:9-10) observed that there were two main episodes of meta­
morphism and folding. The first episode was a regional metamorphism, which 
occurred contemporaneously with or after a folding event in the Palaeozoic 
sediments and volcanics. The second metamorphic episode was a much more 
intense dynamic shearing. The areas that were most affected by this event 
were ash-fall tuffs and volcanic sediments of the Bladen Volcanic Member 
(Druecker 1976:9).
The Santa Rosa group in the Bladen area is sericitized and silicified 
(Druecker 1976:10). Sericite development in the region was related to both 
metamorphic events. While the lava flows are only moderately sericitized, the 
tuffs are highly sericitized in the matrix and crystal fragments. Silicification 
of the Bladen volcanics occurred long after the metamorphic events and is 
related to hydrothermal activity. Druecker (1976:10-12) suggests that there 
are two episodes of quartz veining. The first is associated with a massive
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non-mineralized bull quartz, and the latter is associated with sulfide miner­
alization. As a result of this last episode, pyrite is ubiquitous throughout 
the Bladen area in the form of small crystals. These pyrite cubes are densest 
within the tuffs and volcanic sediments, which have high permeability.
The hydrology of the Bladen is complex. In some places, Bladen Branch 
flows along a fault trace (Dixon 1956:45-46) from west to east. However, 
in most places the Bladen flows from north to south underground along 
the same courses that Bladen’s northern tributaries are flowing (Tom Miller 
1996, personal communication).1 The acidic groundwater derived from the 
erosion of the silicic rocks has deeply incised the limestone creating sinks 
and steep-walled tributary valleys. It is within these tributary valleys that 
Classic Maya sites, which I will be considering, are situated (refer to Figure 
5). Since the rugged topography, thick vegetation, and limestone cover make 
systematic mapping of the volcanic sequence problematic, outcrop mapping 
combined with examination of floats was used to define the variability of 
lithologies along the Bladen Member (Dunham et al 1994-1998).
5.3.1 D istribution  o f L ithologies A long th e  B laden
The distribution of lithologies will be described along the strike of the Bladen, 
from east to west, with respect to the northern tributary valleys and tradi­
tional logging campsites, the names of which are now used to describe the 
area in which the camps were located (Abramiuk and Meurer, ms.).
'Tom Miller is a hydrologist/speleologist who has done extensive research through­
out Belize, particularly in the Maya Mountains, and has been affiliated with the Maya 
Mountains Archaeological Project (MMAP) since 1994.
223
Forest Hill Camp to Richardson Creek
The lithologies from Forest Hill camp west to Richardson Creek consist pri­
marily of volcanic ash deposits that are only partially silicified. Hypabyssal 
rocks comprise approximately 10 percent of the material examined and these 
include samples with large (2 cm) euhedral K-feldspar phenocrysts in a fine 
dark matrix (Abramiuk and Meurer, ms.).
Quebrada de Oro, Teakettle Camp, and Ramos Quebrada
The rocks of Quebrada de Oro, Teakettle camp, and Ramos Quebrada are a 
combination of volcanic ash deposits and volcaniclastic rocks. The volcanic 
ash deposits of this area are similar in appearance and degree of silicification 
to ash examined from the Forest Hill/Richardson Creek area. The volcani­
clastic rocks are composed of detrital fragments that include sedimentary 
rocks (mudstones and sandstones), volcanic rocks (mostly chunks of welded 
tuff), and pieces of massive hydrothermal quartz, in a matrix that appears 
to have formed by erosion of unconsolidated ash deposits. The sedimentary 
rocks range from medium-grained sandstones to conglomerates with clasts 
up to 2.5 cm in diameter (Abramiuk and Meurer, ms.).
Ek Xux and Cuyamel Valleys
The Ek Xux and Cuyamel pockets contains volcanics and hypabyssal rocks 
that are aphyric and extremely silicified. The volcanics consist of silicified 
volcanic ash, ranging from aphyric to 20 volume-percent crystals of quartz 
and feldspar and welded tuff. Several samples contained one to three per­
cent sulfides, predominately pyrite. The hypabyssal samples contain euhe­
dral K-feldspar, pseudotetragonal quartz crystals, and three percent sulfides, 
possibly pyrohytite. Volcaniclastics do not occur in the area (Abramiuk and
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Meurer, ms.).
Muklebal Valley
The Muklebal valley differs from the tributary valleys of the rest of the Bladen 
in that it consists predominantly of finely bedded shallow water limestones 
with local occurrences of chert nodules and hydrothermal quartz veins. This 
is probably due to the fact that water has not cut through the limestone 
covering the Volcanic Member. The finely bedded limestone breaks readily 
along bedding surfaces producing regular blocks that were used in construc­
tion of the Muklebal Tzul site, giving it a distinctive appearance from the 
rest of the sites along the Bladen Drainage. Mudstone, temporally related to 
the limestone and not part of the Santa Rosa Formation, was also found in 
some stream cuts but it weathers extremely readily and is not found outside 
of streams. Volcanic and volcaniclastic rocks are scarce or absent in the area 
(Abramiuk and Meurer, ms.).
5.4 M ethod o f Sourcing
Three steps were involved in the procedure for sourcing ground stone arti­
facts. The first step consisted of sampling the cultural material (manos and 
metates). The second step involved interpreting the geology of the Bladen re­
gion on the basis of the source material (rocks) collected by the MMAP. And 
the third step consisted of comparing the source material with the cultural 
material.
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5.4.1 Sam pling o f C ultural M aterial
Samples of artifacts were collected from the Bladen sites as well as from low­
land sites outside of the Maya Mountains to determine whether the ancient 
inhabitants utilized resources from the Bladen region.2 Ground stone imple­
ments, particularly manos and metates, are the kinds of artifacts that were 
sampled for this analysis.
All of the ground stone artifacts at Ek Xux and Muklebal Tzul that were 
sampled for this study were taken from the 1996-1999 MMAP excavations 
(Dunham et al 1996-1999). These excavations primarily targeted residential 
complexes at the sites. The ground stone artifacts that were sampled from 
Ek Xux and Muklebal Tzul can be dated to the latter part of the Late Classic 
and Terminal Classic, since they were found in context with carbon samples 
and diagnostic ceramics which date to this period (Kindon 2002:269).
Due to permit restrictions from the Department of Archaeology and the 
Department of Forestry no excavations were permitted at the Quebrada de 
Oro Ruin and the RHF Site. As a result, the artifacts at the Quebrada de 
Oro Ruin and the RHF Site had to be sampled using a different method 
which is commonly used in the Maya area. Surface collection from random 
housemounds in and around the site cores was the means by which ground 
stone samples were obtained from these sites. Surface collections do not 
convey the temporal resolution that excavations do, but knowing that these 
communities were coeval and relatively short-lived, as I discussed above, is 
sufficient to permit me to construct a working model of inter-community 
exchange.
Samples of artifacts from sites in other parts of the Maya Lowlands were
2The Maya Mountains, even though technically they can be regarded as highlands, are 
part of the Maya lowlands.
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taken from the collections of the Department of Archaeology in Belmopan 
(DOA). Details regarding the excavation history of the artifacts that were 
sampled can be obtained from the DOA. The DOA identification numbers 
that are used for the ground stone artifacts have been provided in Tables 
8.5-8.5.
In all cases, only broken artifacts were sampled. When an artifact was lo­
cated, its provenience was noted, it was drawn, and then it was photographed. 
A hammer and chisel were used to remove the sample from the artifact.
5.4.2 G eological Interpretation  o f th e  B laden  R egion  
Based on th e  Source M aterial
Most of the source material that was used in this analysis was collected 
between 1993 and 1998 by the MMAP. Due to the dense foliage, the primary 
means of acquiring samples was through collecting floats from the streambeds 
of the Bladen Branch and its tributaries.
The distribution of rock types along the length of the Bladen River (see 
Appendix A) is consistent with the exposures of two volcanic centers. Shallow 
intrusive or hypabyssal rocks are most abundant near Richardson creek and 
Ek Xux, which suggests that these are the locations of the two volcanic 
centers. The spacing between these centers is the same as the average spacing 
of volcanoes along numerous arcs (i.e. roughly 20 km) (Wilson 1989). The 
Quebrada de Oro area, which is approximately halfway between Richardson 
Creek and Ek Xux, has lithologies that are dominated by volcanic ash and 
volcaniclastic (sedimentary) rocks. The ash deposits in the Quebrada de Oro 
area are distal ash falls from these volcanic centers and the volcaniclastic 
rocks are being shed off of the volcanic edifices by erosion. The presence 
of more intrusive rocks to the east (near Richardson Creek) may indicate
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a slight tilting of the arc toward the west so deeper erosional levels occur 
toward the east (William Meurer, personal communication 2002).
The Maya Mountains along the Bladen Branch are a highly segmented 
distribution of rock types which lie along the length of the east-west trend of 
the Bladen. The local weathering processes, which have resulted in the north- 
south tributaries, have cut deep into the volcanic rocks thereby exposing 
rocks all along the volcanic arc (i.e. east-west trend of the Bladen Branch). 
Because the two main volcanic centers occur at either end of the Bladen 
Branch and the north-south valleys lie along the strike of the former volcanic 
arc, none of the intrusive volcanic rocks found near Richardson Creek or in the 
Ek Xux area are found in Ramos Quebrada or Quebrada de Oro. Similarly, 
the volcaniclastic rocks so common in these two drainages are absent both 
up and down stream.
5.4.3 T he Source M aterial and its P o litica l E conom ic  
Im plications for th e  C om m unities
Macroscopically, volcanic rocks, volcaniclastic rocks, mudstones, and silt- 
stones are all distinguishable from one another, and since these materials oc­
cur in specific valleys, it was relatively straightforward to determine where ar­
tifacts made from these materials originated. As a result manos and metates 
in the Bladen region would have constituted what may be termed communal 
goods, or goods that have distinct characteristics that can be attributed to 
specific communities situated in their associated valleys, as discussed above 
in Section 4.2.2.
The volcanics from Ek Xux and those from Forest Hill differ slightly in 
their silicification and so can be distinguished from each other, albeit with 
less confidence. The volcaniclastic materials from Ramos Quebrada and Que-
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brada de Oro are indistinguishable macroscopically, and other measures will 
be taken in the future to distinguish between the two kinds of volcaniclastic 
materials.
This geological evaluation has important political economic implications 
for the Bladen communities. Three of the four communities were located in 
valleys with highly distinct lithologies. The rock resources from two valleys — 
namely Quebrada de Oro in which the Quebrada de Oro Ruin is situated and 
Ramos Quebrada in which the RHF Site is located — are indistinguishable. 
If we propose the idea that these sites were founded in order to exploit 
specific resource (rock) types, as Dunham et al (1995, 1996) suggest, then 
the Quebrada de Oro Ruin and the RHF Site were probably exploiting an 
entire resource zone as a single economic and possibly political entity.
There are some observations that give credence to this notion. Politi­
cally autonomous communities are frequently distinguished by the presence 
of stelae. At Quebrada de Oro we have a ballcourt which is also an impor­
tant feature at many autonomous sites, but no stelae, and at the RHF Site 
we have a stela plaza, but no ballcourt. The presence of stelae, central to 
the notion of an autonomous community, suggests that perhaps these two 
sites functioned as one unit, politically as well as economically. The notion 
of twin polities has been well documented in the Maya lowlands (Houston 
1993; Sharer 1994:220-225; Martin and Grube 2000:61-62).
Because the Quebrada de Oro Ruin and the RHF Site could be regarded 
as a single political economic entity, only three sites or urban centers will be 
considered and they will be identified by the modern site names of: Muklebal 
Tzul, Ek Xux, both of which are situated in the upper Bladen, and the Lower 
Bladen sites (i.e. a combination of the Quebrada de Oro Ruin and the RHF
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Site).3
5.4.4 R esu lts o f th e C om parative A nalysis A long the  
Bladen
After assessment of the relationship between the source material and the 
geology of the Bladen region, the artifacts from the Bladen sites and the non- 
Bladen sites were compared with the source rock samples from the Bladen. 
Hand-sample comparison, demonstrated in Appendix B, was augmented by 
examinations of the thin-sections of the artifacts.
A procedure was devised so that the results of the hand-sample compar­
isons could be reproduced in future analyses of the data. This procedure 
involved a system of five straightforward rules that assigns a rank of confi­
dence for comparing source and cultural material. The confidence-ranking 
scheme was based on a ranking system from 0 to 10. In this system:
• 10 indicated that a perfect match for the artifact was found in the 
source rock collection for a specific valley, with no close matches in the 
other valleys;
• 8 indicated that a perfect match for the artifact was found in the source 
rock collection for a specific valley;
• 6 indicated that a close match for the artifact was found in the source 
rock collection for a specific valley, with no other close matches in the 
other valleys;
throughout the remainder of this thesis, the term “Lower Bladen sites” will refer to 
both the Quebrada de Oro Ruin and the RHF Site.
230
• 4 indicated that a close match for the artifact was found in the source 
rock collection for a specific valley;
• 2 indicated that no close matches for an artifact in the source rock 
collection were found, but that based on the geology of the Bladen 
Branch, a specific source for the artifact could be inferred; and
• 0 indicated that no specific source for the artifact was known.
In addition to these designations of confidence, one assumption was made 
regarding the sourcing of manos and metates. If a mano or metate was made 
from a rock type that occurred in more than one tributary valley of the 
Bladen, then the closest of the valleys to the spot where the mano or metate 
was found was considered to be the source. This assumption is based on Zipf’s 
(1949) least effort principle and is justified for many human activities (Trigger 
1990). This assumption is also supported in the archaeological record for 
the Classic Maya. For example, most bulky ceramics and utilitarian wares 
can be sourced to local workshops rather than distant workshops at Tikal 
(Fry 2003:150-151), and this is generally considered to be true of lithics in 
northeastern Belize as well (Kelly 1982:96).
To illustrate how this assumption was used in the sourcing of manos and 
metates in the Bladen region I provide an example. Mudstone and siltstone 
occur naturally in the Quebrada de Oro, the Ramos Quebrada, and the Muk- 
lebal valley. Using the assumption stipulated, a mudstone or siltstone artifact 
found in any of these valleys is considered to be manufactured locally, and 
a mudstone or siltstone artifact at Ek Xux is considered to come from the 
nearby Muklebal valley. Similarly, moderately silicified volcanic rocks occur 
naturally in the Quebrada de Oro, the Ramos Quebrada, and the Ek Xux 
valley. Thus, following the assumption stipulated, a moderately silicified
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Figure 9: The Bladen Branch exchange system.
volcanic artifact found in any of these valleys is considered to be manufac­
tured locally, and a moderately silicified volcanic artifact at Muklebal Tzul 
is considered to come from the nearby Ek Xux valley.
Also of special note is the fact that one out of twenty-six artifacts sampled 
at the RHF Site, one out of thirty-two artifacts sampled at Ek Xux, and 
three out of thirty-two artifacts sampled at Muklebal Tzul were made from 
vesicular basalt, and could only have come from the Maya highlands. One 
artifact out of thirty-two artifacts sampled at Ek Xux was a metamorphic 
variety that is not seen in the Maya Mountains, and likely came from one of 
the metamorphic sources in the highlands of western Guatemala or northern 
Honduras (West 1964:67).
Appendix C contains the results of the hand-sample comparisons with 
associated confidence levels, and Figure 9 synthesizes these results and rep­
resents the movement of ground stone along the Bladen Branch using arrows.
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5.5 R esults of A nalysis o f Artifacts at Sites 
O utside of the M aya M ountains
At the Department of Archaeology (DOA) in Belmopan, Belize, I concen­
trated on sampling mano and metate fragments from sites in resource poor 
regions of Belize.4 From the DOA, 17 artifacts from Nohmul, 18 artifacts 
from Lubaantun, 3 artifacts from Sarteneja, 1 artifact from Hat Cay, 1 ar­
tifact from Billy Barquedier Creek, 5 artifacts from Little Rocky Point, 32 
artifacts from Altun Ha, 23 artifacts from Baking Pot, 3 artifacts from Cale­
donia, and 11 artifacts from Xunantunich were analyzed.
All of the artifacts at Nohmul were limestone except for one artifact, 
which was granite. All of the artifacts from Lubaantun, Sarteneja, Hat Cay, 
Billy Barquedier Creek were vesicular basalt as were two of the samples taken 
from Little Rocky Point, evidence that vesicular basalt was moving northeast 
along the southern coast of the Yucatan from the Maya highlands. The sheer 
abundance of vesicular basalt artifacts, specifically at Lubaantun, suggests 
that Lubaantun or one of its neighbors may have functioned as a central 
distributor of this material to the other communities in southern Belize (e.g. 
the Bladen communities). The other two artifacts sampled from Little Rocky
4Some sites were sampled which were near to regions with hard rock to manufacture 
manos and metates, but this sampling was unintentional. The focus of my research was 
to head to southern Belize to sample ground stone from the Bladen sites and from the 
MMAP storage barracks which contained ground stone from previous excavations at Ek 
Xux and Muklebal Tzul. No more than 20 artifacts from sites in poor resource regions 
outside of the Bladen were supposed to be sampled at the DOA. However, forestry and 
archaeology permits were delayed, stranding me in Belmopan longer than I would have 
hoped. I, therefore, used this time constructively to sample more artifacts from sites I had 
already sampled at the DOA (e.g. Altun Ha), as well as other sites which I previously had 
no intention of sampling because they were near hard rock resources (e.g. Caledonia).
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Point were granite, whereas one was limestone. The granites came from one 
of the three granite batholiths in Belize (Shipley and Graham 1987; Graham 
1987) based on macroscopic examination.
5.5.1 Figure 3: S ites w ith  C onn ections to  th e  B laden  
C om m unities
My analysis of the artifacts found at sites outside the Bladen (Figure 3) sug­
gests that manos and metates were being exported from the Bladen region 
(see Appendix D). It is even possible to pinpoint specific Bladen communi­
ties that were responsible for exporting the goods. Volcaniclastic artifacts 
confidently can be said to have come from either the Quebrada de Oro or the 
Ramos Quebrada. This would make either the Quebrada de Oro Site and/ or 
the RHF Site, respectively, the agents of export for the volcaniclastic goods. 
It can also be said with confidence that volcanic artifacts at sites outside of 
the Bladen region came from the Ek Xux valley, making Ek Xux the likely 
agent of export of volcanic goods. The reasoning behind this is based on the 
assumption that the inhabitants of the Bladen communities were taking ad­
vantage of what their valleys had to offer. While it is not certain whether this 
kind of entrepreneurship functioned at a local level, it seems very likely that 
it would have been operational in the Bladen region’s interaction with the 
rest of the Maya world. Specialization in manufacturing goods made from 
distinct rock types would have been important for the Bladen communities 
that wanted to occupy niches in Maya economy. For the Quebrada de Oro 
Site and the RHF Site this would have meant taking advantage of the vol­
caniclastic rocks, and for Ek Xux, this would have meant taking advantage 
of the various silicified volcanic rocks.
Thirteen of the samples taken from Altun Ha were granites. Four arti-
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facts at Altun Ha, however, came from the Bladen. Three were volcaniclastic 
indicating a connection to either Quebrada de Oro or RHF, and one was vol­
canic indicating a connection with Ek Xux. All of the Altun Ha samples come 
from Terminal Classic contexts or later except for one of the volcaniclastic 
samples, which comes from the seventh century A.D. (David Pendergast, 
personal communication 2003; Pendergast 1979, 1982). This indicates that 
ground stone was being exported from the lower Bladen communities from 
the Late Classic to Terminal Classic, and that Ek Xux was exporting its 
material in the Terminal Classic.
Of the twenty-three samples taken at Baking Pot, seventeen were granite, 
but four items were made from Bladen material. Even though recent work at 
Baking Pot has produced evidence of much earlier phases, the artifacts that 
were sampled are from the Late Classic period (see Bullard and Bullard 1965). 
Three of the artifacts from Baking Pot were volcaniclastic, and one was 
volcanic; appearances of both types of artifacts are representative of contact 
with both the lower and upper Bladen sites, respectively. This indicates that 
both Ek Xux and the lower Bladen communities were actively engaged in 
exploitation and exportation during the Late Classic.
Finally, one artifact out of the three sampled at Caledonia is volcanic 
and, therefore, probably comes from Ek Xux, whereas one artifact out of the 
eleven sampled from Xunantunich is volcaniclastic of the variety witnessed 
in the Bladen, and likely came from either Quebrada de Oro Ruins or from 
the RHF Site.
In addition to the artifacts inspected at the Department of Archaeology 
in Belize, the thin-sections from Shipley and Graham’s (1987) ground stone 
study at Seibal were analyzed. Out of the 13 artifacts sampled at Seibal 
by Graham, three were confirmed to have originated in the Bladen. One
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is volcaniclastic implying a connection with either the Quebrada de Oro 
Ruins or the RHF Site and the other two artifacts are volcanic implying a 
connection with Ek Xux. All but one of the volcanic artifacts dates to the 
Terminal Classic (Willey 1978).
Figure 10 synthesizes the results of the provenance analysis conducted on 
the sites which were importing Bladen ground stone material.
Destinations
Altun
Ha
Baking Pot Caledonia Seibal Xunantunich
Quebrada 
de Oro/ 
RHF 3 3 0 1 1
Sources Ek Xux 1 1 1 2 0
Muklebal 0 0 0 0 0
TOTAL 32 23 3 13 11
Figure 10: Number of artifacts from sites outside of the Bladen region which can 
be sourced to the Bladen communities. The bottom  row displays the total number 
of artifacts that were sampled at the sites outside of the Bladen.
5.6 Interpreting the Petrographic R esults
Only two artifacts at the RHF Site were volcanic and only one was made from 
siltstone. The rest of the artifacts at the RHF Site were volcaniclastic. Only 
five artifacts at the Quebrada de Oro Ruins were volcanic and two artifacts 
were mudstone. The rest of the artifacts were volcaniclastic. These last two 
observations suggest that locally, grinding implements made from volcani-
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clastic material were preferred. This is further supported by the fact that 
great quantities of volcaniclastics were imported into Ek Xux and Muklebal 
Tzul, implying that volcaniclastic material was in great demand throughout 
the Bladen. Volcanic material was the second most preferred material in the 
Bladen and this is supported not only by the fact that volcanics were the 
second most abundant material at Quebrada de Oro Ruins and the RHF 
Site, but by the fact that Ek Xux imported less materials than did Muklebal 
Tzul, a community which is situated in a valley with no volcanics.
Adopting a wider view, it appears that volcanics were in demand through­
out the Maya realm, just as the volcaniclastics were, if we consider the find­
ings at Altun Ha, Baking Pot, Caledonia, Xunantunich, and Seibal. Mud­
stone, on the other hand, appears to have been in little demand locally, since 
we see so little of it at the Bladen sites, except at Muklebal Tzul. The 
abundance of mudstone artifacts at Muklebal Tzul is, no doubt, explained 
by the fact that mudstone was the only local material with properties com­
parable to but not nearly as preferred as the volcaniclastic material. Thus 
far, no mudstone artifacts have been observed at sites outside of the Maya 
Mountains.
The demand was high for volcanics and volcaniclastics outside of the Maya 
Mountains, but what the exchange relations were that stimulated export is 
at this time unknown. Commerce is one possibility, but tribute requirements 
may also have been a stimulus.
5.7 D iscussion o f Exchange Behavior
Up to now, exchange has been accepted a priori as the behavior responsible 
for the distribution of ground stone at the Bladen communities. However,
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large-scale migrations of people with their belongings have been known to 
occur in the Maya area. For example, it is this explanation that Hammond 
(1975:102-103) gives for the rise of Lubaantun. Therefore, could it be that 
migrations of people with their possessions, moving from the lower Bladen 
(the Quebrada de Oro Site and the RHF Site) to the Upper Bladen (Ek Xux 
and Muklebal Tzul), were responsible for the manner in which ground stone 
was distributed along the Bladen? The answer to this question is that it is 
unlikely, and the reason for this will be discussed next.
The reason why this topic was not broached before is that the idea that 
exchange is the prime behavior behind the movement of ground stone has to 
be inferred from the sourcing results. It was, therefore, necessary to discuss 
the results of the sourcing before a thorough discussion of the behavior behind 
the movement of ground stone could take place.
1. To support the argument for exchange along the Bladen, I will begin 
with the fact that significant quantities of materials were being ex­
ported from the Bladen region to lowland sites outside of the Maya 
Mountains. That is, the proportion of the ground stone used at Altun 
Ha, Baking Pot, Caledonia, Seibal, and Xunantunich that came from 
the Bladen communities during the Late and Terminal Classic is sig­
nificant, as Figure 10 can attest to. The sheer abundance of artifacts 
from the Bladen at communities outside of the Maya Mountains from 
the Late and Terminal Classic periods suggests that there was ground 
stone being exported from the Bladen communities throughout these 
periods.
2. The second fact is that if people were migrating from the lower Bladen 
to the upper Bladen, not only would there be a population increase 
in the upper Bladen, but there would be a corresponding population
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decrease in the lower Bladen, and we do not see evidence for this hap­
pening along the Bladen Branch. Though Ek Xux was probably gaining 
people during the Late Classic (Abramiuk 1998), there is no evidence 
to suggest that the lower Bladen communities were simultaneously los­
ing their populations. This latter point is supported by the third fact, 
which will be discussed next.
3. The third fact is that significant populations were needed for procur­
ing the raw materials, for manufacturing manos and metates, and for 
administrating production and export of the goods. In order to pro­
duce the continuous level of economic output that is witnessed in the 
archaeological record throughout the Late and Terminal Classic, it fol­
lows that there always needed to be significant populations at the com­
munities. Large-scale migrations from the lower Bladen to the upper 
Bladen would have been unlikely since the Bladen communities were 
operating concurrently, and the repercussions of a large-scale aban­
donment of one of the communities and migration to one of the other 
Bladen communities would have certainly been detected in the quanti­
ties of ground stone produced for sites outside of the Maya Mountains. 
Instead there seems to be a relatively continuous flow of ground stone 
from both the upper and the lower Bladen communities throughout 
the Late and Terminal Classic, according to the analysis of the Bladen 
artifacts at Altun Ha, Baking Pot, and Seibal.
I conclude that while some of the movement of ground stone between the 
Bladen communities might be the result of small-scale migrations, the move­
ment of most of the ground stone is not the result of large-scale migrations. 
This is because significant amounts of ground stone were being exported out 
of the upper and lower Bladen communities simultaneously and continuously
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throughout the Late and Terminal Classic periods. For this to have occurred, 
large sedentary populations were needed at the communities in order to pro­
cure, manufacture, and facilitate the export of the ground stone. Without 
these sedentary populations we would not have observed what appears to be 
a continuous output of ground stone from the upper and the lower Bladen 
communities at the sites of Altun Ha, Baking Pot, and Seibal. Because both 
the upper and lower Bladen sites were thriving, there would appear to be no 
reason for large-scale migrations.
Since it is unlikely that large-scale migrations were behind the movement 
of the ground stone along the Bladen, the movement of such significant quan­
tities of ground stone along the Bladen was probably the result of exchange.
If we take the ethnohistoric data on the Quiche Maya discussed in Section 
4.2 and the archaeological data from the Bladen as an indication of the mode 
of exchange that existed along the Bladen, then direct reciprocity or market 
exchange was likely responsible for the movement of ground stone along the 
Bladen. Unfortunately, the distribution of ground stone along the Bladen 
cannot expand on the ethnohistoric evidence due to the proximity of the 
communities. Not only is Renfrew’s (1975:41-43) research on associating 
particular distribution patterns to the modes of exchange more applicable for 
long-distance exchange, but more work with regard to its application even 
for long-distance exchange needs to be undertaken (Torrence 1986:115-121).
If the market system in the Guatemalan highlands today is any indication 
of the way markets were run in Classic Maya times, then each community 
would have had its own market day during the week, and this cyclical market 
system would have funneled goods from all of the communities involved in 
the cyclical exchange system to the one community having the market. This 
would have potentially provided consumers at each of the communities access
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to all kinds of goods directly within the consumer’s community, and this 
would have had the effect of evenly distributing goods, provided all buyer 
preferences were the same in each of the communities.
In other words, gaining access to specific ground stone implements would 
not have had significant effect on the distribution of ground stone at the 
sites because if someone needed something from another community, the 
consumer could either access it by waiting for the market to come to the 
consumer’s community, by walking to a nearby community where there was 
a market, or by exchanging with someone from a different village outside of 
the market system (i.e. direct reciprocity). Differences in the distribution of 
ground stone at each of the sites, therefore, were probably due to how much 
the consumer needed or wanted a particular good. Because all four Bladen 
communities are well within walking distance of each other, they would have 
had relatively equal access to ground stone implements at markets or through 
direct reciprocity. It seems likely that the distribution of ground stone would 
have been more of an indication of compositional preference, rather than 
mode of exchange.
Nevertheless, I find that one point probably can be made with regard 
to exchange types, which is that the mode of exchange known as direct ac­
cess (Renfrew 1975:41) seems to be an unlikely means in which ground stone 
was distributed along the Bladen. Direct access, in the case of the Bladen 
communities, would imply that someone from a community in one valley 
could go to another valley and access its resources “without reference” to 
the people of the community in the other valley. However, in the Bladen 
area, “reference to” the people of the communities in the valleys was prob­
ably unavoidable, especially since settlement took up so much of the valley 
floors and indications are that population densities were probably very high
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(Abramiuk 1998). The Bladen communities were also situated in such a way 
that they likely exploited their own procurement zones (Dunham et al 1995,
1996) and consequently may have restricted outsiders’ access to the resources 
of their valleys. This territorial behavior would also explain why the Bladen 
communities, at least in terms of settlement features, give the appearance of 
being Classic Maya polities, albeit small polities.
5.8 Exchange Behavior A long th e  Bladen: Func­
tion  and Beyond
5.8.1 Functional and N on-F unctional B ehavior A m ong  
th e  B laden M aya
Prom our comparative analysis, it is assumed that exchange was motivated 
primarily by functional factors. Certain rock types seem to have been pre­
ferred for their functional properties in the Bladen region and, it would seem, 
the rest of the Maya lowlands. The difference in the proportions of composi- 
tionally distinct grinding implements at the sites suggests that the rock type 
that was preferred was volcaniclastic. This makes sense, since it is the only 
rock type out of those that were used in the Bladen that is soft enough to 
shape into manos and metates but resilient enough not to chip while grinding 
grains and seeds. In other words, it is considerably harder than mudstone, 
but more malleable than volcanic rock. After volcaniclastic rock, volcanic 
rock seems the most preferred material for making grinding implements, 
followed by mudstone, which is the least used material for manufacturing 
grinding implements.
In addition to functional behavior, non-functional behavior has also been
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detected in the comparative analysis, and it is this anomalous behavior wit­
nessed in the archaeological record that is especially noteworthy. For exam­
ple, mudstone, an extremely soft (“poor quality”) stone for making manos 
and metates, and one that would grind down quickly during food processing, 
was found at Ek Xux, where more resilient (“better quality”) volcanic rocks 
were abundant. Similar non-functional behavior seemed to have operated at 
the Quebrada de Oro Ruins, which had easy access to volcaniclastic material 
and where a highly silicified volcanic ground stone fragment from the Ek 
Xux valley was found. In these sorts of transactions it would appear that 
exchange was not always motivated by the need to obtain good quality grind­
ing stones. In this regard, the operative mechanisms behind ground stone 
exchange in the Bladen region were distinctly different from the operative 
mechanisms which were motivating long-distance trade.
5.8.2 D ifferentiating B laden  M aya E xchange B ehavior  
from Inter-R egional M aya E xchange B ehavior
The economic relationships between the Bladen communities and the low­
land communities outside of the Bladen region were different from the eco­
nomic relationships among the communities in the Bladen region. Within 
the Bladen the flow of grinding implements between communities was bidi­
rectional, whereas the flow of grinding implements between the Bladen com­
munities and the communities outside of the Bladen was unidirectional (i.e. 
from the Bladen region to the surrounding lowland areas).
Grinding implements that were exchanged among the Bladen communi­
ties seem to have been exchanged for a symbolic reason; that is, there was 
something about the manner in which manos and metates were perceived in 
the Bladen which differed from the way manos and metates were perceived
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outside of the Bladen. This contrast is apparent in the marked difference in 
directionality in the two exchange systems, if we assume that one’s conception 
of an object type, such as grinding implements, determines the movement 
of that object type across the landscape. As a result, it can be concluded 
that the economic systems constituting inter-community exchange within the 
Bladen, and inter-regional exchange between the Bladen communities and 
communities outside of the Bladen were qualitatively different systems. The 
difference between these economic systems reflects difference in the meaning 
that manos and metates held for Maya within the Bladen region as compared 
to the context of long-distance exchange.
A similar phenomenon was observed among the eastern Papua-Melanesians 
participating in Kula exchange (Malinowski 1984). The Kula exchange sys­
tem entailed that bracelets be exchanged for necklaces, the bracelets and 
necklaces acquiring their symbolic significance only within the context of 
Kula exchange. The Kula exchange system, however, was distinct from the 
economic system that introduced the bracelets and necklaces into the Kula 
exchange system (i.e. the production sites). It was also distinct from the 
economic systems into which Kula items sometimes entered (i.e. the offshoot 
sites).
Malinowski explains how bracelets (or armshells) called mwali enter the 
Kula exchange system:
“In the olden days, Murua probably was quite as productive a 
centre of this manufacture as the Trobriands , and in these latter 
though Kayleula and the Western islands fish and work the mwali 
as much as ever, the natives of Kavataria are almost entirely out 
of it, busy all the time diving for pearls. Both the main places 
of origin of the armshells, therefore, are [geographically] within
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the Kula ring. After they are made, or, as we saw in Kayleula, 
in the process of making, they enter circulation. Their entry into 
the ring [i.e. the Kula exchange system] is not accompanied by 
any special rite or custom, and indeed it does not differ from an 
ordinary act of exchange. If the man who found the shell and 
made the mwali were not in the Kula himself, as might happen 
in Kavataria or Kayleula, he would have a relative, a brother-in- 
law, or a head man to whom he would give it in the form of one or 
other of the many gifts and payments obligatory in this society” 
(Malinowski 1984:504-505; brackets mine).
Bracelets also fall out of circulation from the Kula exchange system and 
enter other economic systems. As a consequence, the rules for the exchange 
of the bracelets significantly differ in these other economic systems as Mali­
nowski explains:
“There is, however, one movement which specially interests us 
from the Kula point of view, namely that of the two types of 
Kula valuables. One of these articles, the armshells, travels on 
the South Coast from East to West. There is no doubt that 
this article leaks out from the Kula current at its Southernmost 
point, and is carried away towards Port Moresby, where the value 
of armshells is, and was, in olden days much higher than in the 
Eastern district. I found in Mailu that the local native traders 
purchased, for pigs, armshells in the Su’a’u district, and carried 
them West towards Aroma, Hula, and Kerepunu. Professor Selig- 
man, from his notes taken at Port Moresby, informs us that Hula, 
Aroma, and Kerepunu import armshells into Port Moresby. Some
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of these armshells, according to the same authority, travel further 
West as far as the Gulf of Papua” (Malinowski 1984:506).
As Malinowski makes clear, the differences in the economic systems and 
the resulting movement of objects can be attributed to a change in the 
exchange-values of the necklaces and bracelets. However, the inference that 
can be drawn from these passages is that bracelets and necklaces did not 
necessarily acquire different exchange-value so much as the rules of the ex­
change systems changed. For example, when leaving the Kula exchange sys­
tem bracelets are exchanged for pigs rather than for necklaces. This implies 
a change in how the use-values of bracelets and necklaces compared. The 
Kula items did not serve the same symbolic purpose at the production sites 
and offshoot sites that they did among the Trobriand Islands where Kula 
exchange was practiced.
Differences in the symbolic significance of items and the rules which struc­
ture how the items are exchanged and distributed are critical for forming 
boundaries around economic systems. The contrasting directionality (bi- v. 
uni-) in the movement of grinding implements in the Maya area suggests that 
grinding implements which were exported to the large lowland communities 
were exported for functional, pragmatic reasons; that is, the Bladen com­
munities were sending to the large lowland communities items made from 
materials that were not normally obtainable outside of the Maya Mountains 
(e.g. volcanics and volcaniclastics). This trade was directional and prag­
matic because these large lowland communities outside of the Bladen region, 
which were importing grinding implements, reciprocated with other items 
(e.g. ceramics, jade and obsidian artifacts). They did not, for example, re­
ciprocate with limestone manos and metates — which were also widely used 
among the ancient Maya (see Appendix D ) and continue to be used among
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the contemporary Maya (Thompson 1939:174) — for we see no evidence of 
this occurring in the samples that were taken at the Bladen communities. If 
it is assumed that the meaning of an object — or how the use-value of the 
object compares with the use-value of another object — can be inferred from 
its movement across the landscape, the lack of reciprocity with the same ob­
ject type has significant implications because it implies that that object type 
loses the precise meaning it held within the Bladen region. In other words, 
the meaning that an object has and which is shared between transactors is 
changed as it moves out of one context and into another. The object type 
relinquishes the meaning it had in the old context (i.e. within the Bladen 
region) and acquires a different meaning in the new context (i.e. between the 
Bladen region and the sites of Altun Ha, Baking Pot, Caledonia, Seibal and 
Xunantunich outside of the Bladen region). As a result of this transition to 
an inter-regional context, the entire character of the Bladen exchange pro­
cess changes, this time operating according to different mechanisms which 
contrast with the mechanisms that governed grinding implement exchange 
within the Bladen region.
Functional economic exchange (i.e. I-lack-it-so-I-need-it exchange) is of­
ten assumed a priori in many archaeological case studies, but functional 
economics clearly do not fully explain the movement of grinding implements 
among the Bladen communities. In order to explain the movement of grind­
ing implements I will look at what drove the demand for manos and metates 
in the first place. Only after this driving mechanism has been established 
will I turn to the production and exchange of manos and metates and the 
formal modeling thereof.
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5.9 How M anos and M etates Were U tilized  
in the Bladen R egion
To understand the mechanisms of exchange in the Bladen region, the sym­
bolic manner in which manos and metates were conceived and utilized must 
be explained. One need not stray far from the ethnographic and archaeolog­
ical evidence to ascertain the symbolic significance that manos and metates 
held for Maya in local contexts (i.e. among neighboring communities). The 
manner in which manos and metates were interpreted in local contexts is 
pertinent to the Bladen case study, since the Bladen communities comprised 
a local exchange system and the way in which manos and metates were in­
terpreted “locally” by Maya people can facilitate our understanding of how 
the Bladen Maya interpreted manos and metates.
Manos and metates were not only essential for food processing but were 
utilized in rituals symbolizing termination and renewal. The number of 
manos and metates which would have been offered (taken out of circulation) 
during these rituals is relatively large when considering the sheer number of 
the dedicatory occasions in which the ancient Maya would have participated. 
These offerings of manos and metates occurred throughout the Maya area 
during the Classic period. Manos and metates have been found in termina­
tion offerings at Yaxuna (Freidel, Suhler, and Cobos Palma 1998:141) and 
Chichen Itza (Freidel 1998:190), in dedicatory rituals or in votive offerings at 
Cerros (Garber 1989; Garber et al 1998:128), and even in New Year celebra­
tions (Garber 1989; Garber et al 1998:130). Taking manos and metates out 
of circulation on these occasions would have been essential for any Classic 
Maya household.
In addition to retaining a surplus of manos and metates for dedication
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and termination, a certain quantity of manos and metates had to be kept on 
hand for other ritual occasions such as deaths in the family, which frequently 
involved burial offerings of manos and metates — this is seen at Muklebal 
Tzul.
Therefore, it can be assumed that two needs pervaded the average Classic 
Maya household: the need to use and eventually discard manos and metates, 
and the need to save manos and metates. On one hand, households uti­
lized grinding implements for domestic purposes (i.e. food processing) and 
spiritual purposes (i.e. offerings) and when these items served their purpose 
they were discarded. On the other hand, households retained a number of 
grinding implements for unpredictable circumstances, such as deaths in the 
family.
5.10 Conclusion: The B laden Case Study
This chapter is concerned with the archaeological research I conducted in the 
Bladen region. The archaeological research required that both fieldwork and 
laboratory work be conducted. The fieldwork involved collecting the geolog­
ical source rock and ground stone artifacts. The laboratory work involved 
petrographic analysis of ground stone artifacts and matching these artifacts 
to their associated geological sources. The Bladen region is unique in that all 
but two valleys have distinct materials, even though the valleys are in close 
proximity. The Bladen region, therefore, provides an ideal setting for recon­
structing an ancient local exchange system. The purpose of this chapter, 
therefore, is to present the Bladen exchange case study and to satisfy two 
objectives. The first objective is to reconstruct an inter-community exchange 
network and the second objective is to investigate ground stone exchange on
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a larger scale for the rest of the Maya lowlands with respect to the Bladen 
region.
With regard to inter-community exchange, the inhabitants of all three 
Bladen centers exchanged ground stone tools. These centers were econom­
ically and probably politically autonomous centers even though they were 
modest in size and each exploited its own distinctive rock resources which 
were then used in the manufacturing of ground stone implements or manos 
and metates. Although there seems to have been a stronger demand for 
the lower Bladen manos and metates, there was also a reciprocal demand 
for what would appear to be lower grade manos and metates from the upper 
Bladen, resulting in a bidirectional flow of the same artifact type. This would 
of course mean that exchange was not governed solely by functional exchange 
incentives. In fact there seems to be a strong symbolic component involved 
in the exchange of manos and metates, which is especially apparent in local 
exchange contexts like the Bladen and as described by Freidel, Suhler, and 
Cobos Palma (1998), Freidel (1998), Garber (1989), and Garber et al (1998).
The export of Bladen ground stone over longer distances to other commu­
nities in the lowlands indicated that there undoubtedly were bounded local 
exchange networks. By bounded I do not mean that these networks did not 
interact with other networks in the Maya area, but rather that they did so ac­
cording to different rules. For example, manos and metates from the Bladen 
were exported to lowland communities outside of the Bladen, but communi­
ties outside the Bladen did not reciprocate with manos and metates in the 
manner in which the Bladen communities exchanged manos and metates.
In addition to reconstructiong inter-community excahnge and investigat­
ing larger-scale ground stone exchange, there is another reason this case study 
is important. Not only is this thesis concerned with taking the first steps
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toward a comprehensive model of cognition, but it is also concerned with 
developing a procedure or methodology for applying whatever is learned to 
archaeology. This case study — although it plays a small role in the devel­
opment of the comprehensive model of cognition itself — serves a purpose in 
describing how a model of cognition can be used in archaeology to propose 
the reconstruction of past mind frames.
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Chapter 6 
Conceiving of Ground Stone 
Exchange in the Bladen Region  
as a Dynamical System
Utilizing the economic approach discussed in Chapter 4 and the account of 
the Bladen ground stone exchange network in Chapter 5, my objective in this 
chapter is to propose that the Bladen exchange can potentially be modeled 
as a credible dynamical system. A credible dynamical system is a dynamical 
system that can be conceived of as actually existing; its existence in the 
present or the past can be supported.
By focusing on the identification of credible dynamical systems in the ar­
chaeological record, I hope to show the way in which a mathematical model 
can be used as an analytical tool for limiting the number of plausible inter­
pretations of the archaeological record. I do this by constructing a math­
ematical model to describe a social process. In turn, this social process is 
seen to contribute to (or is seen to affect patterning) in the archaeological 
record. Through mathematical modeling followed by logical and empirical
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analysis of the model, the case for particular interpretation can be strength­
ened while superfluous interpretations that do not provide plausible results 
can be eliminated (Abramiuk 1999a, 1999b, 1999c). In this way, the process 
of mathematical modeling and analysis is seen as an exercise of elimination 
and not as truth detection.
Using mathematical modeling and analysis as tools for homing in on 
plausible interpretations or models of social phenomena, thereby eliminating 
the implausible interpretations, means that the dynamical systems described 
by the models which survive the process of modeling and analysis can be 
seen to constitute what I refer to as credible dynamical systems1 (described 
by plausible models). These are dynamical systems that can be conceived 
of as actually having existed. Whether the particular dynamical system 
that is modeled and analyzed is actually the system that effected the social 
phenomenon in question can only be elucidated by the continuing process of 
proposing counter models to describe the phenomenon in an equal or more 
accurate manner.2 Therefore, it is important to make clear that my approach 
does not lead to the claim that a credible dynamical system is the actual 
system that elicited the social phenomenon, but only that the dynamical 
system modeled is among a class of likely candidates. The approach I take 
moves toward an objective archaeology, but does not fall into the trap of 
claiming to be a pure objective approach. An illustration of how the concept 
of credible dynamical systems can be used to elucidate the archaeological 
record, and how models of such systems can be reconstructed and analyzed
xThe term “credible” is used to emphasize that the existence of the dynamical system 
in question has been supported via modeling and analysis. Often, it will already be implied
in the term dynamical system.
2My mode of inference with respect to thus point is compatible with Karl Popper’s 
(1963) notion of “falsification”.
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is the main point I address in this chapter concerning Bladen inter-community 
exchange.
In order to demonstrate that Bladen exchange can be conceived of as 
a credible dynamical system, a mathematical description or model of the 
Bladen exchange network must be constructed to test whether it is justified to 
claim that Bladen exchange constitutes a dynamical system. In this chapter 
I concentrate on the construction and assessment of a mathematical model 
of the exchange network; I base the model on archaeological, geological, 
ethnohistoric, and ethnographic data. Dynamical systems have cognitive 
implications. Therefore, in addition to showing that Bladen exchange can 
be described as a dynamical system, I go on to discuss in Chapters 7 and 8 
the cognitive implications of the dynamical system for the Bladen exchange 
network.
The Purpose of the Mathematical M odel of the Bladen Case Study 
for the Thesis
The mathematical model of the Bladen case study is my instrument for 
showing that Bladen exchange constitutes a dynamical system, which is a 
necessary condition for showing that it is a cognitive system in Chapter 7. 
My model describes a cognitive system, not just an economic system, since 
in Chapter 7 it will be shown that my model describes features to which the 
Bladen Maya probably would have been attuned (i.e. it is an emic model). 
Attunement has enormous implications for the study of cognition, since it 
suggests that exchange systems or social systems, which are shown to be 
credible dynamical systems, can be seen to constitute cognitive systems that 
operate separately from an individual’s brain alone — the brain being the 
paradigmatic example of a cognitive system.
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Before it is possible to claim that something is a cognitive system, how­
ever, one must show that it is theoretically sound to claim that Bladen ex­
change constituted a dynamical system. The mathematical model of the 
Bladen exchange network is integral in demonstrating the theoretical sound­
ness of this claim. A procedure of three steps will be followed to assess the 
credibility of claiming that Bladen exchange can be seen as constituting a 
dynamical system. These three steps are outlined below:
1. A mathematical model of Bladen exchange must be constructed which 
shows that Bladen exchange can be conceived of as a dynamical system 
(Section 6.2). This step is essentially proposing a hypothesis. The 
hypothesis in this case is that Bladen exchange is a dynamical system 
described by the mathematical model that is constructed.
2. Measures for the values of the model’s parameters are devised, and 
the values of the parameters are approximated using these measures 
(Section 6.3). This step is also essentially proposing a hypothesis. The 
hypothesis in this case is that Bladen exchange is a dynamical sys­
tem described by the mathematical model that is constructed with the 
values that have been approximated for the parameters.
3. This mathematical model of Bladen exchange with its set parameter 
values, then, must be shown to produce plausible output with respect 
to the ethnographic record (Section 6.4). This step is essentially a 
test of the hypothesis that Bladen exchange is a dynamical system de­
scribed by the mathematical model that is constructed with the values 
measured for the parameters.
It should be pointed out that most mathematical modeling applications 
in archaeology do not go through Step 2. Parameter values are usually
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computed by fitting the model’s output to some set of time variant data. 
However, following a two-step procedure — instead of the three-step proce­
dure as I have outlined — is less rigorous especially for the modeling of more 
complex phenomena. By going through Step 2, an extra check is set in place 
to prevent erroneous models of phenomena from being constructed. I explain 
my approach in more depth below.
6.1 The D irect M athem atical M odeling Ap­
proach
Conventionally, mathematical modeling of dynamical systems (i.e. dynami­
cal mathematical modeling) has been used by the processual archaeological 
school to explain social dynamics, specifically how societies grow. The em­
phasis in this regard has been on explaining the emergence of “civilization” 
or social complexity by using a hypothetico-deductive approach which com­
pares the output of a model (i.e. the values of the variables of a model as a 
function of time) with temporally variant data in the archaeological record. 
The assumptions that many archaeologists involved with systems modeling 
make is that: 1.) There is a process, typically taken to be a social or cul­
tural process, responsible for the state of the archaeological data (Clarke 
1978:42-43), and that 2.) The social process constitutes a (social or cultural) 
dynamical system (Clarke 1978:42-43). Once these assumptions are made 
(often implicitly) then one models the social process as a dynamical system 
using differential equations or maps (see Section 3.2.1). If a model’s output 
fits the data, then it is said that the model or hypothesis describes a dy­
namical system, the behavior of which appears to explain the social process 
that has generated the data. In other words, because the archaeological data
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compares well with model’s output, the social phenomenon in question can 
be explained as a dynamical system represented by the model being posited. 
The approach taken in this chapter with regard to mathematical modeling is 
theoretically compatible with the approach discussed above, but the method 
I involve in testing is different and, though the approach taken in this chapter 
is not commonly utilized in archaeological analysis, it is just as effective, if 
not more effective, than the approach that typically has been used.
The emphasis of my methodological approach, which I refer to as the 
direct approach, is based entirely on describing the social phenomenon in 
question down to the very measures to approximate the parameters in the 
model. It is only when the model has reached this degree of detail that 
the output of the model is compared with data. Overlooking the “descrip­
tion phase” is a methodological error which can have a detrimental effect on 
one’s analysis. The parameters of a model for all intents and purposes define 
the model. If the social process being investigated does indeed constitute a 
(social) dynamical system, then the model meant to reflect the dynamical 
system must be shown to be plausible and this can only be done if the values 
selected for one’s parameters make “theoretical sense” . This is to say that: 
1.) the measures devised for approximating the values of the parameters 
make “theoretical sense”, and 2.) the values themselves make “theoretical 
sense”, which can be tested by comparing the model’s output with actual 
data. If both of these steps are adhered to, then one’s proposal that the 
social phenomenon being investigated constitutes a credible dynamical sys­
tem described by the model being posited is more easily defendable from the 
accusation that there are a profusion of models that can fit a given data set. 
This criticism in general has been a weakness in mathematical modeling pro­
cedure in archaeology and a contributor in the downfall of the concept of the
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“system” in archaeology. This is because if there are a multitude of models 
of dynamical systems that generate the same results as one’s hypothesized 
model, then the credibility of one’s explanation of the social phenomenon in 
question as a particular dynamical system is greatly diminished.
It is important that I clarify that the models I am referring to here are dy­
namical in the sense that they are used to describe actual dynamical systems. 
The dynamical mathematical model constitutes a differential equation or a 
system of differential equations which describes an actual dynamical system, 
whose states are represented by the model’s variables and whose constraints 
are denoted by the model’s parameters. The variables constitute functions 
of time and whereas the parameters constitute constants.
6.1.1 T he Im portance o f a M o d el’s Param eters and  
Two Approaches for D eterm in in g  Their Values
Depending on the goals of the modeler, it is frequently the case that numerical 
values need to be computed for the parameters in the model of the social 
phenomenon in question. For the analyst whose goal it is to demonstrate that 
a social phenomenon constitutes a credible dynamical system, the parameters 
that describe the constraints of dynamical systems are probably the most 
important features in a mathematical model. This is because parameters 
need to be assessed if there is to be any theoretical feasibility to the claim 
that a social phenomenon constitutes a dynamical system.
The values of the parameters of a model describing a dynamical system 
can be ascertained using two approaches: an indirect approach or a direct 
approach. Which one of the two approaches an archaeologist uses to ascertain 
the values of the model parameters, depends on the hypothesized dynamical 
system that the archaeologist is modeling and the kind of data available to
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the archaeologist.
Indirect Determination of Parameter Values
In the indirect approach the values for the parameters of models are ascer­
tained. That is, the values for parameters in models generally are ascertained 
by seeking the values that fit the model’s output to some temporally variant 
data set.3 This stands in contrast with directly measuring values for the 
parameters of a model, which is the hallmark of the direct approach to be 
discussed in the next section.
In the indirect approach, a model describing some social phenomenon 
is adopted from non-archaeological literature and then transposed onto an 
archaeological case study and utilized in explaining a certain set of temporally 
variant archaeological data in terms of a dynamical system. Eighmy’s (1979) 
work is a perfect example of this. Eighmy is interested in demonstrating the 
veracity of the claim that population growth was density dependent among 
the Anasazi pueblos. The model he uses is based on the logistic differential 
equation (i.e. ^  = ax — bx2), the solution of which is a well established 
growth model for many organisms including humans. Here, the population 
reflected in the cumulative distribution of cut timber for roofs, denoted by 
x , grows at a rate represented by the parameter, a, and diminishes at a rate
3 By temporally variant archaeological data, I mean archaeological data that are chang­
ing through time. For the mathematical modeler, the temporally variant archaeological 
data are synthesized in such a way that they may be regarded to be representative of the 
states of some (social) dynamical system, described by the variables of a mathematical 
model. That Ls to say that the archaeologist implicitly hypothesizes that the temporally 
variant archaeological data are the product of some (social) dynamical system and that 
the archaeological data represent the states of this system. Thus, in considering the ar­
chaeological data, one is in fact considering the states of a hypothesized dynamical system.
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represented by the parameter, b.
The way the indirect method determines the values of parameters is by 
varying them in the model until they generate the best fitting output to the 
archaeological data. Each parameter value produces an associated model 
output which is then fitted to the temporally variant data points obtained 
from the archaeological record. The goal of the fitting procedure, then, is 
to arrive at the best fit between the model’s output through time and the 
archaeological data points though time. When the best fit is computed, the 
associated parameter values which were used to generate that best fitting 
model output are the values determined to be the correct values. Often, this 
fitting is accomplished through least squares regression (Shennan 1997:135- 
144) and is frequently depicted graphically as the model output (i.e. a trend- 
line) among actual data points in the archaeological record. The goodness 
of fit between the trend-line of the model’s output and the archaeological 
data is in effect determined by an R-squared value — a high value implying 
a good fit and a low value implying a poor fit.
How an analyst using the indirect approach is able to explain a social pro­
cess often goes unnoticed by the analyst. However, this still does not change 
the fact that there is an epistemological foundation underlying the indirect 
approach. In the indirect approach, an explanation of the archaeological data 
is achieved when the model of the hypothesized dynamical system produces 
output that concurs with the set of archaeological data reflecting the states 
of the (social) dynamical system. That is, when a model’s output and a dy­
namical system’s states coincide, one’s model explains the social process in 
question — it explains the process as the result of a dynamical system. An 
example of an explanation of this kind can be found in Eighmy’s (1979) re­
search discussed above. In applying the indirect approach to his Anasazi case
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study, Eighmy ascertains the values of the parameters in his model by fitting 
the output of the model to actual data (i.e. in his case, cumulative distribu­
tion of cut timber for roofs). The fact that the the output generated by the 
model can be made to fit the time variant data is seen by Eighmy as support 
for his explanation of how Anasazi population grew the population grew 
in a density-dependent fashion described by the logistic model.
The key point to remember with regards to the indirect approach, how­
ever, is that the parameter values are not really tested since they are not 
independently measured. Rather the values for the parameters are arrived 
at by fitting the output of the model to the data. In other words, the pa­
rameters are inductively obtained. An indirect modeling procedure, such as 
the one I have just described, can be used in obtaining an explanation of the 
social process in question along with a mathematical description of the pro­
cess, but it is wise to note that such a procedure can be made more rigorous 
if the parameters are tested instead of arrived at inductively. Indirect de­
termination of parameters is an extremely useful procedure to determine pa­
rameters in models describing straightforward or well-understood dynamical 
systems (e.g. population growth and supply and demand). This is because 
the models that describe these kinds of dynamical systems are extremely well 
established in describing their associated social processes and because they 
make “theoretical sense” (Eighmy 1979:209). However, in more complex dy­
namical systems, particularly nonlinear dynamical systems, the number of 
possible models that makes “theoretical sense” increases, and it therefore 
becomes necessary to test the assumptions upon which the measures for the 
parameters are based.
261
Direct D eterm ination o f Param eter V alues
There does exist another approach for ascertaining values for the parame­
ters of a dynamical mathematical model. A model can be constructed from 
scratch using archaeological data to describe a specific social process hypoth­
esized to have existed in the past. In this approach the archaeological data 
serve as a means for measuring the values of one’s model parameters directly 
rather than indirectly by fitting model output to time variant archaeologi­
cal data. Whereas, in the indirect approach, archaeological data represent 
the states of a hypothesized dynamical system (i.e. the dynamical system’s 
output), in the direct approach, archaeological data are used to devise ways 
to conceive of the constraints of a hypothesized dynamical system. Thus, in 
considering the archaeological data, the direct approach is concerned with 
the constraints of the hypothesized dynamical system, rather than its states 
as is the case for the indirect approach.
The objective of the direct approach is to use the archaeological data to 
approximate the values of the parameters of the model describing a (social) 
dynamical system. In the direct approach, explanation of a social process is 
achieved when theoretically satisfactory measures for its model’s parameters 
are devised and when the model produces plausible output (i.e. variables), 
which compares well with what would be expected if the social process con­
stituted a dynamical system described by the model. Ideally, temporally 
variant archaeological data would consist of useful state values against which 
one could test the model’s output, but this need not be the case. The fact 
that the model in the direct approach is constructed to describe a particular 
social process and the fact that the parameters themselves are directly ap­
proximated from the archaeological record provides the model with a lot of 
opportunity to generate implausible output. So as long as the output pro-
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duced by the model is plausible (e.g. with respect to ethnographic and or 
ethnohistoric data), it can be seen to pass the test of veracity. In short, two 
things can be seen to be happening. The first is that, in testing a model’s 
plausibility, one is supporting the notion that the social process in question 
constitutes a dynamical system. And the second is that in testing a model’s 
plausibility, one is being provided with a description of this dynamical system 
in the form of a mathematical model.
The way the direct method estimates the values of parameters is by in­
dependently deriving measures for the parameters based on reasoning and 
information gleaned from the archaeological record. While independently 
deriving measures for parameters is not commonly used in the archaeological 
record, it is commonly utilized in economics as well as the hard sciences, such 
as physics. In physics, parameter values need not be obtained through fitting 
model output to data, but can be obtained directly. To take a paradigmatic 
example from physics, suppose we are provided with the model, =  3x, 
which is meant to describe the momentum (i.e. p — 3rr), of a mass, m, along 
the earth’s surface a t sea level. Further suppose that we do not know what 
the value for the mass, denoted by the parameter m, is, but we do know 
what its weight, W , is. In physics, there is no need to fit the solution of this 
linear differential equation to a time variant set of empirical data gathered 
by observing the displacement, rr, of the mass through time. Instead, the 
value for m  can be obtained independently using a measure derived by New­
ton himself, which is that mass times acceleration equals force (or weight) 
(i.e. W  — ma). From this simple measure for force, one can easily obtain 
the value for m  by dividing the weight W  by a (i.e. a is simply the earth’s 
gravitational acceleration at sea level, namely 9.80m /s 2). In effect, the fact 
that the values of the parameters can be obtained directly rather than in­
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directly strengthens the plausibility of the model, m ^  = 3a;. That is, the 
model makes “theoretical sense” because the measures for the parameters 
do and, as such, it can be stipulated that the dynamical system which the 
model describes constitutes a credible dynamical system.
The direct approach is especially useful in hypothesizing nonlinear mod­
els, where a model may have a profusion of different outputs that can fit a 
given situation. Take the logistic model used to model population growth, 
defined by ^  =  ax — bx2, where x  denotes the population as a function of 
time, and a and b are parameters describing the rates of growth and sta­
bilization, respectively. The output of this model is not necessarily unique 
to this model. In fact, there are a multitude of models that can more or 
less mimic the output generated by the logistic model if the parameters and 
initial conditions of the models are chosen properly. Three such models that 
can mimic the logistic model’s output are: ^  =  ax — ^  =  ax — bx3,
and ^  =  ax2 — bx4.
In general modeling procedure, it can be stated that the lower the a pri­
ori probability of building an invalid model, the less we learn from a good 
fit between model output and a set of temporally variant data (Mark Lake, 
personal communication 2004). The motivation behind the direct approach, 
therefore, is to increase the a priori probability of building an invalid model. 
That way, a good fit between model output and real data becomes consider­
ably more significant to the analyst. By independently deriving the measures 
for the parameters, the a priori probability of building a bad model is in­
creased. This is because there are now more opportunities for the model to 
go wrong (e.g. the derived measures for the parameters could be wrong, the 
general structure of the model could be wrong). Therefore, as a result of 
independently measuring the parameters, much more is learned from a good
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fit between a model’s output and a set of time variant data. If, then, the 
model, for which measures have been devised and approximated for the pa­
rameters, does produce output that coincides with actual temporally variant 
data, it is reasonable to propose that the model is a plausible one. This 
is because the odds that a model, which is constructed from scratch with 
independently derived measures for its parameter values, produces plausible 
output are extremely low — far too low to be chance occurrence. Whereas 
the direct approach may not be the best method for obtaining precision es­
timates for the parameters of a model, it is an extremely rigorous method 
that can be used to support the notion that the social process being modeled 
constitutes a credible dynamical system described by one’s model.
An important point to remember is that, in the direct approach, pa­
rameter values function as hypotheses which are subsequently supported de­
ductively. In the direct approach, the parameter values are computed by 
measures independently derived by the archaeologist, and the values are sup­
ported deductively since the values are tested when the model is shown to 
generate realistic output using the parameter values. In this way, the values 
of the parameters are tested, while the explanations of the measures derived 
for approximating the parameter values argue the theoretical feasibility of 
using those parameter values in the first place. In any new model being con­
structed, the direct approach is critical since it enables the modeler to make 
“theoretical sense” of a model. This cannot be done if parameters are com­
puted solely by fitting a model’s output to temporally variant archaeological 
data. It is through the direct approach that one can show support for the 
fact that what is being modeled constitutes a credible dynamical system.
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D iscussion o f Approaches to  D eterm in ing Param eter Values
What has been provided is an outline of two different approaches that an 
archaeologist can use when modeling dynamical systems. The conventional 
way models are constructed is by adopting models from other disciplines. Ar­
chaeologists involved in mathematical modeling, however, must move beyond 
adopting models from population studies and other disciplines and begin con­
structing models of their own using the archaeological record as the basis for 
the information with which to construct the models. Information from the 
archaeological record and ethnographic and ethnohistoric sources can be used 
to construct a mathematical model as well as be used to devise measures for 
the values of the parameters in the model.
As I have alluded to throughout this section, both indirect and direct 
approaches are necessary. The indirect approach can be employed on well 
established models and for the final stages in achieving accuracy in the values 
of one's parameters (i.e. fine-tuning). The direct approach is necessary 
for constructing models which are complex and models in which theoretical 
veracity must be demonstrated. The ideal situation, then, is one in which the 
archaeologist has access to temporally variant archaeological data reflecting 
the output of the (social) dynamical system one is proposing existed, as well 
as archaeological data from which the values of parameters may be measured. 
Unfortunately, the archaeological record is such that it is often depleted of 
one or the other kind of data. For those analyses where there are temporally 
variant archaeological data, the indirect approach is obviously the easiest way 
to model a social process. On the other hand, if there is more information 
pertaining to how the parameters of a model should be measured, then clearly 
the direct approach should be used. Both approaches have their weaknesses. 
For the indirect approach it is the problem of showing that the model makes
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“theoretical sense”, and for the direct approach the problem seems to be 
attributed to a lack of precision of the parameters’ values. The modeler in 
either case must work to the best of his or her ability with the imperfect data 
to which he or she has access. In the case of the Bladen Branch communities, 
there is much more evidence pertaining to the parameters of the model that 
I construct, and this means that the direct approach will be utilized.
6.2 M athem atical M odeling Classic Maya Ex­
change A long the B laden Branch in the  
M aya M ountains
The objective of this chapter is to show how Bladen ground stone exchange 
can be conceived of as a dynamical system. In order to accomplish this I must 
use mathematics, specifically differential equations, to preserve the concep­
tual purity of the notion of a dynamical system as was discussed in Section
3.2.1. It is also important to describe Bladen exchange mathematically in 
order for Bladen exchange to be reproduced and in so doing to be provided 
with output which can then be compared with ethnographic data. A close 
resemblance of the output of the mathematical model and ethnographic data 
will indicate that ground stone exchange can be regarded as a credible dy­
namical system and that the mathematical model describing it is an accurate 
one. Ascertaining the credibility of Bladen exchange as a dynamical system 
is the subject matter of Section 6.4.
The purpose of this section is to construct a mathematical model of 
Bladen exchange. The mathematical model constructed in this section de­
scribes the manner in which manos and metates were produced and dis­
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tributed among the Bladen communities — the output of the model being 
the number of manos and metates that accumulated at the households of the 
communities. The model I construct could be regarded as a macroeconomic 
model (Turner 1993:24-33) describing economic growth with respect to one 
good, namely manos and metates, rather than a model involving transac­
tions. In this way, exchange is an implicit feature in the model. That is, 
manos and metates were being supplied to consumers and in return, the 
suppliers were given goods and/or services in return. But what these goods 
were that were exchanged for the manos and metates is not important for 
this model, since my model is looking at only one side of the exchange process 
— the supply side — and the resulting manos and metates that accumulated 
at the households.
As I have already discussed in Section 5.8, the kind of exchange that was 
responsible for the movement of ground stone within the Bladen region was 
different from the exchange that was responsible for the movement of ground 
stone outside the Bladen region. Whereas the movement of ground stone 
within the Bladen was bidirectional, comprising a recurrent network, the 
movement of ground stone between the Bladen sites and the larger lowland 
sites outside of the Bladen was unidirectional. This probably had something 
to do with the fact that much of long-distance trade was down-the-line trade 
and was therefore segmented.
This segmentation would have had the effect of destroying any origi­
nal contextual symbolism that ground stone held for the inhabitants of the 
Bladen region. That is, the ground stone would not have had the same 
meaning for the inhabitants of the communities outside of the Bladen that 
imported the Bladen ground stone as it had for the inhabitants of the Bladen 
communities. This would imply that Bladen exchange constituted a system.
268
6.2.1 B laden Ground Stone E xchange as a D ynam ical 
System
A system  is an interrelated “network of attributes or entities forming a 
complex whole” (Clarke 1978:43). The notion of a network described as a 
“whole” would imply that a system is bounded (van Gelder and Port 1995:5). 
I identify the interrelated entities and the boundedness in Bladen exchange 
below:
• The interrelated entities in Bladen ground stone exchange constitute 
the members of households within the different communities that were 
engaged in the production, distribution, and utilization of the ground 
stone implements. The flow of ground stone and its associated effect 
on the level of ground stone at the households constitutes the means 
by which these entities were related.
• Bladen ground stone exchange is bounded by the manner in which 
manos and metates were regarded, which clearly was different from 
the way they were regarded outside of the Bladen region. This differ­
ence in meaning that manos and metates held can be inferred by the 
differences in the directions that manos and metates moved within the 
Bladen region and outside the Bladen region.
There is something fundamentally different between an exchange system 
in which transactors from different communities could have frequent one- 
on-one interaction with each other (i.e. local exchange) and an exchange 
system in which one-on-one interaction was infrequent (i.e. long-distance 
trade). Because of the proximity of the communities, Bladen exchange would 
have been the kind of exchange in which there would have been one-on-one
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contact. Exchange would have been utilized to maintain social relations 
between the members of different communities. This would have opened up 
informational channels between the members of different communities which 
would have been necessary if ground stone was to have meaning for the 
transactors, that is, if there was to be any inter-community understanding 
of how ground stone implements were to be utilized. By maintaining these 
ties, not only was exchange used to establish a fluid system of communication 
whereby individuals could exchange information and socialize, but it enabled 
the ground stone tool producer to build up a regular clientele or demand for 
his ground stone, and in so doing keep the movement of ground stone flowing 
between the Bladen communities.
A dynamical system is a system that changes through time (Hirsch 1984:3), 
and this again describes Bladen exchange. Populations rise, people utilize 
manos and metates in food processing and rituals, and as a result manos 
and metates fall out of circulation necessitating the need to replenish the 
implements. As a result I will consider ground stone exchange in the Bladen 
region to be a dynamical system throughout the modeling process. I make 
this assumption initially with the knowledge that in Section 6.4 I will as­
sess the credibility of conceiving of Bladen exchange as a dynamical system. 
If the model produces plausible output the conception of Bladen exchange 
as dynamical system is supported and so is the assumption with which I 
started. If the model produces very different output, then the conception of 
Bladen exchange as a dynamical system in the way I have modeled it is not 
supported.
As I have already explained in Section 3.2.1, dynamical systems can be 
described using differential equations and I will utilize this means to describe 
the Bladen exchange system. I begin with the important macroeconomic
270
concept of production.
6.2.2 Ground Stone P rod uction  in th e  B laden R egion
There axe problems with blindly adopting modern economic equations to de­
scribe production in the Maya area. This is because modern economics relies 
on the notion of physical capital for motivating production and there is no 
evidence to suggest that physical capital was integral in driving production 
in the Maya area (Abramiuk 2004). Also, modern macroeconomic equations 
are based on the assumption that economic systems are stable (i.e. a substan- 
tivist assumption), and therefore economists depend on production functions 
in the models of economic systems which can force the models of these eco­
nomic systems into stability (Uzawa 1963; Inada 1963). What is needed for 
ground stone production is a simple production function that does not rely 
on the notion of physical capital and which is not built on the a priori as­
sumption that production induces economic stability. Attempts have been 
made to introduce the notion of social capital as a substitute for physical 
capital (Abramiuk 2004), but the problem with introducing social capital in 
place of physical capital is that it requires more data on how Classic Maya 
engaged in exchange than is presently available. Another problem is that we 
must in some manner be able to measure social capital, which is not entirely 
impossible, but it requires an external index with known social capitalistic 
characteristics. As a result, the social capital approach sometimes leads into 
the area of speculation.
The production function, which I propose for the average Classic Maya 
household is a linear production function defined by:
f i x , )  = rxj  (6.1)
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In this production function:
• f{xj)  is the output in number of manos and metates being produced 
at a community, Cj.
• Xj is the input and represents the frequency (level) of manos and 
metates being utilized at an average household in community, C j .4
• r  is the rate at which a unit of input is converted into output or, 
specifically, the rate a mano and metate being utilized at an average 
household triggers the production of newly manufactured manos and 
metates. The rate, r, will be taken to be proportional to the rate at 
which manos and metates are depreciating through usage, which will 
be discussed in the next subsection.
The production function defined by Equation 6.1 does not rely on capital 
as did the previous production function and it therefore assumes that the 
number of manos and metates must be replenished as soon as one is taken 
out of circulation either through ritual or through depreciation in the food- 
processing process. Equation 6.1, therefore, can be said to be driven simply 
by the need to maintain a certain level of manos and metates in the household.
4The average household is defined as a group of individuals that engage in production 
and consumption together. In other words, the household is considered to be an economic 
unit which arises out of economic necessity as well as out of familial obligations or co- 
residential obligations. It will be assumed that the household coincides with the residents 
of a dwelling, since co-residents often work and live together. The number of members in a 
household or economic unit may vary and this is reflected in the size of the dwelling (Naroll 
1962). Settlement area can be translated into population using Naroll’s (1962) formula of 
10m2 of settlement area per person. This estimate agrees with the ethnographic evidence 
and is the most dependable estimate that Maya archaeologists have, as I argue in Abramiuk 
(1998).
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Also, note that this model does not suffer from the same assumption of 
diminishing returns to production and as a result, no assumption as to the 
economic system’s stability in which it is featured is made.
6.2.3 D epreciation  o f M anos and M etates and M odel 
for Exchange in th e  B laden  R egion
As I alluded to in the last subsection, production is driven by the need to 
replenish depreciating manos and metates (i.e. manos and metates that are 
falling out of circulation either through ritual or domestic wear as well as 
population growth). Like the production function described by Equation
6.1, mano and metate depreciation can be represented by a linear differential 
equation, namely:
= - ( n  +  5)xi(t) (6.2)
at
In this model:
• Xi(t) describes the mano and metate frequency (i.e. the number of 
manos and metates in use) through time at the average household in 
community, C*.
• describes the change in frequency of manos and metates per av­
erage household per unit time.
• n is the population growth rate.
• 8 is the rate of depreciation of manos and metates that are falling out 
of circulation either through ritual or domestic wear.
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Equation 6.2 describes the situation where the frequency of manos and 
metates per average household naturally decreases as manos and metates 
wear down or taken out of circulation. Similarly, the frequency of manos and 
metates per average household should decrease as the number of households 
grows. The premise behind this latter point is that a growth in households 
will effectively decrease the amount of manos and metates for each household 
incrementally. That is, as the number of households rises, there will be less 
manos and metates to go around to each household.
Together the production function described by Equation 6.1 and the dif­
ferential equation for depreciation described by Equation 6.2 forms the fol­
lowing differential equations for i number of production centers:
= - ( n  +  S)xi(t) +  ci:jPjrXj(t) +  /*(£). (6.3)
j = 1
In this linear differential equation:
• Xi(t) describes the mano and metate frequency (i.e. the number of 
manos and metates in use) through time at the average household in 
community, Ci.
• describes the change in frequency of manos and metates per av­
erage household per unit time.
•  Xj ( t ) is the input and represents the frequency (level) of manos and 
metates being utilized with respect to time at an average household in 
community, Cj.
•  m  is the total number of production centers or communities in the 
inter-community exchange network being considered.
274
• r is the rate at which a unit of input is converted into output or, 
specifically, the rate at which a mano and metate being utilized at 
an average household triggers the production of newly manufactured 
manos and metates.
• n  is the population growth rate.
• ^ is the rate of depreciation of manos and metates that are falling out 
of circulation either through ritual or domestic wear.
• pj is community Cj's  proportion of the output produced in the inter­
community exchange network being considered (i.e. dj  G [0,1]). It 
represents the relative economic strength of the community doing the 
producing.
• dj  is the the proportion of output produced from a particular commu­
nity, Cj,  which is being allocated to Ci (i.e. d j  G [0,1]). The param­
eter, dj-, is ultimately influenced by what the producers of manos and 
metates at Cj were getting from consumers a t Ci in exchange for the 
manos and metates.
•  Ii(t) an external input consisting of imported manos and metates from 
outside of the inter-community exchange network in question.
6.2 .4  R ew riting Equation 6.3
The last subsection has provided some insight into how we may fit Equation 
6.3 to the three economic hubs in the Bladen region. By utilizing the notion 
that imports can be regarded as goods absorbed into the Bladen system, we 
can rewrite Equation 6.3 in the following way:
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— = ~ Ax\{ t )  +  r{[&n +  ku\x i( t )  +  ki2X2(t) +  ki3x3(t)} (6.4)
a t
 =  —A x 2 ( t )  r {k ,2 \X\{ t )  - f  [k22 +  k 2 l \x 2 ( t )  +  ^ 2 3 ^ 3 ^ ) }  ( 6 .6 )at
dx^ p - = - A r 3(t) +  ^ {^32^ 2( )^ +  [km +  k3I\x3(t)}, (6.6)at
where A = n + 8 and kij = Cijpj. (Note that kn =  cupi and it designates the 
proportion of imports from outside of the Bladen being allocated to each of 
the Bladen sites, Ci.) In these equations, x\(t)  is the frequency of manos and 
metates in the average household at Muklebal Tzul, ^ ( t )  is the frequency 
of manos and metates in the average household at Ek Xux, and x3(t) is
the frequency of manos and metates in the average household at the Lower
Bladen sites, and they only represent nonnegative numbers.
As the reader can see, the above three coupled linear differential equa­
tions can be used to describe how ground stone levels or frequencies changed 
continuously through time at the average household in each of the Bladen 
communities. The dynamical system, however, that these equations describe 
is unstable for the values I have estimated. This would imply that households 
would have no limits on the quantity of ground stone they maintained. Since 
this is unrealistic, a saturation point will be introduced, which will act as a 
controlling mechanism for the system.
It seems reasonable to expect that producers would not increase produc­
tion of manos and metates just because the quantity being consumed by a 
household kept on increasing. The lack of extremely large amounts of manos
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and metates at households suggest that there was a point at which producers 
began supplying households at a constant rate rather than an increasing rate. 
In the beginning of the Bladen system’s development there were undoubt-
of the food-processing that was required of a household. As such it seems 
reasonable to assume that the rate at which producers supplied manos and 
metates to households would have increased until this threshold was reached. 
And after the household frequency of manos and metates had reached this 
threshold, production would have simply supplied households at a relatively 
constant rate. This is supported by the fact that there are no indications of 
large-scale workshops in the Bladen region which would have been required 
if an increasing production rate was to be sustained.
In this way, instead of using the production function f (x )  = rx, a better 
approximation for the production function would be:
Assuming that at least two grinding implements were needed per house­
hold (two is the mode of metate frequencies in Hayden and Cannon’s (1984:70) 
ethnographic observations), then it would appear that two manos and metates 
is a good approximation for the threshold, 6. That is, until the threshold is 
reached, manos and metates will be produced in an increasing fashion, when 
this saturation point of two is reached, producers will begin producing and 
supplying households at a constant rate.
Substituting this saturation function for the production function in Equa­
tions 6.4-6.6 gives the following model:
edly households that did not even have enough manos and metates for all
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— = —Axiit)  4  [kn  +  ku\ f (x i )  4- ki2f ( x 2) 4- ki3f ( x 3) (6.7) 
at
— = —Ax2(t) 4  k2i f (x \ )  4- [k22 4- k2j] f (x2) 4- k2^ f(xs) (6-8)
at
— = —Ax3(t) 4  k32f ( x 2) 4- [k^ 4- k3I] f (x3). (6.9)
at
The mathematical model described by Equations 6.7-6.9 is what economists 
would refer to as an exogenous model. That is, the model envisions Bladen 
exchange as being motivated by external factors rather than internal factors 
and they are known as exogenous variables. These external factors, or inputs 
to the system, are population growth and mano and met ate depreciation and 
are together represented by the parameter, A. Both of these inputs can be re­
garded as observable natural and behavioral phenomena occurring outside of 
the economic system in question. This is clearest with regards to population 
growth, but mano and metate depreciation can also be regarded as an ex­
ternally observable process dictated by social environmental circumstances. 
These exogenous factors that pervade outside of the economic system can be 
described formally and measured relatively accurately.
On the other hand, accumulation of manos and metates at households 
constitutes the endogenous variable for the economic system. More precisely, 
the endogenous variables in the Bladen exchange system are the frequencies 
of manos and metates at the average household in each of the Bladen centers.
Equations 6.7-6.9 are deterministic in that when provided with an ini­
tial numerical state, the above equations describe the system’s development 
through time. The development of the system can end at a final state called a
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stable equilibrium, or continue indefinitely, which is often referred to as insta­
bility. Every initial state in a deterministic model of a system has a unique 
trajectory- The equilibria that these trajectories approach is analyzed in 
Appendix E.
6.3 Approxim ating the Values for the Param­
eters in the M athem atical M odel Describ­
ing Bladen Exchange
To finish constructing the mathematical model of Bladen exchange so that 
it may be reproduced to generate an output to be compared with the ethno­
graphic data, it is necessary to approximate the parameters in the model. 
This section devises measures for the parameters in Equation 6.3 and esti­
mates the values for the parameters. Whereas it is important to remember 
that the archaeological data on which I base my estimates of the values for 
the parameters and the methods by which I measure the values for the pa­
rameters may be imperfect, it is also important to realize that these data 
and methods function in effect as hypotheses which are supported when the 
model is shown to produce plausible output.
6.3.1 D eterm in ing th e  N um ber o f G round S tone P ro­
duction  C enters in th e  B laden  Exchange N et­
work (m)
m  is taken to be the number of centers that interact, which in the case of the 
Bladen is three — Muklebal Tzul, Ek Xux, and the Lower Bladen sites. The
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two upper Bladen sites — Ek Xux and Muklebal Tzul — will be considered 
to be distinct communities, whereas the Lower Bladen sites — the Quebrada 
de Oro Ruin and the RHF Site — will be considered to comprise a single 
center. I will sometimes refer to the Lower Bladen sites as a community even 
though technically they occupy different valleys. The reason I will refer to 
the two lower Bladen sites together as a community is that, as I have already 
stated, there is evidence to suggest that these two communities operated as 
a twin-community. This was discussed in Section 5.4.3.
6.3 .2  A pproxim ating th e  H ousehold  G row th and D e­
preciation R ates
The parameters n and S will be considered to be the same for all Bladen 
centers, which amounts to assuming that the growth rates of the centers and 
the grinding implement usage rates at the centers were roughly the same. As­
suming the same growth rates at the communities is a reasonable assumption, 
since the archaeological evidence suggests that the sites were contemporane­
ous, and this means that the communities’ emergence on the scene was likely 
part of the same influx of migrants. Similarly, with regards to the grinding 
implement usage rates, there does not seem to be any compelling evidence 
at this point to suggest that manos and metates were used differently at the 
Bladen sites from other Classic Maya sites.
A scertaining an  E stim ate  for th e  H ousehold  G row th  R a te  (n)
In previous research (Abramiuk 1998), I modeled the palaeodemographic 
growth in the Ek Xux valley and in so doing suggested that a major reason 
for the abandonment of Ek Xux was that the population densities were too 
high to have been supported by the available resources in the valley. That is,
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settlement was expanding beyond the cultivable land available in the valley. 
The settlement area growth was exponential, indicating that the population 
growth conformed to a Malthusian model of growth — at least initially — 
in the development of the Bladen communities. In contrast to the focus of 
my previous research, the focus in this section will be on calculating the 
household growth rate rather than population growth rate. As it turns out, 
the rates are not dissimilar.
To calculate the household growth rate, I counted the number of house- 
mounds in the Ek Xux valley.5 The mechanism that was used to explain 
household growth through time was the developmental cycle (Fortes 1969; 
Freeman 1969; Goody 1969).
The developmental cycle is a well documented phenomenon in which fam­
ilies or households create living areas additional to the primary household 
in regular intervals as new generations arise. The expansion of living areas 
manifests itself in the form of settlement attachments to the primary domi­
cile. The developmental cycle has been documented among the LoDagaba 
(Goody 1969), the Iban (Freeman 1969), and the Classic Maya (Tourtellot 
1988).
Assuming that a developmental cycle occurs every generation and that 
a generation is approximately 20 years (Haviland 1988, Tourtellot 1988), I 
estimate the household growth rate of Ek Xux to be 0.0320 (see Figure l l ) .6
5There could have been hidden settlement, which was not built on any platforms or 
mounds and so my household count is likely lower than the actual number of households
that existed at Ek Xux.
6Assuming settlement area reflects population as Naroll (1962) proposes (i.e. 10m2 of
settlement area per person), the population growth rate at Ek Xux is 0.0294.
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Figure 11: This plot depicts household growth at Ek Xux. The points represent 
the approximate number of households at every generation (20 year interval) after 
the first settlers of Ek Xux came into the valley. The exponential trendline fits the 
data well, giving a household growth rate, n, of 0.0320.
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The Means By W hich Manos and M etates Depreciate
The mano and metate depreciation rate is the rate at which manos and 
metates are diminished by those utilizing the grinding implements in domes­
tic and ritual contexts. Wear rates of manos and metates in Maya prehistory 
can be inferred from ethnographic, epigraphic, and what archaeological evi­
dence there is on the subject.
Below are the two most common means through which manos and metates 
depreciate:
• Manos and metates wear down in food-processing approximately every 
twenty years which is consistent with Hayden’s (1987:15) observations.
•  In addition to this grinding rate, manos and metates were used in ter­
mination rituals (Freidel, Suhler, and Cobos Palma 1998:141; Freidel 
1998:190) dedication rituals or votive offerings (Garber 1989; Garber 
et al 1998:128) and even New Year celebrations (Garber 1989; Garber 
et al 1998:130), which were occasions when old household utensils were 
discarded (Landa, translated by Tozzer 1941:151-152). (Note: This lat­
ter occasion was likely a means of discarding utensils that had already 
been worn down, so it probably did not contribute to the rate of wear.)
Because the New Year was a time in which utensils were ritually destroyed 
in a process connoting death and rebirth, it seems logical to infer that manos 
and metates were used extensively in rituals in the Classic period; perhaps 
only the favorite manos and metates were kept for long periods of time. 
In addition to these ritual uses of grinding implements, manos and metates 
were placed in burials and in caves, as offerings throughout the Bladen region 
(Abramiuk 1996).
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Inferring a Mano and M et ate Depreciation R ate (<5)
Domestic Context It will be assumed that two manos and metates are 
worn down in day-to-day food processing every twenty years, which is 
consistent with ethnographic observations (Hayden and Cannon 1984:70)
D edication/ Termination Context If we assume that structures are con­
structed and reconstructed in synchronization with the developmental 
cycle, then termination and dedication rituals occurred at least every 
20 years. This would mean that at least one mano and metate went 
toward these occasions.
Mortuary Context The Classic Maya were known to have buried manos 
and metates with their deceased. At Muklebal Tzul we have much 
evidence of this occurring. I will therefore propose that approximately 
one mano and metate was used every twenty years in an interment.
This gives a figure of approximately four manos and metates in a 20 year 
interval. This means that a reasonable depreciation rate (<5) for manos and 
metates is 0.20.
Together, the average household growth rate (n) and the depreciation 
rate ((5) give a total growth rate (n +  (5) of 0.23.
6.3 .3  P rovid ing a R ange for r
A specific value for r in Equation 6.3 is difficult to estimate and further work 
needs to go into ascertaining a measure for this parameter, yet the results of 
simulating the exchange model using the measure that I describe below seem 
promising.
Xi is the number of manos and metates that households have which 
prompts production of manos and metates. In this way, r can be regarded as
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a rate of response of the producer. The premise behind this rate is that the 
producer sees how many manos and metates people have in his community 
and from this information decides on how much to produce. If conceived of 
as a rate of production per unit of stock, an approximation for r is difficult 
to ascertain. However, there is another way of conceiving of this measure 
that facilitates in providing an estimate for its value.
How many manos and metates are produced clearly depends on the de­
mand for manos and metates, which of course is dependent on whether or 
not there are other goods in the marketplace that can be used in place of 
manos and metates. In this way, r can be approximated by conceiving of 
it as a measure of how the use-value of manos and metates compares with 
the use-value of other goods rather than a rate. As defined, r is essentially a 
measure of how manos and metates rate with other goods in the marketplace 
and which serve the same purpose of manos and metates, in terms of ritual 
and domestic uses.
There might have been or might not have been goods that could have re­
placed manos and metates in doing the same things that manos and metates 
could do. Surely, no other implement could have been used in the same do­
mestic context as a mano and metate, yet there may have been replacement 
items that could have been used in ritual activities. We know, for example 
that ceramics were used in dedicatory rituals, but whether they could be 
considered equivalents to the mano and metate is difficult to deduce unless 
a thorough investigation of ritual deposits is conducted. Such an investiga­
tion might be able to reveal which ceramic types were associated with ritual 
contexts involving mano and metate deposition which in turn can act as an 
estimate for the number of goods that could replace manos and metates in 
that particular ritual context.
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Such a measure that could be based on such knowledge is:
E
p =  1
z + 1 p
where p denotes the number of functions that manos and metates can serve, 
or number of contexts that manos and metates are found in, and 2 is the 
number of other goods that can serve the same function as a mano and 
metate (i.e. found in the same context with manos and metates). The logic 
of such a measurement is as follows:
• The more functions or purposes that a mano and metate serves, the 
more valuable it is. Thus, a large p results in a high value for the mano 
and metate.
• The more goods there are that can replace manos and metates in serv­
ing a particular purpose, the less valuable is the mano and metate. 
Thus, a large z results in a low value for the mano and metate.
Based on the information we have at this time, the number of contexts I 
have deduced for manos and metates is three (i.e. p = 3, which may of course 
change as more information becomes available. Remaining consistent with 
the contexts I have described in the subsection where I deal with mano and 
metate depreciation rate, 6, manos and metates are found in: food-processing 
contexts, dedication/termination contexts, and mortuary contexts.
In the food-processing context, only manos and metates can process food 
in the same way that manos and metates can process food. As for the 
dedication/termination contexts and mortuary contexts we know that there 
is at least one ceramic type that is found in the same context as manos 
and metates. Using this information we can get a value of one for the first
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context, and a value of at least one half for the other two contexts. This 
summed gives us a value range of [1.0,2.0] for r.
6.3 .4  D eterm in in g  Cf  s P rop ortion  o f th e O utput of 
th e  B lad en  E xchange N etw ork  (pj)
Pj can be calculated for the Bladen communities by taking the number of 
artifacts sourced to a particular Bladen site and dividing this number by the 
total number of artifacts sampled at the Bladen sites (i.e. 116). This figure 
includes imported tools (i.e. 6) from outside of the Bladen region, since it 
is assumed that these imports were absorbed into the local Bladen exchange 
system. The imports, like the local stone tools, contributed to the level of 
manos and metates at the households and therefore to the productivity of 
the community. (Note that the Lower Bladen sites, namely Quebrada de 
Oro Ruin and RHF Site, are considered to be one source community since 
evidence suggests that these two communities operated in concert [refer to 
Section 5.4.3 where this was discussed]). Figure 12 summarizes the results 
of computing pj for the Bladen sites as well as the sites outside of the Maya 
Mountains.
Sources
Muklebal (pi) Ek X ux (p2 ) L. Bladen Sites (pa) External Sites (/?/)
Output
Prop.
ITS
17
116
84
116
6
116
Figure 12: The proportions o f the grinding implements produced for the Bladen 
exchange system  by Muklebal Tzul, Ek Xux, the Lower Bladen communities, and 
the communities in the highlands.
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Destinations
Quebrada de Oro RHF Ek Xux Muklebal
Sources
Quebrada de Oro/ 
RHF 25 25 16 18
Ek Xux 1 0 12 4
Muklebal 0 0 2 7
Highlands 0 1 2 3
TOTAL 26 26 32 32
Figure 13: Sampled and sourced ground stone artifacts at the Quebrada de Oro 
Ruin, the RHF Site, Ek Xux, and Muklebal Tzul.
6.3 .5  M easuring th e  P rop ortion s o f D istrib u tion  (c^) 
A m ong th e  B lad en  S ites
With respect to the parameters in Equation 6.7, Qj is the proportion of C /s  
material output being exported to Ci. c^ j satisfies the property, Y l’JLi °%j — 1 
assuming a closed ground stone exchange economy among the Bladen com­
munities. Empirically, this figure can be estimated by the following pro­
portion: the number of grinding implements from Cj found at C* over the 
total number of grinding implements from Cj.  Figure 13 contains all of the 
information necessary for calculating c^s for all of the communities.
From Figure 13 it is easy to calculate the proportions of grinding imple­
ments, Cij, being produced and then distributed among the Bladen sites. I 
have already mentioned that this value can be measured as the ratio of the 
number of artifacts from Cj  at Ci to the total number of artifacts from Cj. 
This implies first combining Quebrada de Oro and RHF into one production 
unit and then dividing each entry in the row by the sum of all of the entries in
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the associated row. The results for the estimates are displayed in Figure 
14.
Destinations
Quebrada de O ro/RH F Ek Xux Muklebal
Quebrada de O ro/
RHF 5084
16
84
18
84
Sources Ek Xux 117
12
17
4
17
Muklebal 09
2
9
7
9
Highlands 16
2
6
3
6
Figure 14: Fractions of output from the Lower Bladen sites, Ek Xux, and Muklebal 
Tzul.
6.3 .6  Im ports and E xp orts
Ii(t) is taken to be imported manos and metates originating from the Maya 
highlands of Guatemala. Imports of manos and metates, unlike exports of 
manos and metates, would have affected the Bladen ground stone exchange 
system, since the imported manos and metates would have been absorbed by 
the Bladen exchange system. Exports would not have affected the exchange 
of manos and metates within the Bladen region, since the nature of the 
economic relations with the Bladen communities’ long distance clients would 
have paralleled but not impacted upon the local exchange system among 
the Bladen communities. Only grinding implements coming into the Bladen 
system will affect the frequency of manos and metates at households within 
the Bladen communities.
In this study, I am strictly concerned with the local economics among 
the Bladen communities, since the exchange relations with non-Bladen corn-
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munities were undoubtedly different. As was discussed in Sections 5.8 and 
5.9, the peer exchange system of the Bladen region is unique in its particu­
lars and is characterized by local dynamics different from the dynamics that 
governed trade relations outside of the Bladen. As a result, exports were 
probably regarded as obligatory and the purpose of export was to maintain 
connections with the rest of Classic Maya civilization. In return for exporting 
grinding implements, the Bladen Maya would have imported all of the goods 
that were not found locally. In short, the motives for exporting grinding im­
plements to the larger lowland centers were different from the motives which 
governed exchange of grinding implements within the Bladen region and as 
a result export did not impinge upon local exchange. Hence, the Bladen 
inter-community exchange system will be treated as being affected negligibly 
by exports — the exchange system’s boundaries extending only as far as the 
symbolism of manos and metates would have permitted (see Section 5.9) — 
and only imports of grinding implements will be considered. The rest of this 
section is dedicated to computing the inputs, /*(£), for Muklebal Tzul, Ek 
Xux, and the Lower Bladen sites in Equation 6.3.
Whereas highland-made manos and metates undoubtedly were special for 
the Bladen inhabitants (i.e. the material used to manufacture the highland 
manos and metates was different from local material), they are found in the 
same contexts as the locally made manos and metates which suggests that 
they were used in the same way as locally made manos and metates. As such, 
the Bladen inhabitants would have endowed these imported objects with the 
same meaning that local manos and metates held. As a result, imports would 
have been absorbed into the system. This can be expressed by the following 
approximation:
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hi t )  «  cupjrxi i t ) .
The reasoning for this approximation is that /*(£), which designates the 
amount of manos and metates produced and supplied to Bladen community 
Cf, would have been relegated by the level of manos and metates at Bladen 
community Ci. In the case of the imports into the Bladen from outside of 
the Bladen, it will be assumed that because of the great cost involved in 
long-distance trade, the producers in the highlands would have based their 
production strategy on information gathered from the communities to which 
they were exporting. That is, highlanders would have decided on how much 
to supply the Bladen communities based on the number of manos and metates 
at Bladen households.
The parameters, cu (i =  1,2,3), can be obtained from the last row in 
Figure 14, whereas the parameter, p/, can be obtained from the last column 
in Figure 12.
6.4 A ssessin g  th e  C redibility  o f B laden Ex­
change as a D ynam ical System
As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter and at the beginning of 
Section 6.2, it is important to construct a mathematical model of Bladen 
exchange so that it can be reproduced. Reproducing Bladen exchange will 
result in output that can then be compared with ethnographic data. Provided 
that the parameters in the model were independently measured, if the output 
of the mathematical model and ethnographic data agree, then it can be 
said that ground stone exchange constitutes a credible dynamical system 
described by the mathematical model.
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In this section I assess the model by comparing the results of the model’s 
output with ethnographic data and I propose an explanation for the results 
that are generated by the model.
6.4.1 R eproducing Inter-C om m unity E xchange in the  
Bladen R egion  by G enerating and A ssessing  O ut­
put from th e M odel
In order to reproduce the inter-community exchange phenomenon in the 
Bladen region, output from the model describing the exchange phenomenon 
must be generated. The manner in which a model’s output is generated is by 
mathematically analyzing the model of Bladen exchange and or numerically 
simulating the model. A mathematical analysis of the model is the preferred 
means of assessing what the model, and hence the dynamical system, can 
and cannot do through time. On the other hand, a simulation of the model 
is a useful means of graphically representing what the dynamical system does 
through time. I utilize both of these means to generate the model’s output 
and I will briefly discuss each in turn.
The mathematical analysis of this model is provided in Appendix E. The 
results of this analysis reveal that this system is quite stable. Specifically 
there exists a stable equilibrium, referred to as “Equilibrium II”, as long as 
the value for the parameter r  lies within the range [0.83, oo), which of course 
it does (recall that the hypothesized range for r  is [1.00,2.00]).
Figure 15 depicts the results of simulating inter-community exchange in 
the Bladen region, based on the mathematical model described by Equations 
6.7-6.9). What is shown by this figure is how manos and metates accumu­
lated at households within the Bladen region and how they eventually reach a
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Household Ground Stone Accumulation in Bladen
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Figure 15: This plot depicts the results of the dynamical system  described by 
Equations 6.7-6.9, where r is randomly fluctuating in the range [1,2]. This uni­
formly random fluctuating parameter causes the deterministic system , described 
by Equations 6.7-6.9, to respond in a stochastic manner. The diagram shows how 
the household level of manos and metates at Muklebal Tzul (x l) ,  Ek X ux (x2), 
the Lower Bladen sites (x3) grew through time. Mano and m etate frequencies at 
households in Ek Xux and Muklebal Tzul approach the same equilibrium point 
along the same trajectory, whereas the frequency of manos and metates at house­
holds in the Lower Bladen sites approaches an equilibrium point along a trajectory 
well above Muklebal Tzul and Ek Xux.
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stable equilibrium. More work needs to be conducted with regard to homing 
in on the parameter values of the model more accurately, but the exchange 
model constructed, thus far, looks promising in describing mano and metate 
accumulation. The trajectories denoting mano and metate frequencies per 
average household in the Bladen lie well within ethnographic specifications7 
for the Maya highland communities of Aguacatenango, Chanal, and San Ma­
teo — a range of [0,9] for manos and a range of [0,8] for metates (Hayden 
and Cannon 1984:70,77) — and this means that Bladen exchange as it is 
described by Equations 6.7-6.9 constitutes a plausible dynamical system.
According to Figure 15, the average frequencies of manos and metates per 
household in the Bladen are greater than the mean frequencies in the ethno­
graphic data — which I calculate from Hayden and Cannon (1984:70,77) to 
be 2.40 for manos and 1.94 for metates — but this could be due to the fact 
that the average frequencies of manos and metates really were greater in the 
Bladen during Classic times. One reason which might explain why mano 
and metate frequency was greater in the Bladen is that mano and metate 
frequency had a greater significance for the Classic Maya inhabitants. I dis­
cuss this in more detail below in pages 299-300, but before I do this I should 
drive home the idea that the model and the measures I devise to approximate 
the parameter values, when the model’s output is tested against the ethno­
graphic data, are credible. Moreover, the credibility of the model reaffirms 
the hypothesis that Bladen exchange does constitute a dynamical system.
7According to Hayden and Cannon (1984), at the time they collected their ethnographic 
data, highland Maya life in the communities that they investigated had not significantly 
changed since before the Spanish Conquest, and so the data collected by them is suggested 
to be representative of the way in which Classic Maya would have lived.
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A Brief Analysis and Discussion o f the Credibility of the Model, 
Its Parameters, and the Dynamical System  It Describes
To demonstrate the plausibility of the model and the credibility of the dy­
namical system it describes, one needs only to show that the output of the 
model conforms to ethnographic specifications with the values that were ap­
proximated for the parameters in the model. In demonstrating this one point, 
provided of course that the explanations of the measures derived for approxi­
mating the parameter values make “theoretical sense” (see Section 6.3), what 
is shown is that the model and its parameter values are realistic. As a result, 
because the output of the model is consistent with the ethnographic data, the 
model and the dynamical system it is supposed to describe are substantiated. 
I will demonstrate what I mean by analyzing a few of the parameters.
The only parameter in the model for which I had no approximation and 
for which a range had to be hypothesized was the parameter, r. The reasons 
for inferring the numerical range for r are detailed in Subsection 6.3.3; the 
range for r was reasoned to be: [1.00, 2.00]. This selected range of parameter 
values, which I will denote by rs, will clearly have an associated range of 
output values from the system, which I will denote by x s.
The model and the underlying dynamical system it describes can be 
shown to be credible if the hypothesized values help the model to gener­
ate plausible output. To do this, it needs to be shown that any output 
(x G xs) produced by an associated parameter value (r 6 r j  is contained in 
the ethnographic range of output, which I will denote by xe (i.e. recall that 
this range is [0,9]). By “any output”, I mean of course the entire trajectory 
x(t). However, since it can be assumed that x(t) > 0 for all t and that the 
initial conditions are smaller than the equilibrium values,8 it needs only to be
8The fact that initial conditions are smaller than the equilibrium values is reasonable
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shown that the equilibrium values of our model’s output (with the selected 
range of parameter values, rs) and not the entire trajectories lie within the 
ethnographic output range, x e (i.e. x s C x e).9
Because we are dealing with only the equilibrium values then clearly xs 
and x e can be seen to be functions </>(rs) and (p(re) of the parameters rs and 
re, respectively. In other words, xs =  4>(rs) and xe =  <fi(re). Therefore, to 
show that any output (x G x s) produced by an associated parameter value 
(r G rs) is contained in the ethnographic range of output (x  G xe), it needs 
only to be shown that (j){rs) C </>(re).
What needs to be computed, then, to determine whether this relationship 
stands is </>(rs), since we already know (f)(re) (i.e. it is [0,9]). Substituting 
my selected range of values, rs, into the function, <fr(rs), describing the equi­
librium value for the system gives a range that does indeed agree with the 
relationship (j>{rs) C </>(re), since (j>{rs) = [2.40, 7.80].10
What this short analysis demonstrates is that the output of the system 
could have produced results outside of the ethnographic range, had different
to expect since it is only later in an economic system’s development that households would
have had an opportunity to accumulate manos and metates.
9It can be assumed the ethnographic range, [0,9], approximates very nearly an equi­
librium range for the ethnographic system. According to Hayden and Cannon’s (1984) 
ethnographic observations, it would seem that the number of manos and metates was be­
ginning to diminish due to the advent of new technology, specifically mechanical grinders, 
and so it can be assumed that the ethnographic system was entering a transition period 
of instability. Thus, if we extrapolate to before this transition, then the range [0,9] can 
be considered to be nearing the end of a long and enduring equilibrium, which may have
stretched back into Classic times as Hayden and Cannon seem to argue.
10Basically this range was computed by going to the analysis of “Equilibrium II” in
Appendix E  and substituting the minimum and maximum values of the range ra into the 
function for the equilibrium while keeping all of the other parameter values in the function 
as they were.
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hypothesized values for r been selected. And this would mean that Bladen 
exchange would not be considered to be a credible dynamical system, since 
its model would not have produced the results expected of it. Fortunately, 
the hypothesis that r should lie in the range rs = [1.00,2.00] withstood 
the test against ethnographic data. That is, any r  within the range, rs, will 
indeed produce output well within the output range dictated by ethnographic 
observations.
Basically, what I am saying is that the procedure for modeling and testing 
acts as a sort of check-and-balance system, and this limits what can be and 
what cannot be considered to be a credible model (i.e. a model describing a 
credible dynamical system). In general, then, modeling and testing can be 
seen as steps in a process by which possibilities are being limited and certain 
explanations are being shown to be better than others.
This same check-and-balance system is also a t work with the other pa­
rameters in the model as well. Take the allocation coefficients ( )  that were 
obtained from the archaeological fieldwork and labwork. These parameters 
mainly affect the relative magnitudes of the output values, but they also 
affect the actual magnitudes of the output values like r  does. Had the re­
sults of the sourcing analysis in the Bladen case study revealed a different 
distribution of artifacts, which would have consequently changed the values 
for Cij, a different output would have been generated which could be seen 
to be inconsistent with ethnographic observations. For example, say that in 
place of Figure 14 my archaeological investigations found the distribution of 
artifacts to be represented by Figure 16, where A , r, 6, and pj were as they 
were (i.e. A  =  0.23, r = 1.50, 6 = 2.00, pi = 0.08, P2 =  0.15, p% = 0.72, and 
pj = 0.05). Then the model will generate output values outside of ethno­
graphic specifications. And this would of course imply that the model and
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the dynamical system it describes are not credible hypotheses. In this par­
ticular hypothetical case, the number of manos and metates per household 
at the lower Bladen communities would be 9.78, which is of course greater 
than 9, the upper limit of the ethnographic range.
Destinations
Quebrada de Oro/RHF Ek Xux Muklebal
Quebrada de Oro/ 
RHF 8084
2
84
2
84
Sources Ek Xux 117
15
17
1
17
Muklebal 09
1
9
8
9
Highlands 66
0
6
0
6
Figure 16: Hypothetical fractions of output from the Lower Bladen sites, Ek Xux, 
and Muklebal Tzul.
The point to be made here which cannot be emphasized enough is that 
different values for the parameters result in different outputs. It is not a 
coincidence that my model with its associated parameter values produced 
the results that it did, and this of course gives my model and the dynamical 
system it describes credibility. Because the values that were measured using 
data from the archaeological case study did actually produce ethnographi- 
cally consistent results, the parameter values, the measures devised for the 
parameter values, the model which incorporates the parameters, and the dy­
namical system that I am assuming is responsible for the output described 
by the model are all given credibility.
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A  D iscussion o f th e  Significance o f M anos and M etates
Manos and metates had and continue to have great significance for the Maya. 
For the contemporary Maya, the significance of manos and metates can be 
obtained from the ethnographic evidence. For the Classic Maya, the signifi­
cance of manos and metates can be inferred from the archaeological record. 
According to the evidence it would seem that there were more roles that 
manos and metates filled during the Classic period which would suggest that 
more manos and metates would have been needed in the average Classic 
Maya household.
Ethnographic evidence from the Maya highlands (Hayden and Cannon 
1984:74) suggests that the frequency of manos and metates is greater in 
households of lineage heads. Hayden and Cannon’s explanation for why 
manos and metates are accumulating in households of lineage heads is that 
lineage heads maintain a surplus of manos and metates to lend or give away 
to lineage members in need of manos and metates, which are used mainly 
for food processing. The process by which the high status household donates 
a mano and metate to a needy household obligates the needy household to 
return the favor in some way. This reinforces the role that the lineage head 
holds, which is the role of provider, and increases the social status of the 
lineage head and his household. In this way, mano and metate frequency is 
very closely associated with social status.
The significance of manos and metates for the contemporary Maya is 
similar to significance of manos and metates for the Classic Maya, but it 
was probably magnified in the case of the Classic Maya. The importance 
that manos and metates held for the Classic Maya can be inferred from 
the archaeological contexts in which manos and metates are found. These 
contexts are mainly ritual contexts as well as domestic contexts. That is,
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manos and metates were used for various offerings and rituals as well as for 
food processing. I discussed this in depth in Section 5.9 as well as in pages 
283-284. Having a significant surplus of manos and metates would have 
indicated self-sufficiency and, much like social status, it would have been a 
feature to which the Classic Maya would have paid attention.
As I stated above, the frequencies of manos and metates generated by the 
model that I constructed of Bladen exchange fall within the range provided 
by the ethnographic data, but they are slightly higher than the mean fre­
quency derived from the ethnographic data. If we interpret the archaeological 
and ethnographic evidence above, an explanation for the slight discrepancy 
could be attributed to the fact that manos and metates served more roles — 
specifically ritual roles — than they did for the contemporary Maya. In this 
way, the average Classic Maya household would have needed to have more 
manos and metates on hand at any given time to fulfill ritual duties than the 
contemporary Maya household which predominantly uses manos and metates 
for food processing.
Furthermore, it should be pointed out that because the frequency of 
manos and metates functioned like social status among contemporary Maya 
and the Classic Maya, the frequency of manos and metates accumulated by 
households can be utilized roughly to gauge social status. Manos and metates 
in this sense can be seen as a kind of currency which, like all currency, has 
a symbolic importance attached to it and which can bestow increased status 
upon the household who wields it.
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6.4 .2  Interpreting th e  T rajectories o f  th e  States o f the  
E xchange S ystem
Because of the significance that mano and metate frequencies held for the 
Maya, the trajectories of the states of the exchange system would have rep­
resented the course of status through time (Figure 15). The closest analogy 
for status that exists in modern economics is wealth or “standard of living”.
Standard of living is a concept that has had a long history of being de­
bated by sociologists and economists, and there are various proposals as to 
how it should be defined (e.g. Cottam and Mangus 1942). For macroe­
conomists, “standard of living” is a term that is used to describe one’s eco­
nomic or material well-being. To be more specific, standard of living refers 
to income in modern economics, and it is determined by a few important 
factors according to Solow (1956), all of which affect the amount of capital 
people have; these factors are population growth, depreciation of capital, and 
savings rate. From an economic standpoint, these factors contribute to the 
economic growth of society and, therefore, the standard of living of people. 
That is, as population and depreciation rates rise there is less capital (i.e. 
wealth) to go around to every person or household. On the other hand, as 
savings rates increase there is more capital to go around. Societies with high 
standards of living, in other words, are those societies that have low rates of 
population growth and capital depreciation, and a high savings rate.
Although mano and metate frequency was an indication of status rather 
than wealth, mano and metate frequency probably would have had a similar 
effect on the Maya as the standard of living does on us today. In other words, 
mano and metate frequency would have functioned as a marginal standard of 
living at the communities, which the inhabitants would have experienced.11
11 Standard of living in modern economies accounts for all of the exchange items (i.e. in
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Therefore the trajectories of the states of the system would have held special 
meaning for the inhabitants of the Bladen Branch.
The inter-community distribution and accumulation of ground stone would 
have likely determined the relative sociopolitical standing of each of the com­
munities. The inhabitants of the Lower Bladen sites would have been the 
primary storers of grinding implements followed distantly by the inhabitants 
of Muklebal Tzul and Ek Xux. This marginal standard of living, which would 
have been higher at the Lower Bladen sites and at Muklebal Tzul than at Ek 
Xux, would have arisen from supra-individual or macroeconomic processes 
and would have constituted a pattern to which all Bladen community mem­
bers would have been attuned. In other words, the marginal standards of 
living at the communities would have constituted an emic social representa­
tion for the Bladen Maya inhabitants.
6.5 Conclusion: A M athem atical M odel o f  
Classic M aya Exchange
In this chapter, archaeological research is utilized to reconstruct an ancient 
Maya economic system in the Bladen region of the Maya Mountains. The 
main purpose of constructing this model is so that certain inferences may be 
drawn, which will facilitate in illuminating the issue of cognition in the next 
chapter. Whilst the model that I have constructed can be utilized to shed 
light on the political economic climate of the Bladen, I focus instead on how 
such systems as I have modeled are integral in forming representations in the 
human mind. In other words, in this thesis, the model constructed as the 
result of archaeological investigation is utilized as a means to an end, rather 
GDP), not just one item as I have modeled here.
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than an end in itself. This is because I am not particularly interested in 
answering questions about the Bladen Maya, so much as I am interested in 
using the Bladen exchange case study to illustrate how a social institutional 
process, such as the exchange of material goods, can be conceived of as a 
dynamical system.
Section 6.2 was dedicated to hypothesizing that Bladen exchange, which 
was examined in the last chapter, could be conceived of as a dynamical sys­
tem. In Section 6.2, not only was it important to show that Bladen exchange 
had all of the properties that are commonly associated with dynamical sys­
tems (i.e. it had interrelated components and bounds), but it was critical 
to model Bladen exchange using mathematics that are used to describe dy­
namical systems, namely differential equations. The purpose of describing 
Bladen exchange mathematically was to capture the conceptual purity of the 
dynamical system provided that Bladen exchange constituted a dynamical 
system. The mathematical modeling of Bladen exchange also permitted me 
to reproduce Bladen exchange, which was the purpose of Section 6.4 and 
which was important for backing the proposal that Bladen exchange consti­
tuted a dynamical system.
Section 6.4 was dedicated to reproducing Bladen exchange through gener­
ating output from the mathematical model which described Bladen exchange. 
In order to do this, parameters for the mathematical model had to be approx­
imated, and only then was output generated from the model. There are two 
ways in which a model generates output and that is through a mathematical 
analysis of the equations which model the phenomenon, or through simula­
tion. Both means were utilized in this thesis. The mathematical analysis of 
the model of Bladen exchange was provided in Appendix E , and the results of 
simulating the model were represented in Figure 15. The results of the model
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were then compared with the ethnographic results provided by Hayden and 
Cannon (1984:70) for contemporary highland Maya. According to Hayden 
and Cannon, at the time they collected their data, highland Maya life in the 
communities that were studied had not significantly changed since before the 
Spanish Conquest, and so the data collected by them is suggested to be rep­
resentative of the way in which Classic Maya would have lived. On the basis 
that Hayden and Cannon’s inferences are correct, the ethnographic data was 
then used to assess the plausibility of the output generated by the model. 
As it turns out, the results from the model agreed with the ethnographic 
results, since the results from the model fell within the ranges provided by 
Hayden and Cannon (1984:70) for contemporary highland Maya. This, in 
effect, supported the notion that Bladen exchange can be considered to be 
a credible dynamical system. The mano and metate frequencies generated 
by the model exhibited slightly higher frequencies than the mean for the 
ethnographic data, however, this slight discrepancy can be attributed to the 
greater number of roles that manos and metates played in the Classic Maya 
period (i.e. ritual as well as domestic).
According to the archaeological and ethnographic, evidence frequencies 
of manos and metates were likely indicators of social status. In a way, the 
significance of manos and metates for the Classic Maya was similar to the 
significance of “standard of living” for us today in that both concepts have 
meaning for their societal members. The mathematical model which I con­
structed described the dynamical system in which frequencies of manos and 
metates at households changed through time. This dynamical system was 
important since it was within the dynamical system that cognition dwelled 
and, in fact, was generated.
A case in point, which will be carried through into the next chapter, are
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the trajectories of the states of the Bladen exchange system that converge on 
the stable equilibrium represented in Figure 15. Not only do these trajecto­
ries constitute a pattern of marginal standard of living for the inhabitants of 
the Bladen communities, but it likewise can be conceived of as constituting a 
cognitive representation for the Bladen inhabitants. In this way, the trajec­
tories not only mean that the exchange system represented a stable economic 
system (approached an economic steady state), but they also mean that if 
we approach exchange from a different angle — that is if we conceive of the 
Bladen exchange system as a cognitive information processing system (i.e. 
like a neural network) — the exchange system’s trajectories translate into 
representations to which the inhabitants of the Bladen communities were cog­
nitively attuned. The support for conceiving of the Bladen exchange system 
as a cognitive system will be presented in the next chapter.
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Part III
The Emergence of 
Supra-Individual Cognition
306
Chapter 7
Information Processing, 
Cognitive System s, and Bladen  
Exchange
The objectives of this chapter are as follows:
• To explain that information processing capability arises in all dynami­
cal systems and therefore in any social or economic system assessed as a 
credible dynamical system (see pages 315-316). For example, because 
the Bladen exchange system was shown to constitute a credible dynam­
ical system, the Bladen exchange system can be conceived of as having 
information processing capability. Information processing capability is 
an essential characteristic of cognition and consists of the capabilities 
to store and retrieve information.
• To demonstrate that the Bladen exchange system constitutes a dynam­
ical system to which the inhabitants of the Bladen communities were 
attuned. The implication of this demonstration is that exchange sys­
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tems and indeed social systems that are shown to constitute credible 
dynamical systems may contain features that are perceptible to the 
people involved in these dynamical systems, thereby rendering these 
systems cognitive systems. Cognitive system s are the bases for generat­
ing cognition and therefore social systems assessed as cognitive systems 
will logically constitute generators of “supra-individual” cognition. In 
supra-individual cognition, information is built into “supra-individual 
memory” and thus stored for all of the individuals involved in the spe­
cific social system to experience as representations.
In the research discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, two cognitive capabilities 
were delineated and were argued to form what can be generally regarded as 
the basis of cogn ition  (see Section 3.5.1). One is perception and the other 
is information processing. In addition to these two cognitive capabilities, 
a third cognitive capability, namely executive control, is also important in 
cognition. However, executive control is generally regarded as characteristic 
of information processing since they are both considered emergent properties 
of dynamical systems (see Section 7.2). I summarize the cognitive capabilities 
of perception and information processing below:
•  P erception , in this thesis, is specifically defined as attunement to 
features — states or constraints — of a dynamical system. This ex­
tends Turvey and Carello’s (1995) definition of perception in which 
perception is defined as attunement to only the invariant aspects of a 
dynamical system (i.e. constraints). However, it will be shown in this 
chapter that individuals can also be seen to be attuning to the varying 
aspects of a dynamical system (i.e. states). Moreover, it is the varying 
aspects of a dynamical system that permit the individual perceiver to 
process information supra-individually. In this more general notion of
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perception, a constraint or a state  of the dynamical system is potential 
information for the perceiver.
When information is perceived, the information constitutes a represen­
tation  in the brain of the individual. Because the process in which 
information is being perceived is in and of itself a dynamical system 
(e.g. the dynamical system that produces an image on your retina and 
neurally processes this image), a representation can be regarded as a 
feature of a dynamical system manifested as a pattern in the brain (i.e. 
a mental pattern). The basis upon which perception emerges is the 
cognitive system , which for pragmatic purposes is a dynamical system 
comprising the body, its associated nervous system (i.e. the individ­
ual), and the environment (van Gelder and Port 1995:3). Environment 
is a relative term and I use it to reflect the context in which an object 
is situated. For example, if the object of discussion is the individual, 
then the environment consists of the natural and social phenomena oc­
curring outside of the individual. If the object of discussion is a neuron, 
then the environment comprises its linkages with other neurons in the 
nervous system.
• In fo rm atio n  processing  refers to processes governing how informa­
tion is stored or retrieved. Though information processing is usually 
taken to be a product of computation, information processing is in its 
natural form as a dynamical system as I discussed in Chapter 3. As 
such, a dynamical system  (rather than computation) will be considered 
to be the basis upon which information processing capability emerges. 
The dynamical system will also be the basis upon which executive con­
trol emerges, which means that information processing and executive 
control will generally co-occur.
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In general, cognitive processes that are involved in manipulating rep­
resentations within the nervous systems of many biological organisms 
(i.e. learning and recalling) can be conceived of as information pro­
cessing. This is because representations are information, or patterns 
which are meaningful to a subject. For example, the act of learning 
representations can be explained (via information processing) as the 
process by which patterns are stored. Similarly, the act of recalling 
representations from memory can be explained (via information pro­
cessing) as the process by which patterns are retrieved from storage. 
Here, memory is envisioned as a store in the brain for representations.
Information processing, however, is more than just a metaphor for cog­
nition. The information processing paradigm has proved successful in 
explaining cognitive processes since the 1950s (see Section 2.3.2) and, 
as a result, is the main way in which scientists conceive of cognitive 
processes (Reisberg 1997).
7.1 Inform ation P rocessin g  and M em ory
Information processing consists of the capabilities to store patterns and re­
trieve patterns from storage, thereby generating patterns. The functional 
phenom enon of inform ation processing is attributable to all dy­
namical system s.
7.1.1 In form ation  P ro cess in g  is a F undam ental P rop­
erty  o f  A ll D y n a m ica l S ystem s
The concept of a system has been widely used in the sciences and, indeed, 
in archaeology (Clarke 1978; Flannery 1968). However, one of the most im­
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portant properties of certain systems which has been overlooked by archae­
ologists and social scientists, in general, is the property of having a memory 
and hence information processing capability.
In Chapter 3, the focus was on dynamical systems and how cognitive 
systems are dynamical systems. The reverse need not be true, though all 
dynamical systems do have information processing capabilities and therefore 
can be thought of as having a rudimentary cognitive capacity.1 Not all sys­
tems are dynamical, though most are. I will distinguish dynamical systems 
from non-dynamical systems or static systems next.
Static System s
Static systems are systems that do not change with time. As such, a static 
system that is provided with an input source will simply respond instanta­
neously to the input.
In this way, the static system only constitutes a function of its present 
state. It does not rely on any previous states of the system since it has no 
history of the changes that took place in the system, and this is because the 
system is incapable of endogenous change. As a consequence of the lack of 
history of change, the system is said to be memory-less.
Figure 17 represents an electrical example of a memory-less system since 
it depicts a system with only an electrical source and a resistor. Here, the 
source, which could be a battery, generates a current. As the current crosses 
the resistor, which could represent a heat source of some kind, the voltage 
drops. With only a resistor, the energy in the system dissipates. Energy, 
regarded by most system dynamicists to be synonymous with information,
1 Still, it takes a subject’s attunement to a dynamical system in order for it to be 
considered a cognitive system as I discuss in Section 7.3.
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Figure 17: In this idealized electrical system, the voltage (v) across the resistor 
(R) responds instantaneously to input or current (i) generated by a source. This 
static system therefore constitutes a memory-less system.
as Wellstead (1979:14) notes, is released by the system and not recovered.
The main reason that the information is non-recoverable in this system 
is that the system has no storage component. The mathematical description 
of this system according to Ohm’s Law is simply:
which means that the voltage across the resistor (R) responds instantaneously
ply so much voltage to the system will eventually fail as an electrical source. 
Consequently, the entire system will eventually fail because the system is 
entirely dependent on the battery.
v
to the current (i) supplied by the battery (u). A battery, which can only sup-
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D ynam ical S ystem s
Dynamical systems, as I have already discussed in Chapter 3 are systems that 
do change with time. As such, a dynamical system that is provided with an 
input source will respond to the whatever is input into the system along with 
whatever endogenous changes have occurred in the system through time.
In a dynamical system, the dynamical system’s present state constitutes a 
function of the dynamical system’s past states due to feedback in the system. 
Therefore, a dynamical system depends on the previous states as well as on 
the present states of the system. That is, the present states can be seen 
to be storing any of the previous states. Therefore, a dynamical system 
has a history of the changes that took place to it throughout the system’s 
development. As a result, a dynamical system is said to have a memory, such 
that the information being stored in the system’s memory constitutes the 
states of the dynamical system. As I discussed in Section 2.2.2, an example 
of a system that is dynamical and hence has a memory is a recurrent network.
Figure 18 represents an electrical example of a system with a memory. It 
depicts a system with an electrical source, a resistor, and a capacitor. The 
source, which is a battery, generates a current. As the current crosses the 
resistor (e.g. a heat source) and the capacitor, the voltage drops. However, 
with the capacitor, information is stored.
Information, therefore, is recoverable in this system since it has a storage 
component. The mathematical model of this system, which describes the 
total current across the circuit, is:
^ d v  v  
~dt+ ~R = l '
What this model tells us is that the voltages across the resistor (R ) and across 
the capacitor (C ) respond to the current (i) supplied by the battery. The
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capacitor in this case protects the system from failure — the current crossing 
the capacitor being defined by C ^ .  By including differentiation (or integra­
tion if we rewrite the system with respect to voltage [i.e. ^  f* i dt + Ri =  u]) 
and a constraint represented by the parameter C, we get a system with mem­
ory that stores information. Note that we can represent the memory of this 
information clearly in the equation: vc(t) = ^  J* i dt. This equation en­
capsulates the entire voltage history of the capacitor for all t starting with 
zero.
I used an electrical system to illustrate information storage but all dy­
namical systems have this information processing capability. See Shearer, 
Kulakowski, and Gardner (1997:3-5) and Wellstead (1979) for a discussion of 
this information/energy capacity in other dynamical systems besides electri­
cal systems. Also, refer Appendix F  to see how the Bladen exchange system 
can be seen to be storing information.
Information storage has been shown to be a capability of all dynamical 
systems, but how about information retrieval?
Being able to store information (i.e. have a memory) implies that the in­
formation being stored is recoverable. If information is recoverable, it means 
that the information is retrievable, not in the sense that information is taken 
away from the system but in the sense that information can be accessed (i.e. 
perceived by another information processing system). Thus, information 
retrieval goes hand-in-hand with information storage. They are not dichoto- 
mous processes but complementary processes, which are both capabilities of 
all dynamical systems.
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iFigure 18: In this electrical system, the voltage (v) across the resistor (R) responds 
to input or current (i) generated by a source as well as its history of past states 
which are stored in the capacitor (C). This dynamical system therefore constitutes 
a system with a memory.
Discussion o f Inform ation Processing in Dynam ical System s
Does this mean that systems need only to be dynamical to process infor­
mation? Theoretically, “yes” . Being dynamical is a sufficient condition for 
a system to qualify as having information processing capacity. This is be­
cause information processing is a property that does not rely on a physical or 
chemical process; that is, the physical or chemical substrate of a system does 
not influence information processing capability. (Note that what Chalmers 
[1996] [see Section 3.4.2] refers to as a functional organization for generating 
cognition is essentially a dynamical system.) So long as systems are dy­
namical and therefore capable of being described by differential equations, 
they will have information processing capability. This can most clearly be 
demonstrated in the Bladen exchange system. Because information process­
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ing capability has been shown to be a property of all dynamical systems, 
and because Bladen inter-community exchange can be seen to constitute a 
dynamical system, Bladen inter-community exchange can also be conceived 
of as having information processing capability. A more formal discussion 
of the information processing capability of Bladen exchange is presented in 
Appendix F.
Does this mean that dynamical systems do not need to be in the form 
of a network, or more precisely in the form of a parallel distributed network 
(PDN), in order to process information? Again, “yes”. However, there is 
something to be said for dynamical systems that have a parallel distributed 
architecture. PDNs have the capacity for being autonomous, self-organizing 
systems, as I have described in Section 3.2.2. So, in addition to being able to 
process information, a dynamic PDN could be conceived of as a dynamical 
system with a rudimentary domain-general consciousness, not unlike a brain, 
in so far as the system maintains an independence from other dynamical 
systems and controls its own functioning in a distributed fashion without a 
specific executive control center.2
7.1 .2  Sum m arizing H ow  In form ation  Is P rocessed  in  a 
D yn am ica l S y stem
To summarize, the term “information” refers to a pattern in the values of 
the states of a dynamical system. This pattern can either be the value of
2Although this does not figure directly into this discussion, another important charac­
teristic of PDNs is that they are very good at approximating other dynamical systems. 
They are able to take the form of almost any kind of dynamical system, and this interesting 
property will be mentioned again in the next chapter as it plays a role in how individual 
brains internalize representations.
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a dynamical system’s state with respect to time (i.e. a trajectory of the 
dynamical system), or for dynamical systems with multiple states, the pat­
tern can be the values of a dynamical system’s states with respect to each 
other. Hence, information processing constitutes the processes by which a 
dynamical system's state patterns are stored and retrieved, and a dynam­
ical system that processes information is one that accepts and stores state 
patterns, which subsequently can be retrieved.
Information is stored in a dynamical system by virtue of a reverse feedback 
loop which is characteristic of all dynamical systems. This reverse feedback 
loop stores past state values by continuously “recycling” the past state values 
and redirecting them back into the system. In this way, every present state 
value is some function of the system’s past state values. That is, any past 
state value can be seen to be stored in the present state value of a dynamical 
system. As a result, the dynamical system is said to have memory.
Retrieval of this information occurs continuously in the dynamical system 
as the dynamical system is continuously utilizing its past state values to gen­
erate the present state value of the system. Thus, every dynamical system 
can be seen to be retrieving information for its own operation. Dynamical 
systems can also retrieve information from each other through attunement. 
That is, one dynamical system can retrieve information from another dy­
namical system as long as the former dynamical system is perceiving the 
latter dynamical system’s states. The process by which this occurs is called 
internalization and it will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
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7.2 T he In dependence o f Inform ation Pro­
cessing
Since information processing capability is shown to be a property of all dy­
namical systems, such as the Bladen inter-community exchange system, a 
natural and perhaps unsettling question that arises is: Is an inter-community 
exchange network, such as the Bladen system, independent in the sense that 
it can autonomously control its own information processing? And if it is inde­
pendent, where does the individual with his or her brain and its information 
processing capability fit into the picture?
The answer to the first question regarding executive control will be dis­
cussed in this section. The answer to second question concerning the indi­
vidual’s role will become apparent in the next chapter.
7.2 .1  E x ecu tiv e  C ontrol o f  D yn am ica l S ystem s
In theories that deal with the issue of power, we often attribute power to an 
individual (e.g. agency or action theory). However, if I were to attempt to 
discern executive control in a mental system in the same way a sociologist 
would look for power in a social system, certain problems would arise. This 
is because attributing control solely to an individual — who consists of a ner­
vous system and body — does not explain how the nervous system processes 
information. The neuron is below the level of the “individual” and therefore 
out of the individual’s complete or conscious control. Nonetheless, seeking 
to distinguish executive control in a social dynamical system can be accom­
plished in the manner in which power is sought. In other words, seeking 
executive control in social dynamical systems is much simpler than looking 
for executive control in mental dynamical systems, since at the level of “soci­
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ety” or “community”, the individual can be conceived of as playing the role 
of executive controller in social information processing. This is essentially 
what action theory is about (Giddens 1979).
But can we attribute control solely to the individual? If we accept that 
the factors for determining how much consciousness we grant a system con­
sist of the analog nature of dynamical systems taken together with the dis­
tributed property of networks (Donald 2001), then consciousness, at least 
in its rudimentary form, should carry over to social dynamical systems as 
well as inter-neuronal dynamical systems. According to Donald and other 
connectionists (e.g. Reisberg 1997), executive control, or consciousness, is a 
distributed phenomenon throughout the network and it only emerges when 
all of the nodes in the network are working as a system — in our case, a social 
system. Therefore, if we concur with the connectionists, we cannot attribute 
executive control in a society solely to the individual because control also lies 
with society.
To gain further insight into the executive control of social dynamical 
systems and into the independence of social dynamical systems from other 
dynamical systems, I will utilize what is known of executive control in the 
brain (recall Section 3.2.2), and logically extend it to other dynamical systems 
including social dynamical systems.
7.2.2 Connectionism : T he Seat o f  E xecu tive  Control
R evisited
If we attempt to explain how information processing capability in the brain 
is controlled, we run into certain difficulties. For instance, a quick response 
to the question: “What controls information processing in the brain?” might 
consist of: “Information processing in the brain is controlled by us as indi­
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viduals. If I  individually need or want to learn a pattern, I spend time and 
effort on storing the pattern into memory so that I can recall it later.”
The problem with this explanation of control, however, is that we intro­
duce an abstract controlling mechanism — namely “I” — which needs to 
be accounted for. In other words, who is this “I” who has the capability of 
controlling neural networks in the brain?
There are different theories surrounding this ulterior intelligence control­
ling mechanism, which “directs” us to learn something (Reisberg 1997:292- 
299):
• One theory is that a homunculus guides us in learning and thinking. A 
homunculus used to be a term utilized to describe a little man, but it 
has been adopted by cognitive scientists and philosophers to refer to a 
conscious, indivisible controlling mechanism in a specific locale within 
the brain (i.e. the ego).
• An alternative explanation, which is advocated in connectionism and 
which I discussed in Section 3.2.2, is that no “master planner” is re­
quired, since control of information processing resides throughout the 
dynamical system, distributed throughout the entire network (Reisberg 
1997:295-299).
The connectionist view concurs with current cognitive research about 
where the seat of consciousness resides. That is, consciousness is usually 
regarded to be domain general Based on the neuro-physiological data accu­
mulated so far, consciousness does not appear to be the objective of some par­
ticular module in the brain, but rather a phenomenon distributed throughout 
the brain (Donald 2001:37,114). Thus, it would seem that control is a dis­
tributed phenomenon in which the whole is considerably greater than the
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sum of its parts. (Although I am specifically concerned about the connec- 
tionist view of executive control in this chapter, this is not to say that in a 
multi-layer world that the homuncular concept does not have value. In fact, 
I believe it does have value and I discuss the role it plays in developing a 
comprehensive understanding of cognition below and in Chapter 8.)
The connectionist view of executive control begins with notion that infor­
mation processing in the brain arises from a network of very simple intercon­
nected components. These components, or neurons, in and of themselves do 
not amount to anything special, but when taken together they constitute a 
network with the potential to self-organize and maintain some degree of con­
trol over functioning. In the case of human brains, with such a large number 
of neurons located in a small body mass,3 it should not be surprising that 
humans have such a high degree of control relative to other animals (Don­
ald 2001:105). This same phenomenon of distributed control can be carried 
over to other dynamical systems with network architectures, such as artificial 
neural networks and even certain social systems (e.g. exchange networks).
Executive Control in Artificial Neural Networks
In artificial neural processing, the issue of control should be explainable 
through connectionism just as it was for biological neural networks.
It could be inferred that some philosophers, such as Chalmers (1996), be­
lieve that computers are conscious of their purposes in processing, whereas 
others such as Searle (1990) are skeptical of such claims. If being conscious 
is having a certain degree of control over certain faculties, and if this in turn
3The premise here is that less cognitive effort is expended controlling a small body 
than a large body, which means that cognition can be put to other uses (i.e. controlling 
things outside of the one’s body).
321
is the ability of a computer to choose to stop one program and to run a com­
pletely different program from the one that was run before — in other words, 
to adjust — then it is certain that computers have achieved consciousness. 
We see this capability in computer games such as chess, where one subpro­
gram designed for a particular strategy switches to another subprogram that 
effects another strategy.
Hence, I would agree with Chalmers that certain capacities of AI consti­
tute a consciousness of sorts, but to what degree is unclear. Artificial neural 
networks have a certain degree of control over what gets processed when and 
where; that is, they exhibit features that allow them control over some of 
their own capabilities. However, in addition to this self-organizational capa­
bility, which artificial neural networks seem to have, artificial neural networks 
are also subject to human control. That is, we function as homunculi in that 
we design the computers and we use computers for processing what we want 
them to process. For instance, if we want to write a story, we can use a word 
processing program, and if we want to solve an equation, we can use a nu­
merical modeling program. In this way control can be said to be distributed 
not only within the ranks of networks but between these ranks. In the case of 
artificial neural networks, for instance, control is distributed within and be­
tween our biological neural networks and the artificial neural networks. This 
was precisely Clark and Chalmers’ (1998) point, as I discussed in Section 
3.4.3.
Executive Control in Credible Social Dynamical System s
As was demonstrated with regard to the Bladen exchange system (see Ap­
pendix F), information processing can be conceived of as occurring at a social 
level distinct from the individual brain and distinct from any artificial means
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that are used to process information. I refer to this sort of information pro­
cessing which can be seen to be manifesting itself at the social level as social 
processing. Unlike the processing which occurs in natural and artificial neu­
ral networks, the processing of social systems is more difficult to characterize 
because it is unclear whether the social system in question can be conceived 
of as a credible dynamical system. The social system in question must first 
be assessed through mathematical modeling and analysis before it can be 
conceived of as a dynamical system, which in turn will determine whether 
the system has information processing capability.
The reason why individuals are unaware that social systems process in­
formation may be that the individual views society from the perspective of a 
participant, from the inside of emergent supra-individual cognition. If society 
is viewed from the perspective of a participant, this is not unlike awareness 
of total brain function or “thinking” from the perspective of a neuron. A 
neuron does not function in terms of awareness of the brain as an organ of 
“thought” any more than individuals are aware of information processing at 
the level of society. It is no surprise, therefore, that many see society as 
nothing other than something that comprises us (the individual) and which 
is our creation.
If the property responsible for generating executive control is inherent 
in dynamical parallel distributed networks (PDN) as connectionists propose, 
then this implies that executive control can also be seen to be present in 
credible social and economic dynamical systems and can be seen to be dis­
tributed over the different nodes of the interactive network whatever these 
nodes may be. This distribution of control over the nodes endows the brain 
some independence from the neuron, and the credible social or economic 
system some independence from the individual.
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This is consistent with Durkheim’s view of society. Individuals of course 
make up society, and individuals in a group could be examined on a physiolog­
ical basis to explain some social phenomena, but the definition of a group of 
individuals does not constitute society. As I discussed in Section 3.4.1, “soci­
ety” has a historical meaning that goes beyond subsuming a group of individ­
uals (Durkheim 1933). A society includes individuals who hold sentiments 
in common. These sentiments supercede individuals, akin to Durkheim's 
“collective conscience” (1933:79-81).
However, does this mean that we as individuals are unaware of the social 
information that is processed and that we have no role in controlling the 
information? I will explain in the next section that individuals acquire social 
representations, such as “standard of living”, without having to obtain these 
representations through discourse but instead by obtaining representations 
through experiencing certain features of the social or economic dynamical 
system. Thus, social representations do have a direct impact on us individ­
ually since they can affect the way we as individuals process information.
Conversely, our mental representations, through actions, can effect changes 
in how representations are socially processed; therefore, we have a certain 
control over the kinds of social representations that we are presented with 
individually. In this latter regard, we function a little like homunculi for 
social dynamical systems as well as for artificial dynamical systems.
What this means is that, like AI or any other artificial mnemonic device 
we design and use, social dynamical systems (e.g. exchange networks) can 
be seen as interacting with inter-neuronal dynamical systems (i.e. individual 
brains). As well as maintaining the social dynamical system, individuals can 
also be seen as being able to update the social dynamical system in which 
they live. Individuals, therefore, potentially can make changes to the social
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M E N T A L  D Y N A M IC A L  SY ST E M  (i.e. individual)
O  O
SOCIAL DYNAMICAL SYSTEM
(e.g. community)
Figure 19: In this idealistic diagram, inter-neuronal dynamical systems (repre­
sented by the solid circles) and the social dynamical system (represented by the 
dotted oval) do not affect each other. They do, however, each process information, 
such that each dynamical system generates its own representations independently.
representations to which they are attuned. How mental and social dynamical 
systems can be conceived of as interacting with each other will be discussed 
more thoroughly in the next chapter.
7.3 The Cognitive System
Perception, unlike information processing, is a phenomenon which, above all, 
requires an individual or subject to do the perceiving or the experiencing. 
To explain how cognition or, more specifically, how perception arises, one 
needs only to show that the process that leads to perception constitutes a 
perceptible dynamical system (i.e. a cognitive system).
Theoretically, a cognitive system  is a dynamical system that is per­
ceived by any information processor (see Section 3.5.1), but for the purposes
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of the thesis this information processor will be considered to be a human 
brain, since the subjects of analysis in my thesis are humans. The features of 
the dynamical system which humans can perceive are the constraints or the 
states of the dynamical system. Perceptibility of some feature of a dynamical 
system is important to include in any definition of a cognitive system and it 
has been advocated by the van Gelder camp as well as Clark and Chalmers 
(1998) and Donald (1991). That is, cognitive systems are first and foremost 
systems that are in some way coupled with the cognition of a subject.
7.3.1 C ognitive A w areness o f  Features o f th e  D ynam ­
ical System
The first requirement for a dynamical system to qualify as a cognitive system 
is its ability to be perceived by a subject. In the case of humans, humans must 
be attuned to certain aspects of the dynamical system, which I propose can be 
referred to as cognitive features. A dynamical system with this characteristic 
is called a cognitive system.
Cognitive Features
I propose that a cognitive feature is any feature in the physical or social 
environment that is perceptible. What this means is that a cognitive feature 
exists in two places: it exists outside of one’s brain in the physical or social 
environment, and it exists inside of one’s brain, within the neural substrate.
• The fact that a cognitive feature exists outside of one’s brain, as well as 
inside, should be intuitively clear. It can be a chair, a city, a moiety, a 
friend, a home, a house, and practically anything. Without a counter­
part in the brain there is no cognitive feature, only an environmental
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feature. An environmental feature exists regardless of whether or not 
it constitutes a cognitive feature.
• A feature in the environment which can also exist within an individual’s 
brain does so by manifesting itself as a pattern in the neural substrate 
of the brain of the individual. That is, there are select neurons or 
groups of neurons in the brain that when activated form a pattern 
of the environmental feature in the brain. The pattern formed of an 
environmental feature in the brain is not a figment of the imagination, 
but it stems from specific activated neural sectors of the brain.
An important point to realize is that a cognitive feature for an individ­
ual exists in material form both in the environment, and within the neural 
substrate of an individual’s brain. In the environment, the cognitive fea­
ture constitutes some object or action, and in the brain it constitutes a set 
of firing neurons. Whereas this might satisfy the material definition of a 
cognitive feature, this means that from a phenomenological perspective, a 
cognitive feature is not only a feature of the environment nor is it solely a 
pattern of activated neurons, but it also constitutes a representation, and 
hence a feature of the mind. In the view that I advocate, the mind has no 
established substrate, since it can be conceived of as manifesting itself either 
in the environment or in the brain. Similarly, representations can be seen 
to form in the brain or in the environment, but since they also constitute 
meaningful information for the brain, they are recognized as a product of the 
individual’s mind.
Another important aspect of cognitive features is that they can move 
or change through time. This is because environmental features can change 
through time and their changes through time are governed by dynamical sys­
tems. For example, objects move, increase in quantity, decrease in quantity,
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change color, get larger, or get smaller. Similarly, actions grow in intensity, 
decrease in intensity, or lead to other actions. As such, a change to an envi­
ronmental feature will have a corresponding representational change in the 
brain and mind of the individual as long as the individual is attuned to the 
environmental feature. In this thesis I am strictly concerned with environ­
mental features that are governed by dynamical systems, particularly those 
features which constitute the states of dynamical systems. This has impor­
tant implications for anyone interested in studying representations, such as 
an archaeologist.
Although an observer (e.g. an archaeologist) does not know what will hap­
pen to a representation or what form a representation will take in the brain 
at some later time, the observer can infer these representational changes by 
studying the dynamical system that is moving or transforming the environ­
mental feature, as long as the environmental feature is a cognitive feature. 
Of course, the dynamical system will only be approximated within the brain 
of the individual, but it will play a fundamental role outside of the brain in 
affecting the environmental feature which will in turn affect the representa­
tion forming in the brain of the individual, provided that the individual is 
attuned to an environmental feature of the dynamical system. Therefore, in 
order to get at how representations transform themselves through time within 
the brain and mind of the individual, it is absolutely essential to infer repre­
sentational transformation via the dynamical system in the environment.
Because dynamical systems determine where an environmental feature 
will be at any moment of time, and provided that the environmental feature 
is perceived by the individual, then the environmental feature will have a 
representational correspondence in the brain of the individual. In this way, 
when the dynamical system acts on a feature in the environment, it also acts
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on the representation of the feature within the individual's brain and mind.
Cognitive Systems
A cognitive system is a dynamical system with environmental features to 
which an individual is attuned (i.e. environmental features with represen­
tational counterparts in the brain and mind of the individual). That is, a 
cognitive system is a dynamical system which exhibits cognitive features.
The idea that cognitive systems must be able to be perceived should 
be clear. Environmental features of the dynamical system, such as the con­
straints on the system described by the parameters of the model or the states 
of the dynamical system described by the variables in the model, must be 
perceived by the subject’s brain in order to constitute a cognitive system.
A perfect example of a cognitive system in the brain is the neural dynam­
ical system defined by the Additive Short-Term Memory (STM) and Passive 
Delay Long-Term Memory (LTM) Equations (i.e. Equations 3.12-3.13):
d x  n n
=  - A i ( X i ( t ) ) X i ( t ) +  bk i f M t - T k i ) - 0 k ] Z k i ( t ) -  ^ 2  Ct e f [ Xk ( t - T k i ) - O k} + I i { t )
k—l;k^i k=l]k^i
d Z '~ j f  = -Bij(Zij(t))Zij(t) + dijf[xi(t -  nj) ~ r i][.xJ(t)]+.
These equations describe the mental processes of learning and recalling.
The states in these systems are the STM trace represented by the variable 
Xi(t) and the LTM trace represented by the variable
Whereas the STM trace is perceptible, the LTM trace is not perceptible 
(Harvey 1994:176-177). As a result we are only aware of the STM traces 
which form the representations (e.g. perceptions, feelings, images, and im­
pressions) that manifest themselves in our brain. We are not aware of the 
LTM traces that provide the basis for generating the STM traces.
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What this means is that the LTM dynamical system by itself is not a 
cognitive system since it is imperceptible to the subject. The STM dynami­
cal system, on the other hand, does constitute a cognitive system since it is 
perceptible to the subject. Taken together this implies that the LTM dynam­
ical system coupled with the STM dynamical system, described by Equations 
3.12-3.13, also constitutes a cognitive system. It is the contribution from the 
STM dynamical system, however, which makes the coupled system a cogni­
tive system, since the STM dynamical system is the only system in the union 
of dynamical systems that is perceptible.
This discussion of the STM and LTM equations is meant to show that the 
neural dynamical approach is compatible with a cognitive systems approach 
and that a neural dynamical system can be seen as a particular kind of cog­
nitive system. What the notion of cognitive systems affords neural dynamics 
is a more general model within which to situate neural dynamical systems.
7.3.2 W hat D oes and D oes N ot C on stitu te  a C ognitive  
System
Whether or not a dynamical system is a perceptible system depends on the 
subject doing the perceiving. A dynamical system that is a cognitive system 
for one individual may not be a cognitive system for somebody else. An in­
dividual accelerating out of a garage in Prance will undoubtedly perceive the 
dynamical system comprising the accelerating car. However, an individual in 
China, for example, will not perceive the dynamical system of the car driving 
in France.
Another important point to make is that not all dynamical systems are 
cognitive systems. A tree falling in a forest with nobody around to witness 
it constitutes a dynamical system, but it by no means constitutes a cognitive
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system since no one is aware of the tree falling. Therefore, cognitive systems 
comprise a subset of all dynamical systems and hence do not exhaust all dy­
namical systems in the universe. The presumption that there are dynamical 
systems that are not necessarily perceptible implies that though cognitive 
systems are subjective (i.e. require a subject to witness the dynamical sys­
tem), there exists an objective reality where there are dynamical systems in 
motion of which we are never aware.
The approach taken in this thesis is that there is a reality outside of our 
field of perception. The reason for taking this stance is that it is difficult to 
deny that there are dynamical systems in progress which we do not perceive, 
when we are aware of these dynamical systems’ after-effects. For example, 
one explanation for a tree lying on the ground in a forest is that there was a 
dynamical system in which gravity took its toll on the tree. Just because we 
do not perceive the dynamical system that brought the tree down does not 
mean that the dynamical system that brought the tree down never existed. 
It just means that it did not exist for a subject. (One could argue that the 
dynamical system that brought the tree down is a cognitive system since the 
dynamical system that brought the tree down is still in progress [i.e. perhaps 
one could argue that gravity is pushing the resting tree into the ground], but 
this is an entirely different argument than the argument that all dynamical 
systems are cognitive systems.)
The above discussion brings up another point. How long does it take 
for a dynamical system to reach completion (e.g. stabilize)? Potentially, 
a dynamical system can go on forever. Still, this does not mean that a 
dynamical system that goes on forever will ever be perceived by someone, 
and this goes back to the point made above, which is that not all dynamical 
systems are perceptible.
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7.3.3 E pistem ic Properties o f  C ognitive System s
When an individual is attuned to a dynamical system, the dynamical system 
can serve a purpose by facilitating or enhancing, either physiologically or 
cognitively, an individual’s well-being (e.g. helps problem solving).4
Because cognitive systems are perceptible to the subject, cognitive sys­
tems relay information that is processed by the subject. After processing, 
information can then be utilized by the subject to advance his or her position 
(i.e. well-being). The subject receives information from the dynamical sys­
tem and either acts according to the information provided, or processes the 
information and decides what to do or how to act based on this information.
Cognitive systems that are coextensive with the individual and physical 
or social environment can facilitate the individual in several ways. One way 
that a cognitive system can facilitate the individual is by enhancing the 
individual’s cognitive capabilities. An example of such a cognitive system is 
an epistemic action. In Section 3.4.3, I explained that an epistemic action 
is an action, usually taken to be intentional, which improves an individual’s 
biological cognitive capability (Kirsh and Maglio 1994); that is to say, it is 
an action which externalizes the learning process, thereby facilitating the 
subject in processing information more efficiently.
By enhancing cognitive processes through being part of a dynamical sys­
tem, the individual gains knowledge and can improve his/her chances of 
adjusting to the environment. For example, suppose someone falls off a chair 
or from a tree for the first time. Then, it is through that person’s unfortunate 
involvement in the dynamical system (i.e. perhaps that person’s attunement
4This point has been advocated by the cognitive evolutionist school of thought (e.g. 
Donald [1991]) and Clark and Chalmers (1998), Kirsh and Maglio (1994)). They see the 
basis of cognition to be an evolutionary adaptation.
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to his/her momentum at impact with the earth’s surface) that one learns that 
it is best not to fall because of the physiologically damaging consequences 
upon hitting the ground. In this way, by being attuned to a dynamical sys­
tem, one not only learns about falling,5 but one learns that one should not 
fall and risk hurting oneself in the future. More importantly, being attuned 
to supra-individual dynamical systems frees the brain to conduct other cog­
nitive tasks.
Being attuned to dynamical systems that exist supra-individually en­
hances one’s individual biological cognitive capacities. In so doing, cognitive 
systems that link the individual with the environment can potentially help 
that individual survive in the environment.
7.4 The Bladen Exchange System  as a Cog­
nitive System
According to the definition of “cognitive system” that I described at the 
beginning of this chapter, which is based on the definition provided by van 
Gelder and others (see the beginning of this chapter), it is possible to conceive 
of the Bladen exchange system as constituting a cognitive system.
A cognitive system is a dynamical system that has some feature which 
is perceptible by a subject. In other words, a cognitive system is a dynam­
ical system such that the constraints or the states of the dynamical system 
are being perceived. By proposing that the Bladen exchange system was a
5Falling is considered by evolutionary psychologists to constitute innate knowledge 
contained in a naive physics module. While this might be true, it is unlikely that such 
innate knowledge would contain information related to the experience of falling and the 
pain associated with hitting the ground.
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cognitive system, I am suggesting that an environmental feature of the dy­
namical system described by Equations 6.7-6.9 constituted a feature which 
was perceived by the Classic Maya of the Bladen region.
The fact that the Bladen Maya can be seen to have been attuned to the 
Bladen exchange system is supported by the archaeological, geological, and 
ethnographic data. Some features of the Bladen exchange system to which 
the Bladen Maya can be seen to have been attuned are discussed below:
1. The three economic centers of Muklebal Tzul, Ek Xux, and 
the Lower Bladen sites had corresponding representations in the 
minds of people living in the Bladen area.
Evidence gathered from topography, settlement pattern analyses, and ex­
cavation suggests the the Bladen centers were independent By independent I 
mean that each center was to some extent politically autonomous (discussed 
in Section 5.4.3). Each center was also economically autonomous in that each 
had its own local rock resources well suited for the manufacturing of manos 
and metates.
The Bladen centers and their associated resource and sustaining areas are 
well defined topographically and geologically. The factor that most clearly 
delineates the boundaries of the centers’ associated resource and sustaining 
area is rock type. Each center is situated in a valley or zone containing a 
distinctive rock type that was exploited. For the Muklebal valley it is bedded 
limestone, for the Ek Xux valley it is highly silicified volcanic rock, and for 
the Lower Bladen valleys it is volcaniclastic rock.
The assertion that the boundaries of the centers’ political realms are also 
to some extent shaped by rock types is supported by settlement features 
within these zones. In each rock type zone there exists a site with stelae, 
which are defining features in politically autonomous centers. These polit-
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ically autonomous centers would have held a political as well as economic 
claim to their associated zones. (Recall Section 5.4.3 where it was discussed 
that the communities’ political markers coincide with the distribution of rock 
types that were exploited at the communities). What this means is that each 
center can be regarded as a cognitive feature, with each center delimited by 
what could best be termed a cognitive boundary. A cognitive boundary is a 
cognitive feature that circumscribes some entity in the physical environment 
and which, because of its sheer formidability or distinction, cannot escape 
being perceived by the analyst (etically) or by the people the analyst is study­
ing (emically) (Dunham 1990:110-123). In the case of the Bladen, the three 
rock type zones would have constituted cognitive boundaries of the Bladen 
centers.
2. The frequency of manos and m etates at households at the 
three economic centers of Muklebal Tzul, Ek Xux, and the Lower 
Bladen sites had corresponding representations in the minds of 
people living in the Bladen area.
Ethnographic, ethnohistoric, and archaeological data indicate that the 
frequency of manos and metates in households were an important feature 
of Classic Maya life, and to which the Maya would have paid attention (see 
pages 299-302 for a discussion on the importance of frequency).
Though manos and metates were used in domestic contexts, they were 
also utilized in ritual contexts. They were necessary to fulfill certain obliga­
tions and as such were utilized in rituals associated with dedications, termina­
tions, burials, and for cementing social bonds between households. Because 
of the important role that manos and metates played in domestic and ritual 
realms, the frequency of manos and metates would have been an indication 
of one’s wealth and obligations and therefore constituted a measure of status
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as I discuss on pages 299-300.
In other words, the Bladen Maya can be seen to have been attuned to the 
states of the exchange system I modeled using Equations 6.7-6.9 (below):
— =  —Ax\ ( t )  +  [kn  +  k u ] f ( x  i )  +  k12f ( x 2) +  ki3f ( x 3) 
at
— =  —A x 2(t) +  k2i f ( x i )  +  [k22 +  k2j ] f ( x  2) +  k23f ( x 3) 
at
— =  ~ A x 3{t) +  k32f ( x 2) -(- [k33 -|- k3j ] f ( x 3).
Therefore, the Bladen exchange system, described by Equations 6.7-6.9, 
constitutes a cognitive system. What this means is that from the viewpoint 
of the archaeologist, the Classic Maya living in the Bladen can be seen to be 
attuned to the variables of the equations describing the states of the exchange 
system for each community (i.e. ^ ( t) ,  and
7.5 Cognitive Im plications o f Classic M aya  
Ground Stone Exchange in th e  Bladen
This section discusses the implications that the Bladen exchange system has 
for cognitive systems and cognitive studies, in general.
7.5.1 W hat the B laden E xchange C ase S tudy Can Tell 
U s A bout C ognitive System s
The economic model constructed for Bladen exchange raises important issues 
for cognitive systems. It suggests that not only can an individual be attuned
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to a dynamical system — thereby forming a cognitive system — but several 
individuals can be attuned to a dynamical system simultaneously, and in so 
doing form a cognitive system.
Cognitive systems to which several individuals are attuned will be called 
supra-individual cognitive systems. An example of a supra-individual 
cognitive system is the Bladen exchange system because every individual who 
actively participated in the Bladen exchange system would have perceived 
the representational standard of living with respect to manos and metates. 
Those cognitive systems to which only one individual is attuned will be called 
individual cognitive systems. Some examples of the an individual cog­
nitive system is Turvey and Carello’s (1995) person wielding a tool (Section 
3.4.4), Clark and Chalmers’ (1998) hypothetical situation of a person playing 
a computer game (Section 3.4.3), or Additive Short-Term Memory (modeled 
by Equation 3.14 in Section 3.3).
The fact both individual and supra-individual cognitive systems can be 
seen to exist means that cognition can be conceived of as comprising layer 
upon layer of cognitive systems. In this view, each individual has his/her own 
cognitive system and subsuming these individual cognitive systems are supra- 
individual cognitive systems to which several individuals are connected.
The notion that cognitive systems overlap can be referred to as the nested 
cognitive view. A cognitive system in this model can be seen as manifesting 
itself within the brain at the inter-neuronal level or, as I have shown with 
the Bladen case study, in larger nodal units, such as among communities. 
Cognition can be conceived of as existing at other levels in between these two 
layers and possibly beyond the inter-community level as well. Maris and te 
Boekhorst’s (1996) work and Kennedy’s (1998) research have demonstrated 
that a form of cognition which can be referred to as social cognition can
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manifest itself inter-individually. This view was supported in Sections 2.4.3 
and 2.4.2, respectively. I will now discuss some implications of the nested 
cognitive view.
7.5.2 T he Im plications o f D istin ct C ognitive System s 
for R epresentations
Whereas there may be some debate about the details of what defines an idea 
or a belief, both can be regarded as information (van Dijk 1998:21). Consis­
tent with the terminology in cognitive science (e.g. Hinton, McClelland, and 
Rumelhart 1986:77-109), I will usually refer to ideas and beliefs as represen­
tations, which are, in turn, patterns that arise from the states of a dynamical 
system. Turvey and Carello’s (1995) work has shown that in addition to aris­
ing from the states of a dynamical system, representations can arise from any 
perceptible feature of the dynamical system including the constraints of the 
dynamical system. Representations, wherever they may appear, are always 
associated with the processes that create them, and therefore representations 
are linked with cognitive systems.
As I have just discussed, since cognitive systems need not be restricted 
to a single brain, neither do representations need to be restricted to a single 
brain. A representation can arise within the brain of an individual as a 
perception (i.e. an impression in the mind of the individual) of a color; 
or a representation could manifest itself within a society as a meaning (i.e. 
an impression in the minds of multiple individuals) associated with a sign. 
In other words, a representation can manifest itself only for an individual, 
called a mental representation, or it can manifest itself for many individuals 
at once, called a social representation; and whether a representation is only 
perceived by an individual or is perceived by a group of individuals depends
338
on the level at which the cognitive system is operating. Clearly, a color 
can be a social representation as well as a mental representation, as long as 
the cognitive system that is responsible for the representation is manifesting 
itself supra-individually. Thus, it is the level at which cognitive processes are 
being engaged to produce the representation that is the factor determining 
the type of representation produced — mental or social.
7.5.3 Explaining th e Standard o f  L iving R epresenta­
tion
In the last chapter, I constructed a macroeconomic model that was used to 
describe the exchange of ground stone implements among communities in 
the Bladen region of the Maya Mountains. The model simulates what the 
economic growth of the communities would have looked like with respect 
to ground stone tools. This can be seen as ascertaining the “marginal” 
standard of living in the Bladen region at all three centers participating in the 
exchange of ground stone tools. However, standard of living is an interesting 
phenomenon because, on one hand, it corresponds to the amount of capital 
that has accrued in an economy (i.e. an economy with lots of capital has a 
high standard of living) (Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 1992); and on the other 
hand, standard of living constitutes a representation which manifests itself in 
the human mind (Masuoka 1936:263). In this thesis I use the term standard 
of living to refer to a social representation, specifically a sense of well-being 
for people in a particular society.
Two examples of standard of living are the representations: “They are 
wealthier than we are” and “He is more respected than the other man is”. 
Both are examples of representations that form in peoples’ brains, and both 
are examples of what standard of living means to people. In the first example,
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the standard of living representation is related to wealth in a society in which 
wealth is an indication of well-being for people. In the second example, the 
standard of living representation is related to status in a society in which 
status is an indication of well-being for people. Prom a formalist perspective, 
however, both can be regarded as economic phenomena, as I argue in chapter 
4.
But how can this representational form of standard of living be explained 
in the Bladen region? An economic explanation for the phenomenon only 
tells us that there will be specific or measurable levels of manos and metates 
at the communities, but this does not explain what people are experienc­
ing or thinking about in the communities with respect to standard of living. 
Something else is needed that can extend the economic explanation to ac­
count for cognition, specifically a link from the economic states of the Bladen 
communities to the mental states of the inhabitants of the Bladen communi­
ties. (In other words, it must be made clear that the Bladen exchange system 
constitutes a cognitive system.)
I have discussed such a link in Section 5.9 and pages 299-302. The in­
habitants of a household paid attention to (were attuned to) the frequency 
of manos and metates at households throughout the Bladen region. This 
taken together with the fact that the frequency of manos and metates fluc­
tuated according to macroeconomic principles, specifically according to the 
exchange system described by Equations 6.7 -  6.9, means that the Bladen 
Maya would have been aware of these fluctuations.
As a result, there would have been a correspondence between the states of 
the Bladen exchange system and the mental states of the Bladen inhabitants 
throughout the economic development of the Bladen region. This information 
(i.e. the states of the exchange system described by the variables of the
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model), therefore, would have registered as a representation for the people of 
the Bladen. This representation is depicted in Figure 15. Two examples of 
interpretations of this representation which conceivably could have arisen for 
the Bladen Maya are: x3(5.0) < x3(10.0) and £i(30.0),x2(30.0) < x3(30.0). 
Here, Xi(t), x 2(t), and x3(t) constitute the frequencies of manos and metates 
per average household at a given point in time, i, at Muklebal Tzul, Ek Xux, 
and the Lower Bladen sites, respectively.
Expressed verbally, the first relation (i.e. x3(5.0) < x3(10.0)) might be 
interpreted as an individual in one of the Lower Bladen communities think­
ing to himself or herself that the standard of living is considerably bet­
ter at Year 10 than at Year 5 — Year 10 and Year 5 obviously have cor­
relates in the Classic Maya calendar. Similarly, the second relation (i.e. 
aqpO.O), x2(30.0) < .t3(30.0)) might be interpreted as an individual in either 
one of the three Bladen centers thinking that the standard of living in Year 
30 is better in the Lower Bladen sites than it is at Muklebal Tzul or at Ek 
Xux.
These examples illustrate two important points. The first point is that 
even though a Bladen individual would have had different ways of interpreting 
the representation, all of these interpretations are bound to the trajectories 
of the variables in the equations used to simulate the Bladen exchange. Thus, 
the possible interpretations of this representation to which the Bladen Maya 
would have had access can be deduced through formal modeling, analysis (i.e. 
assessment and testing), and simulation. What this means is that, in gen­
eral, interpretability has limits and takes a form which can be reconstructed 
through modeling and analysis. The second point to be made is that it is pos­
sible to explain economically how a representation might be seen to form in 
the minds of Bladen Maya individuals — this representation is the standard
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of living with respect to manos and metates at the Bladen communities.
The implications of the first point that interpretability takes a form that 
can be reconstructed through modeling and analysis are described in Chap­
ter 6. The implications of the second point warrant further discussion, since 
it suggests a relationship between cognitive science and economics. What is 
suggested from the above discussion regarding the Bladen case study is that 
a representational standard of living can be explained through economic 
means. This is because standard of living representation is a mental as well 
as an economic state. Moreover, the standard of living and the economic 
processes that determine it can be conceived of as being the subject mat­
ter of cognitive science, since the standard of living and the processes that 
determine it qualify as cognition, or supra-individual cognition. In supra- 
individual cognition not only is perception of the representations involved, 
but so is information processing. Social systems, such as the Bladen exchange 
system, constitute dynamical systems and hence have memory in which in­
formation can be stored and retrieved.
This memory, which is inherently generated in all credible dynamical sys­
tems and which takes on a social aspect in the exchange system, operates 
much like biological memory does in the human brain, only on a much larger 
scale. Instead of jointly functioning neurons there are interconnected humans 
and human communities. Conceived of in this way, representations — which 
in the case of the exchange system is information regarding the standard of 
living — arise within the exchange system for all of the individuals involved 
in the exchange system to experience. Moreover, these representations can 
be conceived of as remaining in people’s minds by virtue of the fact that the 
exchange system is a dynamical system and therefore stores this information 
for individuals to retrieve and experience, thus explaining how it is that stan­
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dard of living can constitute a persistent representation in peoples’ minds, as 
Masuoka (1936:263) claimed. (See Appendix F  for a mathematical explica­
tion of the information processing capability of the Bladen inter-community 
exchange system).
To conclude this section, I propose that understanding that people can 
be attuned to economic states can greatly advance the future of economic 
modeling by grounding models in cognition — in what is meaningful to the 
people whose actions the economist is modeling. An understanding of the 
cognitive/ economic relationship can draw the economic modeler closer to 
the subjects he or she is modeling by permitting the modeler a glimpse into 
what his or her subjects might be thinking, thereby providing the economist 
with a more comprehensive measurement of people’s well-being.
7.6 Conclusion: The B laden Exchange Sys­
tem  C onstitutes a C ognitive System
It was discussed in this chapter that Equations 6.7-6.9 describing exchange 
along the Bladen Branch can be conceived of as describing a cognitive sys­
tem as well as an economic system. Thus, Figure 15 not only can be seen 
to represent the marginal levels of standard of living on which the exchange 
system in the Bladen region converged, but it can be seen as describing a 
supra-individual cognitive pattern or social representation which was prob­
ably perceived by the inhabitants of the Bladen region during the Classic 
period. In other words, the model I constructed for Bladen exchange can be 
seen as describing the supra-individual cognition of the Classic Maya in the 
Bladen region as well as the economic exchange among the Bladen commu­
nities.
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Moreover, the Bladen exchange system can be seen to process informa­
tion. That is, the Bladen exchange system can be conceived of as having the 
capability to store and retrieve representations, and as such it can be seen 
to process information just as neural networks do in our brain. According 
to the connectionists, dynamical systems with network architectures should 
have a certain degree of control over their own processing. This means that, 
in general, social dynamical systems such as the Bladen exchange system can 
be seen as constituting independent systems. This does not mean that the 
Bladen exchange system and the inter-neuronal dynamical systems of the 
individual inhabitants (i.e. the brains of the inhabitants) were disconnected; 
they were connected to each other, and it will be the objective of the next 
chapter to clarify how supra-individual cognitive systems can be seen to op­
erate together with individual cognitive systems to form a more complete 
account of cognition.
I have described in this chapter the way in which the Bladen exchange 
system can be conceived of as constituting a cognitive system. I have also 
argued for the existence of supra-individual cognitive systems. The proposal 
of the existence of supra-individual cognitive systems has important implica­
tions for cognitive science because it suggests that cognition is nested. In this 
concept, the individual’s brain comprises one cognitive “nest” which is em­
bedded within other supra-individual cognitive nests. Other cognitive nests, 
for example, might be the dynamical systems constituting inter-personal in­
teraction or inter-clan interaction. What follows in the next chapter is a 
discussion on how these cognitive nests might interact, specifically how the 
individual and supra-individual cognitive systems or nests might interact.
344
Chapter 8 
Explaining Social Institutions 
Through a Cognitive Approach
W hat follows in this chapter is an extrapolation of my findings regarding the 
Bladen case study to social institutions in general, provided of course that 
the social institutions being considered can be shown to constitute cognitive 
systems as I have argued to be the case with the Bladen exchange system. 
Prom what was discussed in the last chapter, social institutions and, indeed, 
social systems that comprise society and which have been found to constitute 
credible dynamical systems can be conceived of as dynamical systems to 
which individuals are attuned. This was demonstrated with regard to Bladen 
exchange in Chapters 6 and 7. W hat this demonstration has shown is that 
certain social dynamical systems, such as mental or inter-neuronal dynamical 
systems, can be conceived of as — and therefore categorized as — cognitive 
systems through mathematical modeling and analysis. In this way, each 
social institution that is examined and which is found to be a cognitive system 
must be treated as if it was unique. At the same time, some generalization 
of the case studies examined by the analyst is required if the analyst is to
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work toward building a more comprehensive cognitive model.
With this basic premise in mind, my objectives in this chapter are:
• To take the first steps toward envisioning a comprehensive model of 
cognition which sees behavior (i.e. action) and experience as processes 
that allow an individual and a social dynamical system to interact. 
To do this I propose two integral concepts, namely internalization and 
extemalization, which are necessary for conceptualizing how certain so­
cial institutions (i.e. credible social systems) might be engaged with 
the neurophysiological processes of individuals (e.g. inter-neuronal sys­
tems).
• To explore the potential explanatory power that such a model might 
bring to anthropology by providing examples of how such a view of cog­
nition could be used to elucidate the anthropological and archaeological 
issues of:
1. How representations can be seen to establish themselves in the 
minds of individuals in cultural evolutionary theory (Shennan 
2002).
2. How agency (Dobres and Robb 2000) can be understood and in­
corporated in formal models of social systems.
8.1 The Cognitive Approach
Individual cognition and supra-individual cognition can be conceived of as 
independently functioning cognitive systems operating on different levels. 
This is because, as I discuss in Section 7.2, the fact that cognitive systems 
are independent is a logical consequence of all dynamical systems. Moreover,
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dynamical systems that have parallel distributed architectures are noted for 
having distributed control throughout the dynamical system (McClelland 
and Rumelhart 1986; Reisberg 1997; Donald 2001).
However, neither individual nor supra-individual cognition, on its own, 
can provide a complete account of cognition. This is because individual cog­
nition, generated by the human brain, and supra-individual cognition, gen­
erated by social institutions, interact. Social representations are impressed 
upon the individual mind through the dynamical system — manifested as a 
social institution — evoking the social representations. Conversely, the indi­
vidual mind can be seen as changing social representations by transforming 
the individual’s mental representations into behavior (or actions) that can 
change the supra-individual cognitive system generating the social represen­
tations.
In the language of information processing, being subjected to a social rep­
resentation amounts to having the social representation mentally processed 
(i.e. simply perceiving the social representation), and affecting a social repre­
sentation amounts to having one’s mental representation processed socially. 
In other words, a representation, though it may have arisen in one cogni­
tive “nest” (see Section 7.6), does not necessarily have to be restricted to 
being processed within the same cognitive nest. A representation arising 
in one cognitive nest can cross into other cognitive nests to be processed. 
This kind of processing, called hybrid processing, will be a major topic in 
this chapter and will function as the link between individual cognition and 
supra-individual cognition, which is critical for taking the first steps in devel­
oping a comprehensive model that can be seen as subsuming cognition and 
behavior.
As individuals, we have a significant degree of control over our individual
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cognitive capabilities. However, we do not command this degree of control 
over supra-individual cognition, since it involves externalizing one’s mental 
representations via action and interaction in order to create or make a change 
in supra-individual cognition. By externalizing I mean extending one’s in­
formation processing through action into the physical or social environment 
(refer to Section 3.4.3 regarding the notion of extended cognition). This 
takes an amassing of individuals to effect change at the social level, and this 
requires an immense amount of effort and determination from an individual 
as I discuss in Section 8.1.2.
Neither does supra-individual cognition determine the individual cogni­
tion, since individuals have the power to refuse or accept the social represen­
tations (i.e. social knowledge or ideology) being presented to them. Social 
dynamical systems, in the form of social institutions, instead can be regarded 
as processors designed by individuals for processing information for individ­
uals, a point which was brought up in Section 7.2.1.
Supra-individual cognition is often beneficial to individual cognition and 
can actually decrease mental cognitive effort in the individual by shortening 
or cutting out the time that goes into mental processing. Not all mental 
representations can be processed socially, however, and I will discuss next 
the kinds of mental representations that can be seen as being processed by 
social systems.
8.1.1 M ental R ep resen tation s R evisited
Clearly, not all mental representations can be processed at the social level. 
For example, it would probably be difficult to store the representation “7 
like that poodle” in the minds of individuals comprising one’s social circle. 
That is, it would be unreasonable to expect more than a few people in your
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SEMANTIC REPRESENTATION
0 ^ > o  O O 0 O 0 0
SOCIAL REPRESENTATION
Figure 20: In this diagram mental processing (represented by the solid circles) and 
social processing (represented by the dotted oval) do affect each other. In this case 
individual brains can affect social systems (in the form of social institutions) via 
semantic representations and the actions associated with the semantic represen­
tations. Similarly, social systems can affect individual brains through generating 
social representations.
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community to know your likes and dislikes, and as such it would be difficult 
to get an entire group of people constituting a society to retain this kind 
of information. So what kinds of mental representations can be processed 
at the social level? To shed light on this question I look to psychological 
investigations into propositional memory and the representations that this 
memory stores.
According to Tulving (1983), two kinds of propositional memory can be 
distinguished in the human brain: episodic and semantic. These kinds of 
memory can function as a framework for classifying representations based on 
the information that they contain (see van Dijk 1998). In this manner, I will 
classify those mental representations that can be stored in episodic memory 
as episodic representations and those that can be stored in semantic memory 
as semantic representations:
• Episodic representations are mental representations of events person­
ally experienced or witnessed, or information obtained through dis­
course with others. Episodic representations consist of personal knowl­
edge that is useful for oneself. Examples of episodic representations 
are: “Sally is my friend” or “I like burritos” .
•  Semantic representations are mental representations that individuals 
share. It is knowledge that one would expect is known by someone 
else who comes from the same social group. Some knowledge tran­
scends social barriers. Examples include: “Water boils at 100 degrees 
Centigrade” or “The U.S.A. and U.K. are allies” .
Clearly, semantic representations are the kinds of mental representations 
that have a greater likelihood of being processed socially and hence stored 
in many brains. This is because semantic representations have meaning and
350
hence implications beyond oneself (i.e. ego). Semantic representations con­
stitute the common knowledge of a social group. On the other hand, episodic 
representations, which refer to ego, are not conducive to being socially pro­
cessed and, therefore, cannot be stored in many brains other than ego and 
perhaps another in one’s social circle (i.e. alter). Therefore, I am particularly 
interested in semantic representations, since they are the kinds of represen­
tations that enable the individual through action and interaction to impact 
the social institution. I will discuss the processes by which representations 
and social institutions can be seen to affect each other in the next section.
8.1.2 Internalization and E xternalization
The processes of retrieval and storage can be seen to be analogous to the 
processes of internalization and externalization. The only difference is that 
retrieving and storing usually refer to processes that involve a single cognitive 
system and which occur within the cognitive system, and internalizing and 
externalizing refer to processes that involve more than one cognitive system 
and which occur across cognitive systems. Like the processes of retrieval and 
storage (see Chapter 7), the processes of internalization and externalization 
can be seen as being complementary.
Internalization as M aintaining Social Processing
Although it has been argued that the ways we think are innate, as the evo­
lutionary psychologists claim (e.g. Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby 1995), 
our actual views on things, specifically our semantic representations, are 
very much the product of what we perceive in the environment after birth 
(D’Andrade 1995:190-193). I define internalization as the process whereby 
a pattern in the form of material or behavior in the environment invokes a
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processed representation in the mind of the individual. A processed repre­
sentation is a representation that can be perceived by an individual but does 
not require further mental processing in order for the representation to be 
experienced and or comprehended. This process is not unlike signification, 
in which a signifier — which is usually taken to be material — results in a 
non-material signified concept in the mind of the individual.
A processed representation that already exists in the individual’s mind, 
which comes about as the result of internalization, does not require any fur­
ther mental power to enact. In other words, a processed representation does 
not require the utilization of one’s own biological memory functions to the 
extent that they are utilized for conscious deliberation. Rather one is re­
lieved of conscious deliberation by following a subconscious script (Schank 
and Abelson 1977). The actions involved in following a subconscious script, 
however, fall into the realm of externalization, specifically unintentional ex- 
ternalization.
Externalization as Updating Social Processing
Externalization can be seen to be the process by which a mental repre­
sentation manifests itself outwardly in material or behavior and in so doing 
is stored in the functional organization of the material or behavioral form. 
Thus, externalization is the process by which mental representations are con­
verted into actions. Changes to an existing social institution can either occur 
through voluntary action — what I refer to as intentional externalization — 
or it can occur through involuntary action — what I refer to as unintentional 
externalization (e.g. accidents or following the social representation being 
generated without questioning it).
Consciously putting a representation into action as is the case with inten­
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tional externalization uses energy, both mental and physical, whereas going 
on with life as it has been and simply internalizing and acting on what is 
being internalized, as is the case with unintentional externalization, involves 
less mental and usually less physical expenditure. With regard to intentional 
externalization, a certain degree of inertia exists that must be overcome to 
effect an outward change. Unintentional externalization, by remaining pas­
sive to the social representations to which one is being subjected, does not 
require the same degree of effort. This is similar to Lin’s (2001) proposal 
that there are two sorts of actions: those that maintain one’s resources or 
expressive actions, and those tha t gain more resources or instrumental ac­
tions (refer to Section 4.3.2). Expressive actions involve less physical effort 
to enact than instrumental actions and it is likely for this reason that instru­
mental actions are rarer, whereas expressive actions are more common. The 
difference between Lin’s views and my views, however, rests on the fact that 
Lin is concerned with physical effort, whereas I am concerned with cognitive 
effort.
In the language of information processing, externalization constitutes 
storing one’s representation in the functional organization of material or 
behavior. When the storing process is accomplished on a social level, the 
individual’s representation is stored for the entire social group, not just for 
the individual or small group doing the storing. The representation being 
externalized can be the intention of usurping power from the ruling class by 
gaining control over the functional infrastructure, or it can be more subtle 
— possibly unintentional — such as an idea which leads to an innovation 
that changes the existing technology and, hence, the socio-economic rela­
tions which were formed as the result of the earlier technology. Whatever 
the case may be, externalization is a way in which a representation can effect
353
a functional change, and externalization can be actuated by any individual 
in the society.
Externalization can be seen to be a process which results in the estab­
lishment of social institutions, such as inter-community exchange or political 
alliances and allegiances that can outlive any single individual or individu­
als. In this manner, externalization can be regarded as an investment for 
individuals and groups who are part of society for as long as the society is 
maintained.
Summary o f Internalization and Externalization and Their Com­
plem entary Nature
Cognition involves both externalization and internalization. Externalization 
is the process by which an individual effects behavioral changes on a supra- 
individual level through action and interaction and, in so doing, causes the 
individual’s representations to be stored externally in social institutions. In­
ternalization is the process by which representations that have been stored 
externally in social institutions are accessed and become part of an individ­
ual’s cognitive repertoire. As such, internalization and externalization can 
be conceived of as complementary processes, often operating in concert, each 
reinforcing the other. In order for human beings to have internalized a rep­
resentation, there had to have been a time in which a representation was 
externalized. Conversely, human beings can often be seen to be respond­
ing to the internalization of social representations through externalizing the 
same representations being internalized or externalizing different individual 
representations through unintentional or intentional means, respectively.
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8.2 C onceptualizing Internalization and Ex­
ternalization: F illing in th e Gap Betw een  
Individual C ognition  and Supra-Individual 
C ognition
Is supra-individual cognition really transpiring outside of the individual’s 
brain? In this thesis, I have proposed that supra-individual cognition occurs 
at a level or scale larger than the individual’s brain, but if this is the case, then 
how are the social representations, which are stored in the supra-individual 
cognitive system, retrieved by the individual’s nervous system during inter­
nalization? Conversely, it is easy to see how individual cognition updates 
supra-individual cognition in the process that I have termed externalization 
— it does so via action — but how does action allow the brain to store 
representations in supra-individual cognitive systems?
My proposed explanation of individual cognition and supra-individual 
cognition up to this point has been abstract. I have proposed that there is 
an individual cognitive system and that there are supra-individual cognitive 
systems, each of which is self-organizing and self-controlling and therefore 
independent to a certain degree. As such, mental and social processing sys­
tems, upon first impression, seem divided and unable to be conceptualized 
together even when it is accepted that they interact with each other through 
internalization and externalization.
Implicit in the discussion on internalization and externalization was the 
fact that individual cognition affects supra-individual cognition intermit­
tently via action whereas supra-individual cognition subjects the individual’s 
brain to representations on a relatively continuous basis. This concept par-
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allels a cognitive evolutionary view of the interactive bridge between mental 
processing and social processing. That is, it would be adaptive for brains to 
acquire the capability of utilizing the social environment (i.e. institutions) 
to “relieve” mental processing to some degree.
Whereas the self-organizing, self-controlling view of cognitive systems is 
helpful for understanding the benefits of interaction among cognitive systems 
— individual cognitive systems use supra-individual cognitive systems in fa­
cilitating mental processing and, in a manner of speaking, supra-individual 
cognitive systems use the individual’s brain as a place to manifest repre­
sentations — it does not fully explain cognition. The reason that the self­
controlling view does not fully explain cognition is that individual cognition 
and supra-individual cognition, while being independent, are not isolated 
from each other. They constitute one whole cognitive system in which indi­
vidual and supra-individual cognitive systems can be viewed as subsystems, 
and it is this that allows us to conceptualize the interactive dynamics between 
individual cognition and supra-individual cognition.
To suggest otherwise — that there is a gap between the individual cogni­
tive system and the supra-individual cognitive system — would imply that 
the nature of representations are such that they are transmitted from the 
supra-individual cognitive system to the individual cognitive system during 
the process of internalization. This implies that representations are entities 
of a sort that can cross the gap between social institutions and brains, some­
thing like memes (Dawkins 1976), but different from memes in that they 
would not be transmittable between individuals, but between an individual 
and a social institution.
This concept, however, involves a level of abstraction that is not necessary 
to or consonant with cognitive systems as I have described them. Represen-
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tat ions do not need to be transmitted across hypothetical gaps when they 
can be conceived of as being part of dynamical systems that generate rep­
resentations, and when individuals are subjected to representations through 
their attunement to the dynamical systems.
8.2.1 C onceptualizing E xternalization
In the beginning of this section I asked how an action can result in storing 
mental representations in supra-individual cognitive systems. An individ­
ual’s actions can be conceived of as affecting the supra-individual cognitive 
system because the individual is part of the social system constituting the 
supra-individual cognitive system. In this way, an action on the part of the 
individual will have a corresponding effect on the supra-individual cognitive 
system.
For example, if an individual is prompted by a representation to interact 
with another individual in a certain way based on this representation, then 
(see Section 7.1.2) the first individual is essentially fixing the constraints of 
the interactive system subsuming both individuals. In doing this, the first 
individual can be seen to set up the interactive system to store a represen­
tation. (In this example, the representation that prompts the action is a 
mental representation and it is stored in the interactive system as a social 
representation.) Thus, representations can be conceived of as being stored by 
an individual by acting in dynamical systems that subsume that individual 
and the social environment of which the individual is a part. This concep­
tualization merges the two abstract notions of mental processing and social 
processing into a more complete account of cognition. Figure 21 should help 
clarify this conceptualization of externalization.
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Figure 21: In this diagram portraying externalization, an individual’s action re­
sulting from conscious decision-making is invoking changes to various different 
social systems or social institutions. A. simply shows how cognition arising from 
an individual’s neural substrate is controlling the individual’s motor functions 
(e.g. lifting an arm). B. shows how cognition arising from an individual’s neural 
substrate (i.e. a mental processing system) is making changes to the cognitive 
system (or social processing system) formed between two friends, hence, changing 
the cognition that arises from this inter-personal cognitive system. C. shows how 
cognition arising from an individual’s neural substrate (i.e. mental processing) 
is making changes to the cognitive system formed among several individuals (i.e. 
a community of individuals), hence, changing the cognition that arises from this 
inter-personal cognitive system. D. shows how cognition arising from an individ­
ual’s neural substrate (i.e. mental processing) is making changes to the cognitive 
system formed between members of one’s community (1), which in turn affects 
inter-community interaction, resulting in changes to the cognition that arises from 
this inter-community cognitive system (2). Note how in D changes are effected 
through the associated cognitive system in a cascade fashion rather than through 
transmission.
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8.2.2 C onceptualizing Internalization
With this merging of individual and supra-individual cognitive systems, a 
representation generated by a social institution should automatically gener­
ate an associated representation in the brain of the individual. To clarify this 
process by which a social representation becomes a mental representation for 
the individual it is key to realize that as long as the human brain is attuned 
to the features of a dynamical system — most important being the states of 
the system — then this means that there are neurons or groups of neurons 
in the brain that correspond to the states of the dynamical system in the 
environment (recall Section 7.3.1). As such, a change in the states of the 
social processing system can be seen to effect a corresponding change from 
the neurons designating the states of the social processing system within the 
brain.
Neural networks of the brain have the ability to mimic any dynamical 
system in the environment. Perhaps not surprisingly, this is precisely the 
reason why neural networks are so extensively used by engineers. Engineers 
use artificial neural networks to approximate all sorts of dynamical systems, 
whether they are mechanical or electrical, and for this reason neural networks 
have been characterized as “universal approximators”.
Whereas the actual information processing of social representations can 
be seen to occur on a social scale subsuming the individual’s brain, it is 
conceivable that the effects of a social system or institution would have ram­
ifications within the brain. In this way, representations can be seen to arise 
in situ within the brain and never actually need to cross the hypothetical 
gap between the supra-individual cognitive system (e.g. an inter-community 
exchange system) and the individual cognitive system (i.e. the inter-neuronal 
dynamical system). Figure 22 should help clarify this conceptualization of
359
internalization.
8.2.3 Sum m arizing the C onceptualization  o f External­
ization and Internalization and T heir Im plica­
tions
To summarize, the process of externalization can be seen to involve an indi­
vidual’s actions in storing mental representations in a supra-individual cogni­
tive system by fixing the constraints of the supra-individual cognitive system. 
Thus, the information processing involved in externalization (i.e. storing rep­
resentations) can be seen as a dynamical system which subsumes both the 
individual and the social environment and which functions at a scale larger 
than the brain. On the other hand, internalization (i.e. retrieving represen­
tations) can be conceived of as occurring simultaneously at the social scale as 
well as within the brain, since a social system’s states can be seen as having 
corresponding effects on neural states (assuming that the social system is 
also a cognitive system [i.e. a system to which individuals are attuned]).
8.3 The Cognitive Approach: Explaining Rep­
resentation
One key issue that a cognitive approach to society can help to clarify has to 
do with the nature of a representation.
In recent years, new approaches to cultural evolution have increasingly 
attracted a following in archaeology. Cultural evolution (as defined by Boyd 
and Richerson [1985] and Shennan [2002]) relies heavily on the notion that 
persistent cultural traits or representations are the result of traits or repre-
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Figure 22: In this diagram portraying internalization, a dynamical system in the 
social or physical environment is being perceived by an individual’s brain. In other 
words, because the individual is locked onto some feature of a dynamical system, 
the individual follows its changes through time. Whatever occurs to this feature 
that is attached to the dynamical system within the social or physical environment 
will also happen within the individual’s brain as long as the individual remains 
attuned to the dynamical system. Provided that there is attunement, this means 
that for every dynamical systemic state there will be a corresponding mental state. 
Because of the nature of internalization, the analyst needs only to explain what 
is happening to the dynamical system in the environment in order to understand 
what is occurring within the individual’s brain.
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sentations being successfully selected for over time. Some of these cultural 
informational units, called memes, are perpetuated through discourse and 
eventually become shared by members of a society (Dawkins 1976). Though 
the notion of the meme is not necessary for an evolutionary framework, the 
notion that culture is information which is transmitted and then “inherited” 
through social learning is important for cultural evolutionists in conceiving 
of culture as an inheritance system (Shennan 2002:35-36).
There are difficulties, however, with conceiving of culture as an inheri­
tance system. This is because the representation or meme does not function 
in the way that would be expected of it if it was the analog to the gene in 
biological evolution (Hull 1988:37; Lake 1998:86). However, a more press­
ing problem for cultural evolution from a cognitive standpoint is how the 
cultural evolutionary paradigm conceives of social learning. Cultural evolu­
tionists envision learning as transmission, and this, in turn, affects the way 
that cultural evolutionists conceive of representations. In other words, the 
cultural evolution school sees representations as being transmittable.
8.3.1 Transm ittable R epresentations
Two kinds of representations fall under what I refer to as the transmittable 
paradigm of representations: personal representations and social representa­
tions. Personal representations are representations that are formed and are 
particular to the individual (van Dijk 1998:28). Social representations are 
personal representations that are shared amongst two or more individuals 
(van Dijk 1998:28-31). Personal representations can be said to become shared 
through transmission, much as diseases are spread, and it is for this reason 
that the transmittable approach is referred to as epidemiological (Sperber 
1996).
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In the transmittable view of representations, personal representations 
have the potential of becoming social representations; that is, all social 
representations were personal representations at one time. Some schools of 
thought, however, use a different terminology. For example, according to the 
cultural epidemiological school of thought (Sperber 1996), there exist repre­
sentations and memes. A representation is an idea that an individual comes 
up with, and a meme is a representation that can be successfully replicated 
and shared by several individuals (Sperber 1996:100-101). This provides a 
model that makes it relatively easy to envision how representations are ab­
sorbed, altered, shared, or rejected by individuals because representations are 
seen as particles or units that can be altered or passed on to someone else, 
mainly through discourse. The transmittable view of representations is cer­
tainly the most popular amongst archaeologists and anthropologists today, 
especially amongst those who are closely allied with the cultural evolutionists 
and epidemiologists (e.g. Sperber 1996; Shennan 2002).
8.3.2 The Problem  w ith  Social Learning
According to cognitive scientists, learning — or the process by which repre­
sentations are stored or retained — is a functional phenomenon, called infor­
mation processing, in which a dynamical system or network stores patterns 
through fixing the constraints of the system. This is the way that learning 
has been treated for the past forty years in the work of Grossberg (1967, 
1970a, 1970b) and others (recall Chapters 2 and 3). However this is not how 
learning is depicted in cultural evolution. In cultural evolution, learning is 
regarded as the transmission of ideas, not as a capability of a system. The 
term “social learning,” which is an important concept in cultural evolution, 
is a case in point.
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The difficulty with conceiving of learning as transmission is that the pro­
cess by which representations are transmitted does not constitute learning. 
Learning in the transmission model needs to involve mechanisms that allow 
some representations the ability to be retained by the recipients once the 
representations have been transmitted. As it stands, the transmission model 
lacks a feasible concept of how representations are stored, which is essential 
in any model of learning. Cultural evolutionists assert that the mechanisms 
that allow representations to be retained after they have been transmitted is 
either selection or copying. Through a series of mechanisms (Boyd and Rich- 
erson 1985), representations either battle it out until some finite number 
of the representations succeed in being “inherited” for some period of time 
(e.g. direct and indirect transmission) or else they are passively adopted (e.g. 
conformist transmission).
However, the mechanisms responsible for how social representations axe 
selected in cultural evolution — direct transmission and indirect transmis­
sion — are not explanations for how social representations succeed in being 
formed and retained; they are merely descriptions of the different ways that 
social representations can be “inherited”. Game theory and decision theory 
facilitate the explanation of how different social representations may compete 
against each other after the representations have already manifested them­
selves in individuals — after they have been learned or retained to some 
degree. However, cultural evolutionary theory does not account for how a 
social representation is generated in the first place such that the representa­
tion is retained in multiple minds.
With regard to conformist transmission, the idea is that representations 
are selected before they are retained, so all one needs to do is copy them. 
Still, even in conformist transmission, in which there appears to be no learn­
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ing going on at the time the representation is copied, the representation 
had to arise from some place and in some manner. The process in which 
representations arise, however, is not adequately explained and the cultural 
evolutionist is forced to assume the representation’s existence a priori.
In light of the conceptual difficulties which cultural evolutionists face, I 
have proposed another way of looking at social learning in this thesis. I have 
looked at learning from an information processing perspective and built a 
notion of what a representation is from a functional basis rather than an 
epidemiological one.
8.3.3 N on-Transm ittable R epresen tations
Non-transmittable representations are the kinds of representations I have 
been discussing throughout this thesis. Non-transmittable representations 
are formed as the result of certain kinds of functional organizations. The 
most obvious functional organizations capable of processing information are 
dynamical systems.
The cognitive approach can provide a parsimonious explanation for how 
representations are retained by grounding the notion of representation in 
functionalism.1 In the cognitive approach, representations must have a func­
tional basis in order to be generated. These functional bases exist on many 
different levels or scales from the inter-neuronal scale to the inter-societal 
scale. As such, an idea that manifests itself on an inter-neuronal level can 
only be built into a high-order level (e.g. inter-community scale) through 
some physical change to the high-order cognitive system. For example, by 
changing inter-community relations, a ruler in one community can affect what 
kinds of representations the inhabitants of all of the communities are being
XI take functionalism to mean strong functionalism as I described in Section 3.2.3.
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presented with. This shows that a representation formed in an inter-neuronal 
dynamical system can effect a change in social representations only through 
physically changing the functional organization of the cognitive system re­
sponsible for generating the social representations. This appears superficially 
similar to the idea or metaphor of a particle of information being transmitted 
from one individual to another. In actuality the process in which social rep­
resentations arise (i.e. retained) is training higher-ordered cognitive systems 
to generate representations.
Although non-transmittable representations emerge from dynamical sys­
tems to which individuals are attuned, these representations still require a 
material basis in order to be generated. That is to say that the functional 
organization of the material basis must be arranged in such a way that it 
constitutes a dynamical system. Thus, even though information processing 
capability is not a material phenomenon but rather a functional phenomenon 
(since information processing is substrate independent), it does require some 
material substrate in order to generate information processing capability.
As such, non-transmittable representations are linked to a material sub­
strate. They are not transmittable because they do not need to be transmit­
ted. Whereas transmittable representations replace other representations by 
infiltrating the minds of people and battling it out for superiority within the 
minds of individuals, non-transmittable representations replace other rep­
resentations by effecting a change in the organization of a material basis 
generating the other representations. By changing the functional organiza­
tion of the material basis that is generating an old representation, a new 
representation is produced to replace the old representation. In this way, a 
non-transmittable representation usually has an observable concomitant (i.e. 
action).
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Discourse is a perfect example illustrating the material and representa­
tional dynamic. For those who assert that representations are transmittable, 
discourse is seen as a vehicle for infiltrating the brains of individuals with 
representations. In contrast to this, the non-transmittable paradigm asserts 
that discourse is a means for establishing social institutions (with the proper 
functional organizations) that can, in turn, generate representations at a scale 
larger than the inter-neuronal level. In the non-transmittable view, informa­
tion is relayed between people in order to establish the social institutions, 
but it is the social institutions that are responsible for evoking long-standing 
representations that have an impact on more than one individual. The in­
formation that is relayed between people functions so as to enable people to 
work together to form social unions and institutions which have a dynamic 
of their own for generating representations.
Conventional cultural evolutionary thought proposes that representations 
are transmittable particulate entities that become shared among individuals. 
In this way, representations are spread in a process called cultural transmis­
sion (e.g. through discourse). In other words, representations are particulate 
entities that are distributed in series. One individual comes up with an idea 
and that idea is spread to other individuals and eventually the idea becomes 
a social representation.
However, from what we know of how representations are stored in mem­
ory, this is not a viable model for how representations are formed. Based on 
what we know about information processing, a viable model to explain how 
representations are formed has representations constitute layers emerging 
from dynamical systems to which individuals are attuned. This means that 
ideas can manifest themselves structurally, socially, and/or simultaneously in 
many individuals, and therefore in parallel. In short, the cognitive approach,
367
which is based on how information is processed, can propose an explanation 
for the processes that lead to the formation of a representation.
8.4 The Cognitive Approach: Explaining Agency
The study of agency involves the study of actors and their social relevancy — 
that is, how individuals and small social groups within society can affect the 
social systems or institutions that hold sway over the individuals and small 
social groups (Dobres and Robb 2000:8). Agency is typically studied through 
action (e.g. Joyce 2000:71). However, agency can also be studied using 
the cognitive approach. The cognitive approach is a comprehensive means 
of approaching agency, since it considers the mental processes that initiate 
physical actions as well as the physical actions that result in the changes to 
the social institution. The cognitive approach incorporates representations 
in the social life of the individuals being studied and this is important since 
representations affect and are affected by action.
8.4.1 The C ognitive A pproach as an A ltern ative to  the  
A ction  Approach
For many agency theorists, agency constitutes the individual’s or small so­
cial group’s ability to act voluntarily in such a way as to effect changes in 
society (e.g. Hodder 1987:6). What is explicit is the fact that the individual 
must act, and I refer to this emphasis on studying agency through action 
the action approach. However, what is implicit is that agency begins with 
an intention or representation and follows through with this representation 
via an associated action. In the action approach, the representations that 
sparked the actions are not commonly considered, or if they are considered,
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the representations are left implicit. This has a detrimental effect on any 
attempt to explain behavior in society since representations — mental and 
social — are integral in shaping ways in which individuals and small social 
groups act or behave. Unlike the action approach, the cognitive approach 
sees actions as not only being initiated by representations but actually being 
material or behavioral manifestations of representations which elicited the 
actions. As such, representations and cognition would be featured explicitly 
in agency studies that utilize the cognitive approach, since action is seen as 
being synonymous with cognition.
The fact that action can be regarded as synonymous with cognition has 
been implied throughout the last two chapters. Actions in the social envi­
ronment can be conceived of as dynamical systems if assessed as such, and 
this means that they can be seen to have information processing capability. 
If these systems are perceived, the dynamical systems constitute cognitive 
systems. In this way, actions in the social environment can be seen to be 
cognitive systems. The implication is that a common currency pervades both 
action and cognition, and this common currency is information in the form 
of representations.
Points at Which the Cognitive Approach and the Action Approach 
Intersect and Do Not Intersect
The cognitive approach and action approach intersect on the point of volun­
tary action and do not intersect on the point of involuntary action. I discuss 
these points below.
In the action approach, action is regarded as a physical phenomenon with 
the intent of making changes to the social system subsuming the agent, the 
assumption being that action is voluntary. As such, action as it is portrayed
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by the action approach can be seen to intersect with the cognitive process, 
which I refer to as intentional externalization. In this case, a representation 
affects the functional organization of the society in such a way as to influence 
it to generate the desired representation.
However, the cognitive approach also includes involuntary actions which 
are significant enough to change the functional organization of the social in­
stitution, often causing it to generate unintended representations. These ac­
tions can be referred to as unintentional externalizations (see Section 8.1.2), 
which up to this point have been little discussed, but are still capable of 
being handled by a cognitive approach. The action approach to agency, on 
the other hand, has difficulty reconciling the effects of unintentional actions 
(Dobres and Robb 2000:10) since it is traditionally associated with volun­
tary behavior (Dobres and Robb 2000:4) and the effects thereof on the rest 
of society. Involuntary actions, however, are important since they change 
the functional organization of social institutions in society, and this changes 
the representations being generated, which in turn affects the way in which 
individuals and small social groups voluntarily behave.
In a sense, the cognitive approach is more comprehensive than the action 
approach not only because it can account for agency from the moment it 
emerges in cognition to the moment it finishes its action, but because it 
can include involuntary actions and explain how they can effect changes in 
social institutions and the representations they generate. This is all possible 
since voluntary actions and involuntary actions, whether they stem from the 
individual, a small social group, or social institution, can be conceived of as 
sharing the currency of information in the form of representations. In other 
words, the cognitive approach can account for actions since actions can be 
conceived of as cognitive systems.
370
8.4.2 A gency and S ystem s
To use the cognitive approach requires the utilization of the notion of a 
“system” since the cognitive approach relies on the fact that cognition arises 
from dynamical systems to which other information processors, particularly 
humans, are attuned. Therefore to utilize the cognitive approach to explain 
agency entails a defense of the concept of the system in archaeology, which 
until the 1990s was considered to be an inadequate means for expressing the 
effects of agency (Lake 2003:2).
Agency in archaeology came about to some degree as a response to sys­
tems theory in archaeology (Dobres and Robb 2000:6; Lake 2003:2). Agency 
advocates asserted that modeling a social phenomenon as a social system ne­
glected to incorporate the individual or small groups that would have been 
integral in forming the social system’s dynamics (Graham 1991). Their crit­
icism was merited; however, their rejection of the concept of a system as a 
means of conceiving of society and its social institutions was premature. The 
social system as it came to be regarded was commonly conceived by archaeol­
ogists as being a linear system.2 As a result, the notion of a social system as 
a linear system was seen to be too mechanistic for the purposes of modeling 
society and all of its intricacies. The main complaint against the concept of 
the system was that it could not incorporate the effects individuals or small 
social groups and therefore was unable to depict social complexity. As a 
result, systems and the models that describe them entered a hiatus (Lake 
2003:2).
When the notion of agency emerged it was predominantly post-processual 
(e.g. Hodder 1987, Shanks and Tilley 1987). However as more processual-
2There are exceptions, however. See Renfrew and Cooke (1979) and Renfrew, Row­
lands, and Segraves (1982).
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driven archaeologists began exploring the concept of nonlinear systems, it 
became clear that agency might be incorporated into a system after all (e.g. 
McGlade 1997, van der Leeuw and McGlade 1997). Nonlinear systems are 
dynamical systems that have have several distinctive characteristics of which 
the most important in our discussion is sensitivity to initial conditions and 
the ability to have more than one equilibrium. Sensitivity to initial condi­
tions means that different starting points for the system can yield drastically 
different outputs and have different end points (i.e equilibria). For proces- 
sual archaeologists, the notion that social systems could be conceived of as 
nonlinear systems held out hope that nonlinear systems and the models that 
describe them would provide the modeler with a clearer sense of social reality. 
This is because the notion of small scale perturbations to the initial condi­
tions of the nonlinear social system could be considered akin to individuals 
and small social groups effecting change in the social system that subsumes 
the individuals and small social groups (Spencer-Wood 2000:116,121).
Though it seems like a promising idea, I argue that associating agency 
with initial conditions is an impractical way of conceiving of agency. Agency 
acts on the social system continuously throughout its history or evolution, 
not just on the initial states of the system’s development. Moreover, agency 
is built into the system and becomes part of the social system, and is not 
just superimposed on the social system. Therefore, agency is actually im­
portant in contributing to the trajectory the social system takes. The notion 
that agency is a sustained phenomenon, and not simply a one-time event, 
mirrors what can best be described as “noise” rather than sensitivity to ini­
tial conditions. I propose, therefore, that utilizing the notion of noise makes 
it possible to introduce agency into social systems while maintaining the 
validity of conceiving of society and its institutions as systems.
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It should be pointed out that the concept of noise is a relative one and 
depends on the subject. In this way, if the social system is the subject, then 
agency is the noise, and if the individual is the subject then the social system 
constitutes the noise. In this thesis the focus has been on the social system 
as subject.
Agency as Noise
What has been argued in the last section is that the notion of a system is 
a concept which can adequately cope with agency. In circumstances that 
permit it (e.g. where historical information is available), agency can be 
introduced into the social system discriminately. In cases where we do not 
exactly know what agents were doing, but we still want to introduce the 
effects of agency into the system, we can introduce agency into the system 
as noise.
Unlike conceiving of agency as perturbations to the initial conditions of 
the social dynamical system, agency can be conceived of as random fluctu­
ations to the constraints of the social dynamical system. This noise to the 
constraints is called multiplicative noise and is different from additive noise, 
which is often used in engineering models (Milton 1996). Agency, as mul­
tiplicative noise, affects the development of the social system continuously 
throughout the evolution of the system. As a result, the agent is never ex­
cluded at any time from having an effect on the social system. In addition 
to this, since the noise is affecting the constraints of the system, it is effec­
tively operating on the system endogenously instead of exogenously. As a 
result, agency is built into the system and therefore plays an important role 
in shaping the course that the system takes. Whatever approach is taken 
to conceive of agency — whether it is the cognitive approach or the action
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approach — noise is an adequate means of representing agency.
Next, I illustrate the effects of agency using the cognitive approach on 
the Bladen communities. The reason for using the cognitive approach rather 
than the action approach, as I discuss above in Section 8.4.1, is that it is 
more comprehensive since it includes the representations that initiated the 
actions as well as the actions themselves. Because both representations and 
actions affect each other it is difficult to see how they can be separated, as 
is commonly done using an action approach.
8.4.3 R evisiting th e  Bladen: A  Form al C ognitive E x­
planation for A gency
As I have already argued above, agency can be explained with a cognitive 
approach, specifically with the concept of externalization. I will demonstrate 
how intentional externalization or agency can be realized in a hypothetical 
scenario among the Bladen communities in which the elite — the agents in 
this case — are working at odds with the commoners.
In the cognitive approach, supra-individual cognition functions in facili­
tating the information processing of individual minds, but often changes are 
made to the way that the exchange system socially processes the marginal 
standard of living representation. For example, the elites of the Bladen com­
munities may be envious of the high standard of living representations their 
communities’ populations have been receiving. Therefore, the elites of the 
communities try to change the functional organization of the exchange sys­
tem so as to lower the marginal standard of living for their subjects. In doing 
this, the elites hope that their subjects will not acquire high status.
To change the standard of living representation, the elites must change 
the functional infrastructure, perhaps by advocating policies that increase
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population growth at the communities (n) or increase the number of rituals 
involving manos and metates (5) (recall that in Equations 6.7-6.9, A =  n+8); 
in this way, there will be fewer manos and metates in circulation. This will, in 
turn, lower the representational community rankings. The crucial step, then, 
for the elites is to externalize the small group representation of “lowering 
the standard of living of our subjects”. Only then can the supra-individual 
cognition generated by the Bladen exchange system be changed. Countering 
this will be the commoners who are trying to increase their standard of living 
representations by refusing to partake in rituals (£) involving the usage of 
manos and metates. These changes to n and <5 will cause A  to modulate 
and in this way small social group cognition can be seen as affecting Bladen 
supra-individual cognition via externalization. In so doing, the small social 
groups make changes to the social representation that is being internalized 
by all of the people of the Bladen.
The effect of the conflict of interests between the commoners and the 
elites (i.e. the agents) can best be modeled by updating one of the constraints, 
namely A. The updating of A  can be approximated with normally distributed 
random fluctuations, where A  denotes the mean of these random fluctuations 
(Figure 23). The premise behind this is that interested parties or individuals 
are externalizing and in so doing incurring changes to the exchange system 
that subsumes them. By externalizing their representations, individuals and 
interested parties change the representations they have been internalizing.
To recapitulate how the Bladen case study illustrates earlier points about 
agency, we can conceive of the agents as constituting a small group of elites 
who are trying to lower the average standard of living representation through 
externalization. In doing this, the elites change the functional organization of 
the exchange system, such that a newer, lower standard of living representa-
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tion is generated from the functional organization of Bladen exchange. This 
change occurs throughout the exchange system’s development by one elite 
person or another and produces the effect of noise built into the exchange 
system. This “small-scale” noise from the elites shapes the exchange system 
and affects the trajectory that the exchange system takes.
The most important point is that there is continuous feedback occurring 
between the individual or small groups of individuals and the subsuming 
social system, in our case Bladen exchange. This continuous feedback is 
integral for permitting the individuals to make changes and for shaping the 
encompassing social system’s development. This feedback is not rooted in 
action without cognition, but rather rooted in cognition and the continuous 
interplay between externalization and internalization.
8.5 Conclusion: A C om prehensive M odel of 
Cognition R esides on a Bridge
In this chapter, I use the term externalization to refer to the process or ac­
tion initiated by individual cognition by which representations are stored 
in supra-individual cognitive systems. Similarly, I utilize the term internal­
ization to refer to the process by which representations are retrieved from 
supra-individual cognitive systems and by which they are manifested in the 
brain of the individual. Externalization and internalization are processes 
that bridge the gap between the individual and his or her individual cog­
nition, and the social institution and its associated supra-individual cogni­
tion. Understanding how the processes bridge individual cognitive systems 
and supra-individual cognitive systems is integral to understanding how the 
study of social institutions can be seen as a part of cognitive science.
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Figure 23: This plot depicts the results of the dynamical system  described by 
Equations 6.7-6.9, where r is a uniformly random fluctuating parameter in the 
range [1.0,2.0] and A  is a normal distribution with mean 0.23 and variance 1.00. 
The diagram of this stochastic response shows how the household level of manos 
and metates at Muklebal Tzul (x l) , Ek Xux (x2), and the Lower Bladen (x3) 
sites grew through time. Mano and metate frequencies at households in Ek Xux 
and Muklebal Tzul are the same, whereas the frequency of manos and metates at 
households in the Lower Bladen sites rises clearly above this level. The difference 
between Figure 15 and this figure is that this figure incorporates individual cogni­
tion and associated action. These actions, which come from both the elite and the 
commoners of the Bladen communities, affect the constraints of the exchange sys­
tem that is producing a standard of living representation that all the individuals in 
the system experience. Here, the rulers can be seen as trying to decrease the mano 
and metate frequency and associated standard of living by encouraging population 
growth or ritual usage of manos and metates (i.e. increasing n  and 6, respectively) 
and the commoners can be seen as trying to increase their standard of living by 
not participating in rituals involving manos and metates (i.e. decreasing <5).
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The main purpose of this chapter is to take the first steps toward realiz­
ing a model of cognition — based on how mental representations arise within 
nervous systems — which sees social institutions as supra-individual sources 
of cognition. The general idea is that the social institution can be conceived 
of as a supra-individual cognitive system to which individuals are attuned. 
A social institution, therefore, functions as an extended information proces­
sor to the individual’s brain and therefore facilitates processing in much the 
same way that a computer or calculator facilitates the individual’s cogni­
tive capabilities. In this way, the supra-individual cognitive system extends 
cognition in a manner similar to how external memory devices proposed by 
Donald (1991) and Clark and Chalmers (1998) extend information process­
ing capacity. The only difference is that social institutions can be seen as 
having a much longer development than most of the other external cognitive 
devices which are responsible for the last stage in Donald’s (1991) cognitive 
evolutionary scheme.
I explored two theoretical paradigms which are commonly used among 
anthropologists and archaeologists and I showed that a cognitive approach 
can be used as an alternative to these paradigms. I also showed that the cog­
nitive approach has advantages over these other paradigms. The cultural evo­
lutionary paradigm neglects to account for how social representations arise 
and how they are retained in the minds of individuals. The response from 
the cognitive approach is to regard social representations just as we would 
mental representations and in this way explain how social representations 
are formed and retained. The emphasis on agency arose in response to sys­
tems theorists’ lack of attention to the actions of individuals or small social 
groups. I showed in this chapter that the cognitive approach can account for 
the agency of individuals and small interest groups as “noise” built into the
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social system. The fact that the noise is part of the system has the effect 
of giving the social system a unique character which it would not have had 
without the incorporation of agency.
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Conclusion
Classic Maya ground stone exchange in the Bladen region of the Maya Moun­
tains was not solely a means by which people obtained goods that they re­
quired or desired, nor was it solely a means through which individuals could 
gain prestige or socialize. As much as these socioeconomic reasons are impor­
tant for shedding light on why Classic Maya exchanged ground stone, and for 
gaining insight into the past human lifeways of the Classic Maya, the purpose 
of this thesis was to go beyond what my case study tells archaeologists about 
how the Classic Maya exchanged goods. Although exchange is a social insti­
tution that has very pragmatic reasons for existing (i.e. I want it so I seek to 
obtain it), exchange can be assessed and can therefore be conceived of as a 
dynamical system capable of generating supra-individual cognition. In this 
way, the exchange of ground stone in the Bladen region was seen as a process 
in which the relationship between social institutions and cognition could be 
illuminated. This entailed demonstrating that ground stone exchange within 
the Bladen region could be seen to form a dynamical system to which the 
Bladen inhabitants were attuned (recall chapter 7).3
In this thesis, I began with the premise that aspects of human behavior 
can be represented as fundamentally economic. I used this characteristic to
3Recall that cognition refers to information processing capability as well as the capa­
bility of being perceived by individuals.
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show that “thinking” individuals are aware of the economic patterns sur­
rounding them. This may at first glance sound deterministic — that we are 
trapped into thinking in a manner that is determined by economic systems 
that we have constructed — but it is not deterministic. We are aware of the 
patterns that emerge from economic systems and in most cases we continue 
to follow these patterns, but this does not mean that we all respond in the 
same way to the patterns we perceive.
As I have discussed in Chapter 8, mental processing (or individual cogni­
tion) and social processing (or supra-individual cognition) can be conceived of 
as being independent of each other in that they can be seen to operate at dif­
ferent scales, hence forming separate dynamical/cognitive systems. Because 
dynamical systems can be seen to be independent systems, these dynami­
cal systems exert a certain amount of control over their own functioning. 
In addition to the autonomous nature of cognitive systems, cognitive sys­
tems can also form networks, and this tends to distribute control among the 
functioning constituents of the networks (Reisberg 1997).
Even though cognitive systems such as a brain and an exchange system 
can be seen to be independent, they can interact and indeed have impact 
on each other as I discussed in the last chapter. For example, variations in 
behavioral responses to a general social trend can be introduced by individual 
conscious minds, resulting in changes which influence the supra-individual 
cognitive system and the social representations it produces. So it should not 
seem as if the individual plays no role in affecting and in some cases changing 
the social representations to which the individual is subject (see Section 8.4).
To what extent supra-individual cognition has control over its process­
ing is debatable. However, if the number of nodes and inter-connections 
determines how much control cognitive systems exert over functioning and
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organization (Wu 2001:7), then it would seem logical to expect that the hu­
man brain would have far greater control over its processing than a social 
institution, such as an exchange system, would have over its processing.4
Toward a Fundam ental Theory o f Cognition
The assumption that the human brain has far more control over its own 
faculties than a social institution has over its processing leads me to propose 
that individuals can manipulate social processing. This manipulation can be 
seen in two ways:
1. The first way is to envision manipulation as unintentional — as an 
adaptation to ease cognitive expenditure that is biologically driven. In 
this view, an individual’s brain manipulates social processing through 
action in order to alleviate the brain from having to process information 
on its own.
2. The second way is to envision manipulation as intentional or calcu­
lated. In this view, an individual’s brain manipulates social processing 
through action in order to gain control over the individual’s life.
These views are related since they can both be conceived of as modes of 
externalization, and thus can be seen as links between the cognition mani­
fested in the individual’s brain and the cognition formed by society’s institu­
tions. The result of these explorations suggests that because cognition can be 
seen to extend to social behavior, cognition not only encompasses biological
4There are in the human cortex about 1011 neurons with 1015 synapses (Wu 2001:7),
which is far greater than the number of interacting communities on this earth, let alone
the number of interacting individuals on this earth.
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brain functioning, but it can also be seen to encompass social institutional 
functioning. In other words, it should be possible to conceive of the processes 
behind brain and certain social institutional functioning as not only being 
connected, but also as being based on the same fundamental mechanics, and 
therefore subsumed by a common model.
The idea that cognition is substrate independent has important implica­
tions for cognition because it suggests that cognition is not necessarily the 
subject matter for psychology. Since cognition manifests itself within the in­
dividual, and can be seen to manifest itself within social groups, and between 
the individual and social groups, cognition has to be studied in social as well 
as individual contexts. Moreover, not only can the brain and its functioning 
be conceived of as part of cognitive science, but so can the study of social 
institutions. This means that aspects of economics and sociology might some 
day be studied as cognitive science. Such a cognitive science, as I envision 
it, would not only study cognition in the individual but it would study cog­
nition in the individual and in society. The proposal that many aspects of 
social life can be seen as being analyzed as cognitive science has important 
implications for archaeology and anthropology. I discuss these implications 
in the next sections.
Cognitive M odeling Procedures and Their Im­
plications for A rchaeology and Anthropology: 
A C ognitive Approach to  Society
The main way to construct a cognitive model of a social or economic phe­
nomenon is to construct a model of a phenomenon that can be tested against
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empirical data to ascertain if the model represents a cognitive system. Models 
of contemporary social and economic phenomena can be tested for cognitive 
attunement in the way that Turvey and Carello (1995) test for attunement 
— the analyst’s model can be tested to see if the subjects being analyzed 
are attuned to the constraints or the states of the dynamical system that the 
model describes. And models of ancient social or economic phenomena can 
be tested not through interviewing one’s subjects, obviously, but by model­
ing case studies that have enough historical or archaeological information to 
infer (propose) what people were thinking, as my case study of the Bladen 
has shown.
One issue that a modern economist does not face as often as an archae­
ologist faces is complete detachment from his or her subjects. The modern 
economist is commonly a member of the the society he or she models and 
therefore being etic amounts to being emic to some degree as well since the 
economist is modeling the economy based on his or her own experiences, 
which are of course a part of the supra-individual cognition which subsumes 
the economist. The archaeologist, on the other hand, does not have the good 
fortune of being in the economist’s position. This is because the archaeolo­
gist often is not subsumed by the supra-individual cognition of the people he 
or she is studying. The archaeologist is detached from his or her subjects by 
time and often space.
On the other hand, the archaeologist or anthropologist is frequently closer 
to his or her subjects than the modern economist is to his or her subjects 
in that archaeologists and anthropologists are more sensitive to the material 
culture of people — archaeologists particularly. In archaeological investiga­
tions, meaningful social patterns concerning certain objects can be revealed, 
indicating attunement to these objects. The manner in which a certain object
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type was spatially and temporally distributed in a society is one of the clear­
est indications of how the members of that society were experiencing these 
objects. These objects may then be used as external indices in modeling 
cognitive systems for the ancient inhabitants the archaeologist is investigat­
ing. Where attunement is in evidence, as I propose in the Bladen case study, 
archaeology can contribute uniquely to our understanding of cognition and 
in so doing provide archaeologists with a method for retrieving potential 
representations from the past.
I used a two-step process in constructing a formal model of a cognitive 
system in my research on Bladen exchange. An archaeologist wanting to 
elucidate the representations to which past people were subject can follow 
the same two-step process that I have used. This process is namely:
1. To infer cognitive attunement to some external index.
2. To construct a formal model describing a credible dynamical system in 
which the external index plays a role as a state or constraint of the 
dynamical system. (Often this second step takes some inference, as 
with the first step, but most of the time one can build on physical or 
economic models that are well established, and/or models that can be 
tested to some degree.)
It might seem circular that in order to elucidate the representations to 
which past people were subject, the archaeologist must first propose what 
people were thinking and then formally model it, for what good would model­
ing something be if we already knew what people thought? But the purpose 
of constructing a formal model of a cognitive system is not only to allow 
inferences to be made about what people thought about an external index, 
but to understand how people’s thoughts related to the external index devel­
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oped. This allows the archaeologist to compare a representation in different 
times of a society’s history, and hence allows the archaeologist to formulate 
theories as to why this representation may have developed.
There is another reason why it is important to construct a formal model of 
a cognitive system. Representations are the building blocks for other repre­
sentations and formal modeling is a means of accommodating more complex 
representations built on simpler representations. Let me use the Bladen case 
study to illustrate what I mean about building upon representations.
In the Bladen case study, I first inferred cognitive attunement to frequency 
of manos and metates and then I constructed a mathematical model of the 
dynamical system that described how the frequency of manos and metates 
changed through time. I could have stopped before constructing the model 
describing how frequency of manos and metates changed through time and 
ended after arguing that frequency of manos and metates had meaning for 
the Bladen inhabitants. However, by considering the frequency of manos and 
metates at three communities and treating the change in frequency of manos 
and metates as a dynamical system, I was able to propose the following: that 
the frequencies of manos and metates were indications of status, how status 
at the communities changed through time, and that the Bladen communities 
would have been ranked differently in the minds of the local people, provided 
that the inhabitants were aware of the importance of the frequencies of manos 
and metates. Thus, from the representation corresponding to the attunement 
to mano and metate frequency arose another representation, namely the 
representation of “marginal” standard of living at the communities (i.e. an 
emic cognitive ranking of the communities relative to each other).
As a discipline, archaeology has much to gain from a model of cogni­
tion in which supra-individual cognition plays a role, especially since much
386
of the archaeological record can be viewed as a record of supra-individual 
or external indices to which individuals were attuned. As such, archaeol­
ogy cannot afford not to be actively involved in researching and testing the 
model presented here. Archaeology can contribute to the model presented 
here by locating evidence which can help us gain insight into past peoples’ 
perceptions. For example, in the case of the Bladen sites, archaeologists need 
to intensify excavations around the areas within the sites where iconography 
or textual information is more likely to be recovered reflecting the ancient 
Bladen inhabitants’ perceptions of how the Bladen communities might have 
been ranked relative to each other (e.g. the stela plazas). Textual and mono­
graphic evidence can help to inform a general model of cognition which can 
then be extended and applied to different archaeological contexts.
Concluding Statem ent: The Future for Cogni­
tive Archaeology
The picture painted by this thesis is a world that is conceivably full of dy­
namical systems which may operate in many different aspects of social life. 
Each dynamical system can be seen to operate at a different scale. There 
are dynamical systems that involve the neurons of the brain; others operate 
between a person and an object; still others subsume larger social units such 
as communities. These dynamical systems (which of course must be assessed 
as such), if shown to constitute cognitive systems, can be conceived of as the 
bases of cognition. Cognitive systems are dynamical systems that generate 
representations and store these representations for the individual. All indi­
viduals can be conceived of as being tied to them irrevocably and they not 
only provide individuals with what they know but define who they are.
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Reconstructing cognitive systems is important for archaeology because 
cognitive systems can be conceived of as bridges to understanding past peo­
ples’ mind frames, and mathematical description — being invariant through 
time and space — can be seen as a vehicle for crossing these bridges. The 
living human substrate which is required of a psychological approach is ab­
sent in archaeology. The cognitive approach which has been advocated in 
this thesis, however, permits cognition to be studied in just such a context 
as archaeology, in which the living human substrate is missing.
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Glossary: Some Definitions 
Used in the Thesis
A ttunem ent Perception, awareness, experience. To be attuned to some­
thing is to perceive something, to be aware of something, to experience 
something.
C ognition Cognition in anthropology has been defined in a number of re­
lated ways. Atran’s (1990:3) use of cognition reflects the “... internal 
structure of ideas by which the world is conceptualized.” D’Andrade’s 
(1995:1) perspective is related but broader; he defines cognitive anthro­
pology as “the study of the relation between human society and human 
thought.” Moreover, D’Andrade (1995:1) states that the cognitive an­
thropological agenda is is closely linked to that of psychology. With 
regard to the term cognition, I will provide more than one definition 
relevant to my thesis, all of which are related:
1. Cognition refers to “the underlying mechanisms, states, and pro­
cesses” responsible for one’s actions and behavior (van Gelder and 
Port 1995:1). I would also add to this definition that one’s actions 
and behavior commonly constitute these underlying mechanisms, 
states, and processes, and one’s actions and behavior therefore
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become integral in the emergence of cognition (see Thelen [1995] 
and Turvey and Carello [1995] for examples of this compelling 
reversal).
2. In more abstract terms, ” cognition is the behavior of an appropri­
ate kind of dynamical system” (van Gelder and Port 1995:10,11).
3. Because dynamical systems process information (Wellstead 1979), 
the above definition is consistent with the generally held con­
ception among cognitive scientists that cognition is a system for 
processing information (Bourne et al 1986:2). Defined as such, 
memory can be seen to play a significant role in cognition mainly 
because it is integral for information processing.
4. Cognition also includes the so-called ’’higher mental processes” 
that are characteristic of human-grade cognition, like perception, 
language, decision-making, and distributed executive control. These 
cognitive capabilities, like the formation of memory, can be con­
ceived of as the capabilities of certain kinds of dynamical sys­
tems (see Turvey and Carello [1995], Elman [1995], Townsend and 
Busemeyer [1995], and Reisberg [1997] and Donald [2002], respec­
tively).
Although one can consider dynamical systems to be responsible for 
all of the cognitive capabilities that define what it is to have human- 
grade cognition, I will mainly concentrate on the information processing 
capability of dynamical systems, the distributed executive control of 
certain dynamical systems, and the perceptual capability of certain 
dynamical systems (see Chapter 7). There is considerable evidence 
to suggest that dynamical systems can potentially account for most
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if not all cognitive capabilities, as there is plenty of research which 
suggests it (see Turvey and Carello [1995], Elman [1995], Townsend 
and Busemeyer [1995], and Reisberg [1997] and Donald [2002], as well 
as my arguments in Section 3.5). However, this study focuses on the 
three above mentioned cognitive capabilities, expounds on them, and in 
so doing provides an initial framework for a more comprehensive model 
of cognition that allows these cognitive capabilities to be conceived of 
as operating in a supra-individual realm as well as in an embodied 
realm.
Dynamical System  A system that changes through time (Hirsch 1984:3). 
Although in general many phenomena or processes can be conceived 
of as constituting dynamical systems in a loose sense, in order for a 
particular phenomenon or process to be identified as a dynamical sys­
tem, the process or phenomenon in question must be formally modeled 
and analyzed (i.e. assessed) before it can be considered to constitute a 
credible dynamical system.
Environment Environment is a relative term I use to reflect the context in 
which an object is situated. For example, if the object of discussion 
is the individual, then the environment consists of the natural and 
social phenomena occurring outside of the individual. If the object 
of discussion is a neuron, then the environment comprises its linkages 
with other neurons in the nervous system.
Individual A body and a brain (i.e. a nervous system).
Information A pattern existent in the environment. Later in the thesis, 
“information” will specifically refer to a pattern in the values of the
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states of a dynamical system. This pattern can be the value of a dy­
namical system’s state with respect to time (i.e. a trajectory of the 
dynamical system), or for dynamical systems with multiple states, the 
pattern can be the values of a dynamical system’s states with respect 
to each other.
Inform ation Processing  The processes of storing information into mem­
ory and retrieving information from memory.
M em ory Storage space which, though theoretically can manifest itself any­
where, is commonly regarded to be a brain function and therefore asso­
ciated with the nervous system of the individual. Memory is essential 
for information processing and cognition cannot arise without memory.
R epresentations or beliefs Information that is meaningful to the brain 
though not necessarily generated by the brain. Thus, representations 
are essentially signs that have both a physical and objective component 
to them as well as phenomenological component to them (i.e. they are 
objects in the mind). However, unlike the conventional conception of 
signs which are taken to be arbitrary symbols that simply instantiate, 
representations are taken here to be situated in time and space and 
therefore develop through a process or, more specifically, through a 
dynamical system.
System  A system is an interrelated “network of attributes or entities form­
ing a complex whole” (Clarke 1978:43). The notion of a network de­
scribed as a “whole” would imply that a system is bounded (van Gelder 
and Port 1995:5). Systems are mathematically describable.
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Appendix A: Rock Descriptions 
in the Bladen Region
The following appendix contains rock descriptions of the source rock that
was collected along the Bladen Branch from west to east.
Muklebal Valley:
M BT-2 Hydrothermal quartz on limestone.
M BT-3 Pinkish limestone conglomerate with lots of large white clasts.
M BT-6 White limestone. Extremely fine grained with little transparent 
crystals.
M BT-7 Pinkish coarse grained limestone with reworked fine grained lime­
stone clasts.
M BT-12 Coarse grained pinkish-white limestone.
Ek Xux Valley:
EX-1 Volcanic rock with light grey matrix embedded with grey crystals and 
pyrite crystals. Heavily silicified.
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EX-2 Volcanic rock. Holocrystaline quartz-syenite with pink/grey matrix 
and embedded with well defined pink feldspar and dark grey chunks. 
Heavily silicified.
EX-3 Volcanic rock. Holocrystaline quartz-syenite with green/grey matrix 
and embedded with pink feldspar and dark grey sulfides. Heavily sili­
cified.
EX-4 Volcanic rock. Dark grey matrix with small-medium white phenocrysts. 
Moderate to heavy silicification.
EX -5 Volcanic rock with light grey matrix and purple tinge embedded with 
many small white crystals. Heavily silicified.
EX-6 Volcanic rock. Light pinkish-grey matrix with dark brown chunks and 
pink K-feldspar phenocrysts. Light to moderate silicification. Layered 
texture apparent.
EX -7 Volcanic rock with grey matrix and embedded with well defined pink 
feldspar and dark grey chunks. Heavily silicified.
EX-8 Volcanic rock. Light grey matrix with pink K-feldspar phenocrysts. 
Heavily silicified.
EX-9 Volcanic rock with green/grey matrix and embedded with pink feldspar 
and dark grey chunks. Heavily silicified.
EX -10 Volcanic rock. Pinkish-brown matrix embedded with pink feldspar 
and dark grey chunks. Heavily silicified.
EX -11 Volcanic rock with light grey matrix and purple tinge embedded with 
many small white quartz and feldspar crystals. Heavily silicified.
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EX-12 Volcanic rock. Light green in color with mixed sized black sulfides, 
white quartz, and small pink K-feldspar phenocrysts. Some hemotite 
seepage apparent. Heavily silicified.
EX -13 Volcanic rock with dark grey matrix embedded with medium sized 
quartz and K-feldspar phenocrysts. Heavily silicified.
EX -14 Volcanic rock with green/grey matrix and embedded with pink feldspar 
and dark grey chunks. Heavily silicified.
EX -15 Volcanic/ hypabyssal rock with light grey matrix and purple tinge 
embedded with many small euhedral white quartz and K-feldspar crys­
tals. Heavily silicified.
EX -16 Mylonitized volcanic rock with pinkish-grey matrix embedded with 
small-medium sized pink phenocrysts and black crystals. Heavily sili­
cified with flow texture.
EX -17 Volcanic rock with K-feldspar and quartz in a red-black matrix. 
Moderately silicified. Layered texture is evident.
EX -18 Volcanic rock with pinkish-light grey matrix embedded with not eas­
ily defined white, black, and pink phenocrysts. Moderately silicified.
EX -19 Volcanic rock. Silicified welded tuff with grey matrix and puple 
tinge embedded with small white quartz, K-feldspar crystals. Heavily 
silicified.
EX -20 Volcanic rock. Dark grey matrix with large pink phenocrysts. Mod­
erate silicification.
EX-21 Volcanic rock with light grey matrix embedded with grey crystals 
and pink feldspar crystals. Heavily silicified.
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Cuyam el Valley:
C -l Volcanic rock. Welded tuff. Purple banded dense grey matrix with 
feldspar phenocrysts. Contains quartz vein.
C-2 Volcanic rock. Grey matrix with lots of small-medium sized white and 
pink phenocrysts. Heavily silicified.
C-3 Volcanic rock. Welded tuff. Dense green/grey matrix with almost no 
phenocrysts.
C-4 Volcanic rock. Grey matrix with feldspar phenocrysts. Heavily silicified.
C-5 Volcanic rock. Dark greeen/grey matrix with a few lighter phenocrysts. 
Heavily silicified.
C-6 Volcanic rock. Volcanic ash. Dark grey matrix with medium-large pink 
feldspar phenocrysts. Heavily silicified.
C-7 Volcanic rock. Grey matrix with medium-large pink feldspar phenocrysts. 
Heavily silicified. Has a foliation and phyllitic sheen.
C-9 Volcanic rock. Welded tuff. Dense brownish-grey matrix with layers of 
different shades of black-red.
C-10 Volcanic rock. Welded tuff. Dense grey matrix with almost no phe­
nocrysts.
C - l l  Volcanic rock. Dark grey matrix with pink and white phenocrysts. 
Heavily silicified.
C-12 Volcanic rock. Sheared silicified grey matrix with brown phenocrysts. 
Heavily silicified.
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Ramos Quebrada:
RHF-A Volcaniclastic rock. Fine grained rock that is grey in color but with 
iron oxide staining.
RHF-B Volcaniclastic rock. Medium grained rock that is grey with quartz 
crystals. Stained by iron oxide.
RHF-C Volcaniclastic rock. White and red in color with bands.
RHF-D Volcaniclastic rock. Grey small-medium grained.
RHF-E Siltstone. Light grey to black banding.
RQ-1 Coarse grained volcaniclastic rock. Small-medium grained. Contains 
quartz and hematite.
RQ-2 Volcanic rock. Grey matrix with white phenocrysts. Layers evident. 
Moderately silicified.
RQ-3 Volcanic rock. Grey matrix with white-pink phenocrysts and tiny 
black chunks. Heavily silicified.
RQ-4 Volcanic rock. Light grey matrix with white-pink phenocrysts that 
are not well defined. Heavily silicified.
RQ-5 Volcaniclastic rock. Fine grained rock that is grey in color but with 
iron oxide staining.
RQ-6 Black mudstone with medium sized pyrite crystals.
RQ-7 Coarse grained volcaniclastic rock. Contains large grains of quartz 
and black sulfides.
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RQ-8 Volcanic/hypabyssal rock. Grey with pink K-feldspar phenocrysts. 
Bands present. Heavily silicified.
RQ-9 Volcanic rock. Grey matrix with white-pink phenocrysts that are not 
well defined. Heavily silicified.
RQ-10 Volcanic rock. Dark grey matrix with medium-large pink K-feldspar 
phenocrysts. Embedded with small dark glass fragments. Feldspar 
starting to weather.
RQ-11 Volcanic rock. Greenish-grey matrix with medium-large K-feldspar 
and some pyrite. Moderately silicified.
RQ-12 Volcanic rock. Light pink and grey matrix with white phenocrysts. 
Weakly silicified.
RQ-13 Volcanic rock. Greenish-grey matrix with K-feldspar and some pyrite. 
Heavily silicified.
RQ-14 Volcaniclastic rock. Fine grained rock that is light grey in color but 
with limonitic staining.
RQ-15 Volcanic rock. Dark grey matrix with small white phenocrysts. Lay­
ered texture evident. Heavily silicified.
RQ-16 Volcanic rock. Light grey matrix with tiny pyrite crystals and black 
impurities.
RQ-17 Volcanic rock. Light pink and green matrix. Small transparent 
phenocrysts. Heavily silicified.
RQ-18 Volcanic rock. Welded tuff with dark grey and black-red bands. 
Contains small white phenocrysts.
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RQ-19 Volcanic rock. Silicified volcanic ash. Red matrix with small white 
phenocrysts and black sulfides. Heavily silicified.
Teakettle Cam p:
TK-1 Volcanic rock. Pink and beige matrix with pink phenocrysts and some 
quartz crystals. Red in color. Moderately silicified.
TK-2 Volcanic rock. Holocrystaline quartz-syenite with green/grey matrix 
and embedded with white phenocrysts. Heavily silicified.
TK -3 Volcanic rock. Purple matrix with pink phenocrysts and small quartz 
crystals. Heavily silicified.
TK -4 Volcanic rock. Pinkish-grey matrix with white phenocrysts and some 
pyrite.
TK-5 Volcaniclastic rock. Medium grained rock that is grey in color but 
with iron oxide staining.
TK-6 Volcanic rock. Pinkish-grey matrix with white phenocrysts and some 
pyrite.
TK -7 Volcaniclastic rock. Medium grained rock that is grey in color but 
with black sulfides.
Q uebrada de Oro:
QDO-A Volcanic rock. Grey matrix with white phenocrysts. Heavily sili­
cified.
QDO-B Volcaniclastic rock. Fine grained rock that is grey in color but with 
iron oxide staining.
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QDO-C Volcaniclastic rock. Quartz rich conglomerate.
QDO-D Volcanic rock. Pink and beige matrix with pink phenocrysts and 
some quartz crystals. Red in color. Moderately silicified.
QDO-E Black mudstone.
QDO-1 Volcaniclastic rock. Quartz rich conglomerate. Very large grain 
size.
QDO-2 Volcanic rock. Dark grey matrix with some small white phenocrysts. 
Heavily silicified.
QDO-5 Volcaniclastic rock. Fine grained rock that is grey in color but with 
iron oxide staining.
QDO-7 Red iron ore deposit.
QDO-9 Volcaniclastic rock. Fine-medium grained. Grey in color.
QDO-IO Volcanic rock. Heavily weathered leaving vesicles where phenocrysts 
used to be. Grey in color.
R ichardson C reek Valley:
RC-3 Volcanic rock. Light green matrix with white medium sized phe- 
nocrystsof quartz and feldspar. Heavily silicified.
RC-4 Volcanic rock. Light green matrix with white small phenocrysts of 
quartz and feldspar. Heavily silicified.
400
Forest Hill Camp
FH-1 Volcanic rock. Green matrix with large pink phenocrysts and dark 
green phenocrysts. Weakly silicified.
FH-2 Volcanic rock. Whiteish-cream colored matrix with black impurities. 
Heavily silicified.
FH-3 Volcanic rock. Light grey matrix with small black sulfides and quartz 
crystals. Iron oxide staining is present. Weakly silicified.
FH-4 Volcanic rock. Pale green matrix with medium sized white phe­
nocrysts.
FH-5 Volcanic rock. Welded tuff that has red, white, and black bands with 
small black sulfides. Moderately silicified.
FH-6 Volcanic rock. Grey matrix with large white phenocrysts. Moderately 
silicified.
FH-7 Volcanic rock. Welded tuff that has black and purple bands with tiny 
white phenocrysts. Heavily silicified.
FH-8 Volcanic rock. Grey matrix with tiny black and white crystals and 
pyrite crystals. Contains light grey bands. Heavily silicified.
FH-9 Volcanic rock. Grey matrix with medium sized black crystals and 
pyrite crystals. Heavily silicified.
FH-10 Volcanic rock. Grey matrix with tiny black crystals and pyrite crys­
tals. Heavily silicified.
FH-11 Volcanic rock. Heavily weathered. Dark grey with white phenocrysts, 
many of which have turned red due to weathering.
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FH-12 Volcanic rock. Pale green matrix with tiny white and black phe- 
nocrysts.
FH-13 Volcanic rock. Beige matrix with black and brown broad bands. 
Highly silicified.
FH-14 Volcanic rock. Grey matrix with small white and pink phenocrysts. 
Moderately silicified.
FH-15 Volcanic rock. Grey matrix with tiny black and white crystals and 
pyrite crystals. Heavily silicified.
FH-16 Volcanic rock. Grey matrix with tiny black and white crystals and 
pyrite crystals. Moderately silicified.
FH-17 Volcanic rock. Grey matrix with tiny black crystals and pyrite crys­
tals. Heavily silicified.
FH-18 Vocaniclastic rock. Fine-medium grained conglomerate. Grey in 
color.
FH-19 Volcanic rock. Dark green matrix with large pink phenocrysts and 
dark green phenocrysts. Weakly silicified.
FH-20 Volcanic rock. Grey matrix with small white phenocrysts. Moder­
ately silicified.
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Appendix B: Photographs of 
Rock/Artifact Comparisons
The following appendix contains photographic examples of the hand sample 
comparison that was conducted.
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F igure 24: S iltston e source rock w ith artifact.
4 0 4
F igu re 25: Volcanic source rock w ith artifact.
4 0 5
F igu re 26: H ypabyssal source rock w ith  artifact.
4 0 6
F igu re  27: V olcaniclastic source rock w ith  artifact.
4 0 7
Appendix C: Petrographic 
Analysis of Bladen Artifacts
The following appendix contains charts displaying the results of hand-sample 
and thin-section petrography with associated confidence levels. The confi­
dence scheme was based on a ranking system from 0 to 10. In this system:
• 10 indicated that a perfect match for the artifact was found in the 
source rock collection for a specific valley, with no close matches in the 
other valleys.
• 8 indicated that a perfect match for the artifact was found in the source 
rock collection for a specific valley.
• 6 indicated that a close match for the artifact was found in the source 
rock collection for a specific valley, with no other close matches in the 
other valleys.
• 4 indicated that a close match for the artifact was found in the source 
rock collection for a specific valley.
• 2 indicated that no close matches for an artifact in the source rock 
collection were found. However, according to the geology of the Bladen 
Branch, a specific source for the artifact could be inferred.
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• 0 indicated that no specific source for the artifact was known.
Note that the prefix QDO refers to mano and metate samples collected 
at the Quebrada de Oro Ruin, the prefix RHF refers to mano and metate 
samples collected at the RHF Site, the prefixes EK, EXRM , EXHM  refer to 
mano and metate samples collected at Ek Xux, and the prefixes MU and 
M BT  refer to mano and metate samples collected at Muklebal Tzul.
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A rtifac t Source M atch  (from  b e s t to  w orst) P ro v . C onf. D escrip tio n
QDO-1 R Q -1, Q D O -C Q D O 4 C o arse  g ra in ed  volcaniclastic  rock.
QD O -2 Q D O -5, Q D O -B , R Q -14 Q D O 8 F in e  g ra in ed  volcaniclastic  rock.
Q D O -3 Q D O -A , R Q -3 , C -6, E X -7 Q D O 8 V olcanic rock.
Q D O -4 T K -5 , RQ -1 (n o  good  ex am ples) Q D O 2 M edium  g ra in ed  vo lcaniclastic.
Q D O -5 R H F -D , Q D O -D , Q D O -5 Q D O 8 F in e-m ed iu m  g ra in ed  vo lcaniclastic 
rock.
Q D O -6 R Q -1, Q D O -C Q D O 8 C oarse  g ra in ed  vo lcan iclastic  rock.
QD O -6A R Q -1, Q D O -C Q D O 8 C o arse  g ra in ed  vo lcan iclastic  rock.
Q D O -8 RC -4, P E X P I-1 Q D O 2 W eakly  silicified volcanic rock.
Q D O -9 Q D O -E Q D O 8 B lack m u d sto n e .
QDO-IO EX -5, E X -19 E X 4 H ighly  silicified volcan ic  rock.
QDO-11 Q D O -5, Q D O -B , R Q -14 Q D O 8 F in e  g ra in ed  vo lcan iclastic  rock.
Q D O -11A Q D O -5, Q D O -B , R Q -14 Q D O 8 F in e  g ra in ed  vo lcan iclastic  rock.
Q D O -1‘2 N O N E Q D O 2 E x tre m e ly  fine g ra in ed  volcaniclastic  
rock. S im ila r to  Q D O -5  a n d  Q D O -B  
b u t  sm a lle r g ra in  size.
QDO-14 Q D O -5, Q D O -B , R Q -14 Q D O 4 F in e  g ra in ed  vo lcan ic lastic  rock. R ed 
in  color.
QDO-15 T K -5 , R Q -7, Q D O -C Q D O 2 M edium  g ra in ed  vo lcan ic lastic  rock.
Q D O -16 R C -4 Q D O 2 W eakly  silicified vo lcanic rock.
Q D O -17 Q D O -5, Q D O -B , R Q -14 Q D O 8 F in e  g ra in ed  vo lcan iclastic  rock  em bed­
d ed  w ith  chunks.
QD O -18 Q D O -C , RQ-1 Q D O 8 C o a rse  g ra in ed  vo lcan ic lastic  rock. R ed 
in color.
QD O -19 Q D O -5, Q D O -B , R Q -14 Q D O 8 F in e  g ra in ed  vo lcan ic lastic  rock.
QD O -20 Q D O -B , RQ-14 Q D O 4 F in e-m ed iu m  g ra in ed  vo lcaniclastic 
rock.
QDO-21 Q D O -B , R Q -14 Q D O 2 F in e  g ra in ed  vo lcan iclastic  rock em bed­
d ed  w ith  chunks.
Q D O -22 Q D O -B , R Q -14 Q D O 2 F in e-m e d iu m  g ra in ed  vo lcaniclastic 
rock em b ed d ed  w ith  chunks.
Q D O -23 Q D O -E Q D O 8 B lack m udstone .
Q D O -24 FH -1 F H 10 P a le  g reen  volcanic rock w ith  p ink  phe­
nocrysts .
QD O -25 Q D O -5, Q D O -B , R Q -14 Q D O 8 F in e  g ra in ed  volcaniclastic  rock.
Q D O -F Q D O -5, Q D O -B , R Q -14 Q D O 8 F in e  g ra in ed  vo lcaniclastic rock.
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A rtifac t Source M atch  (from  b e s t to  w orst) P ro v . Conf. D escrip tio n
RHF-1 R Q -14, R H F -A , Q D O -5 , Q D O -B R Q 8 F in e  g ra in ed  vo lcan iclastic  rock.
R H F-2 R Q -7, R Q -1, Q D O -C R Q 8 C o arse  g ra in ed  vo lcan iclastic  rock.
R H F-3 R Q -14, R H F -A , Q D O -5 , Q D O -B R Q 8 F in e  g ra in ed  vo lcan ic lastic  rock.
RH F-4 RQ -14, R H F -A , Q D O -5 , Q D O -B R Q 8 F in e  g ra in ed  vo lcan ic lastic  rock.
R H F-5 R Q -4, T K -7 R Q 6 V olcanic rock  w ith  sm all w hite  phe­
n ocrysts .
RH F-6 R H F -D /A R Q 2 M edium  g ra in ed  volcan iclastic  rock. 
R ed  in color.
R H F-7 RQ -14, R H F -A , Q D O -5 , Q D O -B R Q 8 F in e  g ra in ed  vo lcan ic lastic  rock.
R H F-8 R H F -D /A R Q 2 M edium -large  g ra in ed  vo lcaniclastic 
rock.
R H F-9 R H F-A R Q 10 F in e  g ra in ed  vo lcan ic lastic  rock.
R H F -10 R H F-B , RQ-1 R Q 8 M ed iu m -la rg e  g ra in ed  volcaniclastic  
rock.
R H F -11 RQ -7, R Q -1, Q D O -C R Q 8 C o a rse  g ra in ed  vo lcan ic lastic  rock. Red 
in color.
R H F -12 RQ -14, R H F -A , Q D O -5 , Q D O -B R Q 8 F in e  g ra in ed  vo lcan iclastic  rock. R ed 
in color.
R H F -13 R H F -D R Q 10 F in e-m ed iu m  g ra in ed  volcaniclastic  
rock. R ed  in  color.
R H F -14 RQ -14, R H F -A , Q D O -5 , Q D O -B R Q 8 F in e  g ra in ed  v o lcan ic las tic  rock.
R H F -15 R Q -1 /R H F -D R Q 8 M edium  g ra in ed  vo lcan iclastic  rock. 
R ed  in  color.
R H F -16 N O N E R Q 2 C oarse  g ra in ed  vo lcan ic lastic  rock.
R H F -17 R H F -D R Q 10 F in e-m ed iu m  g ra in ed  volcaniclastic  
rock. R ed  in  color.
R H F -18 R Q -l/R Q -7 , Q D O -C R Q 4 M edium  g ra in ed  vo lcan ic lastic  rock.
R H F -19 R H F -D R Q 10 F in e-m e d iu m  g ra in ed  vo lcaniclastic 
rock. R ed  in  color.
R H F-20 R H F-D R Q 6 M edium  g ra in ed  vo lcan iclastic  rock.
R H F -2 1 N O N E R Q 2 V olcanic rock.
R H F -22 R H F -B /D R Q 8 F in e-m ed iu m  g ra in ed  volcaniclastic 
rock.
R H F -23 R Q -7, R Q -1 , Q D O -C R Q 8 L arg e  g ra in ed  vo lcan iclastic  rock.
R H F-24 R H F -E R Q 6 M u d sto n e  o r s ilts tone .
R H F-25 N O N E N O N E 0 V esicular b asa lt.
R H F-26 R H F -A , R Q -5 R Q 10 F in e  g ra in ed  vo lcan iclastic  rock.
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A rtifac t Source M a tch  (from  
b es t to  w orst)
P ro v . Con. D escrip tio n
EK-1 R Q -7 /5 R Q /Q D O 2 M edium  g ra in ed  vo lcan ic lastic  rock.
EK -2 N O N E N O N E 0 V esicular B asa lt.
EK -3 Q D O -B , Q D O -5 R Q /Q D O 2 F in e  g ra in ed  vo lcan ic lastic  rock. R ed  in  color.
EK -4 R C -4 E X 2 W eakly  silicified vo lcanic rock  w ith  w h ite  phenocrysts .
EK -5 N O N E N O N E 0 F in e  g ra in ed  m e tam o rp h ic  rock.
EK -6 Q D O -B , Q D O -5 R Q /Q D O 2 F in e  g ra in ed  vo lcan ic lastic  rock. R ed  in  color.
EK -7 PH -18, R H F -B /R Q -1 R Q -F H 2 F in e-m e d iu m  g ra in ed  vo lcan iclastic  rock.
EK -8 FH -18, R H F -B /R Q -1 R Q -F H 2 F in e-m ed iu m  g ra in ed  vo lcan iclastic  rock.
EK -9 FH -18, R H F -B /R Q -1 R Q -F H 2 F in e-m e d iu m  g ra in ed  vo lcan iclastic  rock.
EK -10 FH -18, R H F -B /R Q -1 R Q -F H 2 F in e-m e d iu m  g ra in ed  vo lcan ic lastic  rock.
EK-11 Q D O -E M U K 2 B lack m u d sto n e .
EK -12 N O N E E X 2 W eakly  silicified volcan ic  rock w ith  m edium  sized d ark  
p h e n o c ry sts . B uff in color.
E K -13 R C -4 EX 2 W eakly  silicified volcanic rock w ith  w h ite  phenocrysts .
EK-14 N O N E E X 2 W eakly  silicified volcan ic rock w ith  m edium  sized d a rk  
p h e n o c ry sts . B uff in color.
E K -15 N O N E E X 2 W eakly  silicified volcan ic rock w ith  m edium  sized  d a rk  
p h e n o c ry sts . B uff in color.
EK -16 R H F -C R Q /Q D O 2 M ed iu m -la rg e  g ra in  vo lcan iclastic  rock. R ed  in color.
E K -17 R Q -12 R Q /Q D O 2 V olcanic rock . W elded  tuff.
EK -18 N O N E E X 2 Silicified vo lcan ic  rock. Buff in  color.
EK -19 Q D O -E M U K 2 B lack m u d sto n e .
EK-20 N O N E E X 2 V olcanic rock.
EK-21 R H F -D , Q D O -C R Q /Q D O 2 M edium  g ra in ed  vo lcan ic lastic  rock. R ed  in color.
EK-22 N O N E E X 2 V olcanic rock.
EK -23 EX -19, EX-11 EX 8 H igh ly  silicified volcan ic  rock w ith  sm all w h ite  p he­
no cry sts .
EK -24 Q D O -B , Q D O -5 R Q /Q D O 2 F in e  g ra in ed  vo lcan ic lastic  rock. R ed  in  color.
EK-25 E X -19, E X -11 E X 8 H igh ly  silicified volcan ic  rock w ith  sm all w h ite  phe­
n o cry sts .
EK -26 Q D O -B , Q D O -5 R Q /Q D O 2 F in e  g ra in ed  vo lcan ic lastic  rock. R ed  in  color.
E X R M -M 2 N O N E E X 2 V olcanic w elded tuff.
E X R M -M T2 N O N E R Q /Q D O 2 C o arse  g ra in ed  vo lcan iclastic  rock.
EX RM -M 1 N O N E R Q /Q D O 2 F in e  g ra in ed  vo lcan iclastic  rock.
EX R M -M T1 N O N E R Q /Q D O 2 M edium  g ra in ed  vo lcan iclastic  rock.
EX HM -M 1 N O N E R Q /Q D O 2 C oarse  g ra in ed  vo lcan iclastic  rock w ith  large q u a r tz  crys­
ta ls .
EX H M -M T1 N O N E E X 2 V olcanic w elded tuff.
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A rtifac t Source M atch  (from  
b es t to  w orst)
P ro v . Con, D escrip tio n
MU-1 N O N E N O N E 0 V esicular b asa lt.
MU-2 T K -5 , R H F -D R Q /Q D O 2 F in e-m e d iu m  g ra in ed  vo lcan iclastic  rock.
MU-3 Q D O -E M U K 2 B lack m u d sto n e .
MU-4 N O N E R Q /Q D O 2 V olcan iclast ic .
MU-5 T K -5 , R Q -5 R Q /Q D O 2 V ery fine g ra in ed  vo lcan ic lastic  rock.
MU-6 Q D O -E M U K 2 B lack m u d sto n e .
MU-7 R Q -7 R Q /Q D O 2 M edium  g ra in ed  v o lcan ic lastic  rock w ith  lo ts of q u a rtz .
MU-8 R H F -D , B, Q D O -C R Q /Q D O 2 M edium -coarse  g ra in ed  vo lcan iclastic  rock. R ed in  color.
MU-9 Q D O -E M U K 2 B lack m u d sto n e .
M U -10 T K -5 , R H F -D R Q /Q D O 2 F in e  -m ed iu m  g ra in ed  vo lcan ic lastic  rock. R ed  in color.
M U -11 T K -5 , R H F -D R Q /Q D O 2 F in e  -m ed iu m  g ra in ed  vo lcan ic lastic  rock. R ed  in color.
M U -12 R Q -5, R H F -A R Q /Q D O 2 F in e  g ra in ed  v o lcan ic las tic  rock  w ith  a  few sm all p y rite  
c ry s ta ls .
M U -13 RQ -5, R H F -A R Q /Q D O 2 F in e  g ra in ed  v o lcan ic las tic  rock w ith  a  few sm all p y rite  
c ry sta ls .
M U -14 N O N E N O N E 0 V esicular b asa lt.
M U -15 Q D O -E M U K 2 B lack m u d sto n e .
M U -16 T K -5 , R Q -5 R Q /Q D O 2 V ery fine g ra in e d  vo lcan ic lastic  rock.
MU-17 R H F -A , Q D O -B , 
Q D O -5
R Q /Q D O 2 F in e  g ra in e d  vo lcan ic lastic . R ed  in color.
M U -18 Q D O -5, Q D O -B , R H F -
A
R Q /Q D O 2 F in e  g ra in e d  vo lcan ic lastic . R ed  in  color.
M U -19 N O N E E X /C 2 V olcanic rock. W elded  tuff.
MU-20 Q D O -E M U K 2 B lack m u d sto n e .
MU-21 Q D O -5, Q D O -B R Q /Q D O 2 F in e  g ra in e d  vo lcan ic lastic  rock. R ed  in color.
MU-22 Q D O -5, Q D O -B R Q /Q D O 2 F in e  g ra in e d  vo lcan ic lastic  rock. R ed  in  color.
MU-23 R C -4, FH -4 EX 2 W eakly  silicified vo lcanic rock w ith  w h ite  p henocrysts .
MU-24 N O N E N O N E 0 V esicu lar b asa lt.
MU-25 Q D O -E M U K 2 B lack m u d sto n e .
MU-26 Q D O -E /R H F -E M U K 2 M u d sto n e  o r s ilts to n e .
MU-27 E X -6, C 1 /C 1 0 E X /C 2 V olcanic  rock. W elded  tuff. P in k  in  color.
MU-28 C 1 /C 1 0 E X /C 2 V olcanic rock. W elded  tuff. G rey  in color.
M BT-
5(M T-1)
T K -5 , R H F -A R Q /Q D O 2 F in e-m e d iu m  g ra in ed  volcan iclastic  rock.
M B T(M - Q D O -5 ,B , R Q -5 R Q /Q D O 2 F in e  g ra in e d  vo lcan ic lastic  rock. R ed  in  color.
M BT-
l l ( M - l )
N O N E R Q /Q D O 2 F in e  g ra in ed  vo lcaniclastic.
M BT-
9(M -2)
R Q -7, R Q -1 , Q D O -C R Q /Q D O 2 C oarse  g ra in ed  vo lcan iclastic  rock. R ed  in color.
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Appendix D: Geological 
Descriptions of Artifacts at 
Sites Linked to the Bladen Sites
The following appendix contains rock descriptions of the ground stone arti­
facts that were collected from the Department of Archaeology, Belize, which 
have links to the Bladen sites.
Altun Ha:
RP-715 Weathered pink granite.
RP-570 Granite.
35/196-1:363(RP-690) Vesicular basalt.
35/196-l:252(R P -68/88) Weathered pink granite.
RP-460 Hard limestone.
35/196-1:364 Vesicular basalt.
35/196-1:243(FS-15) Pink granite.
RP-103 Red granite.
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RP-472 Grey granite.
35/196-1:241 Weathered granite.
35/196-l:364(R P-703) Fine-grained Bladen volcaniclastic (RQ/QDO) 
35/196-l:241F(R P-43) Pink granite.
35/196-l:24 lD (R P -43) Bladen volcanic (EX).
RP-472B Pink granite.
RP-457 Granite.
RP-412(3) Vesicular basalt.
R P-472(9) Basalt (like BP-O).
35/196-l:241B (R P-43) Pink granite.
35/196-1:328(9) (RP-388) Pink limestone.
RP-91 Vesicular basalt.
35/196-1:304(RP-103) Metamorphic.
35/196-l:241G (R P-43) Vesicular basalt.
RP-415 Pink limestone.
RP-472(1) Badly weathered granite.
35/196-l:24 lC (R P -43) Bladen volcaniclastic (RQ/QDO). 
35/196-1:208 Pink granite.
35/196-l:239(R P -33) Vesicular basalt.
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35/196-1:241A Vesicular basalt.
35/196-l:241E (R P-43) Badly weathered limestone (chem.modified). 
RP-472 Vesicular basalt.
35/196-l:223(R P-12) Vesicular basalt.
35/196-l:249(R P-91) Fine-grained Bladen volcaniclastic (RQ/QDO). 
Baking Pot:
28/190-1:52J Pink granite.
28/190-1:52V Pink granite.
28/190-l:52T  Badly weathered fine-grained pink granite. 
28/190-l:52M  Badly weathered granite.
28/190-l:52F  Badly weathered pink granite.
28/190-1:52K Badly weathered pink granite.
28/190-1:52H Quartzite.
28/190-l:52L Badly weathered pink granite.
28/190-1:52E Badly weathered pink granite.
28/190-1:521 Pink quartzite.
28/190-l:52N  Badly weathered pink granite.
28/190-1:52W Grey granite.
28/190-l:52G  Bladen volcaniclastic (RQ/QDO).
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28/190-l:52U  Badly weathered Bladen Volcanic (EX). 
28/190-l:52B  Pink granite.
28/190-l:52A  Pink granite.
28/190-l:52C  Weathered granite.
28/190-l:52D  Bladen volcaniclastic (RQ/QDO). 
28/190-l:52Q  Pink granite.
28/190-1:520 Badly weathered Bladen volcanic (EX). 
28/190-1:52P Pink granite.
28/190-1:52S Pink granite.
28/190-l:52R  Badly weathered pink granite.
Caledonia:
28/186-2:38B Bladen volcaniclastic (RQ/QDO). 
28/186-2:38C Vesicular basalt.
28/186-2:38 Bladen volcanic (EX).
Xunantunich:
27/189-1:10 Quartzite.
27/189-1:13 Red granite.
27/189-1:151 Bladen volcaniclastic (RQ/QDO).
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27/189-1:131 Pink granite. 
27/189-1:273 Travertine.
27/189-1:11 Limestone.
27/189-1:135 Weathered pink granite. 
27/189-1:5 Limestone.
27/189-1:150 Karstic crust (limestone). 
27/189-1:137 Red granite. 
27/189-1:134 Pink granite.
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Appendix E: M athematical 
Analysis of Bladen Exchange 
System
The following appendix is a cursory analysis of Equations 6.7 - 6.9. The result 
of this analysis has yielded eight cases and has identified an equilibrium in 
each case. Only Equilibrium II affects my system, however. The equations 
were analyzed using Maple.
> # Before I begin this analysis there exists a global condition that
> holds for all equilibria that are analyzed below and that condition is
> that (xl,x2,x3)>=0. The reason for this condition is that xl, x2, and
> x3 denote frequencies of manos and metates which must be nonnegative.
> In addition to this global condition on the equilibria, there is a
> local condition that holds for each individual equilibrium.
>
> #--------------------------Equilibrium I-------------------------
> # Local Condition:
> # xl < theta
> # x2 < theta
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> # x3 < theta
> # Equations:
> # xi> = -A*xl+(kll+kli)*r*xl+kl2*r*x2+kl3*r*x3
> # x 2 ’ = -A*x2+k21*r*xl+(k22+k2i)*r*x2+k23*r*x3
> # x3’ = -A*x3+k32*r*x2+(k33+k3i)*r*x3
> #
> unassign( ’kll’, ’kl2,, ^ 13’, ’k21 ’, ^ 22’, ^ 23’, ’k31y, ’k32’, ’k33’,’kli’,’
> k2i\,k3i,,,A,,,x l \ ,x2’,,x3,,r);
> #Solving xl,=0,x2,=0,x3,=0
>
> simplify(solve({-A*xl+(kll+kli)*r*xl+kl2*r*x2+kl3*r*x3=0,-A*x2+k21*r*x
> 1+(k22+k2i) *r*x2+k23*r*x3=0, -A*x3+k32*r*x2+ (k33+k3i) *r*x3=0}, {xl, x2, x3
> » ) ;
{x2 =0, x3 = 0, xl = 0}
>
> # Equilibrium I always exists since the equilibrium (xl,x2,x3)=(0,0,0)
> and our condition for the equilibrium’s existence is
> (xl,x2,x3)<theta=2,
>
> #---------------------- Equilibrium II----------------------------
> # Local Condition:
> # xl >= theta
> # x2 >= theta
> # x3 >= theta
> # Equations:
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> # xl’ = -A*xl+(kll+kli)*r*theta+kl2*r*theta+kl3*r*theta
> # x2’ = -A*x2+k21*r*theta+(k22+k2i)*r*theta+k23*r*theta
> # x3’ = -A*x3+k32*r*theta+(k33+k3i)*r*theta
> #
> #Solving xl’=0,x2’=0,x3’=0
> unassign(’kll’,’kl2’,’kl3’,’k21’,’k22’,’k23’,’k31’,’k32’,’k33’,’kli’,’
> k2i’,’k3i’,’A’,’xl’,’x2’,’x3’,’r’,’theta’);
> simplify(solve({-A*xl+(kll+kli)*(r*theta)+kl2*(r*theta)+kl3*(r*theta)=
> 0,-A*x2+k21*(r*theta) + (k22+k2i) * (r*theta) +k23* (r*theta) =0, -A*x3+k32* (r
> *theta)+(k33+k3i)*(r*theta)=0},{xl,x2,x 3»);
r theta (kll + kli + kl2 + kl3)
{xl = ----------------------------- ,
A
r theta (k32 + k33 + k3i)
x3 = ----------------------- ,
A
r theta (k21 + k22 + k2i + k23)
x2 = ----------------------------- >
A
>
> kll:=7/116:
> kli:=3/116:
> kl2:=4/116:
421
> kl3:=18/116:
> k21:=2/116:
> k22:=12/116:
> k2i:=2/116:
> k23:=16/116:
> k31:=0/116:
> k32:=1/116:
> k33:=50/116:
> k3i:=1/116:
> A:=0.23:
> r:=1.5:
> theta:=2.0:
>
> # Solving for the equilibrium using the middle of the range r
> solve({x2 = r*theta*(k21+k22+k23+k2i)/A, xl =
> r*theta*(kll+kl2+kl3+kli)/A, x3 = r*theta*(k32+k33+k3i)/A}) ;
{xl = 3.598200900, x3 = 5.847076461, x2 = 3.598200900}
> unassign(’r ’);
> # Solving for the equilibrium for the entire range of r
> solve({x2 = r*theta*(k21+k22+k23+k2i)/A, xl =
> r*theta*(kll+kl2+kl3+kli)/A, x3 =
> r*theta*(k32+k33+k3i)/A},{xl,x2,x3});
{xl = 2.398800600 r, x3 = 3.898050974 r, x2 = 2.398800600 r}
422
> #
> #
> ###### Analysis for Existence:
> ###### in order for Equilibrium II to exist, xl, x2, and x3 must
> satisfy the local condition for this equilibrium so that:
> (3.898050974*r, 2.398800600*r, 2.398800600*r)>theta=2. Solving for r
> for xl and x2, and x3 we get:
> solve(2.398800600*r>=2);
RealRange(.8337499999, infinity)
> solve(3.898050974*r>=2);
RealRange(.5130769231, inf inity)
>
>
> ### The intersection of these sets, namely [.8337499999,infinity),
> then, is a sufficient condition for ensuring the existence of this
> equilibrium. Clearly, our range of [1,2] satisfies this condition so
> that we should expect this equilibrium.
>
>
> ##### Stability Analysis:
>
> unassign(’r’);
423
>> f: = (xl,x2,x3)->-A*xl+(kl1+kli)*(r*theta)+kl2*(r*theta)+kl3*(r*theta)
> g:=(xl,x2,x3)->-A*x2+k21*(r*theta)+(k22+k2i)*(r*theta)+k23*(r*theta)
> h :=(xl,x2,x3)->-A*x3+k32*(r*theta)+(k33+k3i)*(r*theta):
> pts:=solve({f(xl,x2,x3)=0,g(xl,x2,x3)=0,h(xl,x2,x3)=0>,{xl,x2,x 3 » ;
pts := {xl = 2.398800600 r, x3 = 3.898050974 r, x2 = 2.398800600 r>
> with(linalg):
> jac:=jacobian([f(xl,x2,x3),g(xl,x2,x3),h(xl,x2,x3)],[xl,x2,x3]);
[-.23 0 0 ]
[ ]
j a c : = [ 0  -.23 0 ]
[ ]
[0 0 -.23]
>
> eigenvals(subs(pts[1],eval(jac)));
-.2300000000, -.2300000000, -.2300000000
> # Since the eigenvalues are negative Equilibrium II is stable for all
> r.
>
>
> #------------------- Equilibrium III----------------------
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> #
> # xl >= theta
> # x2 >= theta
> # x3 < theta
> #
> # xl* = -A*xl+(kll+kli)*r*theta+kl2*r*theta+kl3*r*x3
> # x2’ = -A*x2+k21*r*theta+(k22+k2i)*r*theta+k23*r*x3
> # x3’ = -A*x3+k32*r*theta+(k33+k3i)*r*x3
> #
> #Solving xl’=0,x2’=0,x3’=0
> unassign(’kll', ’kl2’, ’kl3’,’k21’, ’k22’, ’k23’, ’k31’, ’k32’, ’k33’,’kli’,’
> k2i’,’k3i’,’A’,’xl’,’x2’,’x3’,’r’,’theta’);
> simplify(solve({-A*xl+(kll+kli)*(r*theta)+kl2*(r*theta)+kl3*r*x3=0,-A*
> x2+k21* (r*theta) + (k22+k2i) * (r*theta) +k23*r*x3=0, -A*x3+k32* (r*theta) + (k
> 33+k3i)*r*x3=0>,{xl,x2,x3}));
k32 r theta
{x3 =  -----------------, x2 = r theta (-k21 A + k21 r k33
-A + r k33 + r k3i
+ k21 r k3i - k22 A + r k22 k33 + r k22 k3i - k2i A
+ r k2i k33 + r k2i k3i - k23 r k32)/(A (-A + r k33 + r k3i)
), xl = r theta (-kll A + r kll k33 + r kll k3i - kli A
+ r kli k33 + r kli k3i - kl2 A + kl2 r k33 + kl2 r k3i
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- kl3 r k32)/(A (-A + r k33 + r k3i))>
> kll:=7/116:
> kli:=3/116:
> kl2:=4/116:
> kl3:=18/116:
> k21:=2/116:
> k22:=12/116:
> k2i:=2/116:
> k23:=16/116:
> k31:=0/116:
> k32:=1/116:
> k33:=50/116:
> k3i:=1/116:
> A:=0 .23:
> r :=1 .5:
> theta:=2:
>
> unassign(’r’) ;
> solve({x3 = -k32*r*theta/(-A+r*k33+r*k3i), x2 =
> r*theta*(-k21*A+k21*r*k33+k21*r*k3i-k22*A+r*k22*k33+r*k22*k3i-k2i*A+r*
> k2i*k33+r*k2i*k3i-k23*r*k32)/(A*(-A+r*k33+r*k3i)), xl =
> r*theta*(-kll*A+r*kll*k33+r*kll*k3i-kli*A+r*kli*k33+r*kli*k3i-kl2*A+kl
> 2*r*k33+kl2*r*k3i-kl3*r*k32)/(A*(-A+r*k33+r*k3i))>,{xl,x2,x3>) ;
10 11
426
-6 r (-.6708333331 10 + .1250000000 10 r)
{xl = .1043478261 10  ,
-667. + 1275. r
x2 =
13 13
-9 r (-.2668000000 10 + .5000000000 10 r)
.2998500750 10  ,
-667. + 1275. r
r
x3 = -50. -------------->
-667. + 1275. r
> ##
> #### Analysis for Existence:
>
> ## r satisfies local conditions when:
>
> solve(.1043478261e-6*r*(-6708333331. +.1250000000ell*r)/(-667.+1275.*r)
> >=2 ) ;
RealRange(.5182569724, 0pen(.5231372549)),
RealRange(1.973409694, in f  in i ty )
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> solve(. 2998500750e-9*r*(-. 2668000000el3+. 5000000000el3*r) /(-667. +1275.
> *r)>=2);
RealRange(.5185483756, Open(.5231372549)),
RealRange(1.715901624, infinity)
> solve(-50.*r/(-667.+1275.*r)<2);
RealRange(-infinity, Open(.5130769231)),
RealRange(Open(.5231372549), infinity)
>
>
> ## r satisfies global conditions when:
>
> solve (. 1043478261e-6*r*(-6708333331. +. 1250000000ell*r) / (-667. +1275. *r)
> >=0);
RealRange(0, Open(.5231372549)), RealRange(.5366666665, infinity)
> solve(.2998500750e-9*r*(-.2668000000el3+.5000000000el3*r)/(-667.+1275.
> *r)>=0);
RealRange(0, Open(.5231372549)), RealRange(.5336000000, in f in ity )
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> so lv e (-5 0 .* r / (-667.+1275.* r )>=0);
RealRange(0, Open(.5231372549))
> # The intersection of these sets is empty and hence we should not
> expect an Equilibrium III for any r.
>
>
>
> #----------------------- Equilibrium IV---------------------------
> #
> # xl >= theta
> # x2 < theta
> # x3 >= theta
> #
> # xl’ = -A*xl+(kll+kli)*r*theta+kl2*r*x2+kl3*r*theta
> # x2' = -A*x2+k21*r*theta+(k22+k2i)*r*x2+k23*r*theta
> # x3’ = -A*x3+k32*r*x2+(k33+k3i)*r*theta
> #
> #Solving xl,=0,x2,=0,x3,=0
> unassign( ’kll’, ^ 12’, ^ 13’, ’k21\ ^ 2 2’, >k23\ ’k31\ ^ 32’, ^ 33’, ’kli’,’
> k2i’,’k3i’,’A’,’xl’,’x2>,’x3’,’r’,’theta’);
> simplify(solve({-A*xl+(kll+kli)*(r*theta)+kl2*r*x2+kl3*(r*theta)=0,-A*
> x2+k21* (r*theta) + (k22+k2i) *r*x2+k23* (r*theta) =0, -A*x3+k32*r*x2+ (k33+k3
> i)*(r*theta)=0},{xl,x2,x3}));
r theta (k21 + k23)
429
{x2 =  ------------------, x3 = r theta (-k32 r k21 - k23 r k32
-A + r k22 + r k2i
- k33 A + r k22 k33 + r k2i k33 - k3i A + r k22 k3i
+ r k2i k3i)/(A (-A + r k22 + r k2i)), xl = r theta (-kll A
+ r kll k22 + r kll k2i - kli A + r kli k22 + r kli k2i
- kl2 r k21 - kl2 r k23 - kl3 A + kl3 r k22 + kl3 r k2i)/(
A (-A + r k22 + r k2i))>
>
> kll:=7/116:
> kli:=3/116:
> kl2:=4/116:
> kl3:=18/116:
> k21:=2/116:
> k22:=12/116:
> k2i:=2/116:
> k23:=16/116:
> k31:=0/116:
> k32:=1/116:
> k33:=50/116:
> k3i:=1/116:
> A:=0 .23:
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> r : = 1 . 5 :
> theta:=2:
>
> unassign(’r’);
> solve({xl =
> r*theta*(-kll*A+r*kll*k22+r*kll*k2i-kli*A+r*kli*k22+r*kli*k2i-kl2*r*k2
> l-kl2*r*k23-kl3*A+kl3*r*k22+kl3*r*k2i)/(A*(-A+r*k22+r*k2i)) , x3 =
> -r*theta*(r*k32*k21+k23*r*k32+A*k33-r*k22*k33-r*k2i*k33+A*k3i-r*k22*k3
> i-r*k2i*k3i)/(A*(-A+r*k22+r*k2i)), x2 =
> -r*theta*(k21+k23)/(-A+r*k22+r*k2i)},{xl,x2,x3>);
11 11 
-7 r (.1500000000 10 r - .2932500001 10 )
{x3 = .8695652174 10  ,
-667. + 350. r
x l =
13 13
-9 r (-.4668999999 10 + .2000000000 10 r)
.2998500750 10  ,
-667. + 350. r
r
x2 = -900. ------------- >
-667. + 3 5 0 . r
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>>
> #### Analysis for Existence:
>
> ## r satisfies local conditions when:
>
> solve (. 2998500750e-9*r* (-. 4668999999el3+. 2000000000el3*r) / (-667. +350. *
> r)>=2);
RealRange(.8337500001, 0pen(l.905714286)),
RealRange(2.667999999, infinity)
> solve(-900.*r/(-667.+350.*r)<2);
RealRange(-infinity, Open(.8337500000)),
RealRange(0pen(1.905714286), inf inity)
> solve(.8695652174e-7*r*(.1500000000ell*r-.2932500001ell)/(-667.+350.*r
> )>=2);
RealRange(.5182569721, 0pen(l.905714286)),
RealRange(1.973409695, in f in ity )
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>>
> ## r satisfies global condition when:
>
> solve(. 2998500750e-9*r*(-.4668999999el3+.2000000000el3*r) /(-667. +350. *
> r)>=0);
RealEange(0, 0pen(l.905714286)), RealRange(2.334500000, infinity)
> solve(-900.*r/(-667.+350.*r)>=0);
RealRange(0, 0pen(l.905714286))
> solve(. 8695652174e-7*r*(. 1500000000ell*r-. 2932500001ell)/(-667. +350. *r
> )>=0);
RealRange(0, Open(1.905714286)), RealRange(l.955000001, infinity)
> # The intersection of these sets is 0 and hence we should not expect
> an Equilibrium IV for any r.
>
>
>
>
> #----------------------- Equilibrium V-----------------------
> #
433
> # xl < theta
> # x2 >= theta
> # x3 >= theta
> #
> # xl’ = -A*xl+(kll+kli)*r*xl+kl2*r*theta+kl3*r*theta
> # x2’ = -A*x2+k21*r*xl+(k22+k2i)*r*theta+k23*r*theta
> # x3’ = -A*x3+k32*r*theta+(k33+k3i)*r*theta
> #
> #Solving xl,=0,x2,=0,x3,=0
> unassign(’kll’, ^ 12’, ^ 13', *Y2V , >ls22’, ’k23J, Jk31\ ’k32’, >k33’, 'kli*,’
> k2i’,’k3i’,’A’,’xl’,>x2’,’x3’,>r’ ,’theta’);
> simplify (solve ({-A*xl+(kll+kli)*r*xl+kl2*(r*theta)+kl3*(r*theta)=0,-A*
> x2+k21*r*xl+(k22+k2i) * (r*theta) +k23* (r*theta) =0, -A*x3+k32*(r*theta) + (k
> 33+k3i)*(r*theta)=0},{xl ,x2,x3») ;
r theta (kl2 + kl3)
{xl =  ------------------, x2 = - r theta (kl2 r k21 + k21 r kl3
-A + r kll + r kli
+ k22 A - r kll k22 - r kli k22 + k2i A - r kll k2i
- r kli k2i + k23 A - k23 r kll - k23 r kli)/(
r theta (k32 + k33 + k3i)
A (-A + r kll + r kli)), x3 = ----------------------- >
A
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>> kll:=7/116:
> kli:=3/116:
> kl2:=4/116:
> kl3:=18/116:
> k21:=2/116:
> k22:=12/116:
> k2i:=2/116:
> k23:=16/116:
> k31:=0/116:
> k32:=1/116:
> k33:=50/116:
> k3i:=1/116:
> A:=0 .23:
> r:=1.5:
> theta:=2:
>
> u n assig n (’r J) ;
> solve({x2 =
> r*theta*(-kl2*r*k21-r*k21*kl3-k22*A+r*kll*k22+r*kli*k22-k2i*A+r*kll*k2
> i+r*kli*k2i-k23*A+k23*r*kll+k23*r*kli)/(A*(-A+r*kll+r*kli)), xl =
> -r*theta*(kl2+kl3)/(-A+r*kll+r*kli), x3 =
> r*theta*(k32+k33+k3i)/A},{xl,x2,x3});
{x3 = 3.898050974 r ,  x l = -1100. ---------------------- , x2 =
435
-667. +250. r
12 13
-9 r (.8000000000 10 r - .2501250000 10 )
.5997001499 10  }
-667. +250. r
>
> #### Analysis for Existence:
>
> ## r satisfies local conditions when:
>
> solve(-1100.*r/(-667.+250.*r)<2);
RealRange(-infinity, 0pen(.8337500000)),
RealRange(Open(2.668000000), inf inity)
> solve (. 5997001499e-9*r* ( . 8000000000el2*r-. 2501250000el3) / (-667. +250. *r
> )>=2 ) ;
RealRange(.8337500000, 0pen(2.668000000) ) ,
RealRange(3.335000000, infinity)
> solve(3.898050974*r>=2);
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RealRange(.5130769231, infinity)
>
>
> ## r satisfies global condition when:
>
> solve(-1100.*r/(-667.+250.*r)>=0);
RealRange(0, Open(2.668000000))
> solve (. 5997001499e-9*r* (. 8000000000el2*r-. 2501250000el3) / (-667. +250. *r
> )>=0 ) ;
RealRange(0, Open(2.668000000)), RealRange(3.126562500, infinity)
> solve(3.898050974*r>=0);
RealRange(0, inf inity)
> # The intersection of these sets is [.5130769231,.8337500000) and
> hence only expect an Equilibrium V in this range for r.
>
>
>
>
> #---------------------- Equilibrium VI-----------------------
> #
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> # xl >= theta
> # x2 < theta
> # x3 < theta
> #
> # xl' = -A*xl+(kll+kli)*r*theta+kl2*r*x2+kl3*r*x3
> # x2’ = -A*x2+k21*r*theta+(k22+k2i)*r*x2+k23*r*x3
> # x3’ = -A*x3+k32*r*x2+(k33+k3i)*r*x3
> #
> #Solving xl,=0,x2,=0,x3,=0
> unassign( 'kll’, ’kl2’, ’kl3’, ’k21’, ’k22’, ’k23’, ’k31’, ’k32’, ’k33’, 'kli’,’
> k2i’,’k3i’,’A’,’xl’,’x2’,’x3’,’r’,’theta’);
> simplify (solve ({-A*xl+(kll+kli)*(r*theta)+kl2*r*x2+kl3*r*x3=0,-A*x2+k2
> 1* (r*theta) + (k22+k2i) *r*x2+k23*r*x3=0, -A*x3+k32*r*x2+ (k33+k3i)*r*x3=0>
> ,{xl,x2,x3») ;
k21 r theta (-A + r k33 + r k3i) 2
{x2 xl = - r theta (-kll A
2
+ kll A r k33 + kll A r k3i + kll A r k22 - kll k22 r k33
2 2
- kll k22 r k3i + kll A r k2i - kll k2i r k33
2 2 2
- kll k2i r k3i + kll k23 r k32 - kli A + kli A r k33
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2+ kli A r k3i + kli A r k22 - kli k22 r k33
2 2
- kli k22 r k3i + kli A r k2i - kli k2i r k33
2 2
- kli k2i r k3i + kli k23 r k32 - kl2 k21 r A
2 2 2
+ kl2 k21 r k33 + kl2 k21 r k3i - kl3 k21 r k32)/(%l A),
2
k21 r theta k32
x3 _ -------------- }
7.1
2 2 2 
7,1 := A - A r k33 - A r k3i - A r k22 + k22 r k33 + k22 r k3i
2 2 2
- A r k2i + k2i r k33 + k2i r k3i - k23 r k32
>
>
> k ll:= 7 /1 1 6 :
439
> kli:=3/116:
> kl2:=4/116:
> kl3:=18/116:
> k21:=2/116:
> k22:=12/116:
> k2i:=2/116:
> k23:=16/116:
> k31:=0/116:
> k32:=1/116:
> k33:=50/116:
> k3i:=1/116:
> A:=0.23:
> r := 1 .5:
> theta:=2.0:
> unassign(*r’);
> solve({x3 =
> k21*r''2*theta*k32/(A''2-A*r*k33-A*r*k3i-A*r*k22+k22*r~2*k33+k22*r~2*k3i
> -A*r*k2i+k2i*r~2*k33+k2i*r~2*k3i-k23*r~2*k32) , x2 =
> -k21*r*theta* (-A+r*k33+r*k3i) / (A~2-A*r*k33-A*r*k3i-A*r*k22+k22*r~2*k33
> +k22*r'‘2*k3i-A*r*k2i+k2i*r~2*k33+k2i*r''2*k3i-k23*r''2*k32), xl =
> r*theta*(kll*A''2-kll*A*r*k33-kll*A*r*k3i-kll*A*r*k22+kll*k22*r~2*k33+k
> H*k22*r~2*k3i-kll*A*r*k2i+kll*k2i*r~2*k33+kll*k2i*r~2*k3i-kll*k23*r~2
> *k32+kli*A~2-kli*A*r*k33-kli*A*r*k3i-kli*A*r*k22+kli*k22*r~2*k33+kli*k
> 22*r~2*k3i-kli*A*r*k2i+kli*k2i*r~2*k33+kli*k2i*r~2*k3i-kli*k23*r~2*k32
> +kl2*r*k21*A-kl2*r''2*k21*k33-kl2*r~2*k21*k3i+k21*r''2*k32*kl3)/((A''2-A*
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> r*k33-A*r*k3i-A*r*k22+k22*r~2*k33+k22*r~2*k3i-A*r*k2i+k2i*r~2*k33+k2i*
> r~2*k3i-k23*r~2*k32)*A)},{xl,x2,x3}) ;
7 r (-667. + 1275. r)
{x2 = -.6250000000 10  , xl = .0001874062969 r
% 1
15 15 15 2
(.1112222500 10 - .2676337500 10 r + .1032500000 10 r )
2
9 r
/C/.1), x3 = .1562500000 10  >
°/.l
11 11 11 2
•/.l := .2780556250 10 - .6774218753 10 r + .2726562500 10 r
>
>
> #### Analysis for Existence:
>
> ## r satisfies local conditions when:
>
> solve(.1874062969e-3*r*(.1112222500el5-.2676337500el5*r+.1032500000el5
> *r~2)/(.2780556250ell-.6774218753ell*r+.2726562500ell*r~2)>=2);
441
RealRange(.5185342339, Open(.5187886538)),
RealRange(1.782730341, Open(1.965738568)),
RealRange(3.109025982, inf inity)
> solve(-6250000.*r*(-667.+1275.*r)/(.2780556250ell-.6774218753ell*r+.27
> 26562500ell*r',2)<2) ;
RealRange(-infinity, Open(.5185483752)),
RealRange(Open(.5187886538), Open(l.715901626)),
RealRange(Open(1.965738568), infinity)
> solve(156250000.*r~2/(.2780556250ell-.6774218753ell*r+.2726562500ell*r
> “2X2);
RealRange(-infinity, Open(.5182569719)),
RealRange(Open(.5187886538), Open(l.965738568)),
RealRange(Open(1.973409696), infinity)
>
>
> ## r satisfies global condition when:
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>> solve(. 1874062969e-3*r*(. 1112222500el5-.2676337500el5*r+. 1032500000el5
> *r~2)/(.2780556250ell-.6774218753ell*r+.2726562500ell*r~2)>=0) ;
RealRange(0, Open(.5187886538)),
RealRange(.5198221774, Open(l.965738568)),
RealRange(2.072272254, infinity)
> solve (-6250000. *r* (-667. +1275. *r) / (. 2780556250el 1-. 6774218753ell*r+. 27
> 26562500ell*r~2)>=0);
RealRange(0, Open(.5187886538)),
RealRange(.5231372549, Open(1.965738568))
> solve(156250000.*r~2/(.2780556250ell-. 6774218753ell*r+.2726562500ell*r
> ~2)>=0);
RealRange(-infinity, Open(.5187886538)),
RealRange(Open(1.965738568), inf inity)
> # The intersection of these sets is empty and hence Equilibrium V does
> not exist for any r.
>
443
>>
> #------------------------ Equilibrium VII-------------------------
> #
> # xl < theta
> # x2 < theta
> # x3 >= theta
> #
> # xl’ = -A*xl+(kll+kli)*r*xl+kl2*r*x2+kl3*r*theta
> # x2’ = -A*x2+k21*r*xl+(k22+k2i)*r*x2+k23*r*theta
> # x3’ = -A*x3+k32*r*x2+(k33+k3i)*r*theta
> #
> #Solving xl,=0,x2,=0,x3,=0
> unassign('kll’, ’kl2’, ’kl3’, ’k21’ , ’k22’ , ’k23’, ’k31’, ’k32’, ’k33’, ’kli’, ’
> k2i’,’k3i’,’A’,’xl’, ’x2’,’x3’,’r’ ,’theta’);
> simplify(solve({-A*xl+(kll+kli)*r*xl+kl2*r*x2+kl3*(r*theta)=0,-A*x2+k2
> I*r*xl+(k22+k2i)*r*x2+k23* (r*theta)=0, -A*x3+k32*r*x2+(k33+k3i)* (r*thet
> a)=0>,{xl,x2,x3») ;
r theta (A k23 - r kll k23 - r kli k23 + kl3 r k21)
{x2  --------------------------------------------------
%1
r theta (-A kl3 + r k22 kl3 + r k2i kl3 - k23 kl2 r)
xl  ------------------------------------------------- , x3
"/.I
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2 :
= r theta (-k32 r A k23 + k32 r kll k23 + k32 r
2 2 
- k32 r kl3 k21 - k33 A + k33 A r k22 + k33 A i
2 2
+ k33 r kll A - k33 r kll k22 - k33 r kll k2i
2 2
+ k33 r kli A - k33 r kli k22 - k33 r kli k2i
2 2 
+ k33 kl2 r k21 - k3i A + k3i A r k22 + k3i A ]
2 2
+ k3i r kll A - k3i r kll k22 - k3i r kll k2i
2 2
+ k3i r kli A - k3i r kli k22 - k3i r kli k2i
2
+ k3i kl2 r k21)/(#/.l A)>
2 2
7.1 := -A + A r k22 + A r k2i + r kll A - r kll k22 - ]
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kli k23 
k2i
k2i
2
kll k2i
2 2 2 
+ r kli A - r kli k22 - r kli k2i + kl2 r k21
>
> kll:=7/116:
> kli:=3/116:
> kl2:=4/116:
> kl3:=18/116:
> k21:=2/116:
> k22:=12/116:
> k2i:=2/116:
> k23:=16/116:
> k31:=0/116:
> k32:=1/116:
> k33:=50/116:
> k3i:=1/116:
> A:=0.23:
> r:=1.5:
> theta:=2:
>
> unassignC’r’);
> solve({x2 =
> -r*theta*(-k23*A+k23*r*kll+k23*r*kli-r*k21*kl3)/(A~2-A*r*k22-A*r*k2i-r
> *kll*A+r''2*kll*k22+r''2*kll*k2i-r*kli*A+r~2*kli*k22+r~2*kli*k2i-kl2*r~2
> *k21), xl =
> r*theta* (A*kl3-r*k22*kl3-r*k2i*kl3+k23*kl2*r) /(A~2-A*r*k22-A*r*k2i-r*k
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m{(!% )/
( OT 09Zfr££3Z99* + * OT 0000093£0T' + ^ OT 0000989£09*- 
frT Z frl frT
) ■* 09Z0098663 *
T7.
= gx ‘------------------------------------------------------------------ -z - = Tx
(•* OT 0000009ZTT * + OT 000009T008’- )  •*
8T 8T
T7.
‘------------------------------------------------------------------------  Z- = 3X}
(i OT 00000009ZZ" + OT 0000008993*-) •*
3T £T
i ({ex‘sx‘xx>‘{(v*(T33l*3.^3T^-T32l*TT3l < 
* Z ~ * + Z Z ? [* T l'S [* Z ~ x + V * T l'* [* J -T Z i[* ll 'S [* Z ~ x+ Z Z * * ll'% * Z ~ z+ V * ll'sl* J- T Z i l* * * V - Z Z i[ * z  < 
*V-3~V))/(T£W 3**3^*3T^-T£^*3~J*T3^*TT^+I£^*3_-Z*332I*TT3[+I£3I*-Z*V*IT3I- <
£ v;:*i33i*T T ^+e£2t*3~-z*332t*T T 3[+ee2l*-i*V *T T 2[-I33t*-z*V *££3l-3 3 3 I* ^ * V * £ £ > [-3 -V * £ £  <
*+ £ T * * 3 C T * 3 ~ J * T 3 * + 3 C T * 3 _ J * £ C T * T T * - 3 £ * * 3 _ J * £ 3 S * m -V * £ 3 3[*-I * 3 £ aO * 1B;l-0 t[ l * J  <
= £x ‘ (T3 <
^ * 3 ^ * 3 T ^ - T 3 ^ * I P [ * 3 ~ J +33^*TT3I*3_-:t+ V *IT 3l*-Z-T33I*TT3I*3~-I + 3 3 3I*TT3I*3~-I +V*TT <
13 13 12 2
7.1 := .4448890000 10 - .4001999999 10 r  + .8250000000 10 r
>
>
> #### Analysis for Existence:
>
> ## r satisfies local conditions when:
>
> solve(-2. *r*(-. 3001500000el3+. 1175000000el3*r)/ (. 4448890000el3-.400199
> 9999el3*r+.8250000000el2*r~2)<2);
RealRange(-infinity, 0pen(.8337500002)),
RealRange(0pen(1.725286130), 0pen(2.667999999)) ,
RealRange(Open(3.125622960), inf inity)
> solve(-2.*r*(-.2668000000el3+.7750000000el2*r)/(.4448890000el3-.400199
> 9999el3*r+.8250000000el2*r~2)<2);
RealRange(-infinity, 0pen(.8337500002)),
RealRange(0pen(1.725286130), 0pen(3.125622960)),
RealRange(Open(3.334999999), in f in i ty )
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> solve (. 2998500750*r* (-. 5035850000e 14*r+. 1032500000e 14*r~2+. 5672334750e
> 14)/(.4448890000e13-.4001999999el3*r+.8250000000el2*r~2)>=2);
RealRange(.5185342345, Open(l.725286130)),
RealRange(1.782730337, 3.109025986),
RealRange(0pen(3.125622960), inf inity)
>
>
> ## r satisfies global condition when:
>
> solve(-2.*r*(-.3001500000el3+.1175000000el3*r)/(.4448890000el3-.400199
> 9999el3*r+.8250000000el2*r~2)>=0);
RealRange(0, 0pen(l.725286130)),
RealRange(2.554468085, Open(3.125622960))
> solve(-2.*r*(-.2668000000el3+.7750000000el2*r)/(.4448890000el3-.400199
> 9999el3*r+.8250000000el2*r~2)>=0);
RealRange(0, 0pen(l.725286130)),
RealRange(0pen(3.125622960), 3.442580645)
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> solve(.2998500750*r*(-.5035850000el4*r+.1032500000el4*r~2+.5672334750e
> 14)/(.4448890000e13-.4001999999el3*r+.8250000000el2*r~2)>=0);
RealRange(0, Open(l.725286130)),
RealRange(1.765380600, 3.111955962),
RealRange(Open(3.125622960), infinity)
> # The intersection of these sets is [. 5185342345, .8337500002) and
> hence Equilibrium VII does exist when r is in this range.
>
> #-------------------- Equilibrium VIII--------------------------
> #
> # xl < theta
> # x2 >= theta
> # x3 < theta
> #
> # xl’ = -A*xl+(kll+kli)*r*xl+kl2*r*theta+kl3*r*x3
> # x2’ = -A*x2+k21*r*xl+(k22+k2i)*r*theta+k23*r*x3
> # x3’ = -A*x3+k32*r*theta+(k33+k3i)*r*x3
> #
> #Solving xl’=0,x2,=0,x3,=0
> unassign(’kll’,’kl2’,^13’,’k21’,^22’,’k23’,’k31’,>k32J,>k33’,’kli’,»
> k2i’,*k3i’,*A’,’xl*,*x2 *,’x3’,’r’,*theta’);
> simplify(solve({-A*xl+(kll+kli)*r*xl+kl2*(r*theta)+kl3*r*x3=0,-A*x2+k2
> l*r*xl+(k22+k2i)*(r*theta)+k23*r*x3=0,-A*x3+k32*(r*theta)+(k33+k3i)*r*
450
> x3=0},{xl ,x2,x3»);
{x2 = - r theta (r A k22 k33 + r A k2i k33 + r A k2i k3i
+ r A k2i kli + r A k22 k3i - r A k23 k32 + r A k22 kll
2 2 2
- r k2i kli k33 - r k22 kll k33 - r k2i kll k33
2 2 2
+ r k21 kl2 k33 - r k22 kli k33 + r k23 k32 kll
2
- r k2i kll k3i + r A k22 kli - r A k21 kl2 + r A k2i kll
2 2 2
- r k22 kll k3i + r k23 k32 kli + r k21 kl2 k3i
2 2 2 2
- r k2i kli k3i - r k21 kl3 k32 - r k22 kli k3i - A k2i
2 /  2
- A k22) / (A (A - A r k33 - A r k3i - r kll A
/
2 2 2 
+ r kll k33 + r kll k3i - r kli A + r kli k33
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2+ r kli k3i)), xl = -
r theta (-kl2 A + kl2 r k33 + kl2 r k3i - kl3
2
- A r k33 - A r k3i - r k l l A  + r kll k33 +
2 2
- r kli A + r kli k33 + r kli k3i),
k32 r theta
x3 =  ---------------- >
-A + r k33 + r k3i
>
>
> kll:=7/116:
> kli:=3/116:
> kl2:=4/116:
> kl3:=18/116:
> k21:=2/116:
> k22:=12/116:
> k2i:=2/116:
> k23:=16/116:
2
k32)/(A
2
kll k3i
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> k31:=0/116:
> k32:=1/116:
> k33:=50/116:
> k3i:=1/116:
> A:= 0 .23:
> r:=1.5:
> theta:=2:
> unassign(’r ’);
> solve({x2 =
> r*theta*(k32*r*k23*A-k33*A*r*k22-k33*A*r*k2i-k3i*A*r*k22-k3i*A*r*k2i+k
> Ii*k2i*r~2*k33+kli*k2i*r~2*k3i-kli*k23*r''2*k32-kl2*r''2*k21*k33-kl2*r''2
> *k21*k3i+kl2*r*k21*A-kli*A*r*k22+kli*k22*r~2*k33+kli*k22*r~2*k3i-kli*A
> *r*k2i+kl I*k22*r~2*k3i-kll*A*r*k2i+klI*k2i*r~2*k33+kl l*k2i*r~2*k3i-kl 1
> *k23*r~2*k32-kll*A*r*k22+kll*k22*r~2*k33+k21*r~2*k32*kl3+A''2*k22+A~2*k
> 2i)/(A*(A~2-A*r*k33-A*r*k3i-r*kll*A+r~2*kll*k33+r''2*kll*k3i-r*kli*A+r~
> 2*kli*k33+r~2*kli*k3i)), xl =
> -r*theta* (-kl2*A+kl2*r*k33+kl2*r*k3i-kl3*r*k32) / (A~2-A*r*k33-A*r*k3i-r
> *kll*A+r~2*kll*k33+r~2*kll*k3i-r*kli*A+r''2*kli*k33+r~2*kli*k3i) , x3 =
> -k32*r*theta/(-A+r*k33+r*k3i)},{xl,x2,x3»;
r
{x3 = -50. -------------- , x2 = .001499250375 r (
-667. + 1275. r
15 15 15 2
-.3460062499 10 r + .1557111500 10 + .1032500000 10 r )
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/
/  (
/
12 12 12 2
.2224445000 10 -  .5085874997 10 r  + .1593750000 10 r  ) ,
x l = -.03000000000
13 13
r  (-.2223333333 10 + .3875000000 10 r)
 >
12 12 12 2
.2224445000 10 - .5085874997 10 r  + .1593750000 10 r
>
>
> #### Analysis fo r  E xistence:
>
> ## r  s a t i s f i e s  lo c a l cond itions when:
>
> so lv e ( - . 3000000000e-1* r* ( - . 2223333333el3+. 3875000000el3*r)/(.222444500
> 0 e l2 - .5085874997el2*r+. 1593750000el2*r~2)<2);
R ea lR an g e(-in fin ity , 0pen(.5182569728)),
454
RealRange(Open(.5231372554), Open(l.973409692)),
RealRange(0pen(2.667999998), infinity)
> solve(. 1499250375e-2*r*(-. 3460062499el5*r+. 1032500000el5*r~2+. 15571115
> 00el5)/(. 2224445000el2-. 5085874997el2*r+. 1593750000el2*r~2)>=2);
RealRange(.5185342350, 0pen(.5231372554)),
RealRange(1.782730335, Open(2.667999998)),
RealRange(3.109025986, inf inity)
> solve(-50.*r/(-667.+1275.*r)<2);
RealRange(-infinity, Open(.5130769231)) ,
RealRange(Open(.5231372549), inf inity)
>
>
> ## r satisfies global condition when:
>
> solve(-.3000000000e-l*r*(-.2223333333el3+.3875000000el3*r)/(.222444500
> 0el2-. 5085874997el2*r+. 1593750000el2*r~2) >=0) ;
RealRange(0, Open(.5231372554)),
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RealRange(. 5737634408, Open(2.667999998) )
> solve(.1499250375e-2*r*(-. 3460062499el5*r+.1032500000el5*r~2+.15571115
> 00el5)/(.2224445000el2-.5085874997el2*r+. 1593750000el2*r~2)>=0) ;
RealRange(0, Open(.5231372554)),
RealRange(.5356393264, Open(2.667999998)),
RealRange(2.815510794, infinity)
> solve(-50.*r/(-667.+1275.*r)>=0);
RealRange(0, Open(.5231372549))
> # The intersection of these sets is empty and hence Equilibrium VIII
> does not exist for any r.
>
>
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Appendix F: A M athematical 
Demonstration of the Bladen  
Exchange System Processing  
Information
The purpose of this appendix is to demonstrate how the Bladen exchange 
system can be conceived of as processing information, specifically storing 
information.
The premise behind this analysis is that dynamical systems have the 
capacity to store information and that effort and/or flow stores for this in­
formation (or energy) can be identified in all dynamical systems. In what 
follows, I will identify what can be considered to be flow and effort stores for 
the Bladen exchange system, and then I will demonstrate that information 
can be conceived of as being stored in this economic system.
Identification of the Information Flow and Effort Stores in the 
Bladen Exchange System
Effort and flow stores can be found in all dynamical systems. This phe­
nomenon is mostly studied by those who work with mechanical systems such
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as engineers (see Wellstead 1979). In theory, though the notion of effort and 
flow stores extends to all dynamical systems in general and I will identify 
next what can be seen to be effort and flow stores within the Bladen ex­
change system. By “stores”, I mean mechanisms within the system which 
can actually be seen as storing information.
1. A mechanism which exhibits flow storage characteristics within the 
Bladen exchange system is the change in the number of ground stone 
implements per household in community, Cj, per unit time. This flow 
storage mechanism has an associated flow variable which describes it 
defined by
2. A mechanism which exhibits effort storage characteristics within the 
Bladen exchange system is a given community C f  s contribution in 
exporting ground stone to a peer community C*. This effort storage 
mechanism has an associated effort variable which describes it defined 
by kijf ( x j ).
Accepted among scientists and engineers (Wellstead 1979), there exist 
two kinds of effort variables and two kinds of flow variables. There exists 
an effort variable (e) and an effort accumulation variable (ea). Likewise, 
there exists a flow variable ( /)  and a flow accumulation variable ( /a). The 
accumulation variables are essentially the effort and flow variables integrated 
and they represent the actual information be stored, not just the amount of 
information being stored, which I will discuss shortly. These variables are 
associated with each community, C j, and a peer community, Cj, and they 
can be mathematically described in the following way:
e =  ki j f (xj), ea = ea(t0) +  ktj f (xj )dt
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where it can be recalled from Section 6.2.4 that:
, rQ if Xa >
f ( x j)
rx if Xj <
Computing the Quantity of Information and Kind of Information 
Being Stored W ithin the Bladen Exchange System
Now that the effort and flow variables along with their associated accumu­
lation variables have been identified in the model of the Bladen exchange 
system, we can proceed to demonstrate that these variables and the mecha­
nisms within the system that they represent are storing information.
The amount of information stored by the mechanisms of the Bladen ex­
change system, represented by the variables that were just described, can be 
denoted by 2 ^ and can be computed in the following manner:
f t  rt dx . rxj{t)
'I'ij I o f  dt kij I f  (Xj) dt kij I f  (xj) dxj
Jto Jto dt  Jxj(to)
fX j 1 ( rrO dxj V = ki:j |  - x 2 Xj(to) +  rOxjk^ ^ I rXj dxj +  I Q i \ a { 
’X j ( t o )
X j { t )
6
= kij { ~  7^ ( t 0) +  [rOxj(t)  -  rO2] } =  k{j [02 -  x 2{t0)\ + rQ [xj{t) -  0]}
What this calculation shows is that when the Bladen exchange system is 
conceived of as a dynamical system, there is a finite amount of information
being stored in certain mechanisms within the Bladen exchange system. A
ing stored increases as the exchange system evolves, that is, as Xj(t)  (i.e. the 
amount of manos and metates per household in given community) increases.
Whereas this computation shows us how much information is being stored, 
it also tells us something about what kind of information is being stored. As 
was discussed in Section 7.1, it was pointed out that the actual information 
being stored in any dynamical system constitutes the dynamical system’s 
states. This is consistent with what was just stated above, that it is the ac­
cumulation variables that store the actual information. Looking back at the 
flow accumulation variable we clearly see that it is indeed the states of the 
dynamical system represented by the variable Xj(t) that constitute the actual 
information being stored within the Bladen exchange system (i.e. f a = Xj). 
The actual information being stored is important to identify since it is the 
actual information to which individuals involved in the exchange system are 
likely to have been attuned. By attuning to this information the individual 
(i.e. in this case an inhabitant of one of the Bladen communities) was allow­
ing himself or herself to internalize this information, thereby permitting the 
individual to retrieve representations from the social system.
What was calculated above was the amount of information stored in the 
mechanism involving a community with respect to only one of its peers, but 
the total amount of stored information for the community with respect to all 
of its peers in the system can be calculated by:
brief examination of the solution tells us that this amount of information be-
m
i —1
for a particular community, Cj.  Moreover, the quantity:
460
J ++ -  ^ Z x +j
.7=1
denotes the total amount of information stored within the entire exchange 
system.
This all suggests that main information storage mechanism can be seen to 
be the community and its involvement in exporting ground stone to a peer 
community. Since there are three peers involved in the Bladen exchange 
system (i.e. m — 3), all three communities with their associated export 
linkages with their peers are accumulating information such that the entire 
Bladen exchange system can be seen to be one great information processor, 
where the information consists of the state values of the system.
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